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Abstract 
The thesis examines Serbian conspiracy culture at the time of the Nato bombing of 
Yugoslavia in the spring of 1999. During the war, conspiratorial themes became a regular 
occurrence in Serbian mainstream media, as well as in pronouncements by the Serbian 
political establishment. For the most part, conspiratorial explanations focused on the 
machinations of transnational elite organisations such as the Bilderberg group or, more 
generally, on the conspiracy of 'the West'. However, conspiratorial accounts of the war 
occasionally invoked themes which were previously deemed to be beyond the boundaries of 
acceptable opinion, such as the allusion to a Jewish conspiracy or to the esoteric and occult 
aspects of the alleged plot. 
The thesis outlines the history of conspiracy theories in Serbia and critically reviews 
psychological approaches to understanding the nature of conspiracy theories. It suggests that 
the study of conspiratorial discourse requires the exploration of the rhetorical and 
argumentative structure of specific conspiratorial explanations, while paying special attention 
to the historical and ideological context within which these explanations are situated. 
The thesis is largely based upon the examination of the coverage of the war in the Serbian 
press. Recorded conversations with two well known Serbian conspiracy theorists are also 
analysed. The study suggest that conspiratorial interpretations of the war drew upon a 
longstanding conspiracy tradition of explanation which has a strong antisemitic legacy and is 
rooted in right-wing Christian ideology. Analytic chapters explore the discursive and 
ideological dynamics by which the antisemitic and mystical aspects of the conspiracy 
tradition emerged briefly in Serbian mainstream media and political discourse. The thesis 
concludes by examining the status of conspiracy theories in Serbia in the aftennath of the 
political changes in October 2000. 
Key Words: conspiracy theory, Serbia, Yugoslavia, antisemitism, Serbian Orthodox Church, 
Nikolaj Velimirovic, 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
The thesis exammes Serbian conspiracy culture at the time of the Nato bombing of 
Yugoslavia. During my first post-bombing visit to Belgrade, in the summer of 1999, I was 
struck by the readiness of people I spoke to -my friends, their parents, librarians, taxi-drivers 
or shopkeepers- to invoke the idea of conspiracy when trying to explain the causes of the war 
with Nato. Even those who had in the past mocked conspiracy theories propagated by the 
Milosevic regime, no longer appeared inclined to do so. To be fair, not everyone I spoke to 
endorsed the wilder reaches of conspiracy theory. In many cases my collocutors merely 
acknowledged that the idea of a world plot no longer seemed fanciful and therefore could not 
be dismissed outright as being beyond the bounds of acceptable opinion. 
The visible change in the popular perception of the mechanics of world politics was also 
visible in the kind of conspiracy theories which citizens of Serbia appeared ready to accept. 
As the thesis will show, around the time of the Nato bombing, a number of conspiratorial 
themes which used to be confined to the margins - such as the notions of a Jewish conspiracy 
or the idea of parapsychological mass manipulation - became invoked, spoken about and 
elaborated as fairly unproblernatic, even in the mainstream media. 
The present thesis can be seen as an attempt to understand the dynamic behind the broadening 
of the boundaries of acceptable opinion in Serbian society, the dynamic that turned 
antisemitic or paranormal conspiratorial explanations into acceptable interpretations of the 
conflict with Nato. What follows is a brief summary of the forthcoming chapters. 
Chapter 2 introduces the notion of conspiracy theory as an ideological tradition. Here it will 
be suggested that conspiracy theory constitutes a loose pattern of ideas, arguments, beliefs 
and rhetorical devices, all of which are used to support the idea of a sinister conspiracy, the 
aim of which is world domination. The chapter begins by outlining the history of the 
conspiracy tradition, from the time of the French Revolution to the present day. Historical 
analysis is followed by an outline of the basic characteristics of the conspiratorial explanatory 
framework or 'style'. Also, a taxonomy of conspiracy theories is provided. The proposed 
distinction - which is elaborated in the empirical chapters - is that between classical, world 
elite and protoconspiracy theories. Finally, Chapter 2 contrasts the view of conspiracy theory 
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as a tradition of explanation with alternative and broader conceptualisations of the tenn, 
which can be found in American literature in cultural studies. 
Chapter 3 examines the history and idiosyncrasies of the Serbian conspiracy culture. It traces 
the roots of Serbian conspiracism to the late 19th Century, and examines in greater detail the 
1930s populist movement which played a crucial role in the shaping of contemporary Serbian 
conspiracy theory. The links between the conspiracy tradition and Slavophile anti-Westernism 
are also examined. This chapter introduces into the thesis the figure of Bishop Nikolaj 
Velimirovic, the high priest of Serbian conspiracism, whose right-wing antisemitic religious 
ideology resonates in much of the recent conspiratorial writing in Serbia. 
Chapter 4 provides a critical review of existing socio-psychological explanations of 
conspiratorial beliefs. It examines the cognitive and motivational factors, identified m 
psychological literature, which are thought to underpin the belief conspiracy theory. The 
chapter also considers the contribution of research on the psychology of rumour and 
paranormal beliefs to the understanding of conspiracy theory. Critical examination of 
psychological approaches to conspiracy theory is used to argue that the study of conspiratorial 
discourse requires the exploration of the rhetorical and argumentative structure of specific 
conspiratorial explanations, while paying special attention to the historical and ideological 
context within which these explanations are situated. Finally, the chapter reflects on the 
question of method and argues that 'traditional scholarship' is more suitable for the study of 
ideological aspects of conspiracism than any specific and well-defined qualitative or 
quantitative methodology. 
Chapter 5 lists the data and materials used in the empirical chapters and provides brief 
descriptions of specific publications looked at in the study. Biographical details of the 
principal exponents of Serbian conspiracy culture, whose work is examined in the thesis, are 
also provided. 
Chapter 6 examines the notion of protoconspiracy theory which was the most 'reasonable' 
and the most widespread type of conspiratorial discourse in the Serbian media at the time of 
the Nato bombing. Using the example of the Belgrade daily Politika, the chapter examines 
various ways in which protoconspiracy theory differs from other forms of conspiratorial 
discourse and argues that, in spite of the important differences and its apparent 
'reasonableness', this type of explanation often draws on the arguments and rhetorical devices 
originating from the conspiracy tradition. This chapter also suggests that, although 
protoconspiracy theory had been one of the principal features of Serbian government rhetoric 
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. ever since the early 1990s, with the breakdown of alternative explanations which occurred at 
the time of the Nato bombing, protoconspiracy theory was elevated almost to the status of 
common sense in Serbian media and political discourse. 
Chapter 7 examines the emergence of antisemitic conspiratorial themes in the mainstream 
daily Politika. It explores the way in which the propagation of ostensibly more reasonable and 
innocuous versions of conspiracy theory, such as world elite conspiracy theories, brings into 
the open the darker side of conspiratorial ideological tradition. Using the example of a 
number of articles from Politika and the book The Trilateral by Smilja Avramov, this chapter 
suggests that, in formulating their version of conspiracy theory, writers on the conspiratorial 
machinations of the world elite regularly draw on the longstanding ideological tradition of 
conspiracy theory. In doing so they often inadvertently promote the more contentious themes 
of that tradition, thereby contributing to its legitimisation. 
Chapter 8 looks at the relationship between paranormal explanations and conspiracy theories. 
Using the example of the alleged activities of Group 69, a team of enthusiasts for the 
paranormal with tentative links with the Yugoslav military, this chapter suggests that, in 
Serbia, paranormal and conspiratorial explanatory frameworks were often integrated into a 
single explanation. The examination of the way in which the activities and the philosophy of 
Group 69 were treated by the military establishment in the mid-1990s will be used to suggest 
that, at that time, paranormal explanations and conspiracy theories did not occupy the same 
status in relation to the prevailing standards of reasonableness. Paranormal explanations were 
regarded as being beyond the pale, while conspiracy theory was already an established aspect 
of military discourse. 
Chapter 9 picks up this point and examines the way in which the discrepancy between 
conspiracy theories and paranormal explanations, in terms of public perception and status, 
diminished in subsequent years. It suggests that by the late 1990s, the kind of mystical 
theorising which military authorities once deemed to be beyond the bounds of respectability, 
gradually became regarded as a valid explanatory discourse. Drawing on the work on social 
representations by Serge Moscovici, the chapter explores in more detail the discursive and 
rhetorical processes which facilitated the legitimisation of pseudo-scientific and mystical 
explanations in the late 1990s. Specifically, the analysis will focus on the way in which the 
term 'neocortical war' - originally used in US literature on information warfare - made its 
way, or became anchored, into Serbian conspiratorial culture, and how the adoption of this 
term by conspiracy theorists, such Colonel Svetozar Radisic, contributed to the legitimisation 
of paranormal aspects of conspiratorial explanations. 
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Chapter I 0 examines the fate of Serbian conspiracy culture in the aftermath of the fall of the 
Milosevic regime in October 2000. It revisits the major themes examined in the earlier 
chapters and explores them in the light of the recent political changes in Serbia. The chapter 
argues that after the events of October 2000, conspiracy theories (and theorists) by and large 
returned to the margins of politics. An important exception is the Yugoslav army, whose 
publications continue to promote conspiracy theories. This chapter will also suggest that in 
spite of a general marginalisation of conspiracy culture, conspiracism continues to play a role 
in Serbian politics, albeit a more limited one, and persists as an enduring feature of 
conservative political ideology. 
It should be noted at this point that the present thesis does not provide an analysis of every 
aspect of contemporary Serbian conspiracy culture. In fact, some significant aspects of 
Serbian conspiracism are not addressed in the forthcoming chapters. The ideology of the 
Radical Party ofVojislav Seselj, a right-wing political organisation which openly propagated 
conspiracy theories throughout the 1990s is not examined. Similarly, the thesis does not 
explore, in any detail, conspiracy theories propagated by Orthodox Christian publications, and 
right-wing elements within the Serbian Orthodox Church. These aspects of Serbian 
conspiracy culture were neglected on this occasion because they, by-and-large, relate to 
places where conspiracy theories can be expected to be found. Most modern societies, even 
developed Western democracies, have, in their midst right-wing political parties that promote 
conspiracy theories, or Christian Right movements which justify their clericalist political 
ideology through the notion of a world plot. The focus of the present thesis is to examine how 
this cultural tradition, which habitually occupies a marginal position in modern societies, 
suddenly became regarded as an acceptable and tolerable interpretation of world politics by 
state institutions which are not traditionally associated with the wilder reaches of conspiracy 
culture (such as the Army) and more importantly by the mainstream media in Serbia. 
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Chapter2 
Conspiracy theory as an ideological tradition: history and taxonomy 
' ... that everything in the French revolution, even the most dreadful of crimes, was foreseen, contemplated, 
contrived, resolved upon, decreed; that everything was the consequence of the most profound villainy, and 
was prepared and produced by those men wbo alone held the leading threads of conspiracies long before 
woven in the secret societies, and who knew how to choose and to hasten the favourable moments for their 
schemes. 
Auguste de Barruel, Memoirs pour servir a l'histoire du Jacobinisme, 
Vol. I, p. ix-x, Hamburg, 1803 
'This movement among the JEWS is not new. From the days ofSpartacus-Weishaupt to those ofKarl Marx, 
and down to Trotsky (Russia), Bela Kun (Hungary), Rosa Luxembourg (Germany), and Emma Goldman 
(United States), TillS WORLD-WIDE CONSPIRACY FOR THE OVERTHROW OF CMLIZATION AND FOR THE 
RECONSTITIJTION OF SOCIETY ON THE BASIS OF ARRESTED DEVELOPMENT, OF ENVIOUS MALEVOLENCE, AND 
IMPOSSIBLE EQUALITY, HAS BEEN STEADILY GROWING.' 
Winston Churchill in nlustrated Sunday Herald, 8th February, 1920. 
'How can we account for our present situation unless we believe that men high in this government are 
concerting to deliver us to disaster? This must be the product of a great conspiracy, a conspiracy on a scale 
so immense as to dwarf any previous such venture in the history of man. A conspiracy of infamy so black 
that, when it is finally exposed, its principles shall be forever deserving of the maledictions of all honest 
men.' 
Senator Joseph McCarthy, addressing the United States Congress, 14 June, 1951 
Cited in Hofstadter, 1966; p.7 
'The creators of the New World Order leave nothing to chance. The great religious and esoteric war over 
spheres of interest and power which has been fought for years, is simply the final crusade which brings us 
into the era of New Age, into the 'new kingdom of humanism without God ... A great majority of visible 
world politicians, such as Tony Blair, Robin Cook, Madeline Albrigbt, even Bill Clinton are just proteges, 
toys. Behind the idea of the New World Order lies capital, which, it is thought, is in the hands of the most 
powerful world bankers, who spread their tentacles, power and influence via a hierarchical web of public 
and secret organisations' 
Gordana Knezevic, Invisible clique rules the planet, Politika, 4 June 1999, p.15. 
The above passages were written at different times over the past 200 years. They reflect the 
beliefs of three men and a woman of dissimilar social, cultural and political backgrounds who 
were or are citizens of four different countries. The quoted observations have been made in 
response to diverse social events, ranging from the French Revolution to the bombing of 
Yugoslavia in 1999. And yet, in spite of these and other differences, the remarks of a French 
Jesuit priest, a British Conservative politician, an American Republican Senator and a young 
Serbian journalist share important similarities. First and foremost, all four assume the 
existence of a conspiracy. They reflect the view that social and historical events occur as a 
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consequence of a carefully worked out plan, plotted in secret by a small group of powerful 
individuals. They endorse what Popper (1966) referred to as the 'conspiracy theory of 
society', the view that 'explanation of a social phenomenon consists of a discovery of the men 
[sic] or groups who are interested in the occurrence of this phenomenon (sometimes it is a 
hidden interest which first has to be revealed) and who have planned and conspired to bring it 
about' (p.95). Although the passages invoke different conspiratorial bodies - the llluminati, 
Jews, Communists or international capitalists - 'the same fundamental claim appears beneath 
the variants - that there is an occult force operating behind the seemingly real, outward forms 
of political life' (Roberts, 1974; p.29-30). 
The causal attribution illustrated by the opening paragraphs, which is characteristic of 
conspiratorial accounts generally, might suggest that conspiracy theory represents an extreme 
form of personal explanation. As a subsequent chapter will show, there have been attempts in 
social psychology to explain belief in conspiracies in terms of the theory of attributions (e.g. 
K.ruglanski, 1987; Zukier, 1987). However, literature on conspiracy theories repeatedly 
proposes that there is more to conspiratorial explanations than the supposition that causes of 
events in the world can be attributed to someone's volition and design. Tales of conspiracies 
are said to constitute a distinct manner of expression. Richard Hofstadter (1966) referred to 
conspiracy theory as a political or rhetorical 'style'. He employed the term 'much as a 
historian of art might speak of the baroque or the mannerist style. It is above all a way of 
seeing a world and of expressing oneself (p.4). Hofstadter proposed that the 'paranoid' style 
of conspiracy theory consists of a distinctive pattern of ideas, values, interpretations and 
images which reflect a specific world-view and perspective on history and politics. 
The essential features of the broader conspiratorial outlook have been summarised by Billig, 
(1989). Besides attributing causality to the will of specific groups or organisations, in 
conspiracy theories: 
'all events are seen in terms of an evil conspiracy to take over the world. The conspirators are 
said to work insidiously to subvert independent nations and races. They do their evil damage by 
poisoning the minds of ordinary people, who are innocently unaware of the conspiracy. 
Moreover, there is an apocalyptic tone to such publications, for it is asserted that conspiracy is 
nearing success. The conspirators have already succeeded in controlling most of the powerful 
organisations of the world. Communism and capitalism are seen as being controlled by the 
conspirators, and their apparent opposition is yet another dastardly trick to confuse the 
unsuspecting public. So powerful is the conspiracy, that the manipulators are on the threshold of 
attaining their goal of complete world domination.'(Billig, 1989; p.l55-156) 
Comparable descriptions of the conspiratorial explanatory style have been offered by Cohn 
(1957), Hofstadter (1966), Lipset and Raab (1978), Johnson (1983) and others. All of these 
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analyses point to the existence of a common thematic configuration in conspiratorial 
narratives and of an ideological structure which justifies the characterisation of conspiracism 
as a distinct explanatory discourse. 
The regularity which appears to be present in conspiratorial accounts can be attributed to the 
persistence of an ideological tradition of conspiracy theory (Billig 1978, 1987a, 1988a, 1989). 
This tradition consists of a corpus of ideas, arguments, 'facts', revelations and 'proofs' 
pertaining to the alleged world plot, which have accwnulated over the past two centuries, and 
which are referred to, cited, quoted and perpetuated by new generations of conspiracy 
theorists. 1n other words, conspiracy theories are rarely created de novo. Instead, writers 
typically draw upon the existing tradition of explanation. They regurgitate, revamp and apply 
to new circumstances the body of knowledge, the explanatory logic and rhetorical !ropes 
previously expounded in texts, books or pamphlets which have attained the status of 'classics' 
within the conspiratorial tradition of explanation (Billig, 1978, 1989). Over time, the 
ideological tradition of conspiracy theory gathered a momentum of its own. It has now 
become difficult to construct a theory of world conspiracy that does not, at least inadvertently, 
draw upon the cultural heritage of the conspiracy tradition. The main reason for this self-
perpetuating quality of conspiracist ideology is that it is easier to build on existing 
explanations than to create new ones (Billig, 1989). This is especially so considering that the 
conspiracy theory of society is not only a view of the world as it is at present, but also an 
interpretation of the past. As conspiracy is thought to be the motive force in history, the writer 
on conspiracies must place his 'discoveries' and revelations about the present within a 
broader historical context. Rather than 'inventing' a whole new history of conspiracy, 
theorists typically draw on the work of their predecessors, thus assimilating their 
interpretation within the existing conspiratorial tradition. 
The way in which the conspiracy tradition shapes contemporary conspiratorial thinking has 
been demonstrated in the past using the examples of the British far-Right and the far-Left 
(Billig, 1987a, 1989, 1978) the American Right (Lipset and Raab, 1978) and the Arab 
political culture (Pipes, 1996). One of the principal aims of the present thesis is to 
demonstrate the emergence of this tradition of explanation in the Serbian media and popular 
discourse in the final years of the 20th century. The present chapter will set the scene for the 
subsequent analyses by elaborating further on the theme of conspiratorial ideological 
tradition. It will begin with an historical outline which will trace the origins of conspiracy 
theory to the time of the French Revolution, and sketch the vicissitudes of conspiracism to the 
present day. The overview will be based on literature which deals with the history of 
conspiracy theory in more detail (Cohn, 1957; Lipset and Raab, 1978; Poliakov, 1974; Berlet 
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and Lyons, 2000, Katz, 1980). Consequently, rather than providing a comprehensive 
historical analysis, this section will identify key moments in the evolution of the conspiracy 
tradition, especially those which are relevant, in one way or another, to the later examination 
of Serbian conspiratorial culture. 
The chapter will then proceed to explore in greater detail the basic characteristics of the 
conspiratorial explanatory framework and 'style'. This is important as even the greatest 
sceptics, when it comes to the explanatory value of conspiracy theorie~, such as Popper ( 1966, 
1972), Hofstadter (1966), or Lipsett and Raab (1978), admit that conspiracies occur regularly 
and are even a 'typical social phenomenon' (Popper, 1966; p.95). Political assassinations, 
dramatic transfers of power, political scandals and cover-up, as well as much of everyday 
political activity, all involve the collaboration of multiple individuals who collude in the 
attempt to bring about a desired outcome. Consequently, a belief in a conspiracy is not a 
priori questionable, excessive or part of the conspiratorial tradition of explanation. In order 
for an explanation to be located within the conspiracy tradition, it must be shown to possess 
the ideological structure and thematic organisation characteristic of the conspiratorial 
explanatory 'style'. First and foremost, in contrast to various references to local instances of 
conspiracy and secret collusion, explanations which belong to the ideological tradition have 
an exceedingly comprehensive and all encompassing character (Lipset and Raab, 1978). All 
social events are monomaniacally attributed to a single world conspiracy (Lipset and Raab , 
1978; Billig, 1989). Also, texts which draw on the ideological tradition of conspiracy theory 
have other common features which are characteristic of the conspiratorial explanatory 'style' 
and which distinguish them from alternative explanations. These include the particular way in 
which the conspirators are portrayed, the assumption of a Manichean distinction between 
Good and Evil, the emphasis on the notion of mass manipulation and the apocalyptic tone of 
the conspiratorial narrative. 
After the outline of main characteristics of the conspiratorial explanatory style, a taxonomy of 
conspiratorial discourse will be proposed. It will be argued that the transformation of 
conspiracy theories over the past two centuries has made conspiracism a heterogeneous 
culture which consists of different variants, including classical, world elite and 
protoconspiracy theories. Each of these types will be briefly outlined and explained. It will be 
the task of subsequent chapters to show that, in spite of the differences in content and style, 
all three variants can be linked to the ideological tradition of conspiracy theory. 
The chapter will conclude by contrasting the view of conspiracy theory as a tradition of 
explanation with alternative conceptualisations found in the more recently published literature 
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on the subject (Fenster, 1999; Melley, 2000; Knight, 2000). As will become apparent, the 
latter tends to depict conspiracy theory as an almost ubiquitous feature of contemporary 
(American) mass-culture and a legacy of the post-modem condition. Following from the 
broader definition of conspiracy theory is often a more positive stance towards this 
phenomenon. A critical examination of the recent conceptualisations of conspiracy theory 
will suggest that a distinction needs to be maintained between, on the one hand conspiracy 
theory as a specific ideology and an explanatory style, and on the other, the broader 
discourses of suspicion evident in contemporary mass culture which often invoke the general 
theme of conspiracy. One reason in favour of the distinction is that confounding conspiracist 
ideology with various broader cultural trends has significant political implications. As will 
become· apparent, the over-inclusive definition of conspiracy theory often trivialises the role 
which the conspiratorial ideological tradition continues to play in the construction of racist 
ideology, primarily antisemitism. 
2.1. Historical overview 
The roots of the conspiratorial ideological tradition can been traced to a variant of the 
mythology of secret societies which developed at the end of the 18th century. Two classical 
works on the causes of the French Revolution, both of which were published in 1797, are 
usually cited as the first examples of modem political conspiracy theory (Hofstadter, 1966; 
Lipset and Raab, 1978; Billig, 1978; Cohn, 1957; Roberts, 1974; etc.). First is the four-
volume Memoirs pour servir a l'histoire du Jacobinsme by Augustin de Barruel, a French 
Jesuit priest exiled in England. The other, Proofs of conspiracy against all religions and 
governments of Europe, carried on in the secret meetings of Free Masons, llluminati and the 
Reading Societies was written by John Robison, a professor of Science at the University of 
Edinburgh and an active member of the English Masonic Lodge. Although the first two 
volumes of Barruel's book were published several months before Robison's work, it is 
generally acknowledged that it was Robison who first speculated on the alleged conspiracy, 
and that his ideas inspired Barruel to embark on his own literary project (Cohn, 1957; 
Roberts, 1974). 
Both Barruel's and Robison's books allege that the French Revolution was orchestrated by 
the Bavarian llluminati, a secret society of 'enemies of the human race, sons of Satan' 
(Barruel, 1797; quoted in Cohn, 1957) who at the time supposedly controlled the European 
Freemasonry and the Jacobins of France. In reality, the llluminati were a relatively obscure 
Bavarian secret society, founded in 1776 by Adam Weishaupt, a young professor oflaw at the 
University of lngolstadt. Like the Freemasons, the Illuminati advocated the Enlightenment 
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values of rationalism and anti-clericalism, and championed causes such as the abolition of 
torture and of witchcraft trials, the improvement of education, etc. (Cohn, 1957; Roberts, 
1974). There is no evidence that the llluminati ever 'controlled' the Freemasons, or wielded 
any significant political influence. The two secret societies were rivals for the short period of 
time before the llluminati were dissolved in 1786. 
It would be naive to assume that a long-standing tradition of explanation like conspiracy 
theory has a fixed point of origin that could be unequivocally traced to a particular book or to 
the thinking of a specific individual or individuals. As Roberts (1974) points out, the broader 
mythology of secret societies which is reflected in Barruel's and Robison's work on the 
llluminati conspiracy existed throughout the 181h century. Consequently, the demonisation of 
the Freemasons and the llluminati in the post-Revolutionary reactionary literature is a 
continuation of this older tradition. At the same time, Barruel's and Robison's books are 
without a doubt the first comprehensive and widely read examples of the type of social and 
historical explanation which assumes that political and social events are caused by a vast 
clandestine plot, the aim of which is nothing less that world domination. Moreover, Barruel's 
and Robison's works proved to be an endless source of inspiration for subsequent generations 
of conspiracy theorists worldwide. The Memoirs and the Proofs of Conspiracy have been 
cited, quoted and recommended in conspiracy literature ever since, and are recognised by 
conspiracy theorists themselves as pioneering and seminal studies within this tradition of 
explanation. 
In his analysis of the early history of the secret society mythology, Roberts (1974) sheds some 
light on the reasons why the conspiratorial interpretative framework emerged as a distinct 
pattern of explanation in the aftermath of the Bourgeois Revolution, rather than at any other 
point in history. The ~olution, Roberts argues, shook the foundations of the French society 
like no other event, questioning its every belief and challenging every institution. For the 
frustrated advocates of the old aristocratic order, everyday canons of explanations, which 
typically invoked the 'force de chases', (i.e. the inertia of history), climactic or psychological 
causal interpretations, could not adequately account for the dramatic and sweeping societal 
transformation. Interpretation was thus driven towards an alternative explanatory framework, 
one which Roberts suggests was central to European civilisation, and which drew upon the 
Christian cultural tradition - 'men were responsible for their own history: things happened 
because people wanted them to' (Roberts, 1974, p.371). 
\ 
Importantly however, the interpretative framework of early conspiracy theory did not only 
reflect the Christian notion of'free will'. According to Groh (1987), embedded in conspiracy 
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theory is the secularised version of the animistic view of the world (mentalite primitive) 
which dominated pre-modem Europe. Animism interpreted causality exclusively in terms of 
the actions of concealed forces. Also, conspiracy theory took on board the conceptions of 
politics and power which were prevalent at the time. As Roberts (1974) points out, in the 
ancien regime power was wielded by a small number of members of the aristocracy whose 
daily political activity consisted of plots, court intrigues, back-stabbing and secret collusion. 
The French Revolution was therefore seen as yet another plot, one of unprecedented size and 
scope. The culprits were sought among the 'usual suspects', the progressive secret societies 
dernonised for decades by the Church authorities, who advocated the same ideas and 
propagated the same values as the ominous Revolution. 
The belief in the existence of a 'vast and sinister conspiracy, a gigantic and yet subtle 
machinery of influence set in motion to undermine and destroy a way of life' (Hofstadter, 
1966, p.29), which inspired the early reactionary writing on the Revolution, persisted in 
subsequent decades. Moreover, it became a regular feature of conservative political ideology 
in France, Germany, Russia and Italy. Interestingly, the United States proved particularly 
receptive to the emerging conspiracy culture (Hofstadter, 1966; Lipset and Raab, 1978; Berlet 
and Lyons, 2000; Davis, 1972). The Proofs of conspiracy was published in the US only a year 
after it first appeared in England, and soon became a best-seller. Robison's earliest American 
follower was the Boston Congregationalist minister Jedidiah Morse, whose sermons in the 
late 1790s warned the Americans about the threat posed by llluminism. 
In his analysis of the history of American conspiratorial culture, Davis (1972) suggests that 
for the American public, the appeal of early conspiracy theories lay in the fact that 'the 
circumstances of the [American] Revolution conditioned Americans to think of resistance to a 
dark, subversive force as the essential ingredient of their national identity' (p.23). 
Conspiracism subsequently became embedded in American populist culture. Practically every 
populist project in American history, from the nativist, anti-Masonic and anti-Catholic 
movements of the 19th century, to the most recent Militia organisations and the Christian 
Identity Movement, were based on a threat from some form of conspiracy. The idiosyncrasies 
of the history of American conspiratorial culture are examined in considerable detail in other 
literature on the subject (Hofstadter, 1966; Lipset and Raab, 1978; Berlet and Lyons, 2000; 
Barkun 1994). The present historical overview however, will focus solely on the aspects of 
conspiratorial cultural tradition which have had international and global implications. 
A particularly notable development in the history of conspiratorial explanatory discourse, was 
the emergence of the myth of a Jewish conspiracy in the early decades of the 19th century. By 
11 
the 1850s, the Jews will have replaced the llluminati and the Freemasons as the masterminds 
behind the alleged world conspiracy, relegating the secret societies to the position of foot 
soldiers and pawns in the hands of the international Jewish elite. 
The reasons behind the victimisation of Jews in conspiracy theories, which culminated in the 
Holocaust, are usually sought in the long history of Jewish demonology which goes back to 
the early days of Christianity (Cohn, 1957; Poliakov, 1974). As Cohn (1957) notes, 'in this 
[conspiratorial) fantasy the remnants of ancient demonological terrors [were) blended with 
anxieties and resentments which are typically modern' (p.27). In other words, the thesis of 
Jewish conspiracy politicised and secularised the ancient myths of Jews as 'killers of Christ', 
poisoners of wells and murderers of children, thus ensuring the persistence of antisemitism in 
the modern age of secular politics, Enlightenment values and Reason. 
Norman Cohn (1957) traces the myth ofJewish conspiracy to 'Simonini's Letter', a document 
allegedly written by an Italian army officer which was sent to Barruel in 1806. The letter drew 
Barruel's attention to the activities of the financially powerful 'Judaic sect', which supposedly 
controlled the llluminati, the Freemasons and the Vatican, and which planned to subvert 
Christianity, 'turn Christians into slaves' and annihilate the House of Bourbon. 
'Simonini's Letter' is interesting not only as the first known allusion to a Jewish plot, but also 
as an early example of a way of reasoning that has characterised conspiracy theory ever since. 
It reveals a tendency to infer causality on the basis of an event's consequence. The 
implementation of the values of equality, liberty and fraternity in post-revolutionary France 
led to the granting of civil rights to French Jews, rights which were subsequently extended by 
Napoleon to much of European Jewry. The fact that Jews benefited from the Revolution was 
enough for contemporary conspiracy theorists to conclude that Jews must have planned the 
event, or at least controlled those who did, i.e. the Freemasons and the llluminati (Cohn, 
1957). Moreover, in Russia the alleged 'collusion' between Napoleon and the Jews was used 
by the Church and state authorities to reinforce the image of the French Emperor as the 
'Antichrist'. In 1806, the Synod of the Russian Orthodox Church accused Napoleon of 
colluding with the Jews in the attempt to overthrow Christianity and 'proclaim a false messiah 
in his own name' (Doubnov, 1933, cited in Cohn, 1957). 
After these early allusions to a Jewish conspiracy, the idea remained dormant until 
approximately half a century later. According to Katz (1980), the myth was revived by the 
writing of Gougenot des Mousseaux, who in 1869 published an elaborate account of a satanic 
plot supposedly orchestrated by 'kaballistic Jews' (Le Juif, lejudaisme et lajudaisation des 
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peuples cretiens). Cohn (1957) however notes that even before des Mousseaux's work was 
published, antisemitic conspiratorial themes emerged in two works of fiction. First was 
Benjamin Disraeli's novel Coningsby published in 1848. One particular sentence in the book 
has earned Disraeli a prominent place in the history of the myth of the Jewish conspiracy. In 
Chapter 15, one of the novel's Jewish characters makes the following remark: 
'So you see my dear Coningsby, that the world is governed by very different personages from 
what is imagined by those who are not behind the scenes' (Disraeli, 1848) 
The sentence followed a (false) claim that finance ministers in all major European countries at 
the time were Jews. Although it has been pointed out on numerous occasions that the allusion 
to a Jewish secret network was part of a 'naughty joke' (Cohn, 1957), by which Disraeli 
attempted to mock contemporary beliefs in Jewish financial power (Poliakov, 1974), 
antisemites and conspiracy theorists have since then interpreted this passage from Coningsby 
as an important admission, straight from the pen of a famous and influential Jew, that the 
Jewish financial elite is 'the hidden hand' behind European politics. Even today, Serbian 
antisemitic conspiracy theorists such as Ratibor Durdevic and Spasoje Vlajic, whose work 
will be examined in subsequent chapters, allude at times to Disraeli's work. 
The 1850s also saw the emergence of another fictional piece of work which, although 
relatively unknown in its own right, later provided the basis for Protocols of the Elders of 
Zion. The novel Biarritz, written by the German author Hermann Goedsche under the 
pseudonym of John Retcliffe (published in 1868), contained a chapter entitled 'On the Jewish 
cemetery in Prague'. The chapter described a meetitig by the representatives of the twelve 
Tribes oflsrael who gathered to discuss global conquest. Although purely fictional, the theme 
of the Jewish plot can be seen as a romantic and sensationalist manifestation of the rising 
German antisemitism of the 1860s and 70s (Cohn, 1957). Over the next four decades, the 
chapter from Biarritz was gradually taken out of its fictional context and printed as an 
'authentic' document (Rabbi's Speech). Moreover, it was attributed to different 'reliable' 
sources, such as an 'English diplomat' or even a Rabbi. Eventually, early in the 20th century, 
the initially fictional account of the conspiring Jewish elders was combined with extracts from 
Maurice Joli's work Dialogues en Enfer entre Montesquieu et Machiavelli and was 
distributed by the Russian secret police under the title Protocols of the Learned Elders of Zion 
(see Cohn, 1957 and Poliakov, 1974, for a detailed account of the origins of Protocols). The 
purpose of Protocols was to incite and legitimise pogroms against Russian Jews in the early 
1900s. Some 30 years later, the booklet had considerably more devastating consequences 
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when it became, as Cohn (1957) aptly described it, a 'warrant' for Nazi genocide against the 
Jews. 
The myth of a Jewish conspiracy dominated the conspiratorial tradition throughout the first 
half of the 20th century. Protocols was translated into most languages and published 
throughout the world. Although it was soon revealed as a forgery, its principal theme even 
struck a cord with certain prominent political figures. As the paragraph at the beginning of the 
chapter suggests, Winston Churchill endorsed the idea of the Jewish conspiracy in the 1920s. 
In the United States, the famous industrialist Henry Ford emerged as the champion of 
conspiratorial antisemitism. His four-volume work, The International Jew, which echoed the 
principal themes of Protocols, subsequently became a best-seller in Hitler's Germany. Hitler 
himself admitted that 'Heinrich Ford' was one of his heroes and a source of inspiration. 
An important addition to the conspiratorial tradition in the early 1920s was the inclusion of 
communism in the conspiratorial narrative. In the years following the Russian Revolution, 
explanations of this dramatic event were gradually assimilated into the existing conspiratorial 
tradition. Communism was blamed on Jewish bankers, mainly from the United States, who 
allegedly financed the Revolution and were due to profit from pitting capitalism and 
communism against each other. The story of Jewish involvement in the Revolution has been 
traced to yet another forgery, a document sold to an American diplomat by a Russian 
journalist in 1918 (Poliakov, 1987). The document alleged that German-Jewish bankers such 
as Schiff or Warburg controlled the Bolshevik government. The document was subsequently 
endorsed and propagated by White Russian emigres in the West, most notably General 
Arsene de Goulevitch, author of the book Tsarism and the Revolution (Billig, 1978). 
The general idea that Jewish power lay behind the Revolution echoed an older belief, 
widespread in Russia in the early 20th century, concerning the connection between Jews and 
socialism. For instance, in 1905 Russian Tsar Nikolai IT famously wrote to his mother that 
'nine out often' revolutionaries in Russia were Jewish (Poliakov, 1987; Pipes, 1998). Also, in 
the early 1900s Russian clerical authorities regularly used anti semi tic rhetoric to denounce the 
workers' protests (Poliakov, 1987). As a result, in the years after the Revolution, Marx's 
Jewish roots and the disproportionate number of Jews in socialist movements both in Russia 
and elsewhere were regularly invoked in antisemitic conspiracy literature as evidence of the 
inherently Jewish nature of Bolshevism (see, for instance, the quote from Churchill). 
The early writing on the causes of the Revolution by Russian reactionaries struck a cord with 
conservatives world-wide, who projected their fear of socialist revolt into the theme of 
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conspiracy. In Germany, France, Eastern Europe and elsewhere, conspiratorial antisemitism 
and anti-communism gradually became interchangeable discourses in the ideology of right-
wing and conservative political forces. Also, the idea of collusion between Jews and 
Communists caught the imagination of populist ideologists in the US. Ever since the 1870s, 
North American agrarian and producerist movements resented wealthy bankers and financiers 
from the East Coast of the US who were often referred to as the 'corporate Jew class' and 
portrayed as enemies of the (white) American worker (Lipset and Raab, 1978). In the 1920s 
and 30s, champions of American producerism such as Henry Ford, or nativism like Father 
Charles Coughlin took on board the 'revelations' about the 'Jewish capital's' communist 
connections, and used them to substantiate their anti semi tic, anti-corporate claims. 
The developments within conspiratorial culture after the Russian Revolution are significant 
for two reasons. First of all, to the present day, the claim that the Revolution was organised by 
the Western (Jewish) fmancial elite remains a ubiquitous feature of many strands of 
conspiratorial explanatory discourse. Although the Jewish origin of the 'financiers' and 
'bankers' is often not explicitly stated (e.g. Gary Alien, 1965), the fact that this theme can be 
traced to antisemitic writing in the 1920s provides evidence of continuity within the 
conspiratorial cultural tradition. Secondly, the blurring of boundaries between antisemitic and 
anti-communist rhetoric led to a gradual emergence of the idea of a vast communist plot, 
paving the way for the kind of conspiracism that became a trademark of the McCarthy era in 
early days of the Cold War. 
The myth of the Jewish conspiracy reached its most dramatic point in Nazi Germany, where 
Hitler's genocidal policies were impaled throughout by the ideology of conspiratorial 
antisemitism. Books such as Protocols of the Elders of Zion, Hitler's Mein Kampf, Eckart's 
Bolshevism from Moses to Lenin, Fritsch's Handbook of the Jewish Question and Ford's 
International Jew, sold hundreds of thousands of copies throughout the Third Reich in the 
1930s and 40s. The common theme which runs through all these books- that of a vast Jewish 
conspiracy which aims for world domination - inspired Hitler's racist policies and 
contributed to the death of over six million European Jews. 
In the aftermath of the Second World War, conspiracy tradition of explanation underwent 
another noteworthy transformation. Once the true extent of Nazi war crimes became known to 
the world, it became impossible to champion the idea of a Jewish conspiracy with the same 
degree of openness as before the events of 1939-1945. As Leon Poliakov noted, 
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'Today the Jews are no longer accused of weaving a permanent plot against mankind, of 
unleashing revolutions and historical catastrophes. They are no longer attributed with 
supernatural powers. Any display of fanatical and ''paranoid" anti-Sernitism by an individual, 
which, as we described, had such a hold on certain leaders of rtineteenth-century thought, is 
dismissed by public opinion as a freak, or even a psychosis' (Poliakov, 1974, Vol. 3, p.469) 
In many ways, the belief in a Jewish conspiracy became a criterion for distinguishing the 
respectable from the unacceptable in politics. Ideologists who continued to promote 
antisemitic prejudice became confined to the outer reaches of the political spectrum (Billig, 
1987a). 
As anti-Jewish prejudice became a detestable political option, many conspiracy theorists 
abandoned the notion of a Jewish plot in favour of a seemingly more acceptable version of 
conspiratorial explanation. For instance, Robert Welch, founder of the John Birch Society, 
went to great lengths to distance himself and his organisation from allegations of 
antisemitism. In 1963 he denounced Protocols as a 'communist forgery' and in subsequent 
years expelled several members of the Society who expressed anti-Jewish prejudice in public 
(Lipset & Raab, 1978). Unwilling to pursue the notion of a Jewish conspiracy, Welch and 
other conspiracy theorists in the 1950s and 60s turned to an older tradition, one that locates 
the hub of the alleged plot among non-ethnic and secular secret (or not-so-secret) societies 
and organisations. Characteristics previously associated with the conspiratorial Jewish 
corporate elite were gradually transferred onto the 'Soviet Empire', the Bilderbergers, the 
Trilateral Commission, the leaders of the 'New World Order' or even the 'United Nations'. 
What emerged was a new and seemingly more legitimate, innocuous and non-prejudicial 
version of conspiracy theory. 
Hofstadter (1966) suggests that in the post war years, conspiracy theories, especially in the 
US, changed in other important ways. Post-war conspiracy theorists no longer saw themselves 
as protectors of a well-established way of life which was under threat from alien forces. 
Instead, conspiracy theorists began to see themselves as already dispossessed. As a result, 
anti-conspiratorial activity turned into a fight to reclaim what was already lost, and prevent 
the final act of destruction by the evil conspiracy. This change in emphasis gave conspiracism 
a significant subversive character. From McCarthy to Me Veigh the goal of conspiracy 
theorists has been to uncover the secret behind the American establishment, and expose it for 
what it is: a fa9ade for the machinations of 'Communists', 'New World Order', the 'Zionist 
Occupational Government' or the trans-national financial and political oligarchy. Hofstadter 
attributed this change in conspiracy culture to the development in mass media. The media 
made the 'enemy' more visible, thus shifting the attention of anti-conspiratorial activity from 
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. vaguely described villains such as Masons, Jesuits or International Bankers, to concrete and 
eminent public figures who are seen as crucial players in the conspiracy. 
An important implication of the relatively new, subversive element of conspiracy theory is 
that it entrenched this ideological tradition on the margins of politics, among the disenchanted 
and the resentful. The very assumption that outward forms of political life are just a front for 
an evil conspiracy excludes this tradition of explanation, and those who subscribe to it, from 
mainstream political life (Billig, 1978). In the West, conspiracism is restricted mainly to the 
extreme Right (e.g. Hofstadter, 1966; Lipset and Raab, 1978, etc.), although there is evidence 
of conspiratorial thinking in the ideology of the Left (Billig, 1987a; Pipes, 1998; Berlet, 1994; 
Berlet and Lyons, 2000, etc.). In both cases conspiracism is the ideology of fringe movements 
which operate outside the framework of conventional politics. 
The post war developments in American conspiratorial culture have had important 
implications for conspiracism elsewhere. Since the Second World War, conspiracy theories 
have been one of America's more successful cultural exports. For instance, the notion of the 
Bilderberg conspiracy, first put forward by the likes of the John Birch Society, was 
subsequently endorsed by Soviet propaganda (Pipes, 1998). Also, in the UK, books written by 
American authors are regularly distributed by the far-Right (Billig, 1978). In Yugoslavia, 
American 'classics' (e.g. Alien, Colernan etc.) have been translated, published, quoted and 
cited by domestic conspiracy theorists. An important implication of the global influence of 
American conspiracy literature is that theorists around the world now locate the heart of the 
alleged plot within the US establishment, which is thought to be under the heel of evil 
conspirators. As a result, in many parts of the world the rhetoric of conspiracy has been 
assimilated within the more general anti-imperialist and anti-American political argument. 
Conspiracy theory became the creed not only of the disenchanted and the 'dispossessed' 
within the US, but also of all those around the world, who feel marginalised and threatened by 
American military, economic and diplomatic supremacy. This development within 
conspiratorial culture has turned conspiracy theory into a common language of resistance 
against the dominance of Western political culture. It has coloured anti-Western ideology in 
the Middle East, in Russia, and elsewhere. The way in which this particular aspect of 
contemporary conspiracism influenced the proliferation of conspiracy theories in Serbia in the 
1990s will be the topic of subsequent empirical chapters. 
The aim of this historical overview has been to demonstrate that throughout the past 200 years 
writers, politicians and people in general, have at times attributed the causes of social and 
political events to an evil conspiracy. However, in order to establish the existence of a 
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tradition of thought, it is not enough to point out the similarities between the ideologies or 
beliefs of different historical periods (Billig, 1978). What is required is evidence of continuity 
of thought. The clearest evidence of continuity comes from the way in which writers of 
conspiracy material address the question of the history of conspiracy. When locating current 
plots and schemes within the centuries-long tradition of conspiratorial activity, conspiracy 
theorists will often openly acknowledge their ideological roots. The John Birch Society for 
instance reissued Robinson's book almost two centuries after its original publication and 
acknowledged its relevance to the understanding of contemporary society (Lipset and Raab, 
1978). Similarly, in the earlier quotation from Churchill, the alleged Jewish conspiracy is 
traced back to the days ofWeishaupt, thus implicitly invoking the historical beginnings of the 
conspiracy tradition. Similar examples can be found in the writings of Nesta Webster, the 
British far-Right, American populist movements and in Middle Eastern conspiracy culture 
(Billig, 1978, Lipset and Raab, 1978, Pipes, 1996) 
The question of continuity, which is essential to the notion of an ideological tradition will 
feature prominently throughout the present thesis. A theme which runs through all the 
empirical chapters is the presence of antisemitism in contemporary Serbian conspiracy 
culture. This may seem unusual considering that in Serbia, unlike in the Middle East for 
instance, there was no Jewish dimension to the crisis, and therefore no visible political gain 
from an allegation of Jewish involvement. In spite of this, antisemitic themes were to be 
found. One possible explanation is that there is something culturally specific about antisemitic 
ideology (Billig, 1989). The specificity of antisemitism will be sought in the fact that, after 
dominating conspiratorial discourse for almost hundred years (from the 1850s to the end of 
WWII), anti-Jewish themes become firmly embedded in the conspiratorial cultural tradition 
and remain a continuing aspect of its ideological heritage. Consequently, antisemitic themes 
appear in Serbian conspiracy theories not because of their political relevance, but because 
they are a legacy of this conspiratorial cultural tradition. The demonstration of the often subtle 
allusion to the Jewish nature of the conspiracy in Serbian conspiratorial writing will therefore 
be a recurring reminder of the continuities within the conspiratorial ideological tradition. 
2.2. Principal features of conspiratorial explanatorv stvle 
As well as showing evidence of continuity, in order to locate a particular explanatory 
discourse within the conspiratorial ideological tradition, an explanation must be shown to 
possess the ideological structure, and explanatory 'style' characteristic of the conspiracy 
tradition. The task of the present section will be to outline and examine some of the features 
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of the typical conspiratorial 'tale', as identified by Hofstadter (1966), Lipset and Raab (1978), 
Billig (1978, 1987a), Groh (1987) and others. 
2.2.1 Leap o(lhe imagination 
While most characteristics of conspiracy theories which will be outlined in this section pertain 
to the content of the conspiratorial narrative, the 'leap of the imagination' is more about the 
logic, nature and presentation of the conspiratorial argument. 
Hofstadter (1966) suggests that an important feature of the conspiratorial explanatory style is 
the elaborate concern with demonstration and presentation of proof. Conspiracy theories will 
usually include a detailed elaboration and exposition of plausible and verifiable historical 
facts. For instance, Barrue!'s and Robison's work contains accurate historical data about 
Weishaupt's llluminati and 18"' century French Freemasonry. Similarly, contemporary 
conspiracy literature on the Bilderberg group or the Trilateral Commission will often 
describe, in considerable detail and with a commendable degree of accuracy, the history and 
structure of these organisations. The historical element of the conspiracy theory provides a 
'kernel of truth', around which the rest of the narrative is constructed. 
Also, conspiracy literature will seek to establish credibility by emulating conventional 
scholarship. The 'high brow' conspiracy theorists (Hofstadter, 1966) will flaunt dubious 
academic credentials (professor, Dr., etc ), publish books with scholarly-sounding titles, and 
mimic mainstream academia by using references, graphs, footnotes, bibliography, etc. For 
instance, Senator McCarthy's 96-page 'manifesto' McCarthyism contains no less than 313 
footnote references (Hofstadter, 1966). The application of a quasi-academic style gives the 
conspiracy treatise a plausible appearance and an aura of respectability. 
hnportantly however, in conspiracy theories, the multitude of disparate arguments placed 
along factual lines and veiled in quasi-scholarly rhetoric usually lead to fantastic conclusions. 
'The most careful, conscientious and seemingly coherent application to detail' which 
characterises conspiracy theory, turns out to be mere preparation for the 'big leap from the 
undeniable to the unbelievable' which occurs, often in a subtle way, at some crucial point in 
the narrative (Hofstadter, 1966; p.37). The vast amount of the detailed 'evidence' becomes 
encapsulated into a completely consistent and coherent theory which claims that conspiracy is 
the motive force in history and that the 'unbelievable is the only thing that can be believed' 
(p.36). 
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Once the 'leap of the imagination' is made, the conspiracy theory acquires a 'specific kind of 
irrationality associated with a stubborn, highly rational and highly operational logic' (Groh, 
1987). Logical contradictions, or contrasting evidence, cease to have any bearing on the 
conspiratorial story-line (Moscovici, 1987). The theory of conspiracy becomes a closed 
narrative whose claims are irrefutable: the Jack of proof about conspiracy, or any positive 
proof against its existence, is always turned around and taken as evidence of the craftiness of 
the secret cabal behind the alleged plot and as confirmation of its ability to conceal its 
clandestine machinations (Groh, 1987). As Billig (1987a) notes, 'conspiracy theorist is to the 
professional historian what the treasure- hunter is to the archaeologist; only in the case of the 
conspiracy theorist, there is no means of convincing them that their quick dig among the 
documents has revealed only false gold' (p.132). 
The 'leap of the imagination', and the irrefutable explanatory logic which it helps to establish, 
enable conspiracy theory to 'tie together the untidiness of the social world into a tale of 
deception and conspiracy' (Billig, 1988a, p.203) and weave a tale of secret collusion that has 
no temporal or geographical limits. By denying the existence or relevance of mistakes, 
failures and ambiguities, conspiratorial narrative sees society in a way that is 'far more 
coherent than the real world' (Hofstadter, 1966; p.36). It establishes connections between 
diverse historical events by a 'causal nexus that, in the end is not demonstrable' (Groh, 1987, 
p.ll) and assumes that conspirators are ubiquitous and omnipresent, active in every part of 
the world and unaffected by logistical constraints. 
2.2.2. Character ofthe conspirator 
The defming feature of conspiracy theory is the belief in the existence of a narrow circle of 
powerful individuals (Jews, llluminati, Bilderbergers, vast industrial-military complex, etc.) 
whose covert plans and schemes determine the course of history. The personalisation of 
historical and social causality which is implicit in conspiracy theory attaches considerable 
importance to the character of the persons behind the alleged plot. It has even been suggested 
that conspiracy theorists become obsessed with the conspirators and 'mesmerised by the 
enemies they have studied so assiduously and with such horrified fascination' (Bell, 1962, 
cited in Billig, 1978). Although the identity of the conspiratorial groups varies considerably, 
texts belonging to the conspiratorial tradition of explanation tend to view the conspirators in 
similar ways. 
Conspirators are typically seen as 'the perfect model of malice, a kind of amoral superman: 
sinister, ubiquitous, powerful, cruel, sensual, luxury-loving' (Hofstadter, 1966, p.31-32). The 
conspiratorial clique is thought to wield enormous power. It is able to bring about devastation: 
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it 'causes depressions, manufactures disasters and then enjoys the profits from the misery [it) 
has produced' (ibid, p.32). 
The conspirators are also presented as deprived of admirable human qualities. In classical 
conspiratorial discourse, conspirators are often associated with illicit sexual behaviour, 
sometimes involving children, and are even attributed Satanic qualities (Davis, 1972; Billig, 
1978, 1989). These features can be seen as the legacy of the early conspiracy literature of 
Barruel, Mousseaux and others who emphasised the anti-Christian motives behind the 
conspiracy. Also, they reflect the Jewish medieval demonological themes of child ritual 
abuse, which became incorporated into the conspiratorial tradition in the mid-19th century. In 
conspiracy theories where explicit satanic themes are absent, the enemy is more frequently 
attributed criminal, psycho- and socio-pathological qualities. The conspirators are the epitome 
of the machiavellian political principle that the end (world domination) justifies the means. It 
is not by accident that it is Machiavelli's contribution to the Dialogue en Enfer that was 
subsequently attributed the Elders in the forged Protocols of the Elders ofZion. 
Ever since the earliest conspiracy theories, the hub of the alleged plot was, as a rule, located 
amid the elite: among the llluminati and the Freemasons, or more recently in 'universities', 
among 'intellectuals' or within the higher echelons of business and politics. It is the position 
of privilege that gives the conspirators power and the ability to control the masses and keep 
everyone in ignorance about their sinister aims. The conspirators have at their disposal 
effective means of influence such as control over education, the press and technology as well 
as endless fmancial resources. According to Lipset and Raab (1978) this particular feature 
makes the populist appeal of conspiracy theories easier to understand. The conspiratorial elite 
are presented as distinct from 'the people' and characterised as 'secret and alien, dealing as 
they do in arcane subjects' (p.l6} Just like the conspirators' debauchery, their elitism also 
drives a wedge between the conspiratorial minority and the masses whom the conspiracy 
theorist explicitly or implicitly addresses. 
When it comes to identifying the actual conspirators, writers of conspiracy theories are faced 
with a dilemma. As the personification of Evil and the ultimate causal agent in history, 
conspirators have to be made visible and identifiable. However, this demand needs to be 
reconciled with the necessity for the conspirators, and the conspiracy itself, to remain 
clandestine (Lipset and Raab, 1978). In the early days of conspiracy theories, the mysterious 
secret societies fitted the bill perfectly. Today, the identity of conspirators is often formulated 
in vague terms, using economic vocabulary such as 'capitalism' or 'American bankers', or by 
means of symbolic geographical locations like New York, Wall Street, Vatican, or Kremlin. 
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In this way, a specific body of people (Bankers, Catholics or Communists) is given a 'secret, 
arcane centre', thus enhancing the mystery surrounding the conspiracy without compromising 
the conspirators' concrete identity (Lipset and Raab, 1978; p.16). However, no matter how 
broad or vague a category is used to describe the conspirators, the assumption of plotting and 
decision-making usually invokes personal attribution. The motive and actions are described 
using personal adjectives: 'lust for power', 'power hungry megalomaniacs' etc. (Billig, 1978). 
The use of broader categories such as 'international bankers' or 'Communism' (characteristic 
of the John Birch Society propaganda in the 1960s and 70s and the McCarthyite rhetoric 
before that) has the additional advantage of being sufficiently broad to include potentially 
anyone. Individuals previously identified as belonging to the chosen broad category can be 
excluded if circumstances so require: they become renegades, 'former members', escapees 
from the grip of the conspiratorial clique, and therefore valuable 'witnesses'. At the same 
time, the ambiguity of the chosen category enables someone's previously unknown 
association with the evil ruling oligarchy to be 'revealed'. Although even classical conspiracy 
theories, which use the less flexible category such as 'Jews' often expose someone's secret 
Jewish origin in order to account for their participation in the conspiracy, the use of broader 
categories in the more recent forms of conspiracy literature enables the theorists to achieve 
the same aim in a more plausible and 'reasonable' way. 
2.2.3. Manipulation o(many by the few 
At the heart of the belief in conspiracy is typically a recognition of delusion. Visible reality is 
not what it seems, but is an illusion, a fa9ade which conceals the true motive of the 
conspirators. As Roberts (1974) put it, at the core of the conspiracy mythology is a 
'community unaware of its true nature. Apparently self-conscious and self-regulating, it is 
unknown to itself, in fact directed by concealed hands' (p.365). Ordinary masses are seen as 
'soft and seduced by the opiates of welfare and propaganda' (Lipset & Raab, 1978, p.16). 
According to conspiracy theorists, the masses are kept under control through a wide range of 
techniques. Traditionally, educators, politicians and journalists are seen as the principal 
manipulators. As will become apparent in subsequent chapters, contemporary versions of 
conspiracy theory, especially protoconspiracy theories, focus primarily on the media as the 
'instrument of seduction', thus reflecting the broader cultural beliefs in the power of the 
media and propaganda. Other types of conspiratorial discourse invoke more bizarre and less 
plausible means of manipulation. Robison, for instance, referred to a type of tea that causes 
abortion, or a stench bomb that would fill 'a bedchamber with pestilent vapours' (Robison, 
1797, cited in Hofstadter, 1966).1n more recent times, even popular music has been said to be 
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a means of control which causes 'nerve jamming, mental deterioration and retardation' 
(Noebel, 1965, p.l). Among those who see conspiracy as an inherently Satanic venture, 
manipulation is formulated mainly in terms of hidden symbolism which affects the public 
subliminally. Honouring of Lucifer, audible when pop records are played backwards, the 
apparent omnipresence of number 666 in everything from Macdonald's food to Microsoft 
software, or the existence of hidden messages in political speeches, newspapers and on TV, 
are only some of the 'favourites'. Also, the assumption that conspirators have at their disposal 
yet undisclosed technological inventions enables conspiracy theorists to speculate on devices 
and procedures worthy of science fiction literature, such as brain manipulation, microchip 
implants, chemically altered water supplies, etc. The theme of mass manipulation and its 
crucial role in the conspiratorial explanation will be examined in more detail in subsequent 
chapters. 
2.2.4. Manichean view o(politics 
It has already been mentioned that conspiracy theory vilifies the conspirators, who are 
portrayed as the epitome of Evil and malice. Within the conspiratorial narrative, the 
malevolent conspiracy is presented as diametrically opposed to the ultimate force of Good. 
According to Moscovici (1987) 'conspiracy mentality divides people, things and actions into 
two classes, one is pure, the other impure. Classes are polar opposites: everything social, 
national, etc. vs. what is anti-social, anti-national' (p.154). 
Within conspiratorial Manicheanism, political activity is reduced to fighting things out to a 
finish between two moral opposites. The course of history is seen as 'almost exclusively a 
matter of good or ill will' (Lipset and Raab, 1978, p.13) allowing no room for chance, or 
mistakes. Similarly, politics is reduced to a struggle between good and bad intentions, which 
precludes negotiation or compromise. Importantly, Manicheanism has a self-perpetuating 
quality. The 'all or nothing' perspective makes success virtually impossible, thus increasing 
the frustration and strengthening the belief in the terrifying qualities of the 'enemy' 
(Hofstadter, 1966). 
Some authors have traced this binary opposition between good and bad in conspiracy 
theories to the historical link between conspiracy tradition and Christian theology. For 
example, Popper (1966) referred to conspiracy theory as a 'primitive kind of superstition' 
which results from the 'secularisation of religious ideas'. Hofstadter saw conspiratorial 
Manicheanism as the 'secular and demonic version of Adventism' while Groh (1987) 
interpreted it as reflecting St Augustine's 'anthropological universalism' and the distinction 
between civitas dei and civitas diaboli. 
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Roberts (1974) however, sees the dualism in conspiracy culture as a legacy of the French 
Revolution. He suggests that the fall of the ancien regime transformed the political sphere and 
created a polarisation of opinion in which 'for' and 'against' became two mutually exclusive 
and jointly exhaustive positions. This aspect of political dualism still persists in a symbolic 
form in the traditional distinction in politics between Left and Right. The Manicheanism of 
conspiracy theory is therefore seen as a relic of this aspect of late 18th century political 
culture, which over the years became tainted with Christian eschatology, thus acquiring a 
particularly dramatic dimension. 
It is also noteworthy that Manicheanism is sometimes seen not just as a feature of 
conspiratorial narrative, but also as its condition of possibility. Popper (1972) argued that 
conspiracy theory tends to be characteristic of those belief systems or political ideologies 
which are concerned with the implementation of fundamental truth, or with the creation of 
'heaven on earth'. The unavoidable failure of such projects can only be explained by 
reference to an evil force which has a 'vested interest in thwarting this illustrious endeavour'. 
The simplistic moral dualism of conspiracy theory imposes itself as an appealing explanation 
why the promised parusia (second coming of the saviour), whether literal or metaphorical, 
has failed to occur (Groh, 1987). 
2.2.5. Apocalyptic tone o(the conspiracy theory 
Closely related to conspiratorial Manicheanism is the apocalyptic tone of the conspiracy 
theory. Explanations of events in a conspiratorial narrative often assume that the evil 
aspirations of the conspirators are coming close to being fulfilled. The present is defmed as 
the time for the fmal 'showdown' which will determine whether evil will accomplish world 
domination. Just like Manicheanism, the apocalyptic vision is driven by the fact that the 
conspiracy theorist 
'traffics in the birth and death of whole worlds, whole political orders, whole systems of human 
values. He is always manning the barricades of civilisation. He constantly lives at a turning 
point: it is now or never in organising resistance to conspiracy. Time is forever just running out' 
(Hofstadter, 1966, p.29-30) 
Although conspiratorial apocalypticism runs dangerously near to hopeless pessimism, the 
theorists never lose their determination to fight. Conspiracy theory typically envisages a 
positive outcome, a rebirth which will ensue after the fmal clash with the forces of evil. 
Somewhat paradoxically, the stronger the enemy gets, the closer their final defeat is thought 
to be (Billig, 1978). Billig (1978) suggests that the theme of decisive confrontation with the 
evil enemy draws upon the Millennia! pattern of thinking which has been assimilated into the 
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conspiracy tradition from Judeo-Christian religious philosophy. Millennialism reflects the 
belief that the establishment of Heaven on earth will follow the inevitable destruction of the 
current order and the end of the temporary rule of Satan. Millennia! eschatology drives the 
naive optimism of conspiracy theory by enforcing the belief that success is always the result 
of good intentions: positive spirit and honourable intent can and will overcome the 
technological and economic superiority of the enemy . 
••• 
The extent to which the described characteristics appear in specific conspiratorial accounts, as 
well as their precise shape and form, varies considerably. TI!is depends on the type of 
conspiracy theory, the local context, level of detail and the nature of the social problem that 
the theorist wishes to explain. However, personal attribution, the leap of the imagination, the 
specific construction of the enemy, the Manichean moral dualism, apocalyptic tone and the 
notion of mass manipulation are typical characteristics of the conspiratorial explanation, and 
have become entrenched in the ideological tradition over its 200-year long history. 
Consequently, it is the presence of these characteristics that can be used to locate specific 
explanatory discourses within the conspiratorial tradition of explanation. As subsequent 
chapters will show, these characteristics were notably present in the way in which the 
bombing of Yugoslavia in the Spring of 1999 was perceived and accounted for in the Serbian 
media and political discourse. 
2.3. Classification of conspiracy theories 
As the historical outline suggested, the 200 year-long history of modern conspiracisrn has 
been marked by continuous evolution and transformation. The catalyst for change has often 
been the need to make conspiracy theories more plausible, acceptable, and pertinent in 
response to changing social circumstances. For instance, the notion of a Jewish conspiracy 
emerged at the time of, and reflected, the antisemitism which swept through Europe in the 
mid-19th century, only to be discarded in the years after the Holocaust, when anti-Jewish 
prejudice became ostracised from mainstream politics. The fluid and dynamic quality of 
conspiratorial discourse can be said to have contributed significantly to the endurance and 
persistence of this type of explanation. 
As a result of its continuous transformation, contemporary conspiracism is not a monolithic 
culture. As conspiracy theories underwent various changes, remnants of the older versions 
managed to survive. As a result, conspiratorial discourse today consists of numerous variants, 
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ranging from the relatively sophisticated to the absurd, which exist side by side. Considering 
that different types of conspiratorial explanation share a common ideological heritage, the 
boundaries between them are often fuzzy and a clear distinction is difficult to draw. On the 
other hand, classification, even if only theoretical and conjectural, can often provide a useful 
analytical tool. For that reason, the present project will propose a distinction between 
classical, world elite, and protoconspiracy theories. This distinction, which was derived from 
the analyses in the empirical chapters, proved to be a convenient and valid taxonomy in the 
context of Serbian conspiratorial culture. The relationship between the three types of 
conspiracy theory, and the way in which they interrelate in order to perpetuate the 
conspiratorial ideological tradition, will be examined in later chapters 
•!• Classical conspiracy theories are a legacy of the 19th century conspiracy tradition. They 
are concerned with the esoteric working of the Jews or secret societies such as the 
llluminati or the Freemasons. This type of conspiratorial discourse is characterised by 
strong pseudo-scientific, mystical and esoteric overtones, which are often manifested in 
the way in which methods of mass manipulation are conceptualised. Also, classical 
conspiracy theory often refers to the Satanic and anti-Christian aspects of the world plot. 
It is in this version of conspiracy theory that the features of the 'paranoid style' are most 
visible. 
•!• World elite conspiracy theories include accounts which focus on the sinister and 
clandestine activities of more recent, essentially non-ethnic and secular organisations 
such as the Council on Foreign Relations, the Bilderberg group, or the Trilateral 
Commission. World elite conspiracy theories can be distinguished from classical 
counterparts by their 'reasonable' appearance. They abandon mystical and religious 
overtones in favour of a more rational style associated with mainstream studies of 
international relations. 
•!• Protoconspiracy theories include explanations which draw heavily on the idea of a 
'hidden hand' that is behind historical and political events. However, proto-conspiracy 
theories fall short of making explicit references to the identity of the conspirator or an 
overall world plot. Protoconspiratorial narrative typically adopts the passive voice thus 
avoiding the labelling of the conspirators, or uses euphemisms such as 'directors of 
horror', 'advocates of the New World Order', etc. Also, as well as often having a 
geographically limited scope (e.g. reference to anti-Serbian conspiracy without 
necessarily mentioning a world plot), protoconspiracy theory has a restricted temporal 
dimension in that the contemporary conspiracy is rarely explicitly linked to the 
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conspiracies of the past. Finally, like world elite conspiracy theories, protoconspiracy 
theories have a more acceptable and respectable guise, and tend to avoid the mysticism 
and the millennialism of classical conspiratorial discourse. 
The origins of classical and world elite conspiracy theories can be easily traced to specific 
stages in the history of the conspiratorial tradition of explanation, i.e. to the periods before 
and after the post-World War ll marginalisation of antisemitic conspiratorial themes. On the 
other hand, the roots of protoconspiracy theories appear to be not so clear. However, as the 
most 'reasonable' and rational of the three types, protoconspiracy theories could be seen as a 
response to the contemporary 'intellectual presumption against conspiracy theories' (Pidgen, 
1995). Recent literature on conspiracy theory repeatedly remarks that in recent decades this 
type of explanation has become regarded as an irrational, paranoid or absurd mode of 
thinking. As one writer on the subject points out, 'very few notions generate as much 
intellectual resistance, hostility and derision within academic circles as a belief in the 
historical importance and efficacy of political conspiracies' (Bale, 1995). Conspiracy theories 
are often perceived as the stuff of kooks and extremists, something which lies beyond the 
bounds of what is considered a rational explanation. Moreover, conspiracy theory is not only 
seen as irrational or false, but also as politically suspect, as antithetical to '"proper" 
democratic politics' (Fenster, 1999, p.xii). 
Because of the dismissive connotations associated with the term 'conspiracy theory', there 
has been a tendency within conspiratorial literature to seek to avoid this epistemologically 
damaging label. For instance, Serbian authors whose work will be examined in subsequent 
chapters seldom refer to their own explanation as 'conspiracy theory'. Unlike self-proclaimed 
conspiracy theorists of the past such as John Robison, Auguste de Barruel, Nesta Webster, 
Senator McCarthy or Gary Alien, contemporary writers, especially those with greater 
pretension towards mainstream status, present their work as something other than 
conspiracism. By distancing their claims from the category of 'conspiracy theory', their 
world-views are made to seem more rational, reasonable and plausible. 
The emergence of protoconspiratorial discourse can be seen as a manifestation of this more 
general rhetoric of dissociation. It represents an attempt at distancing from the conspiracy 
culture by modifying its most obvious features: by obscuring the identity of the conspirators, 
or by toning down some of the more contentious aspects of conspiratorial rhetoric such as its 
apocalyptic tone or its temporal and geographic dimensions. However, as Chapter 6 will 
demonstrate, in spite of the attempts to conceal the link between this type of explanation and 
other forms of conspiracy theory, the explanatory style of protoconspiracy theory can be 
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traced to the conspiratorial ideological tradition and plays an important part in its 
perpetuation. 
2.4. Ideological Tradition Vs Post-modern Culture: alternative interpretations of 
conspiracy theory. 
In recent years there has been a rise in academic interest in various aspects of contemporary 
conspiracy culture (Fenster, 1999; Knight, 2000; Pipes, 1998; Melley, 2000; Robins and Post 
1997; Berlet and Lyons, 2000). With the exception of Pipes's earlier book on conspiracy 
theories in the Middle East (Pipes, 1996) and a recent edited volume with a more 
internationalist perspective (Marcus, 1999), most contemporary scholarly analyses of 
conspiracy theories focus on the American context. The revived interest in American 
conspiracy culture can be attributed to two distinct influences. Firstly, the 1996 Oklahoma 
bombing drew the attention of the public to the potential danger posed by the conspiracy 
theory-wielding militias and fringe right-wing movements. Secondly, in recent years there has 
been a proliferation of conspiracy themes in US mass culture, including books, films, TV, the 
interne!, popular music, etc. The rise in the popularity of conspiratorial explanations is further 
reflected in the fact it is only relatively recently (1997) that the term 'conspiracy theory' 
established itself sufficiently firmly in colloquial language to warrant a separate entry in the 
Oxford English Dictionary. 
Recent literature which emerged in response to the atrocity in Oklahoma (Barkun, 1994; 
Berlet and Lyons, 2000; Pipes, 1998) by and large follows the intellectual tradition of 
Hofstadter (1966), Lipset and Rabb (1978), Billig (1978) and other writers who examined 
conspiracy theories primarily as a feature of radical politics. Like the present thesis, these 
studies endorse the view of conspiracy theory as a specific ideological tradition of 
explanation. On the other hand, literature on conspiratorial themes in American mass culture 
(Knight, 2000; Melley, 2000; Fenster, 1999), whose interests lie in the domain of cultural or 
American studies, tended to adopt a different and altogether broader conceptualisation of 
conspiracy theories, which will be examined in the present section. 
Rather than seeing conspiracy theory as an fringe political ideology antithetical to mainstream 
democratic politics, cultural studies of conspiracy theories regard the belief in conspiracy to 
be an inherent feature of American post-modern culture. For instance, in Conspiracy Culture: 
from Kennedy to the X-Files Knight (2000) argues that contemporary conspiracy theory 
constitutes an 'ironic stance towards knowledge and the possibility of truth' (p.2), arising 
from 'a cynical and generalised sense of ubiquity - and even the necessity - of clandestine 
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conspiring forces in a world in which everything is connected' (p.3). Knight sees conspiracy 
theory as signifying the 'permanent uncertainty about the fundamental issues of causality, 
agency, responsibility, and identity' (p.4) which defmes contemporary America. 
Timothy Melley (2000) makes a similar point in The Empire of Conspiracy, when he suggests 
that conspiracy theory 'arises out of a radical doubt about how knowledge is produced and 
about the authority of those who produce it' (p.13). Melley suggests that in today's world, 
conspiracy theory individualises contemporary impersonal forms of control and regulation; 
attributes to them the human capacities of volition, intent and agency; and transforms them 
into an image of an almighty plot (Melley refers to this process as agency panic). Likewise, in 
Conspiracy Theories: Secrecy and Power in American Culture Mark Fenster (1999) argues 
that conspiratorial narrative 'ideologically addresses real structural inequities, and constitutes 
a response to a withering civil society and the concentration of the ownership of the means of 
production, which together leave the political subject without the ability to be recognised or to 
signify in the public realm' (p.67). 
fu locating the origin of contemporary conspiracy culture in the postmodern condition, 
Knight, Melley and Fenster draw upon two intellectual sources. First is Frederic Jameson's 
pronouncement that conspiracy theory constitutes the 'poor person's cognitive mapping in the 
postrnodern age', and represents a 'degraded figure of the total logic oflate capital' (Jameson, 
1991). fu recent writing on conspiracy theories, Frederic Jameson's work is mainly referred to 
in order to undermine the traditional conceptualisation of conspiracism as a feature of fringe 
political movements (Knight, 2000, p.l9). The suggestion that conspiracy theory reflects a 
'utopian desire to understand and confront the contradictions and conflicts of contemporary 
capitalism' (Jameson, 1991; p.ll6), releases the term from its negative political connotations 
and establishes conspiracy theory as a widespread 'theory of power' which oversimplifies the 
political and social complexities of the (post)modern age, and challenges problems such as 
high-technology surveillance, consumerism, or the monopoly of international capital (Fenster, 
1999, Melley, 2000). 
As well as drawing upon Jameson's ideas, recent cultural analyses of conspiracy theories 
refer, either directly or indirectly, to Paul Ricoeur's notion of 'hermeneutic of suspicion'. fu 
Freud and Philosophy, Ricoeur proposed that interpretation can take the form of an 'exercise 
of suspicion'. He identified Freud, Marx and Nietzsche, as 'masters of suspicion' in that all 
three authors based their work on religion on the practice of unmasking the 'true' meaning by 
stripping away the 'false consciousness' (Ricoeur, 1970; p.33). Marx famously exposed 
religion as the 'opium of the people' which hides true class inequalities; Nietzsche argued that 
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religion serves as the refuge for the weak and a justification for 'slave morality' (Stewart, 
1989); while Freud traced religion to a particular psycho-sexual dynamic in the unconscious. 
The practice of revealing the 'real' by throwing light on the 'apparent', which underlies 
Ricoeur's 'hermeneutic of suspicion', has led some authors to dtaw a parallel between this 
interpretative exercise and 'paranoia'. For instance, the Encyclopaedia of Postmodemism 
(Routledge, 2000) suggests that 'hermeneutic of suspicion', refers to the 'incipiently paranoid 
interpretative posture which presumes that the deep organization of culture is unintelligible to 
the knowing subject'. Similarly, Melley notes that 'going "more deeply" into the "obvious"' 
is a feature which psycho-analysis shares with 'paranoia' and conspiracy theory. Melley 
dtaws further parallels between psychoanalysis and conspiracy theory when he points out that 
they share not only an interpretative stance, but also a theory of agency. By conceptualising 
the unconscious as a 'mental agency' or 'system', psychoanalysis, just like conspiracy theory, 
locates the motive force of human actions, thoughts and desires to an inaccessible 'system', 
and employs a rhetoric which accords this system human capacities such as motive, unity or 
efficacy (Melley, 2000; p.24). 
Peter Knight invokes Ricoeur when he suggests that conspiracy theory reveals the dynamic of 
a 'quasi-paranoid hermeneutic of suspicion' (Knight, 2000, p.IO) which is largely taken for 
granted by the American public. Similarly, using the example of the X-Files, Knight suggests 
that contemporary conspiracy theory, 'far from offering a paradoxically comforting and fixed 
paranoid interpretation ... revels in an infmite hermeneutic of suspicion which undermines 
every stable solution that the Special Agents [Moulder and Scully] reach' (p.28). In other 
words, conspiracy theory is seen as reflecting a ubiquitous suspicion that 'nothing is ever 
quite as it seems' which in turn leads to an epidemic of mistrust, and a continuing drive for 
endless interpretation. 
What is noteworthy- and problematic- about Fenster's, Melley's and Knight's recent writing 
on conspiracy culture is not the broadness of the definition as such, or the general idea about 
the proliferation of suspicion and mistrust in post-war American society. The problem with 
this approach is that what the three authors describe as 'conspiracy culture' or 'conspiracy 
theory' is regarded as having originated from the Hofstadterian 'paranoid style'. The broader 
culture of suspicion is seen as a post-modem development within the conspiratorial tradition, 
as its new variant which has almost completely supplanted the older varieties. 
For example, Knight (2000) suggests that in the aftermath of the Kennedy assassination, 
conspiracy theories ceased to be the prerogative of the 'obsessive-minded right-wing, 
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. paranoid nut' or 'the dangerous proponent of extremist politics' (p.3). Instead, 'new forms of 
conspiracy culture have emerged' (p.23) which have become a widespread phenomenon, and 
have 'spilt over' into contemporary mass culture. Conspiracy theories were 'no longer the 
lingua franca of the extremists, but [have] become part of the American vernacular' (Knight, 
2000, p.25). In the process, conspiracy theories developed a 'self-ironising' and reflexive 
quality. Conspiracy culture no longer provided 'simple moral certainties, but increasing doubt 
about even the most fundamental assumptions about What Is Really Going On' (p.lO). It 
became 'less of a mark of irrational extremism than the default view for a countercultural 
generation' (p.34). Melley (2000) similarly suggests that the post-WWII conspiracy culture in 
the US is not driv:n so much by the dynamic of scapegoating or by radical politics, but by the 
need to manage the 'sense of diminished human agency' (p.ll) in the face of the increasingly 
menacing 'organisations, technology, or system' (p.8, original emphasis). Fenster, (1999) 
adds to the critique of Hofstadter (1966) and other classical literature on conspiracy theories 
by arguing that the narrow conceptualisation of conspiracy theories as a 'style' characteristic 
of populist movements fails to take into account the emerging role of conspiratorial discourse 
as a widespread 'popular conception of power'. Conspiracy theory is today an 'extreme form 
of political cynicism in which dissatisfaction is stabilised within a narrative that provides an 
all-encompassing scandal at its centre' (Fenster, 1999; p.71). The general idea about the 
recent changes in the nature, content and function of conspiracy theory has been summarised 
by Silverstein (2000) who notes that 'if the previous paradigm of conspiracy was the 
Protocols of the Elders ofZion, the new model is the X-Files'. 
It is intriguing that in outlining the assumed post-modern transformation of conspiracy 
theories, none of the three authors entertains the possibility that the broader philosophy of 
postrnodern suspicion which underpins the X-Files, Oliver Stone's JFK, novels by DeLillo, 
Pynchon or Borroughs and other cultural products which they examine in their work, may not 
be the direct descendant of the Hofstadterian 'paranoid style' or in any direct way related to 
the conspiratorial ideological tradition. Knight, Melley and Fenster ignore the possibility that 
the broader discourse of suspicion and a pervasive scepticism about power and agency, which 
developed after the second world war and became particularly acute in the US after the 
Kennedy assassination, may in fact constitute a different, albeit related, cultural phenomenon. 
However, there are good reasons why the 'hermeneutic of suspicion' and the broader post-
modem scepticism (both of which undoubtedly characterise contemporary American culture) 
need to be distinguished, both historically and conceptually, from the conspiratorial 
ideological tradition. 
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First of all, the conspiratorial tradition of explanation, as described by Hofstadter (1966) or 
Lipset and Raab (1978) continues to exist, both in the United States and elsewhere, unabated 
by the new 'forms' exemplified in novels by DeLillo, Burroughs, Atwood, Pynchon and 
Helier or in TV dramas such the X-Files. As Berlet and Lyons (2001), Barkun (1994) and 
other writers on the American extreme Right repeatedly point out, the conspiracy tradition, 
with its antisemitic elements and populist rhetoric persists on the fringes of American politics. 
Moreover, the conspiracism of extreme political movements appears not to have changed in 
the way that recent literature suggests. There is nothing 'postmodem' about the conspiracy 
theories propounded by the Posse Commitatus, the Christian Identity Movement or 
Farrakhan's Nation oflslam. The ideology of the far-right contains nothing of the postmodem 
tongue-in-cheek playfulness and the 'self-reflexive' tone found in the X-Files or the 1997 film 
Conspiracy Theory. Rather, the ideological single-mindedness of conspiracist ideology 
remains entrenched in the realm of modernity, where tales of clashes between civilisations, 
the implementation of truth, and battles between moral extremes can be elaborated without 
even the smallest dose ofpostmodem irony. 
Also, there is little evidence to suggests that cultural products on which contemporary 
literature on conspiracy theories focuses (i.e. novels, films or TV shows), belong to, or are an 
extension of the previously outlined conspiratorial tradition of explanations. Ideologists of 
Militia or White supremacist movements seldom refer to, for instance, Pynchon's Gravity's 
Rainbow when elaborating some conspiratorial argument. They are more likely to invoke 
Gary Alien's None Dare Call it Conspiracy, which was published in the same year as 
Pynchon's novel. Similarly, Timothy McVeigh's terrorist act in Oklahoma City was inspired 
by The Turner Diaries, a book about the popular revolution against Jews and Blacks, rather 
than by Helier's allegorical novel Catch 22 or any similar contemporary piece of literature. In 
the same way, one will seldom find Burroughs' Naked Lunch mentioned on the reading lists 
of White supremacist organisations, along with the work of Robison, Henry Ford or Nesta 
Webster. The reason is that the two types of literature belong to different cultural traditions. 
Post WWII fiction, which echoes the broader discourse of suspicion, is not part of the 
ideological tradition which is described by Hofstadter (1966), Billig (1978) or Lipset and 
Raab (1978). Although they may have a common underlying theme of conspiracy, the 
narratives of the X-Files or Don DeLillo's Libra neither draw on the conspiratorial tradition 
of explanation, nor contribute directly to its perpetuation. 
The second problem that stems from the failure to distinguish between the conspiracy 
tradition and general trends in contemporary postmodem culture, is that the political 
implications of the conspiracy tradition are repeatedly undermined. Although recent writing 
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on conspiracy culture recognises the dangers posed by the excessive versions of the 'paranoid 
style' and their inherently prejudicial and anti-democratic potential, they nonetheless discuss 
political extremism in the context of mainstream, postrnodem cultural trends. The Turner 
Diaries, Tim McVeigh, the rhetoric of the Nation oflslam, and other examples of conspiracist 
tradition are not granted separate chapters or sections. There is no visible attempt to enforce 
an unequivocal conceptual, moral or political distinction between the conspiracy tradition and 
the more innocuous versions of the post-modem 'paranoid' culture. Melley (2000), for 
instance, refers to the belief in the Zionist Occupational Government, The Turner Diaries and 
the militia ideology as manifestations of the same 'agency panic' which is thought to underlie 
the writing ofPynchon and Helier. Similarly, Tim McVeigh and the Unabomber are cited as 
examples of the pervasive fear of te~hnology als~_evident in Kesey's One Flew Over the 
Cuckoo's Nest or Ellison's Invisible Man. The problem with this approach is that by 
confounding the conspiracist ideological tradition with various symbolic representations of 
modem society, the more positive stance towards conspiracy culture is stretched so as to 
include many controversial aspects of the conspiracy tradition. 
This particular point is evident in the opening chapter of Knight's (2000) book. Although the 
author acknowledges that the New World Order conspiracy theory 'can easily shade into 
tedious and vicious scapegoating which often contains a barely concealed antisemitic strain' 
(p.38), in the same paragraph he recognises that 'though sometimes farfetched, stories about 
the US government knowingly collaborating with 'alien' powers, or about the sinister 
influence of unelected, shadowy internationalist organisations, make sense in the current age 
of rapid globalisation' (p.38). Conspiracy theories are thus seen as only 'sometimes' 
farfetched. Otherwise, they are presumably on to something. On the previous page, Knight 
similarly noted that conspiracy theories propounded by the militias and Patriot movements 
seem unreasonable only 'at first sight' (p.37). Knight's willingness to regard these theories as 
potentially acceptable and reasonable (once one goes beyond the first impression) stems from 
the fact that militia ideology, and traditional conspiratorial themes such as the New World 
Order conspiracy, are treated as manifestations of the 'postrnodem suspicion' which 
addresses genuine concerns of contemporary society in a playful and self-ironising way. The 
failure to distinguish between the conspiracy tradition and the discourses of suspicion, 
elevated the ideology of extremism and radical politics to the status of what Knight later calls 
'routinised paranoia', which today is the 'default mode of contemporary cultural criticism' 
(p.73). 
The disregard for the political dimension of the conspiracy tradition is also apparent when 
Knight discusses Macdonald's Turner Diaries. Although Knight acknowledges that The 
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Diaries are conspiracy theory 'taken to its most bloody and dangerous extreme', he goes on 
to claim that 
'in the haste to condemn the novel's heavy handed message, however, few if any considered 
what makes up the bulk of the book. In many places the overarching story of violent revolution 
is almost forgotten amid the welter of mechanical detail ... As much as it is a conspiratorial 
blueprint for racial warfare and an attack on multiculturalism, The Turner Diaries is also a 
homage to the value of skilled labour ... and lament for the way those skills have begun to be 
redundant in post-war America.' (p.40) 
The bigotry of The Turner Diaries is allocated secondary importance in Knight's analysis. 
Macdonald's book is presented as yet another example of literature in which the theme of 
conspiracy is invoked to represent the dissatisfaction with contemporary industrial relations in 
the US. Regardless of the formal dismissal of the prejudicial message of The Turner Diaries, 
the fact that the book is discussed in the context of fairly innocuous fictional literature 
underestimate the novel's antisemitic and anti-Black dimension, as well as its ideological 
origins in the American far-Right. 
This pattern is repeated in the discussion of conspiracy theories among the Black community 
in the US, where Knight mentions the presence of antisemitic themes in the conspiratorial 
rhetoric of the Nation oflslam (NOI). Rather than tracing the roots ofNOI's antisemitism to 
the conspiratorial ideological tradition, Knight interprets the anti-Jewish prejudice of Black 
militants as a rather trivial aspect of American race relations. The contempt for the 'Jewish 
slumlord' expressed in NOI propaganda is explained away as 'part of the longer tirade against 
a host of other "white slumlords"' (p.163). Moreover, Knight suggested that the recent 
'mutual fear and loathing' between Blacks and Jews was exacerbated by the 'moral panic' 
whipped up by the mainstream media, Jewish organisations (ADL), and the US Senate, in 
response to the suggestion, made by a NOI leader, that Jews have organised the slave trade. 
Knight's dismissal of conspiratorial antisemitism as a by-product of American race relations, 
for which Jewish organisations such as B 'nai Brith and the ADL are partly responsible, not 
only ignores the legacy of antisemitism in the conspiratorial cultural tradition but also 
trivialises the political and social implications of anti-Jewish prejudice. 
The way in which the over-inclusive definition of 'conspiracy theory' or 'conspiracy culture' 
undermines the political and ideological dimension of the conspiratorial tradition is also 
apparent in Fenster's (1999) work. Although mainly critical of conspiracy theory as a political 
project, Fenster (1999) suggests that conspiracy theories '[have] had a remarkably productive 
role in American history, in the development of a secular Enlightenment rationality' (Fenster, 
1999, p.xv). Presumably, Fenster is referring to the variety of 19"' century populist 
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movements whose role in American history is rarely thought to be particularly commendable 
(see for instance Berlet and Lyons, 2000). fu fact, these movements provide the ideological 
basis for contemporary Militias, supremacist movements and other right-wing groups in the 
US. Also, Fenster suggests that 'fascist racism' is not 'conspiracy theory's necessary result'. 
Rather, as a counterculture which encourages suspicion about the existing power structure, 
conspiracy theory is thought to harbour a progressive and democratic potential. This is a 
claim that is hardly supported by the history of the conspiratorial cultural tradition, and is 
defensible only if the term 'conspiracy theory' is taken to be sufficiently broad to include any 
suspicion about power and government. 
The purpose behind this examination of recent cultural studies of conspiracy theory has not 
been to belittle their general aim, which is to analyse contemporary mass culture and its 
preoccupation with the idea of conspiracy. fustead, the intention was to draw attention to the 
necessity of a distinction between post-modem cultural trends and the ideological tradition of 
conspiracy theory; as well as to highlight the problems, both conceptual and political, which 
arise out of the failure to separate the two phenomena. At the same time, this is not to say that 
there is not a more subtle and complex interconnection between conspiratorial tradition and 
the general discourse of suspicion. This issue will be picked up in a later chapter, where 
examples from the Serbian political context will be used to suggest that the exercise of 
suspicion, while not drawing on the conspiratorial tradition of explanation, often poses the 
general question and introduces an explanatory dilemma to which the conspiratorial tradition 
of explanation can offer a simple and coherent answer (see Chapter 6). 
2.5. Conclusion 
The aim of the present chapter has been to introduce a conceptualisation of conspiracy theory 
which will be adhered to throughout the thesis. Conspiracy theory was defined as a tradition 
of explanation which comprises of a set of ideas, values, interpretations and images which are 
used to construct a causal explanation at the heart of which is the idea of world conspiracy. It 
was further suggested that conspiracy theory constitutes a type of explanation that is typically 
found on the fringes of contemporary democratic and pluralist political culture, and which has 
traditionally inspired (and was in turn perpetuated by) extremist and populist movements 
worldwide. fu defining conspiracy theory in this relatively restricted way, the present project 
sides with what is today widely regarded as the classical literature on the subject, including 
Hofstadter (1966), Lipset and Raab, (1978), Davis (1972), Roberts (1974), Billig (1978) etc. 
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The relatively narrow definition of the subject matter not only excludes from the category of 
conspiracy theory the broader discourses of suspicion which characterise contemporary 
Western culture, but also eliminates other types of explanations, such as institutional analysis 
(Chomsky) or some versions of 'vulgar Marxism' which are occasionally included in the 
category of conspiracy theory (e.g. Pipes, 1998). As the examination of the recent studies of 
conspiratorial themes in US mass culture demonstrated, the imposition of strict conceptual 
bouodaries is necessary and well-justified. Over-inclusive definitions which incorporate into 
the category of conspiracy theory any allusion to secrecy and collusion, or any attribution of 
causality to actions and motives of determinate individuals, often undermine the political 
implications of the conspiratorial tradition and the role which it continues to play in the 
production of extremist ideology and discourses of prejudice. 
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Chapter3 
Serbian populist right-wing politics: the roots of conspiracy culture 
In outlining the historical development and main characteristics of the conspiracy tradition, 
the previous chapter focused on the tradition's 'universal' features, rather than on the 
specificities of Serbian conspiratorial culture. Tills approach was justified, considering that 
there appears to be an informal exchange of information, resources and lmowledge among 
conspiracy theorists worldwide. For instance, the writing of Ratibor Durdevic, one of Serbia's 
most prolific conspiracy theorists, contains frequent references to American writers such as 
Eustace Mullins, Gary Alien or Henry Ford. At the same time, Durdevic's name appears on 
the 'reading list' recommended by the Islamic Association for Palestine webpage. Similarly, 
various right-wing organisations in the US such as the LaRouchians, even the Christian 
Identity Movement, often share conspiratorial resources and arguments with the Nation of 
Islam as well as with some left-wing critics of the American establishment such as the former 
Attorney-General Ramsey Clark (Berlet & Lyons, 2000; Pipes, 1998). Tills cross-cultural 
dimension of conspiracy theories plays an important part in the preservation and continuation 
of a distinct cultural tradition. 
The more general appeal of the conspiracy tradition does not imply that the precise shape, 
form and tone of a conspiratorial explanation is not affected by individuals, political 
movements or ideological traditions which are unique to the social and cultural context in 
which that explanation emerges. For this reason, the present chapter will outline the history 
and idiosyncrasies of the Serbian conspiratorial tradition and identify various religious, 
political and cultural influences which have helped shape the explanations of the bombing of 
Yugoslavia in the Spring of 1999. 
In examining the history of Serbian conspiracy culture, the chapter will pay particular 
attention to the Serbian populist movement of the 1930s, which played a crucial role in the 
development of Serbian conspiratorial discourse. In this context, the chapter will reflect on 
the teachings of Bishop Nikolaj Velimirovic (1880-1956), a Serbian Orthodox Christian 
thinker, who as well a being a respected religious scholar, is also a prominent authority within 
Serbian conspiracy culture. As the empirical chapters will show, VelimiroviC's name 
repeatedly crops up in Serbian conspiracy material. In fact, it can safely be said that in 
contemporary Serbia it is difficult to find an elaborate account of a world conspiracy that does 
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. not, in one way or another, reflect upon some aspect of the Bishop's work. The reasons 
behind Velimirovic's prominent status within Serbian conspiracy culture will be sought in his 
role as the spiritual leader of 1930s populism and as one of the architects of the clero-
nationalist dimension of Serbian conspiracism. Following the historical overview of Serbian 
conspiratorial discourse, the chapter will outline various aspects of the ideological climate in 
Serbia in the 1990s which facilitated the proliferation of conspiratorial explanatory discourse. 
3.1, Early history of Serbian conspiracy culture and the emergence of conspiratorial 
antisemitism 
The roots of Serbian conspiracy culture can be traced to the emergence of conspiratorial 
antisemitism in the fmal decades of the 19th century. As the previous chapter indicated, in 
most of Europe, antisemitic conspiratorial themes emerged in reaction to the emancipation of 
Jews in the first half of the 19th century. In Serbia, conspiratorial antisemitism developed 
relatively late (after 1870), but like elsewhere, it was in reaction to the abolition of anti-
Jewish legislation and the liberalisation of Serbian society. 
Serbia's struggle for independence in the early 19th century was accompanied by the 
persecution of the country's Jewish minority. From 1804 onwards, Jews were systematically 
driven out of provincial Serbia and made to settle in Belgrade.1 The exodus of the Jewish 
community culminated in 1846 when Jews were forbidden by law to live outside the city. 
Importantly, in the early days of persecution, the victimisation of Jews was not based on fear 
of Jewish conspiracy, but on religious antisemitism which was deeply entrenched in Orthodox 
Christianity and which contributed to a general distrust of and animosity towards the 'alien' 
Jewish community (Poliakov, 1974; Cohn, 1957; Perdurant, 1995). As an English Consul 
noted at the time, Jews were 'shut off from their so-called fellow-subjects as if contact with 
them would communicate the plague' (cited in Cohen, 1996). Later, with the emergence of 
the Serbian mercantile class in the mid 19th century, antisemitism attained a commercial 
dimension as pressure was placed on the Serbian authorities to curb the competition from 
Jewish businesses and impose legal limits on the dealings of Jewish-owned companies 
outside the capital. Tills led directly to the ghettoisation of Jews in Belgrade after 1861. 
Interestingly, in the 1860s and 70s Britain exercised regular diplomatic pressure on Serbian 
rulers to end the persecution of the country's Jewish community.2 As a result of British 
pressure, the Berlin Treaty, signed in 1878, which formally granted Serbia its independence 
and statehood, required of the newly established kingdom to recognise political and civil 
rights of all religious minorities. Resistance to this section of the treaty was considerable, so 
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aspects of anti-Jewish legislation remained in force Wltil 1889, when the new constitution 
brought Serbia in line with its treaty obligations. The subsequent period was characterised by 
the speedy emancipation of the Jewish commWlity. By the early 20th century, six Jews had 
entered Serbia's government, education authorities and the military establishment 
(Freidenreich, 1979). 
The gradual liberalisation of Serbian society, which began with the signing of the Berlin 
treaty, was accompanied by a widespread feeling of resentment and backlash among sections 
of the Serbian population. The Serbian Orthodox Church authorities in particular complained 
against the new rights given to Jews, and numerous antisemitic tracts were published at the 
time (Cohen, 1996). One of them was the translation of a German pamphlet Religious 
Teaching of the Talmud or the Mirror of Kike Honesty, which was translated and published in 
1878 by the well-Jmown publicist Vasa Pelagic. Another was the 1882 antisemitic tract Let's 
not give Serbia to the Kikes, the authors of which were several anonymous 'Serbian patriots'. 
The book called for the formation of a 'Serbian anti-Jewish (antisemitic) society' similar to 
those foWlded by 'German and HWlgarian patriots'. These and other antisemitic publications 
of the period focused on two related themes: the portrayal of Jewish religion as 'evil', and of 
the Jewish community as an exploitative and alien force in Serbian society. For instance, 
Pelagic's 1878 pamphlet asserted that the Talmud requires of Jews to 'cheat, steal, grab, have 
pawn shops, plunder, hate, destroy, exploit, and kill all people who are not Jews'. Subsequent 
publications, such as The Book about Jews: At whose store should we shop (anonymous, 
1904) elaborated on the economic theme by accusing the local Jewish population of immoral 
practices such as price-rigging or usury, the aim of which was to impoverish the Serbian rural 
community. Significantly, these anti-Jewish ideas reflected the sentiments of 19th century 
German antisemitism (Poliakov, 1974). This is not surprising, considering that Serbia's 
fledgling bourgeoisie was principally educated in Germany, Austria and Hungary from where 
it imported the dominant ideas of that period. Consequently, while drawing most of its force 
and popular appeal from the longstanding Jewish demonology propounded by the Orthodox 
Church, the late 19th century antisemitism, which signalled the arrival of the conspiratorial 
tradition of explanation to the Serbian society, developed under the strong influence of the 
German nationalist writing of that period.' 
In the first half of the 20'• century, and especially during the reign of King Peter I 
Karadordevic (1903-1918), antisemitic discourse persisted in Serbia amid a generally more 
liberal political climate which brought with it greater tolerance towards Jews. In 1919 the first 
Jewish community organisation, the Alliance of Jewish Municipalities was founded. The 
Alliance acted on behalf of the Jews in the newly formed Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and 
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Slovenes (renamed the Kingdom of Yugoslavia in 1929) and served as a kind of anti-
defamation league which ensured equal treatment and social equality for Jews. In 1936, for 
instance, the Alliance won a lawsuit against the publishers of the Serbian translation of 
Protocols of the Learned Elders of Zion, thus managing at least to delay the book's 
publication by several years. In this period the status of conspiratorial antisemitism in Serbia 
was comparable to that in other European democracies. The notion of a Jewish plot existed as 
an explanatory discourse and often constituted what Billig {1987b) referred to as the 'polite 
currency of gentile conversation' (p.250). However, in the sphere of politics, antisemitic ideas 
were confined to marginal organisations and movements and as such did not affect 
government policy. This state of affairs persisted until the arrival of the German occupational 
forces in 1941. 
Although of limited political significance at the time, conspiratorial antisemitism propounded 
in the 1930s by fringe political movements proved crucial for the subsequent development of 
the conspiratorial culture in Serbia. In the decade which preceded the Second World War, the 
notion of Jewish conspiracy was raised to the level of political ideology, and was formulated 
as a fairly coherent set of ideas and assumptions which have inspired Serbian conspiratorial 
writing ever since. 
3.2. Conspiracy theory as a political ideology and religious doctrine: Dimitrije Ljotic, 
Nikolaj Velimirovic and 1930s Serbian populism 
The mid to late 1930s witnessed the democratisation of Yugoslav society. In the aftermath of 
the assassination of King Alexander Karadordevic in Marseilles in 1934, a number of pro-
Western and pro-European parties emerged on the political scene (e.g. the Popular Front), and 
endeavoured to strengthen the country's democratic institutions and prevent the emergence 
of fascism and nazism. At the same time, increasing ethnic tension and the activity of various 
subversive organisations such as the Communist Party (outlawed in 1920) or the Croatian 
Ustashi movement, threatened to destabilise Yugoslavia's new democracy. The rising sense 
of political uncertainty spawned a number of right-wing movements which offered an 
alternative 'solution' to the problems of corruption, political squabbling and what they called 
the 'overall moral deterioration of the nation'. The most significant Serbian right-wing 
movement of this period was Zbor (Rally) founded in 1935 by Dimitrije Ljotic {1891-1945). 
Ljotic is today considered to be the main architect and representative of pre-World War II 
Serbian right-wing populism (Martic, 1980; Popov, 1993; Stefanovic, 1974; Kljujic, 1974; 
Gligorijevic, 1965). 
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Zbor's political program consisted of a blend of Italian Fascism, 
German Nazism, and Orthodox Christian fundamentalism. Ljotic 
spoke of 'the people' as an 'organic being' which must abandon 
individualism, parliamentary democracy, communism, the 
emancipation of women and other values of modernity. He argued 
that the nation must rally round a charismatic Leader (preferably the 
King from the Karadordevic dynasty), and return to its religious and 
cultural traditions (Popov, 1993). Ljotic advocated a strong state 
based on the categories of 'God, King and paterfamilias [domaCin ]', in which the teaching of 
Orthodox Christianity and Serbian peasant traditions would provide the main organising 
principles (Martic, 1980; Kljujic, 1974; Stefanovic, 1974). 
Apart from a strong base among students of the University of Belgrade (where the 
organisation even had its own restaurant) and among members of the Orthodox clergy (see 
below), Zbor was, by and large, an unpopular political movement. Membership never 
exceeded a couple of thousand, and included, as well as priests and students, mainly members 
of urban nriddle classes such as doctors, lawyers, judges, bureaucrats, teachers and traders 
(Popov, 1993).4 In the elections of 1935 and 1938, Ljotic's organisation attracted around one 
percent of the vote and failed to win a single seat. It is generally believed that most Serbs 
rejected Zbor because its ideology was considered to be too close to fascism and nazism. The 
late 1930s were a time of widespread support for Western powers among the Serbs, and was 
accompanied by intense distrust and hatred of Germany and its allies (Martic, 1980; Jrvine, 
1995). Because of his open adnriration for Hitler, Ljotic was often referred to in the press as a 
'German agent', a label which he strongly rejected.5 As a profoundly anti-democratic 
movement, Zbor was subjected to regular police intinridation in the pre-war years. Its assets 
were confiscated, rallies interrupted, and pronrinent members arrested, especially after 1940, 
when the movement was officially outlawed by the authorities (Martic, 1980). 
Ljotic's political fortunes changed with the arrival of German troops in April1941. Zbor and 
its military wing, the Serbian Volunteer Force (Srpski Dobrovoljacki Korpus; SDK) became 
Serbia's main collaborationist organisation, and a much more reliable ally of the Germans 
than the official puppet regime ofGeneral Milan Nedic (Martic, 1980).6 Members of the SDK 
fought alongside the Germans against Partizan and Chetnik insurgents, and were even 
involved in the organisation of retaliatory executions of civilian population.7 Ljotic founded 
the Serbian equivalent of the Hitler Jugend, and opened a prison camp in the town of Sremska 
Palanka the aim of which was to 're-indoctrinate' Serbia's communist youth (Martic, 1980; 
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Stefanovic, 1974). Also, a number of prominent members of Zbor obtained high positions in 
the Serbian collaborationist government (Cohen, 1996). 
While general aspects of Ljotic's populist ideology and his collaborationist activity are dealt 
with elsewhere (Popov, 1993; Martic, 1980; Stefanovic, 1984; Gligorijevic, 1965; Kuljic, 
1974; Petranovic, 1983; Borkovic, 1979; etc.) the present discussion will focus on the theme 
of conspiracy which runs through, and is in many ways central to Ljotic's political outlook. In 
LjotiC's writing the uncompromising anti-modernist stance, which includes radical anti-
individualism, anti-rationalism, anti-humanism, anti-pluralism and anti-intellectualism 
(Popov, 1993), is repeatedly justified and rationalised by reference to a global international 
Jewish-Masonic-Communist conspiracy against the Serbs and other Christians. 
For example, in the book The Drama of the Contemporary World, which contains a collection 
of transcripts of Ljotic's speeches delivered in 1939 and 1940, it is alleged that behind the 
world's problems lies the 'Great Director' (as in theatre director), a 'collective personality' 
which consists of 'a people without land, language, a stable religion, a people without roots, 
the Jews' (Ljotic, 1940; p. 9-11). 8 Ljotic traces the origins of the Jewish conspiracy to the 
French Revolution (p.22) and claims that every significant historical event since 1789 
(including the Berlin Treaty and the Russian Revolution) was caused by the Jews, and by the 
European Masonic Lodges whom Ljotic referred to as the 'Jewish Continental Comintern' 
(Martic, 1980). In Ljotic's writing, Jews are portrayed as the force behind Zbor's three main 
anathemas: liberal democracy, Freemasonry and communism, and therefore as the 
movement's (and by extension the nation's) principal enemy (Popov, 1993). In fascism Ljotic 
saw a form of resistance against global Jewish control and he praised Hitler for uncovering 
the conspiracy of 'World Jewry' (Martic, 1980). 
Before the Second World War, Zbor's conspiracy theory was disseminated and popularised 
mainly by means of public rallies and through Zbor's own publications such as Otadibina 
(Fatherland), Nas Put (Our Path), Novi Put (New Path), Bilten JNP Zbor (Bulletin of the 
Yugoslav Popular Movement Zbor) and a German language publication Die Erwache 
{Awakening), aimed at Serbia's Volksdeutsche community which inhabited parts of the 
northern province of Vojvodina. Individual issues of these publications were occasionally 
prohibited by the authorities, in some cases as a result of successful lawsuits by the Alliance 
ofJewish Municipalities. However, during the Second World War, Zbor's publishing activity 
flourished. Ljotic and his associates were responsible for the publication of a significant 
proportion of the total of 51 antisemitic titles published in Serbia between I 941 and 1945 
(Helsinki Committee for Human Rights Report on Antisemitism, Belgrade 200 I). Authors of 
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books such as Under the Star of David: Judaism and the Freemasons movements in the past 
and today (Pavlovic, 1943), The Serb People Under the Clutches of Jews (Mojic, 1941) and 
Jews in Serbia (Prokic, 1941) were all prominent members of Zbor. Furthermore, Zbor was 
behind the notorious Great Anti-Masonic Exhibition, organised in Belgrade in October 1941 
under the auspices of the German authorities. The exhibition, the aim of which was to 
publicise the alleged existence of a Judeo-Masonic-Communist conspiracy, was the largest in 
a series of similar propaganda activities which Zbor organised throughout Serbia in the early 
1940s. 
Ljotic's principal contribution to Serbian conspiratorial culture is that his writing gave the 
local version of conspiracy theory a narrative coherence and political direction which it 
previously did not possess. He performed a function comparable to that of Henry Ford in the 
US or Hitler in Germany. In the populist ideology of the 1930s, the concerns of Serbian 
nationalist and conservative forces were assimilated into the conspiratorial tradition of 
explanation, and the 'problems' of Serbian society were projected into the idea of a global 
Jewish, communist and Masonic conspiracy. More importantly, the publishing activity of 
Zbor both before and during the war produced the core material of Serbian conspiracy culture 
and elaborated many themes which are still in evidence in strands of Serbian conspiratorial 
discourse sixty years later. 
While literature on Ljotic and 1930s Serbian populism regularly acknowledges the role of 
Zbor in laying the foundations of Serbian conspiracy theory (Popov, 1993; Martic, 1980; 
Stefanovic, 1984), studies on the subject often neglect to mention that Zbor was in many ways 
a political manifestation of a wider cultural phenomenon of that period, one that had a 
particularly strong religious dimension. In fact most of LjotiC's political beliefs, including the 
notion of world conspiracy, reflect the views of Bishop Nikolaj Velimirovic who, as early as 
in the 1920s, propounded many ideas which were subsequently popularised by Zbor. 
Bishop Velimirovic was one of the most respected Serbian religious figures of the early 20th 
century, famous for his nationalism and clericalism as much as for his personal charisma, 
oratorical skills and erudition (Bigovic, 1998)? As an ardent follower of the medieval Serbian 
Saint Sava, Velimirovic advocated the union of church and state, claiming that a 'state which 
is not Christian is - Satanic' (quoted in Subotic, 1996). Like Ljotic, Velimirovic believed in 
society founded on the principles of Orthodox Christian tradition, and a state based on 
religion, rather than science, art or economics (Dream about a Slav Religion, Velimirovic, 
2001; p.ll-25). Also, Velimirovic proposed the 'God-King-paterfamilias' triad as the basis 
of a future Christian society long before it was taken up by Ljotic (Subotic, 1996). 
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In contrast to Ljotic, who openly politicised many of Velimirovic's ideals, the Bishop 
propagated his views in a more surreptitious way, through a less formal religious movement. 
In early 1920s he founded Bogomoljci (the Devotionalists), an evangelical movement 
consisting of a dispersed network of cells which disseminated Velimirovic's teachings 
throughout Serbia (see Subotic, 1996). 
In one of his last interviews Bishop Velimirovic openly claimed 
that he was the spiritual leader and eminence grise of Serbian 
populism. Velimirovic insisted that Ljotic was his 'pupil and 
faithful follower in Christ' who, metaphorically speaking, was 
merely 'passing the incense burner' (quoted in Popov, 1993). At 
the same time, Velirnirovic held his 'apprentice' in high esteem. At 
Ljotic's funeral in 1945, Velirnirovic spoke of the deceased as 'a 
politician bearing a cross', and praised him as the 'ideologue of 
clericalist nationalism' whose importance transcends the Nikollli Velimirovic 
boundaries of Serbian politics (cited in Kostic, 1991 and Subotic, 1996). Further evidence that 
Ljotic and Velirnirovic were actually part of the same broader political movement, comes 
from the fact that there was a significant overlap between the membership of Zbor and the 
Devotionalists. According to some sources, from 1935 onwards, leaders of Zbor were the 
'backbone' ofVelimirovic's movement (Subotic, 1996; p.195), while according to others, the 
Devotionalists collectively joined Ljotic's Zbor in the late 1930s (Stefanovic, 1984, Cohen, 
1996). 
Particularly significant to the present discussion is the fact that the conspiratorial antisernitism 
evident in Ljotic's political project is also apparent in Bishop Nikolaj Velimirovic's writing, 
where the religious aspect of the anti-Jewish bigotry is especially prominent. For instance, in 
Words to the Serbian People Through the Dungeon Window, written in the final years of the 
Second World War, Velirnirovic spoke of all modern ideas including 'democracy, and strikes, 
and socialism, and atheism, and religious tolerance, and pacifism, and global revolution, and 
capitalism, and communism' as the inventions of 'Jews, or rather their father, the Devil' 
(p.l94). According to V elimirovic, behind modernity lay a Satanic conspiracy, the aim of 
which is to 'place a Jewish Messiah on Christ's throne' (p.194). Velimirovic most frequently 
referred to Jews as' Civuti' ('Kikes') and to the Jewish ghetto as 'Civutana' a derivative of the 
derogatory name for Jews. 
44 
. It is important to note that antisemitic references in Velimirovic's religious philosophy cannot 
be dismissed as a mere remnant of the older anti-Jewish tradition which persists in Orthodox 
Christian theology. Rather, the antisemitism evident in Velimirovic's teaching and in various 
early devotionalist publications bears the hallmarks of European and American conspiracy 
tradition. In fact, the Devotionalist movement played a crucial role in the dissemination of 
conspiracy theories in the 1920s, long before Zbor was established. As early as 1926, and 
therefore more than ten years before Protocols of the Learned Elders of Zion was first 
published (and banned) in Serbia, the Devotionalist journal HriH:anska Zajednica (The 
Christian Community) printed parts of Protocols in the text Bloody foundations, or the 
Protocols of the Elders of Zion (No.2-3, March 1926; p.6-9). Incidentally, the article was 
taken from the Catholic journal Nova Revija (The New Review), published in Croatia. In the 
same year, The Christian Community reprinted extracts from Pelagic's aforementioned 
translation of the German pamphlet Religious Teaching of the Talmud ... (No 4, April, 1926; 
p.S-11 ). Also, the Devotionalists, who maintained strong links with the Serbian diaspora in 
the US, introduced the antisemitic ideas of Henry Ford to the Serbian public. In the spring of 
1927, The Christian Community published the article Enemies of Christianity, according to 
Henry Ford in which socialism and Freemasonry were identified as two 'darlings of the Jew' 
(No.l-2, January, 1927; p.4-9).10 Similar conspiratorial texts conveying the antisemitic, anti-
masonic and anticommunist message were a regular feature of Devotionalist religious 
publications at the time (see Subotic, 1996). 
It is also worth mentioning that Velimirovic's writing in the 1930s and 40s reveals traces of 
Nazi political rhetoric. For instance, on one occasion Velimirovic publicly referred to Nazi 
Germany as a realisation of his own nationalist ideal. In a speech delivered in 1935, 
Velimirovic described Hitler as an inadvertent follower of the principles laid down by the 
Serbian medieval Saint Sava. Velimirovic suggested that 'one must applaud the current 
German Leader, who as a simple craftsman and a common man, realised that nationalism 
without faith is an anomaly, a cold and insecure mechanism' (Velimirovic, 2001, p.36). Also, 
Velimirovic's writing in the 1930s reflects the racist ideology characteristic of that period. In 
the essay Whose are you, little Serbian people, written in 1939, Velimirovic speaks of Serbs 
as 'God's children and people of the Aryan race, who have been granted the honorary role of 
being the main pillar of Christianity in the world' (Velimirovic, 2001, p.40). He suggests that 
'we are Aryan by blood, Slavs by surname, Serbs by name, Christians in heart and spirit' 
(ibid.). For Velimirovic, Serbs were the guardians at the gates of Aryan Europe, who protect 
its purity from 'inferior tribes'. 
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In spite of the noticeable presence of Nazi political rhetoric in Velimirovic's discourse, the 
Bishop's attitude towards Germany and its regime was somewhat ambivalent. In 1941, 
Velimirovic was one of the staunchest opponents to the decision by the Yugoslav government 
to sign a pact with the Axis forces. Also, in some of Velimirovic's later writing Nazism and 
Fascism were dismissed as the 'pneumonia' of society which needs to be eradicated (see 
Bigovic, 1998). Yet, such criticisms of Nazism tend to appear side by side with what is 
effectively the Serbian clerico-nationalist variant of the same ideology, characterised by the 
claims about the moral, spiritual and racial superiority of the Orthodox Slavs, Serbs and the 
Dinar race 11 and which, like its German equivalent, has the notion of a Jewish conspiracy at 
its core. 12 
Velimirovic's ambivalence towards the Germans was also reflected in Ljotic's writing. 
Ljotic's initial enthusiasm for Hitler diminished significantly after September 1939, when, 
according to his own account, the leader of Zbor became disappointed that the German 
dictator 'fell for the Jewish trick' and started a war from which Jews would ultimately benefit 
both politically and financially (Martic, 1980). And yet, doubts about Hitler's military 
strategy did not prevent Ljotic from assisting the Nazis in the implementation of the 'final 
solution' during the German occupation of Yugoslavia. Ljotic resolved his ambivalence by 
adding a peculiar apocalyptic twist to his conspiracy theory. He predicted that the war 
between Germany and the Allies would ultimately end in the defeat of the Nazis, but that the 
winners, the Soviet 'Judeo-Communists' and the 'Judaised West' would both end up drained 
by the lengthy conflict. At this point, true Christian nations (including of course the Serbs) 
would rise from the ashes, establish a new and better world, and deliver a fatal blow to the 
'cunning Jew' and his Satanic conspiracy (Ljotic, World Revolution). In other words, Ljotic 
justified Zbor's collaboration with the Nazis as a temporary and necessary measure, which 
would preserve the strength of the Serbian nation for the impending and much more important 
showdown with the real enemies, the Jews, Freemasons and Communists (Martic, 1980). 
In contrast to Ljotic, whose political career flourished under the Germans, Bishop 
Velimirovic was arrested in the summer of 1941. In 1944, he was sent briefly to the Dachau 
concentration camp, along with the Serbian Patriarch Gavrilo. According to one of 
VelimiroviC's biographers, the order for the arrests of two of Serbia's most influential church 
dignitaries came directly from Hitler who was apparently outraged by Bishop Nikolaj's role 
in the organisation of the anti-Axis demonstrations in Belgrade which preceded the invasion 
(Bigovic, 1998).13 Although Velimirovic's pro-British political stance has been recognised by 
most historians of that period (Petranovic, 1983; Nenezic, 1984; Borkovic, 1979), favourable 
biographical accounts ofVelimirovic's life fail to mention that Bishop Nikolaj spent most of 
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the war under house arrest in the Ljubostinja monastery. He was interned at Dachau only in 
1944, for less than two months, before Ljotic intervened and had both the Bishop and the 
Patriarch released.14 Moreover, according to some accounts, Velimirovic was held at Dachau 
as an Ehrenhafling, an 'honour prisoner', which meant that he lived in separate quarters 
within the camp hospital and ate the same food as the German officers (Cohen, 1996). These 
revelations undermine the claims of Velimirovic' s supporters that the Germans feared the 
Bishop's influence and popularity, or that he suffered significant hardship (even torture) 
during the imprisonment. Nonetheless, Velimirovic's alleged 'martyrdom' at the hands of the 
Nazis is often invoked by his admirers as a way of building the Bishop's political and moral 
credibility, and undermining the accusations that Velimirovic was a Nazi sympathiser or at 
least a close associate and spiritual guide of Serbian nationalist collaborators.15 
3.3. Serbs vs. 'the rotten West': The roots of anti-Western political discourse in Serbia 
As will become apparent in subsequent chapters, in contemporary Serbian conspiracy 
theories, the hub of the alleged plot is most frequently located in 'the West'. Although the 
focus on the West (and America in particular) is not unique to Serbian conspiratorial 
discourse (see previous chapter), the roots of anti-Westernism in Serbian conspiracy culture 
go beyond the conspiracy tradition. The antagonism towards Western political and cultural 
influences, which is evident in strands of contemporary Serbian nationalist discourse is 
grounded in the mid 19th century Slavophile movement (Colovic, 1997; Perovic, 1992, 1994). 
It was only in the 1920s and 30s that Slavophile anti-Westernism became assimilated into the 
conspiratorial explanatory discourse. Once again, a key role in this development was played 
by Nikolaj Velimirovic. 
Slavophile sentiments, which first developed in Russia in the early 19th century, did not arrive 
in Serbia from Russian Orthodox pan-Slavists like Aksakov or Homyakov, as is often 
thought, but from Czech and Slovak sources, notably Ludevit Stur and the poet Jan Kolar 
(Skerlic, 1925; Colovic, 1997, Perovic, 1992). Slavophile ideas were brought to Serbia by 
students from the universities of Budapest and Posen who propounded their newly acquired 
ideas through the Serbian Youth Association (DruZbina Mladezi Srpske) which they founded 
in 1847. 
The basic tenet of Slavophilia was the belief in 'Slavdom' which has the power to 'revive 
weakened humanity, replace the exhausted Latin and incomplete Germanic civilisations, form 
a great Slav empire and establish a complete, humane and ideal civilisation' (Skerlic, 1925; 
cited in Colovic, 1997, p.89). According to Skerlic (1925), pan-Slavism was inspired by the 
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writings of Hegel and Fichte who saw Germany as the embodiment of 19" century culture 
and human spirituality.16 Slavophiles took German romanticist ideas further, arguing that the 
'spirituaiJy fresh' Slavs wiiJ eventuaiJy inherit the 'spiritual hegemony' of the Germans, and 
that Slavic culture will become the 'ultimate creation of the human spirit' (Skerlic, 1925; 
p.167). The aiJeged superiority of Slavic culture was often formulated in racial terms. S1avs 
were presented as a separate 'race' whose strength lies in the freshness and healthiness of its 
'blood' (Colovic, 1997). 
Inherent in the Slavophile argument was the idea that 'Slav East' and 'European West' were 
two irreconcilable worlds, engaged in a perpetual cultural, religious, national and economic 
struggle (Perovic, 1994). This feature of the Slavophile ideology was particularly prominent 
in the writing of Russian authors, especiaiJy Dostoyevski, who gave the racial and cultural 
anti-Westernism a strong religious emphasis. In his writing, the East-West dichotomy was 
transformed into the conflict between Orthodox East and Catholic/Protestant West. 
From 1860s onwards, anti-Westernism became a particularly strong theme in Serbian 
Slavophile discourse, which in this period also attained significant nationalist overtones 
(Skerlic, 1925). Attributes previously associated with Slav people in general were graduaiJy 
confined to the Serbian nation (Colovic, 1997). Serbs became the epitome of Slavophile 
values, the role model for other Slav nations, and the standard-bearers in the crusade against 
the 'rotten West'. In the decades which followed, Slavophilia, and its anti-Western element in 
particular, remained a credible force in Serbian nationalist discourse. In some cases it is even 
said to have influenced mainstream politics. For example, the writing of Russian Slavophile 
philosopher Danilevski is thought to have affected the politics of two prominent early 20" 
century Serbian statesmen, Nikola Pa§ic and Stjepan Radic (Perovic, 1994; Colovic, 1997).17 
However, in the early 20th century, nowhere was Slavophilia more influential and popular 
than among members of the Orthodox clergy. Under the influence of Dostoyevski's later 
writing, a number of Serbian Orthodox thinkers, including Bishop Nikolaj Velimirovic and 
Father Justin Popovic, turned Slavophile anti-Westernism into an ideological weapon against 
the liberalisation and secularisation of Serbian society. 
Velimirovic and Popovic, both of whom were educated in Western Europe, believed that 
Europe was under the influence of 'new ideologies: individualism, nationalism, liberalism, 
conservativism, materialism and secularism'. All of these values signalled the 'de-
Christianisation' of Europe and its imminent end. Father Justin Popovic argued that 'Homo 
Europaicus ', whose culture is based on the concept of Man rather than on God, will self-
destruct as 'deicide must end in suicide' (quoted in Subotic, 1993). Velimirovic also had an 
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apocalyptic vision of the future of Europe. He saw Marx, Darwin and Nietzsche as the three 
'ghosts of Europe' whose influence would bring the annihilation of Western civilisation. 
Also, both authors were critical of the progressive trends among the Serbian intelligentsia in 
early 20th century, which, they argued, polluted the 'nation's soul' with 'European nihilism'. 
For Velimirovic and Popovic the antidote to the damaging secularisation of Serbian society 
lay in the adherence to Orthodox Christian values. The difference between 'Orthodoxy' and 
'Europe' was often described in the form of simple dualities: Europe stands for death, 
materialism and Nietzschean Superman, Orthodoxy for eternal life, spiritualism and 
Dostoyevskian Ornnihuman (Bigovic, 1998).18 Predictably, the qualities of 'Orthodox Slavs' 
were often reduced to narrower categories such as 'Serbs' or the 'Balkan people'. 
Velimirovic, for instance, claimed that the 'Balkan mentality' (which refers more or less 
exclusively to Serbs) is the 'symbol of the authentic, Christian view of the world, man and 
culture'. 
In the 1920s, Velimirovic's rampant anti-Westernism, and the fear of European cultural 
influence among the Serbian masses, led him to take action. The establishment of the 
Devotionalist movement, which was mentioned in the earlier section, was a direct 
consequence of the perceived need to protect the Serbs from European secularist philosophy, 
as well as from the emergence of non-Orthodox religious communities such as the Adventists 
(Subotic, 1993, 1996). It is in the Devotionalist evangelical teachings and especially in its 
literature and publicity material (Orthodox Christian Community) that the Slavophile anti-
Westernism became blended with the conspiratorial tradition. Partly under the influence of 
Russian nationalist writing, secularism and rationalism became regarded as Jewish ideas, 
humanism became a Masonic value, and the Adventists were seen as no more than the 'spawn 
of Judeo-masonry' (Subotic, 1996) and a cuckoo's egg planted to undermine Orthodox 
Christianity. In the 1930s, these issues were further politicised by Ljotic and other ideologues 
of the Serbian Right and were integrated into a coherent explanatory discourse which became 
the essence of Serbian conspiracy tradition. The totality of Serbia's social, economic and 
political problems were blamed on a global conspiracy behind which stood 'the rotten West' 
as the epitome of the 'Judeo-Masonic' values loathed by Serbian conservative philosophers 
and politicians of that period. 
The amalgamation of conspiracy tradition and Slavophile ideology in the 1930s gave Serbian 
conspiratorial discourse a characteristic nationalist even racist tone, and a strong religious 
dimension. As the empirical chapters will demonstrate, in addition to the general 
characteristics of the conspiratorial narrative outlined in the previous chapter, Serbian 
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conspiratorial discourse often refers to the spiritual (or in some cases genetic) superiority of 
the Serbs or Orthodox Christians in general, which supposedly explains their victimisation in 
the hands of the secularised, modem and conspiratorial 'West'. 
3.4. Post World War ll developments and the rnarginalisation of conspiracy theory 
After the end of the Second World War, the new government of Yugoslavia, led by President 
Tito, took a very tough stance towards the defeated collaborationist forces in all parts of 
Yugoslavia. Ljotic did not live long enough to face the Partisans' version of 'revolutionary 
justice'. He died in a car crash in Slovenia in 1945, where, together with other Serbian 
collaborators, he was planning one last anti-Communist offensive. After German capitulation, 
most of Ljotic's forces fled Yugoslavia for fear of Communist reprisals, preferring to 
surrender to the British authorities in Austria (Stefanovic, 1974; Kostic, 1991). However, they 
were promptly extradited back to Yugoslavia where most of them were summarily executed 
by the Partisans at Kocevski Rog. Velimirovic, who joined Ljotic in Slovenia after his release 
from Dachau and gave his blessing to some of the most notorious Serbian warlords including 
Momcilo Dujic, Pavle Durisic and Kosta Pecanac, managed to escape this fate and emigrate 
to the United States, where he died in 1956. A number of other of Serbian 
populist movements who were accused of 
entertaining fascist ideas and collaborating 
with the Nazis (including a number of well 
known intellectuals such as Vladimir 
Velmar-J ankovic or Milos Cmjanski) also 
emigrated to various parts of the world 
including the US, Australia, England, Spain 
or parts of South America. 
Ve1imirovic, during a visit to the Serbian 
collaborationist forces in S1ovenia, 1945 
Back home, the new authorities went to considerable lengths to sideline and marginalise the 
1930s right-wing nationalist ideological tradition. Tito's government was dedicated to the 
principles of 'brotherhood and unity' between Yugoslav nations, which implied official 
opposition to any kind of nationalism and chauvinism, including antisemitism (Sekelj, 1997). 
In the post-war years, Communist Yugoslavia was largely devoid of the kind of 
institutionalised antisemitism which persisted in other Eastern European countries, including 
the USSR, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary (Sekelj, 1997; Volovici, 1994; Pipes, 1998). 
Although different to right-wing conspiratorial antisemitism, left-wing versions of anti-Jewish 
prejudice which were propounded by Communist regimes during the Cold War, reflected 
some of the themes of the conspiracy tradition such as the fear of Jewish economic power, 
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and its subversive potential (see Billig, 1987a). Not only were these themes absent from 
Yugoslav state ideology, but the authorities were occasionally openly critical of antisemitic 
campaigns in other countries (see Sekelj, 1997). 
In this period, Nikolaj Velimirovic, Ljotic and other exponents of pre WWII conspiracism 
were branded 'traitors', and the publication of their work was officially prohibited. Also, 
various organisations within the Serbian Orthodox Church, such as the Association of 
Orthodox Priests, were made to publicly denounce Velimirovic's ideas (Bigovic, 1998). 
Nonetheless, a small number of theologians from the Belgrade seminary (such as Bishops 
Atanasije Jeftic, Jrinej Bulovic and Amfilohije Radovic) continued to defend Velimirovic's 
religious philosophy, mainly within official church publications (Bigovic, 1998). Their 
activity became especially intense in the 1980s (Radic, 1996). 
While conspiratorial discourse was being marginalised in post-war Yugoslav society, various 
organisations within the Serbian diaspora endeavoured to keep the flame of Serbian 
conspiracy culture alive. The publishing company Iskra, based in Munich, published most of 
Velimirovic's and Ljotic's work in the 1960s and 70s, while a magazine of the same name 
was being published in Birmingham (UK) by a group of Ljotic's supporters. In the US and 
Australia, countries with the largest number of 'political emigres' fleeing 'communist 
persecution', the memory of Velimirovic, Ljotic, Momcilo E>ujic, Pavle I>urisic, DraZa 
Mihajlovic and other collaborators was frequently celebrated within various community 
organisations and 'veteran associations'. It should be noted that a major role in the 
preservation of Serbian nationalist and populist ideology within the diaspora was played by 
the Serbian Orthodox Church, which in many cases was, and still is, the focal point of 
community life for Serbian expatriates. 
Serbian nationalism, populist political tradition and conspiratorial explanatory framework 
remained the province of Serbian right-wing emigrant organisations and various dissident 
groups until the end of the Cold War which saw the revival of right-wing ideology throughout 
Eastern Europe, including Serbia. 
3.5. The fall of communism and the revival of Serbian nationalism 
The post-communist revival of Serbian nationalism is usually associated with the ascent of 
Slobodan Milosevic in the late 1980s. In the Western media in particular, throughout his 10-
year rule, Milosevic was regularly referred to as a 'ruthless', 'militant' nationalist and the 
mastermind behind the notorious project 'Greater Serbia'. However, as numerous political 
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·analysts point out, the insistence on the nationalist dimension ofMilosevic's ideology tends to 
miss the essence of his charisma and political longevity (Vujacic, 1995; Ramet, 1991; Silber, 
1996; Dilas, 1993, Trifkovic, 1997). Analysts of Milosevic's rule argue that the former 
Serbian president was above all a political opportunist, whose 'ideals', nationalist or 
otherwise, were simply the means of preserving his position of power and authority. The key 
to Milosevic's rise to power lay not in a strong nationalist conviction, but in his ability to ride 
the wave of popular nationalism, while at the same time presenting himself as a 'socialist' and 
the guardian of the 'legacy of the country's socialist revolution'. This 'dual ideology' 
(Vujacic, 1995; Markotic, 2000) enabled Milosevic to attract popular support while keeping 
the country's most reactionary institutions (such as the army) on his side. The upshot of 
Milosevic's ideological indistinctness is that he did not 'invent' contemporary Serbian 
nationalist ideology or the idea of Greater Serbia, but simply embraced them once it became 
apparent that doing so would be advantageous to his political career. 
Greenfeld (1992) points out that the principal role in the elaboration and popularisation of 
nationalist ideology is traditionally played by a country's intelligentsia. This appears to be 
true in the case of the revival of Serbian nationalism, which was formulated and disseminated 
in the 1980s, first and foremost by the Serbian intellectual elite gathered within two 
prominent institutions, the Union of Writers and the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences 
(Srpska Akademija Nauka i Umetnosti; SANU). 
The concern for Serbian national issues among the country's intelligentsia resulted from the 
attempt to address what was known at the time as the 'Serbian' or the 'Kosovo question'. In 
1981, Communist Yugoslavia witnessed the largest popular revolt in its recent history, when 
the Albanian political elite, which governed Kosovo at the time {1968-1981), demanded 
constitutional changes that would effectively enable the province to declare independence 
from Yugoslavia. The 'separatist' demands were accompanied by violent and intimidatory 
expression of anti-Serbian sentiments which led to a mass exodus of the Serbian minority 
from the province. The plight of the Serbian refugees, which at the time was frequently 
ignored or sidelined by the Serbian and Yugoslav authorities, provoked widespread 
dissatisfaction and anger at the inability, or unwillingness, of state institutions to tackle the 
problem (Popov, 1993). In 1986, the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences drafted a 
'memorandum', the aim of which was to assess the political and economic situation in 
Yugoslavia and draw attention to the deterioration of the status of the Serbian people within 
the federation. The memorandum, which was leaked to the press, later became known as the 
'requiem for Yugoslavia' and the 'blueprint for Greater Serbia' (Silber and Little, 1995). It 
accused the federal authorities of an 'anti-Serbian' bias. It suggested that post-war economic 
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development in Yugoslavia prioritised the interests of Slovenia and Croatia, thus crippling 
Serbia's economic potential. Also, the memorandum alleged that the Serbian nation, the 
largest ofYugoslavia's constitutive nations, had been deliberately 'dismembered' and divided 
by the administrative borders between federal units established by Tito and Kardelj after 
WWII. The document lamented the current status of Serbian minorities in Croatia (which 
were seen as endangered by rising Croatian nationalism) and Kosovo, where Serbs were said 
to be subjected to 'physical, political, cultural and legal genocide'. 
The memorandum was effectively the first authoritative elaboration of Serbian nationalist 
concerns in the 1980s. The ideas contained in it are important to the present discussion 
because they reflect a relatively novel component of Serbian nationalism which has helped 
shape contemporary conspiratorial discourse. This aspect of nationalist ideology, which the 
sociologist Aleksa Dilas refers to as 'historical nihilism', is characterised by the conviction 
that Serbs had been treated unfairly by other Yugoslav peoples, who failed to appreciate the 
sacrifices of the Serbian nation during the two world wars and who refused to acknowledge 
the Serbian contribution to the creation of the Yugoslav state (Dilas, 1993). This sentiment 
can be illustrated using the example of the writing of Dobrica Cosic, a best-selling Serbian 
author, who is said to have played a prominent role in the drafting of the 1986 Memorandum. 
As early as in 1982, Cosic spoke of the 'ungrateful brothers' of the Serbian people, and noted 
that 
'We have allowed those whom we have liberated and helped create their own nations and nation 
states, to come and deny us our freedom·loving past, declare us hegemonists and occupiers and 
confine our history to the limits imposed by the Comintern and its ideological interpretations' 
(Cosic, 1992a; p.63) 
In a later book he went on to suggest that the ingratitude of others had turned Serbs into 
'second class citizens without rights' who were being exploited, bullied, and 'subjected to 
chauvinist terror, assimilation, discrimination' etc. (Cosic, 1992b; p.190). In its most drastic 
form, 'historical nihilism' called for the abandonment of the failed 'Yugoslav project' and the 
creation of a homogenous Serbian state, in the shape of a 'Greater Serbia' (Popov, 1993). 
In the late 1980s, Milosevic joined the Serbian intelligentsia on the increasingly crowded 
nationalist bandwagon, and promised to return the lost dignity and pride to the Serbian people 
in Kosovo (1987-89), Croatia (1991) and Bosnia (1992). Also, as soon as it became apparent 
that the Serbian nationalist project did not have the support of international power structures, 
the claims of 'historical nihilism' were extended to the international community. One of the 
better known myths concerning the world's 'ingratitude' towards the Serbs is the belief that 
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by weakening the Turkish army in the Battle ofKosovo in 1389, the Serbs, although defeated, 
effectively saved European civilisation from a Turkish invasion. According to the myth, this 
was a sacrifice for which the Serbs had never been properly rewarded. Milosevic himself 
invoked this theme during the notorious speech delivered at the commemoration of the 600th 
anniversary of the Battle ofKosovo in June 1989. In the subsequent period, the apparent Jack 
of understanding for the 'Serbian cause' led to a growing sense of injustice and resentment 
towards the West. As the empirical chapters will show, the Jack of international support was 
eventually attributed to sinister motives, thus setting in motion the conspiratorial 
interpretative framework which culminated in the proliferation of conspiratorial discourse. 
At this point, it should be noted that the revival of nationalism in Serbia in the late 1980s, 
followed a somewhat different pattern compared to that in other former Communist countries 
in Eastern Europe. According to Jrvine (1995) the change in the status of right-wing ideology 
in Eastern Europe after the fall of the Berlin Wall can be represented using a refrigeration 
metaphor. During the Cold war, the extreme Right was in a state of 'deep freeze' before being 
'defrosted' following a period of post-communist 'thawing'. The implication of this metaphor 
is that the extreme Right is assumed to have effectively picked up where it left off in 1945. 
For instance, this can be said to be true of Croatia, where the ideology propounded by Franjo 
Tudman often bore the hallmarks of the Second World War version ofCroatian nationalism. 
Many controversial historical figures such as Cardinal Alojzije Stepinc, Ustashi leader Ante 
Pavelic and other nationalists were officially, or semi-officially rehabilitated, and the anti-
Serbian and antisemitic themes characteristic of 1940s Croatian Fascism were revived, albeit 
it more moderate forms (see Jrvine, 1995; Ramet, 1999; etc.). In Serbia, the pattern of 
transition was different, mainly because of Milosevic's double-pronged ideological strategy 
which included a blend of nationalism and socialism. Milosevic's enduring devotion to Titoist 
ideology, which some argue was the result of his wife's influence on his political thinking 
(Dukic, 1998), made the Serbian leader hostile to Serbian Second World War nationalist 
movements. Nationalist figures from the 1940s were never officially rehabilitated in Serbia. 
Also, Milosevic always remained distant towards the Serbian Orthodox Church. Even as the 
President of Serbia and Yugoslavia, Milosevic only ever sent Christmas or Easter greetings to 
the Patriarch of the Serbian Orthodox Church and the clergy, never to the Serbian people as a 
whole. Moreover, on a rare visit to a Serbian monastery in Mount Athos, in April 1991 
Milosevic famously addressed the monks with a partisan-style informal greeting 'Hello' 
('Zdravo'), without showing the kind of humility or respect which protocol demands. In 
other words, the nationalism and populism on which Milosevic's rule was founded, and which 
Popov (1993) referred to as 'regime populism' can not be said to constitute a continuation of 
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the older nationalist tradition outlined earlier, which has characteristic clericalist and neo-
fascist overtones. 
Although Milosevic himself was not actively engaged in the revival ofpre-World War Two 
versions of nationalist ideology, he did little to curb the activities of others. In some ways, this 
would have been unnecessary considering that once he had established himself as the 
champion of the Serbian nationalist cause, Milosevic could only benefit from the 
popularisation of nationalist sentiments (lrvine 1995). Also, by tolerating nationalist 
extremism among his political opponents, the Serbian leader was able, if and when necessary, 
to present himself as a moderate, especially before western leaders. Consequently, Milosevic 
effectively gave free rein to various extreme right-wing organisations and movements, 
allowing them to promote their version of Serbian nationalism (Irvine, 1995; Markotic, 2000). 
Popov (1993) labelled the activity of right-wing parties and organisations in the 1990s 
'opposition populism', which, unlike the 'regime populism', had a strong anticommunist 
dimension. Anticommunism within the Serbian Right led to a misguided historical 
revisionism and the glorification of everything that communist authorities once satanised, 
including the populist movements of the 1930s and 1940s. Ljotic, Zbor, the Chetniks, the 
collaborationist government of Milan Nedic and other controversial historical figures and 
movements, all became regarded as 'real patriots', victims of 'communist persecution' and 
'architects of Serbian national unity' (Popov, 1993). In the early 1990s, the main exponents of 
this strand of Serbian nationalism, were the Serbian Chetnik Movement of Vojislav Seselj 
(later renamed the Serbian Radical Party), Serbian Popular Renewal of Mirko Jovic, the St 
Sava Party led by Father Zarko Gavrilovic and some strands within the Serbian Renewal 
Movement ofVuk Draskovic. 
The apologist trend within 'opposition populism', which flourished in the early 1990s, was 
endorsed by the Serbian Orthodox Church, which saw in the emerging nationalism a way of 
re-establishing the Church as the leading force in Serbian society and politics (Popov, 1993). 
In 1994 for instance, the Patriarch of the Serbian Orthodox Church, Pavle, justified the 
actions of Nedic and other collaborators by arguing that 'it was a way of saving the people 
from the revenge of the occupiers' (quoted in Cohen, 1996). An especially significant role in 
the politicisation of the Serbian Church authorities in this period was played by the 'hawks' in 
the Patriarch's entourage, Bishop Atanasije Jeftic, mentioned earlier as a prominent 
Velimirovic scholar, and Bishops Amfilohije Radovic and Irinej Bulovic. All three were 
disciples of Father Justin Popovic. Velimirovic too was fully 'rehabilitated' by the Church. 
The Bishop's remains were brought back to Serbia from the United States in 1991. His 
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reburial, which was attended by church dignitaries, (opposition) politicians, intellectuals and 
over 30,000 members of the public (Bigovic, 1998) was seen by many at the time as 
indicative of rising Serbian nationalism. Also, calls for Velimirovic's canonisation became 
louder and more frequent. 19 Bishop Nikolaj is today regarded as the most respected Serbian 
religious figure since the medieval Serbian Saint Sava (e.g. Najdanovic, Bishop Nikolaj, Glas 
Crkve [Voice of the Church] No.3, 1991) Velimirovic has also been compared to St John the 
Baptist and St John Chrysostom (Bigovic, Word on Bishop Nikolaj, Glas Crkve, No. 3, 1993; 
Radovic, Bishop Amfilohije's address, Glas Crkve, No. 3, 1987). At the same time it is 
noteworthy that Velimirovic's antisemitism was never officially condemned by the Church 
authorities. This aspect ofVelimiroviC's work appears to be taboo within Serbian theological 
circles, and the ideological implications of his teachings are largely ignored. Consequently, 
most believers appear to be unaware of the controversy surrounding Velimirovic's writing. 
The rehabilitation of Velimirovic and others by the religious authorities contributed to the re-
emergence of the clerico-nationalist ideas characteristic of the 1930s and 40s. Representatives 
of 'opposition populism' have often propagated various Velimirovicesque themes such as the 
notion that Serbs are the purest representatives of Christianity, that they are under threat from 
the 'the West' and its alien values, and that the future of Serbia lies in its alliance with 
Orthodox Russia (Popov, 1993). The revival of these ideas also signalled the resurrection of 
the Slavophile tradition mentioned in the earlier section. Seselj's Radical Party for instance, 
maintained links with a number of Russian extremists such as Vladimir Zhirinovski, the 
author Eduard Limonov, leaders of the nationalist Pamyat movement, and other organisations 
and individuals who propounded anti-Western and anti-liberal ideas in Russia. 
Although 'opposition populism'- with its anti-communist and pseudo-religious dimension- is 
distinguishable from Milosevic's 'regime populism' - which had secular overtones and laid 
greater emphasis on the issues of national unity and 'historical nihilism' - the two have an 
important common element. They share the strong anti-Western sentiment which, in both 
cases was projected into a notion of an international, anti-Serbian conspiracy, the aim of 
which is the subjugation, even the destruction of Serbs. As the empirical chapters will show, 
in constructing their explanatory narratives, Serbian conspiracy theorists from both camps 
drew on the same conspiratorial tradition of explanation. They invoked similar themes and 
arguments and drew upon both the more general, 'trans-national' conspiracy tradition 
examined in the previous chapter, and its local expression outlined in the present discussion. 
By the late 1990s, this reliance on a common ideological heritage effectively brought the two 
versions of Serbian populism together and contnbuted to a broadening of the boundaries of 
acceptable opinion in a way that turned many conspiratorial claims which were previously 
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deemed to be unreasonable, unacceptable and unwarranted into what appeared to be 
legitimate explanations of the Serbian predicament. 
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Chapter4 
Social psychology and the study of extraordinary explanations: 
From attributional bias to ideology 
In the previous chapters it was suggested that conspiracy theory constitutes a distinct tradition 
of explanation, a set of ideas, values, interpretations and images which are used to construct a 
causal account at the heart of which is the idea of a world conspiracy. Also, the conspiracy 
tradition, both in general and specifically in the Serbian cultural context, was shown to be a 
historically-situated discourse, one whose dynamic development in the past two hundred 
years is deeply intertwined with other broader political and social transformations. This 
historical and ideological approach to conspiratorial discourse stands in contrast to a number 
of explanations of conspiracy theories which have been offered by traditional psychology. 
The present chapter will begin by critically examining a number of psychological 
explanations of conspiratorial belief. It will suggest that most psychological explanations, 
which focus primarily on the cognitive and motivational aspects of conspiratorial belief, share 
an important shortcoming. They all seem unable to account for the content of conspiracy 
theories. Any satisfactory explanation of conspiracy theories should be able to account for the 
persistence of the distinct explanatory style outlined in previous chapters, as well as for the 
cultural specificity of conspiratorial antisemitism. As was already mentioned, a theme that 
runs through the present thesis is the emergence of the idea of a Jewish conspiracy in 
contemporary Serbia. The focus on Jews in Serbian conspiracy culture may seem odd 
considering that there was no Jewish dimension to the Yugoslav crisis in the 1990s. Serbia's 
enemies were not Jews, and the Jewish minority in Serbia did not play any part in the recent 
wars. And yet Jews were accused of plotting world domination in the same way that they are 
accused of such sinister activity in other countries, including for instance Japan, a culture 
whose contact with Jews is minimal. Following the ideas of Moscovici (1984a), Gergen 
(1973, 1994, 1985), Billig (1988a) and others, the chapter will suggest that a better insight 
into the dynamic of conspiracy theory as a collective belief can be gained by examining it 
within its historical context, and as an ideological tradition which prescribes particular 
patterns of thinking and behaviour. 
The chapter will reflect on the question of method. Following Billig (1978, 1988a), it will be 
suggested that specific methodologies, whether qualitative or quantitative, are not always 
useful for investigating the ideological aspects of social phenomena, including the conspiracy 
tradition. Instead, it will proposed that a better insight into the tradition of conspiracy theory 
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. can be gained through the application of what is commonly known as 'traditional 
scholarship'. By applying the scholarly method, particular discourses can be situated within 
the broader tradition of explanation, and in doing so the historical and cultural contingency of 
conspiracy theory as a social phenomenon can be demonstrated. 
4.1. Social psychology and conspiracy theory: the limits of explanation 
In the concluding remarks to the edited volume Changing conceptions of conspiracy 
(Graumann & Moscovici, 1987), Car! Graurnann reflected on the complex relationship 
between psychology and conspiracy theory. Graurnann noted that although conspiracy 
theories are a topic of 'intrinsic psychological interest' (p.245), there is no such thing as a 
distinct 'social psychology of conspiracy theory'. There does not appear to be a body of social 
psychological knowledge or research which is devoted specifically to the study of conspiracy 
theories. Research in this area has been left, almost completely, to the mercy of disciplines 
such as history, anthropology or political science. However, as Grauman also pointed out, 
literature on conspiracy theories which has been presented by historians and social or political 
scientists contains many explanations which are essentially of a psychological nature. 
Analysts typically speak of conspiracy theories as manifestations of fears, fantasies, 
projections, aggression or paranoia (Grauman, 1987). Even the historian Norman Cohn, 
whose book Warrant for Genocide resisted the temptation of psychological reductionism until 
the very last chapter, concluded his history of Jewish conspiracy mythology with an elaborate 
psychoanalytic examination of 'collective projection' (see below). 
The complex relationship between conspiracy theory and psychology is compounded by the 
fact that when psychological terms are used in sociological literature to explain belief in 
conspiracy, their meaning is often very different (usually much broader) than that which 
acadenric or clinical psychologists would deem appropriate. Most of the time in fact, the use 
of psychological jargon is merely metaphorical. In his classical analysis of the 'paranoid 
style', Hofstadter (1966) openly asserted that his use of the word 'paranoid' is only analogous 
to the conventional clinical meaning. However, a number of other authors, who at first sight 
seem to follow Hofstadter's approach to conspiracy theory, have allowed the reference to 
paranoia to drift from the realm of metaphor to its literal, clinical meaning. For instance, in 
Political paranoia: the psychopolitics of hatred (1997), Robins and Post offer an extensive 
psychological profile of Stalin, with particular focus on his susceptibility to paranoid 
delusions. The purpose of the example was to illustrate the relationship between clinical 
paranoia and belief in conspiracies, thus drawing a direct parallel between a clinical and a 
cultural phenomenon (Knight, 2000). A similar pattern is observable on occasions in Pipes' 
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book Conspiracy, where, within a predominantly cultural and historical analysis of conspiracy 
culture, there are references to the fact that many pioneers of conspiracy theory, such as Nesta 
Webster, showed signs of clinical paranoia. Apparently, Webster never opened her front door 
without a revolver in her hand (Pipes, 1998). 
The reasons behind the tendency to 'psychologise' conspiracy theories can be sought in the 
rhetorical implications of psychological explanations. There is a general tendency for 
psychological explanations to be invoked when unusual social phenomena need to be 
accounted for. In particular, psychological theories tend to be called upon when the 
phenomena in question involve ideological positions which are not perceived to be normative 
or acceptable. In these instances, psychological explanations can be employed to construe a 
particular political or ideological perspective as irrational, unreasonable and dysfunctional, 
thus placing it beyond the arena of rational discussion and debate. If a point of view is 
portrayed as resulting from a dysfunctional psychological process, then its claims do not have 
to be contested or refuted on rational grounds. 
The latter point is particularly relevant to belief in conspiracy, because conspiracy theories are 
inherently irrefutable and unfalsifiable. As was mentioned in an earlier chapter, the 
hermeneutic of conspiracy theory is such that empirical or logical evidence against the 
existence of conspiracy can always be interpreted as further proof of the cunning nature of the 
conspirators (Billig, 1978, 1989). This is acknowledged by Groh (1987), who argues that: 
'this logic [of conspiracy theories] can only be refuted in the realm of the theory of action and 
history, and the motives exposed from a socio-psychological point of view. If this is really so, 
then in the strict sense, conspiracy theories cannot be scientifically refuted- at least as long as 
one maintains the scientifically-historical assumption of paradigms as developed and refined by 
Thomas S. Kulm and others' (p.4) 
In other words, since conspiracy theories cannot be refuted through the application of rational 
argument and empirical enquiry, they can be undermined by being relegated (or promoted) to 
the domain of clinical or social psychology. 
It should be noted however that the reference to psychological underpinnings of conspiratorial 
beliefs is not only a way of resolving the epistemological problem posed by the irrefutability 
of conspiratorial claims. It is also a way of dealing with a notable moral dilemma commonly 
associated with explanations of conspiratorial antisernitism. The dilemma can be illustrated 
by the example ofCohn's (1957) Warrant for Genocide, where the reliance on psychological 
explanation was justified in the following way: 
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'There is no denying that many attempts to apply the findings of dynamic psychology to social 
phenomena have been misguided. But one is dealing here with very bizarre phenomena indeed; 
and I do not think that one can account for these particular fantasies [about a Jewish world-
conspiracy], nor for the fact that they are always attached to this particular group, unless one 
takes unconscious mechanisms into account' (p.284-285) 
In some sense, the psychoanalytic conclusion to Cohn's mainly historical account of the 
conspiracy myth reflects a historian's recognition that ideological underpinnings of a truly 
devastating historical event such as the Holocaust, cannot be adequately understood by means 
of history alone. The murder of European Jews was so shocking and disturbing, that it could 
not be merely 'historicized'. Instead, the explanation needed to go deeper, into the depths of 
human psychology. The same drive for a deeper psychological explanation of Nazism and 
conspiratorial antisemitism motivated the likes of Adorno, Bettleheim, Ackerman, as well as 
subsequent generations of social psychologists who have attempted to tackle the problems of 
prejudice from a psychological perspective. At the same time, there has been a tradition in 
social psychology that warned against reductionism and questioned the possibility of purely 
psychological explanations of social phenomena. Henri Tajfel (1981) for instance cautioned 
against universal psychological theories, and allocated to social psychology the more modest 
task of providing mere 'insights' into specific events and behaviour (Billig, 1996). As Billig 
(1996) points out, universal psychological explanations also harbour the danger of trivialising 
dramatic social events. The suggestion that conspiratorial antisemitism, as the ideology 
behind the Holocaust, was a mere manifestation of the general phenomenon of 'prejudice' or 
'scapegoating' would trivialise the immensity of the Nazi crimes against the Jews and would 
undermine the historical uniqueness of the Holocaust. 
Although Graurnann was correct to point out that there is not a specific branch of social 
psychology dedicated to the study of conspiracy theories, a number of research paradigms 
within social psychology have been applied, directly or indirectly, to the phenomenon of 
conspiracy theory. Research on attribution theory for instance has been used to account for 
the cognitive dynamic of conspiratorial beliefs. Other psychological perspectives, like the 
theory of scapegoating as well as a number of psychoanalytic approaches, focused on the 
relevant motivational factors. In the following sections the two aspects of the psychology of 
conspiracy theory will be critically examined in turn. Also, research on rumour will be briefly 
examined and its relevance to the understanding of conspiracy theories outlined. Finally, 
psychological explanations of paranormal beliefs will also be looked at, considering that later 
chapters (Chapters 8 and 9) deal with the emergence of paranormal conspiracy theories during 
the war. 
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4.2. Cognitive factors in conspiracy theory 
A tradition in social psychology which is most commonly applied to the explanation of 
conspiracy theories is the research on causal attribution. Ever since the 1950s, psychologists 
have emphasised the tendency in human thought to ascribe causes to events (Heider, 1958, 
1967; Kelley, 1967, 1972; Shaver, 1975; Antaki 1985; Fiske and Taylor, 1984; Hewstone, 
1983, 1989, etc.). It has even been argued that causal inference is one of the most 
fundamental cognitive activities and therefore a universal aspect of the human mind (e.g. 
Jones and Davis, 1965; Heider, 1958). 
According to attribution research, in trying to understand the world around them, people are 
thought to act as 'naive scientists' (Heider, 1958). They appear to use different, quasi-rational 
strategies to understand causal relationships between events. According to some theories, 
people use a 'causal calculus' in which different types of information such as consensus, 
distinctiveness and consistency are used to arrive at an attribution (Heider, 1958; Brown, 
1986). Kelley's (1967) covariation model proposes that the cognitive strategy used to make a 
causal inference is effectively a lay version of the statistical analysis of variance. 
One of the more general findings which emerged from attribution research is that people tend 
to make two broad types of causal attribution. Sometimes, causes of events are attributed to 
the activities of the actors involved (personal attribution), while on other occasions, causes 
are traced to situational factors, which lie beyond the motives, intentions and behaviour of 
specific individuals (situational attribution). Much of attribution research examines different 
factors which affect the type of attribution made, e.g. the effect of political beliefs (Furnham 
and Lewis, 1986), mood (Bohner et al., 1988; Schwarz and Clore, 1983), personality (Rotter, 
1966), and many other situational and personal variables. 
The relevance of attribution research to the phenomenon of conspiracy theory comes from the 
fact that belief in conspiracy can be seen as reflecting a 'causal schemata' and a specific 
'attributional style'. In conspiracy theory, causes of social events are attributed to the 
deliberate activities and intentions of a small group of powerful individuals (Kruglanski, 
1987; Zukier, 1987). As has already been mentioned in an earlier chapter, conspiracy theory 
shows a blatant disregard for situational factors and denies the possible causal implications of 
historical accident, or of social, economic and political conditions. In that sense, conspiracy 
theory can be seen as an extreme form of personal or group attribution, used to explain 
political and social events. 
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The cognitive style of conspiracy theory, characterised by the overabundance of personal 
causal inferences, is neither dysfunctional nor particularly remarkable, from the perspective of 
attribution research (Billig, 1978, 1989). It is generally recognised that, in Western society at 
least, when observing the behaviour of others, there is a preference for personal attributions 
over situational ones (Kelley, 1967; Alexander and Epstein, 1969).1 This widespread trend is 
known as the 'fundamental attribution error' (Nisbett and Ross, 1980). Its ubiquity in Western 
society is noteworthy because it suggests that conspiracy theories reflect the general 
attributional tendencies of our society, rather than deviate from them. Moreover, the 
compatibility between conspiratorial reasoning and 'normal' cognitive functioning facilitates 
the presentation of certain conspiratorial claims as 'reasonable'. For instance, in the context of 
the broader bias towards personal attribution, suspicion about the 'real' motives behind a 
political action or the search for hidden agenda in politics - both of which are inherent in 
conspiracy theory - appear neither objectionable nor particularly 'conspiratorial', in the 
conventional, pejorative sense (Billig, 1978). On the other hand, one thing that does make 
conspiracy theory cognitively peculiar is that it takes the bias towards personal attributions to 
the extreme, in the spirit of Hofstadter's notion of the 'leap of the imagination'. Within the 
conspiracy tradition, it is always the same causal attribution which is being made (Billig, 
1989). Conspiracy theorist will 'monomaniacally' come back, over and over again, to the 
same simple explanation, and will account for every event in terms of the same secret group 
engaged in a global conspiracy (Lipset and Raab, 1978). This 'monomaniacal' attributional 
tendency goes against a general trend noted in attribution literature. Research on causal 
attribution seems to suggest that complex events of high magnitude, tend to be explained 
using multicausal explanations (Cunningham and Kelley, 1975). Conspiracy theorists seem to 
fail to develop the multicausal schemata for complex events. Instead, they 'see simplicity in· 
complexity' and construct a causal explanation for wars, historical changes, economic crises 
etc. in terms of recognisably simple conspiratorial narrative (Billig, 1978). 
Although it may be possible to regard the absence of 'multicausal schemata' as a criterion for 
distinguishing conspiratorial from non-conspiratorial attributional tendencies, little is known 
about the factors which determine whether the 'multi causal schemata' will or will not 
develop. It is therefore difficult to state what it is that leads some individuals but not others to 
succumb to the temptations of conspiratorial explanations. Although there have been attempts 
to relate attributional styles to various enduring personality factors, it is unlikely that these 
would be of much relevance to conspiracy theory (Billig, 1978). Any explanation of the 
cognitive dynamics of conspiratorial belief would have to take into account the fact that social 
groups, societies - even entire cultures - from time to time become engulfed in conspiratorial 
beliefs. In other words, attribution research would have to explain what it is that leads a large 
63 
number of people to alter, often for a limited period of time, their cognitive or attributional 
style. 
One possible factor that might provoke such widespread change in the way in which 
attributions are made is the implication of the event-to-be-explained on a group's cherished 
beliefs. There is empirical evidence to suggest that ways of attributing causes change if there 
is a threat to the attributor's self-esteem (Stevens & Jones, 1976). With their self-esteem 
under threat, people generally tend to seek causes of negative events externally, regardless of 
evidence to the contrary. A similar dynamic might be at work on a collective level. In the face 
of a threat to a group's core beliefs or to the social identity of the group's members, a 
defensive mechanism or a self-serving bias might kick in, leading the group to seek the causes 
of relevant events externally, in the personal attributes of an outgroup (Hewstone and Jaspars, 
1982; Tajfel, 1981, etc). 
This and other motivational aspects of conspiracy theory will be looked at shortly. At this 
point, the shortcomings of the attributional interpretation of conspiracy theory will be briefly 
examined. One significant problem with the applicability of attribution research to collective 
phenomena, such as the belief in conspiracies, is that most of the relevant studies have been 
conducted in fairly artificial and sterile experimental conditions. Results of these studies have 
been shown to be sensitive to very minor alterations in the experimental situations which 
means that findings are unlikely to be sufficiently robust to be applicable to the more fluid 
and unpredictable conditions of everyday life. More importantly, as Moscovici and Hewstone 
(1983) point out, the experimental paradigm typically used to study attributions has a 
tendency to neutralise the context in which people deal with causes. Attribution research 
assumes that when faced with an event, people engage in a complex quasi-scientific process 
which guides them towards, for instance, an 'external' or an 'internal' attribution. The 
approach focuses on the cognitive dynamic of the attributional process as if it exists in 'a raw 
state', isolated from general theories or representations (Moscovici and Hewstone, 1983). The 
research ignores the fact that most people 'know' in advance what caused an event. They 
have pre-existing representations or accounts within which specific events are assimilated. 
People 'know the outcome of the question they meet: Jews are to blame because ... ; the poor 
are exploited because ... ; blacks are inferior because ... ' (p.120). These explanations are not 
rationalisations of an purely cognitive 'attributional bias', but are ready-made, lay theories 
about history, society and power, which stem from historically situated social representations 
(Moscovici, 1984a; Moscovici, 2000), interpretative repertoires (Potter & Wetherell, 1987), 
cultural myths (Tajfel, 1981) or discursive resources. These explanations are manifested (and 
observed in an experimental situation) as a specific attribution. In focusing on 'how' 
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attributions are made rather than 'why', attribution theory 'deals with the surface matter and 
forgets the heart composed of common-sense theories' and causal explanations (Moscovici 
andHewstone, 1983; p.l21). 
A similar point was made by Billig (1978, 1989), specifically in relation to conspiracy 
theories. Billig (1989) points out that while attribution theory may shed some light on what is 
thought to be the cognitive dynamic of conspiratorial thinking, it cannot explain the content of 
a conspiratorial explanation. It does not elucidate the persistence of antisemitism as an 
enduring feature of conspiratorial culture throughout the world, in the same way that it cannot 
explain why it is that conspiracy theories, apart from attributing causes to a global plot, also 
consist of a distinct explanatory style which was examined in Chapter 2 as characteristic of a 
particular ideological tradition. The upshot of Billig's (1978, 1989) argument (which is 
echoed by Moscovici and Hewstone, 1983) is that conspiracy theories need to be looked at as 
a tradition of explanation, and a historically-situated explanatory discourse, rather than as an 
outcome of a universal cognitive process. 
4.3. Motivational factors in conspiracy theory 
Besides examining conspiracy theory as a somewhat distorted cognitive schemata which leads 
to a propensity for simplistic personal attribution, social psychologists have also examined the 
motivational dynamic of conspiracy theory (Billig, 1978; 1989). They have been interested in 
the psychological processes that lead an individual, or a group to 'push the personal 
attribution to the point of absurdity' (Billig, 1989, p.161). 
One motivational aspect of conspiratorial belief has already been touched upon in the 
previous section where it was suggested that attributional pattern is contingent upon the 
perceived threat to self-esteem. The adoption of what Kruglanski (1987) refers to as 
'defensive attributions', enables the person making the causal inference to avoid 
responsibility for certain events by shifting the blame onto others. The self-serving 
implications of external and personal attribution of societal events is related to the notion of 
'scapegoating'. The idea of 'scapegoating' was developed in the 1940s by Hovland and Sears 
(1940) within the broader framework of frustration-aggression theory. The principal claim of 
the theory is that in frustrating situations, when the causes of some social strain are unclear or 
out of reach, majority group members tend to displace their aggression onto relatively 
defenceless minority groups (Hogg & Abrams, 1988). In that sense, conspiracy theory is seen 
as the rationalisation of the majority's displaced aggression. 
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. There is a strong historical association between explanations of conspiracy theory and the 
notion of minority scapegoating. The earliest formulations of the psychology of scapegoating 
were motivated by the desire to explain conspiratorial antisemitism in Nazi Germany (Dollard 
et al., 1939). Both in literature on conspiracy theory and on scapegoating, the two phenomena 
are often treated as inextricably linked. For instance, in his writing on the 'conspiracy 
mentality', Moscovici (I 987) argued that 'minorities, heretics or dissidents will surely be 
accused of conspiracy in periods of sudden societal upheaval. It is enough for such minorities 
merely to exist, and they will be accused' (p.157). Similarly, in social psychological literature 
on scapegoating, conspiracy theory is often cited as a relevant example. Allport (1954) 
illustrated scapegoating by quoting an American political agitator whose claims reflect some 
of the basic themes of conspiracy theory: 
'When will the plain, ordinary, sincere, sheeplike people of America awaken to the fact that 
their common affairs are being arranged and run for them by aliens, communists, crackpots, 
refugees, renegades, socialists and traitors' (p.69, quoted in Hogg and Abrams, 1988) 
The problem with the 'scapegoating' explanation is that, just like the attribution research, it 
fails to account for the cultural specificity of antisemitism and its enduring presence in 
conspiracy culture. Poliakov (1987) illustrates the problem by pointing out that usual ideas of 
'scapegoating' cannot explain for example why Jews were blamed for the Russian revolution, 
and not the Letts, another minority group which at the time was equally influential within the 
Russian workers' movement. Similarly, Blee (2002) suggests that contemporary antisernitism 
has certain idiosyncracies which a general psychological theory of prejudice or scapegoating 
cannot adequately account for. First of all, unlike other forms of prejudice, antisemitism is 
almost exclusively conspiratorial. Jews are the only minority group that consistently gets 
accused of a global conspiracy, even in cultures which have no Jewish minority (e.g. in Japan, 
see Billig, 1989; Pipes, 1998) or in societies where the population in general harbours 
relatively mild negative, or even neutral feelings towards Jews (Hockenos, 1993). A general 
psychological theory cannot explain the existence of what Lendvai (1971) and Hockenos 
(1993) referred to as 'antisemitism without Jews' . 
It outlining the difference between antisemitism and other forms of minority prejudice, Blee 
(2002) suggests that in the contemporary United States, most racial prejudice (e.g. against 
Hispanics or African Americans) has a concrete and personal dimension. Racism is typically 
formulated by recounting personal anecdotes or specific instances of 'bad experiences' with 
racial minorities. As a result, among activists in rightwing groups in the US, prejudice against 
African Americans, Hispanics or Asians and any scapegoating that follows from it, emerges 
as an elaboration or abstraction of 'everyday racism'. Moreover, many members of far right 
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organisations have joined groups such as the KKK, Christian Identity Movement or the 
Skinheads in order to act upon existing prejudicial views (Blee, 2002). Antisemitism in 
contrast has a pronounced abstract and mythical quality (Smith, 1996). Most American right 
wing activists interviewed by Blee (2002) who harbour antisemitic views admit to have never 
encountered a Jew. In fact, few of them held any opinions about Jews before joining racist 
organisations and becoming acquainted with the conspiracy tradition. They absorbed the 
antisemitic tradition from the ideology of right-wing organisations, from oral and written 
propaganda, the media or the interne! (Blee, 2002). A similar point is made by Zygrnunt 
Baumann in Modernity and the Holocaust (1999), where it is suggested that, unlike in early 
Twentieth Century, antisemitism is no longer a 'private affair of the lower classes' (p.80) or 
merely an instance of 'heterophobia'. Rather, 
'The now dominant form of antisemitism is a product of theory, not of elementary experience; it 
is supported by the process of teaching and learning, not by intellectually unprocessed responses 
to the context of daily interaction' (Baumann, 1999, p.79) 
Consequently, unlike many other forms of racist scapegoating, conspiratorial antisemitism 
does not appear to be a mere rationalisation of existing anti-Jewish sentiments. The myth of 
Jewish conspiracy '[refers] to facts normally inaccessible to and unknown to the masses, and 
certainly not located in the realm of their daily and unmediated experience' (Baurnann, 1999, 
p.80). In other words, conspiratorial antisemitism can be said to emerge from the belief in the 
conspiracy, as part of the heritage of the conspiracy tradition. This idea will be pursued in 
greater detail in later chapters, where it will be shown that the emphasis on the ideological 
aspects of conspiracy tradition can help explain the emergence of antisemitic conspiratorial 
discourse in Serbia, a country in which Jews do not constitute a politically, economically or 
demographically significant minority, at a time when Jewish involvement in the political 
events was non-existent. 
An additional benefit which belief in conspiracy is thought to bring to those who subscribe to 
it is the illusion of control. According to Bains (1983), blaming various conspiratorial groups 
such as the llluminati, Freemasons, Jews or the Bilderbergers, enables the conspiracy theorists 
to attribute various crises to a cause that is ultimately controllable. As Herzstein (1980) noted: 
'Nazism was one of the most optimistic of ideologies ... optimistic because the physical 
destruction of a people could salvage the world for an ideal Germany of goodness and virtue' 
(quoted in Bains, 1983; p137). The 'package of control' (Bains, 1983) inherent in the 
conspiratorial belief gives the explanation an element of wish-fulfilment. Conspiracy theory 
cultivates unrealistic hopes of change and promises a better world, once the evil conspirators 
are finally overthrown (Billig, 1978). 
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Besides the notions of 'scapegoating' and defensive attributions, both of which draw on 
research belonging to traditional social psychology, accounts of motivational factors in 
conspiracy theory have also been derived from the psychoanalytic intellectual tradition. Much 
of the theorising in this vein is based on the work of Adomo et al. (1950), Ackerrnan and 
Jahoda (1950) and Bettleheim and Janowitz (1950).2 All three studies have attempted to 
explain prejudice, and especially antisemitism (including that of the conspiratorial kind), in 
terms of the psycho-analytic concept of 'projection'. Adomo et al. (1950) suggest that in 
conspiracy theory, the alleged conspirators are seen as harbouring the thoughts, feelings and 
motives which the theorist cannot consciously admit to and which he projects onto the 
conspiratorial group (see Billig, 1978). 
In exammmg projection as the motive force behind conspiratorial antisemitism, 
psychoanalytic explanations have traditionally emphasised the link between projection and 
ethnocentrism, i.e. the belief in the superiority of the ingroup in relation to outgroups. Adomo 
et al. (1950), for instance, reported that, according to their measures, antisemitism and 
ethnocentrism were highly correlated variables (cited in Billig, 1978). The correlation was 
interpreted by Ackerrnan and Jahoda (1950) as reflecting the antisemite's unconscious 
'identification with the Jews because of their symbolic weakness' (cited in Billig, 1978). The 
more general ethnocentric description of prejudice which emanated from this tradition later 
became influential in social psychology. There appears to be a widespread tendency to 
explain antisemitism and other forms of prejudice in terms of perceptions of (Jewish) 
inferiority and weakness (Billig, 1978). 
The problem with the common emphasis on the link between projection and ethnocentrism is 
that conspiracy theory actually perceives the enemy as anything but weak. Bettleheim and 
Janowitz (1950) attempted to resolve this problem by arguing that the perception of Jews may 
reflect 'superego stereotypes', i.e. the suppressed wishes of the superego, projected onto the 
outgroup. However they never fully developed this idea or examined its implications for the 
general ethnocentrism model (Billig, 1978). On the other hand, Cohn (1957}, in outlining a 
psychoanalytic interpretation of the Jewish conspiracy myth, suggested that conspiratorial 
antisemitism reflects 'unconscious negative projection' (p.285}, which presents the Jews in a 
dual fashion. Jews are perceived both as the 'bad' son (through projected Oedipal fantasies) 
and as a 'collective father figure' who is seen as possessing tyrannical and merciless qualities. 
Hofstadter (1966) also pointed out that conspiracy theory reflects 'both the ideal and the 
unacceptable aspect of self' (p.32). The conspirators are usually almost admired by the 
conspiracy theorists, and are seen as being in possession of the same virtues that the theorist 
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himself promotes, such as patriotism, discipline, traditional values, dedication, etc. 
Consequently, if there is some identification with the enemy in conspiracy theory, it is not 
with its 'symbolic weakness' and inferiority but with qualities which the conspiracy theorist 
cherishes. 
In Cohn's (1957) analysis, the idea of an outgroup as a 'collective father figure' is not only 
invoked to explain the portrayal of conspirators as powerful, but also to account for the 
continuing presence of Jewish conspiracy theory. Cohn thus argues that in Nazi Germany, 
cultural stereotypes of Jews as organised, traditionalist, rich, etc. made them almost 
archetypal father figure and therefore a convenient target for the projection of unresolved 
hostilities towards parental figures. 
A common problem associated with psychoanalytic explanations of conspiracy theory is that 
they are largely speculative and based primarily on post hoc reasoning (Billig, 1978). For 
instance, Cohn (1957) explains the belief in conspiracy as a rationalisation of an 'inner 
necessity' (p.295), a psychological compulsion generated by unresolved ambivalence towards 
parental figures. Cohn traces this 'regression to infantile modes of thinking' (p.288) to 
incomplete 'maturation' caused by, among other things, 'unfavourable educational and 
cultural pressures' (p.287). Conspiratorial beliefs are therefore regarded primarily as an 
individual, rather than a collective phenomenon, and one that is attributable to aspects of 
psychosexual development. Such a claim is problematic because it ignores the periodicity of 
conspiratorial beliefs and the noted popularity of conspiracy theories across cultures and 
across generations. 'Educational practices' change over time and differ across cultures and yet 
belief in conspiracy appears to persist. Psychoanalytic explanations have been unable to 
identify specific experiences and child-rearing practices that lead to the tendency towards 
negative projection, and have failed to demonstrate the role of these practices in the creation 
of collective beliefs in diverse cultures and at different times. An additional problem 
associated with psychoanalytic explanations of conspiracy theory relates to the assumed role 
of psychosexual development, and especially the resolution of the Oedipus complex. The 
Freudian theory of psychosexual development assumes important gender differences in the 
way in which the Oedipal conflict is resolved. However, psychoanalytic explanations of 
conspiracy theories have not explained whether this ought to lead to gender difference in the 
dynamic of 'negative projection'. There is no evidence that such gender differences exist. 
Also, if 'negative projection' is seen as a collective phenomenon, then psychoanalytic 
theories must account for the unjustified male bias, and explain why it is that society typically 
follows what is essentially the psychosexual development of men (Blee, 2002). 
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A further problem associated with Cohn's psychoanalytic explanation lies in the reference to 
unfavourable 'cultural influences' as a causal factor in 'negative projection'. In the 
concluding pages of his book, Cohn recognises that conspiratorial antisemitism is also an 
'ideology' which played an important part in creating the mindset of Nazi Jew-killers, in that 
it legitimated their crimes. While the appeal to the ideological basis of antisemitism may be 
seen as reflecting Cohn's own reservations concerning the validity of a purely psychological 
explanation, it also contributes to the circularity within the general psychoanalytic argument. 
If conspiratorial antisemitism is the rationalisation of a deeper psychological dynamic of 
projection (and therefore its consequence) then it cannot at the same time be a part of its 
cultural origins. A similar problem of circular reasoning is posed by the assumption 
concerning the relation between cultural stereotypes of Jews and belief in conspiracy. Bearing 
in mind Blee's (2002) suggestion that specific representations of Jews tend to develop 
simultaneously with the belief in conspiracy, it would be difficult, if not impossible, to 
maintain the view that cultural stereotypes of Jews cause the latter to become targets of 
conspiratorial claims. In fact, it is questionable to what extent stereotype of Jews as 'rich' or 
'powerful' can be distinguished at all, either ideologically or psychologically, from the 
conspiracy myth itself. Consequently, the relationship between conspiracy theory and the 
cultural stereotypes of Jews is likely to be more complex than is suggested by the 
psychoanalytic explanation. 
4.4. Psychology of rumour and conspiracy theory 
Another aspect of social psychological research which, often inadvertently, reflects upon the 
concept of conspiracy theory, is the research on rumour. Literature on the subject of rumour 
(AIIport and Postman, 1947; Rosnow and Fine, 1974; Shibutani, 1967; Turner, 1993; 
Neubauer, 1999) often cites stories of conspiracies, plots and subversion, as examples of its 
subject matter. For instance, in I heard it through the grapevine: Rumour in African American 
culture, Patricia Turner (1993) examined many conspiratorial myths prevalent amongst the 
Black community in the US. Allegations concerning deliberate attempts to render Black men 
infertile through poisoning, or stories about the deliberate spreading of AIDS among the 
Blacks, which Turner examined as examples of rumour and 'urban mythology', are also 
claims about the existence of the anti-Black conspiracy. Also, in their classical book The 
Psychology of Rumour Allport and Postman (1947) cite, as a relevant example, the rumour of 
Jewish conspiracy during World War II and alleged attempts by the Jewish community to 
take over the US government (p. 21-22). Similarly, Rosnow and Fine (1974) give as an 
example of rumour the claim that playing pop records backward reveals satanic and menacing 
messages. These claims are also a regular feature of contemporary conspiracy culture (e.g. in 
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Durdevic, 1997a; Milosevic, 1999; see also Pipes, 1998). Finally, in his analysis of the Jewish 
conspiracy myth, Cohn, (1957) pointed out that medieval Jewish demonology, which 
subsequently evolved into an elaborate conspiracy theory, took the form of periodical 
outbreaks of rumour about well-poisoning or ritual abuse of gentile children. 
The link between the social psychology of rumour and conspiracy theory is also evident in the 
similarity between what are thought to be the underlying cognitive and motivational factors. 
Rumours, just like conspiracy theories, are thought to offer explanations for troubling social 
events. Allport and Postman (1947), Shibutani (1966) and others all suggest that inherent in a 
rumour is a desire to provide an explanation which would bring relief (sense of control, wish-
fulfilment etc.) to those who believe in it. Also, research in this area suggests that rumours 
flourish in times of war, social crises or economic disasters, when previously established 
'social machinery' breaks down and available canons of explanation prove inadequate for 
explaining the causes and the implication of a social strain (Nkpa, 1975, 1977; Shibutani, 
1966). A similar dynamic has been said to underlie the proliferation of conspiracy theories. 
Tales of conspiracy tend to emerge in response to some social strain, especially one that has 
significant implications and dubious causes (Graumann, 1987; Zukier, 1987; Pipes, 1998). 
Social psychological literature on rumour also frequently draws on the notion of 
'scapegoating' when accounting for the prevalence of 'hate' or 'hostility rumours' about the 
treacherousness of various ethnic minorities and outgroups. Allport and Postman (1947) 
argued that rumours about minority subversion emerge in order to 'relieve, justify, and 
explain' (p.36; emphasis original) the basic negative emotion and hostility towards 
minorities. The emergence of prejudicial rumours is therefore seen as a rationalisation of 
'everyday prejudice', in that blame in the 'hate rumour' is fixed on a group towards which 
there is an existing distrust in a particular social context. 
Similarly, thoughts on the motivational aspects of rumour resemble explanations of 
conspiracy theories in that they draw on the psychoanalytic notion of 'projection'. For 
instance, in order to support the argument about the dynamic of projection in 'hate rumours' 
against various minorities, including Jews, Allport and Postman (1947) cited a study by 
Frenkel-Brunswik and Sanford (1945). This study, in which a link was found between 
projection and antisemitism, belongs to the same research tradition which established the 
existence of a projective element in the beliefs in a Jewish conspiracy. 
The shared notions about the motivational and cognitive underpinnings of rumour and 
conspiracy theory implies that most of the criticisms of psychological explanations of 
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conspiratorial beliefs outlined earlier are also applicable to the explanations of rumour. At the 
same time, there are reasons why studies of rumour can offer additional and valuable insight 
into the phenomenon of conspiracy theory. First and foremost, studies on rumour tend to pay 
greater attention to the content of an explanation, rather than merely on the type of attribution 
inherent in it or the general underlying motives. As a result, in rumour research, there has 
always been a greater recognition of the relevant social and cultural dynamic. For instance, 
although early studies focused on rumour as 'a specific (or topical) proposition or belief, 
passed along from person to person usually by word of mouth' (Allport and Postman 1947, 
p.ix) it has since been recognised that electronic and printed media contribute greatly to the 
perpetuation of hearsay and rumours (Rosnow & Fine, 1976; Shibutani, 1966, Rosnow, 
1980). The emergence of the Internet in the 1990s has provided rumour with another 
significant new medium for transmission (Yarbrough, 1998). In recognition of the wider 
social aspect of rumour, the research on rumour now regards its subject matter as a social 
phenomenon as much as an aspect of interpersonal communication. This change of emphasis 
has led to a notable fuzziness of boundaries between psychological explanations and those 
offered by other disciplines such as sociology, or folklore studies. As a result there is 
considerable overlap between the work of, for instance, psychologists Allport, Postman, 
Rosnow, or Fine, sociologist Shibutani (1966) or folklorists Patricia Turner (1993) and 
Jeffrey Victor (1994). 
Interest in the sociological and historical aspect of rumour has been partly driven by the 
recognition that rumours often contain cyclically reappearing symbolic themes (Rosnow, 
1980; Rosnow and Fine, 1976; Shibutani, 1966). Even Allport and Postman (1947), who 
originally commented that rumours are characteristically of 'temporary interest', 
acknowledged the existence of'solidifiedrumours' as 'unusually persistent hearsay' which is 
transmitted from generation to generation. These recurrent rumours are thought to be similar 
to legends, in that they have 'become part of the verbal heritage of a people' (La Piere and 
Famsworth,1936). An example of a 'solidified rumour' would be what are commonly known 
as 'urban legends' or 'urban myths'. These include tales of 'dead hitchhikers', paranormal 
experiences during camping trips, alleged discovery of rat meat in hamburgers bought in fast-
food chains etc. (Brunvand, 1988, 2000). A more sinister example of recurring 'rumour', 
which comes directly from the conspiracy tradition, would be the idea of Jewish ritual 
physical and sexual abuse of children, mainly boys (Cohn, 1957; Billig, 1989). This theme, 
the origins of which lie in medieval Jewish demonology has become entrenched in the 
conspiracy culture and has persisted to the present day. 
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.A related aspect of rumour research which is relevant to conspiracy theories is the notion of 
'diving rumours', introduced by Allport and Postman (1947). Many recurring rumours are 
current for a while, before 'diving' under the surface, only to reappear sometime later, when 
circumstances warrant their re-emergence. For instance, in the two World Wars many 
rumours were remarkably similar. Tales of enemy atrocities against children or subversion at 
home, which were common in 1918, resurfaced in 1939-1945 (Allport and Postman, 1947, 
Neubauer, 1999). Similarly, many urban myths from the Afiican American community 
analysed by Turner (1993) tend to crop up from time to time, as do rumours of Satanic ritual 
abuse in the US (Richardson et al., 1991; Victor, 1994). Bearing in mind the periodical 
recurrence of conspiratorial claims, conspiracy theory could also be conceptualised as a type 
of recurring, diving rumour. 
An important question regarding the concept of 'diving rumours' is the status of any 
particular claim in-between its periodical resurfacing. Allport and Postman (1947) offered 
two possible explanations. First, they suggested that there might not be any real continuity 
between the manifestation of the same rumour at two different points in time. They proposed 
that 'human needs generate similar stories' in response to similar circumstances. This implies 
that what appears to be a single diving rumour are in fact two different manifestations of the 
same underlying psychological process. Thus, the emergence of the same rumour at different 
times is attributable to common cognitive and motivational underpinnings rather than to an 
ideological link. However, Allport and Postman (1947) also reflected on the possibility that 
people 'revive' the same explanations in response to similar social conditions. In contrast to 
the first interpretation, the latter reveals a sensitivity to cultural and historical aspects of 
rumour as an explanation. It proposes that a solidified diving rumour constitutes an 
explanation that can be drawn upon in times of crisis, and which, like legends or myths, give 
the world 'a meaning that does not have to be constantly recast' (Young, 1936). This 
interpretation is compatible with the notion of conspiracy theory as an ideological tradition, in 
that it reflects the view of conspiracy theories as a ready-made explanatory discourse which 
can be drawn upon in the face of a breakdown of alternative explanations. 
Evidence to support the claim about the existence of an ideological connection between 
separate manifestations of a diving rumour comes from the fact that conspiracy theories, 
urban myths, stories of satanic abuse, and other periodically occurring rumours never really 
'disappear'. Rather, they are merely confmed to the margins, to the writing of fringe authors, 
to newsletters published by marginal political or religious movements, or to web pages 
belonging to various 'enthusiasts'. The 're-appearance' of these rumours is therefore a matter 
of reinstatement in mainstream discourse, not of complete re-creation. For instance, theories 
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about the possibility and actuality of Satanic ritual abuse are kept constantly alive by various 
extreme Christian movements and other quasi-scientific organisations and institutions (Victor, 
1994). They become part of mainstream public discourse in response to some crisis when they 
provide simple and comforting explanations. Urban myths about ghosts of hitchhikers, 
camping experiences, etc. are similarly maintained in books or web pages from where they 
occasionally emerge into everyday discourse. The same dynamic can be said to apply to 
conspiracy theories. As has already been indicated, conspiratorial claims which existed in 
Serbia in the 1930s and 40s did not disappear in 1945, and therefore did not have to be 
created de novo by some particular cognitive or motivational process in the 1990s. Instead, 
the conspiracy culture was kept alive throughout that time in Serbian emigrant publications, 
in the propaganda of expatriate organisations, and in the writings of individual conspiracy 
theorists. The dynamic which propelled this rnarginalised explanation into mainstream media 
and political discourse will be the topic of subsequent chapters. 
4.5. Paranormal beliefs and conspiracy theories 
In Chapters 8 and 9 it will be suggested that conspiracy theories were not the only 
extraordinary explanatory framework that emerged from the margins during the Nato 
bombing of Yugoslavia. The war with Nato will be shown to have contributed also to the 
proliferation of paranormal beliefs. The present section will explore aspects of traditional 
psychological explanations of beliefs in the paranormal and examine any potential 
contribution that this research could make to the understanding of the proliferation of 
paranormal beliefs in Serbia in recent years. 
Research on paranormal beliefs within the traditional social-cognitive theoretical framework 
is closely related to the research on causal attribution outlined earlier. In the same way that 
attribution theorists have been interested in cognitive factors which underpin the propensity 
towards, for instance, 'personal' as opposed to 'situational' causal attribution, so researchers 
within what has become known as the 'psychology of anomalous experience' are interested in 
the cognitive dynamic behind the tendency to attribute causes to factors which lie beyond 
what is considered to be possible within the limits of natural science. Put simply, 
psychologists have been interested in the cognitive factors which distinguish between 'sheep' 
and 'goats', i.e. between the believers and the non-believers in paranormal phenomena 
(French, 1992; Blackmoore, 1990). 
The basic assumption shared by many psychologists who have attempted to uncover 
psychological dynamic beneath paranormal beliefs (Aicock, 1981; Blackmore, 1990; Hines, 
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1988; Irwin, 1993, etc.) is that such beliefs occur as the result of 'cognitive biases within our 
information processing system, leading to the misinterpretation of certain kinds of situation' 
(French, 1992; p.296). Following from this assumption is the belief that some individuals are 
more prone to relevant cognitive biases than others, and that the nature of these biases can be 
uncovered by identifying the differences in cognitive functioning between 'credulists' and 
'sceptics', 'sheep' and 'goats'. The research paradigm within this line of research typically 
consists of comparing two experimental groups - believers vs. non-believers - distinguished 
on the basis of scores on standard questionnaires such as Belief in the Paranormal Scale (BPS, 
Jones et al., 1977); and identifying potential differences between them in what is effectively 
the process of causal attribution. 
The most frequently cited biases which are thought to underpin beliefs in the paranormal, are 
the 'illusion of control' bias (i.e. perception of a random process as being under one's control, 
Ayeroff & Abelson, 1976; Langer, 1975, McGarry and Newberry, 1981), bias in probability 
judgement (Kahnernan et al., 1982; Blackmore & Troscianko, 1985; Blackmore, 1990); 
impaired performance on syllogistic reasoning tasks (Wierzbicki, 1985); lack of critical 
thinking (Aicock and Otis, 1980; Roe, 1999) and the tendency to seek confrrmatory evidence 
for our own beliefs (Russel and Jones, 1980; Jones and Russell, 1980). Also, there have been 
attempts to trace the distinction between 'sheep' and 'goats' to differences in intelligence 
(Killen et a!, 1974), educational attainment (Emmons and Sobal, 1981, Messer and Griggs, 
1989), even authoritarianism (Adomo, et al. 1950). 
One of the recognised shortcomings of research in paranormal beliefs is the fact that 'belief in 
the paranormal' is treated as a single category of beliefs, which includes a multitude of very 
different types of assumptions about the world of the supernatural. French ( 1992) for instance 
acknowledges that 'it would be extremely naive to hope that any one factor could be 
identified as underlying all aspects of paranormal belief, given the wide variety of alleged 
paranormal phenomena' and goes on to suggest that 'different biases would underlie different 
beliefs' (p.296). So far, however, scepticism about the possibility of a unified theory of 
paranormal belief has not prevented psychologists from using general measures in their 
research, or from drawing fairly general conclusions from their fmdings. At the same time, 
the prospect of each specific belief having a different underlying bias limits the explanatory 
and predictive value of the cognitivist explanation. It opens the possibility of an infinite 
number of potential biases which can be speculated on when specific beliefs do not fit the 
general pattern of findings. 
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Another noteworthy aspect of research in the psychology of paranormal beliefs is the 
distinction between 'sheep' and 'goats'. Inherent in the division is the assumption that people 
either believe or do not believe in paranormal phenomena. However, the existence of such a 
formal dichotomy is highly questionable. Even the measures used to asses the level of 
paranormal beliefs (e.g. the PBS) tend to assume the existence of a continuum rather than of 
distinct categories. The distinction between 'sceptics' and 'believers' is, therefore, one of the 
researcher's discretion. Gagne and McKelvie (1990) for instance used the top and bottom 30 
percent of the normally distributed scores on the PBS to create 'sheep' and 'goats' categories. 
This left 40 percent of the population whose 'cognitive biases' were effectively not 
investigated. 
More importantly, researchers who regularly divide their subjects into clear and formal 
categories (often Jabeiied with rather undignified animalistic metaphors) consider themselves 
to be beyond the proposed categorisation. Published papers on paranormal beliefs wiii often 
begin with a philosophical argument which establishes the author's own position on the 
matters of paranormal phenomena (e.g. French, 1992; Blackmore, 1990). Significantly, 
writers wiii rarely define themselves as 'sheep' or 'goats'. Instead they will adopt an agnostic 
and ambivalent stance. The reality of paranormal phenomena will be neither denied nor 
firmly endorsed. Blackmore (1990), for instance, aclmowledges that when examining a 
subject's belief in his or her psycho-kinetic powers, 'we cannot rule out the possibility that 
they do [possess such powers]' (p.65). Yet Blackmore (1990) says nothing about the state of 
her own cognitive biases or the nature of the cognitive processing which informs her own 
ambivalent stance or that of her similarly agnostic colleagues. 
The rhetoric of ambivalence evident in scientific writing on paranormal phenomena reflects 
an ideological dilemma faced by most writers on the subject. In the contemporary scientific 
community there is a significant bias in favour of scepticism towards paranormal phenomena. 
Paranormal beliefs challenge many commonsense notions about the world, as well as the 
basic postulates of natural sciences (W ooffitt, 1992). As a result, members of a scientific 
community are accountable for any opinion that falls short of unequivocal scepticism. At the 
same time, there are important philosophical reasons why the existence of paranormal 
phenomena cannot be denied outright (French, 1992, Humphrey, 1996). Also, bearing in mind 
the widespread nature of some form of paranormal belief in contemporary society (e.g. Gallup 
and Newport, 1991; Humphrey, 1996), writers proclaiming extreme scepticism would be 
accountable for what might be seen as evidence of excessive and somewhat outdated 
scientific rigidity.3 The rhetorical management of ambivalence in scientific reports is a way of 
addressing this ideological dilemma. Significantly however, while engaging in this rhetorical 
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work, advocates of cognitive explanations of paranormal phenomena such as French (1992) 
or Blaclcrnore (1990) consistently deny their subjects a similar discursive and rhetorical 
practice. In his examination of the rhetoric of paranormal accounts Wooffitt (1992) suggests 
that ordinary people are just as accountable for their paranormal claims and therefore 
susceptible to similar cultural pressures. With that in mind, there is no reason to assume that 
lay accounts of paranormal phenomena or experiences would not be constructed and 
formulated in a way that addresses the same ideological dilemmas as professional writing on 
the subject. Belief in, or scepticism towards paranormal phenomena are not manifestations of 
some enduring feature of an individual's cognitive capacities or a stable attitude, but stances 
in an argument, rhetorical positions which can be used differently to construct a factual claim 
about causal relations in the world. In constructing their social world, people draw upon what 
are essentially culturally available explanations. These include both reflections on the 
possibility of paranormal phenomena and common sense assumptions about the boundaries of 
science. Neither of these positions are ever unequivocally accepted or rejected. Instead, they 
are constantly negotiated, reshaped and modified, depending on the demands of the situation, 
the speaker's need to manage his accountability, or any other rhetorical activity in which the 
speaker may be involved. As discourse analysts often point out, mutually exclusive 
categories, such as 'believer' and 'sceptic', which are used in psychological studies, are all 
too frequently mere constructs of the research methods used by cognitivist approaches (Potter 
& Wetherell, 1987, Edwards and Potter, 1992). 
A related criticism of traditional psychological approaches to paranormal beliefs concerns the 
categories used by researchers to describe paranormal phenomena. Personal experiences 
which psychological literature deals with consist typically of individual instances of 
psychokinesis or the control of mind over matter (e.g. changing the colour of the traffic-lights 
by thinking about it), instances of extrasensory perception such as telepathy, clairvoyance, or 
precognition, and finally, encounters with ghosts. These categories are derived mainly from 
literature on parapsychology. They are not necessarily concepts or categories which feature in 
commonsense notions about the paranormal. Moreover, by limiting itself to areas belonging 
to parapsychology, psychological literature fails to deal with, for instance, religious beliefs, 
which also involve numerous assumptions about the existence of the world of the 
supernatural. As a result, in the realm of psychological theory and research, the assumed 
psychological dynamic underpinning the belief in parapsychological phenomena is (at least 
implicitly) treated as psychologically distinct from institutionalised religious belief. As the 
examination of paranormal accounts which emerged in Serbia in the 1990s will demonstrate 
(Chapter 8), beliefs in phenomena such as psychokinesis or clairvoyance, can be, and often 
are constructed within the framework of institutionalised (Orthodox Christian) religion, thus 
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undermining the assumed conceptual and practical distinction between different types of 
supernatural belief. 
A further problem with the cognitivist approach to paranormal beliefs relates to the claim that 
such beliefs are generally the result of personal experience (e.g. Glicksohn, 1990; Haight, 
1979; Murphy and Lester, 1976; etc). Blackrnore (1984) even found that personal experience 
is the single most commonly reported reason for belief in the paranormal. This assumption is 
often used to back up the claim about the cognitive and attributional element of the 
psychological mechanisms behind the belief in the paranormal. It is assumed that explanation 
of a personal experience is more likely to be attributable to aspects of individual cognitive 
functioning rather than to some broader social or cultural dynamic. However, as Humphrey 
(1996) points out, the assumption about the importance of personal experience is greatly 
misleading. Even if personal experience is reported as influential among those who have 
supposedly had it, this does not mean that personal experience is a decisive factor in 
determining the belief in the population as a whole. Humphrey (1996) notes that 'the fact that 
personal experience may be sufficient, does not entail that they are in any way essential' (p. 
164). In the review of relevant surveys, Humphrey found a fairly stable pattern: between only 
a third and a half of reported believers for any specific category of paranormal phenomena 
have allegedly had the relevant personal experience (Humphrey, 1996). For instance, while, 
on average, 70 percent of British people report believing in ESP, only 30 percent claim to 
have had a relevant personal experience. Out of 45 percent of the British who believe in 
ghosts, only 15 percent have 'seen' one. By far the greatest influence on the paranormal 
beliefs of the population at large was not personal experience but the cumulative effect of 
television, radio, books and magazines. In a survey conducted in Reading, which Humphrey 
uses as a representative example, the combined effect of the media was more than 50 percent, 
as opposed to 21 percent who cited personal experience as the decisive factor. 
The reinterpretation of survey data opens the possibility that personal experiences are simply 
reported as the most important and decisive factor by those who claim to have had it. The 
reasons why such experiences are regularly singled out as significant stem from the rhetorical 
and epistemological implications of first-hand knowledge. In a climate of scepticism, 
professing a belief in 'psi' because one 'read it in the paper' or 'heard in on TV' is much 
more easily disputable than a reference to personal experience. As discourse analytic research 
on fact construction points out, a claim such as 'I never believed in ghosts/psi!ESP, until one 
day I saw ... ' plays an important role in the construction of factual accounts of paranormal 
phenomena (e.g. Wooffitt, 1992; Potter, 1996) 
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For the present purposes, the influence of the media on paranormal beliefs is noteworthy 
because it suggests that susceptibility to this type of belief may be the result of a wider social 
and cultural dynamic. Evidence in favour of this proposition comes from the fact that the 
prevalence of beliefs in the paranormal fluctuates across time, and periodically engulfs whole 
communities, cultures or societies (e.g. Jahoda, 1972). Also, anthropological research 
suggests that in many societies, the use of paranormal explanations is governed by very strict 
rules behind which lie specific social norms. For example, a psychological explanation of 
paranormal beliefs, founded on the notion of fairly general cognitive biases, would struggle to 
explain why among the Azande tribes studied by Evans-Pritchard (1937), witchcraft as a 
causal explanation is limited only to certain types of events. So, adultery, disloyalty or any 
violation of a social taboo are considered to be beyond the explanatory power of witchcraft 
(Bains, 1983). The fact that the boundaries of a paranormal explanation are governed by 
social norms, points towards the existence of a cultural and ideological mechanism behind 
this type of explanation. 
Social and cultural factors which have been identified as contributing to the proliferation of 
beliefs in the paranormal tend to be similar to those which are thought to bring about belief in 
a conspiracy. First, there is the reference to the need to provide a simple explanation for a 
complex reality and the desire to explain why 'bad things happen to good people'. Also, the 
emergence of paranormal and conspiratorial explanations are both associated with a 
breakdown of traditional, normative explanations of social phenomena. According to Michael 
Shermer (1997), author of People Believe in the Weirdest Things and an established sceptic 
when it comes to the world of the supernatural, people's belief in the paranormal is 
determined by a need for 'simple explanations for an often complex and contingent world. 
Good and bad things happen to both good and bad people, seemingly at random' and beliefs 
in some transcendental reality 'provides a simple path through life's complex maze' (1997, 
p.275). Also, in Magic, Science and Religion Malinowski (1954) puts forward the view that a 
belief in magic builds confidence in situations of uncertainty (O'Keefe, 1982). Paranormal 
beliefs have also been said to offer a solution to seemingly insoluble problems (Defrance et 
al. 1971; Marty, 1970; Scheidt, 1974; Tiryakian, 1972). Similarly, Schumaker (1990) argues 
that the function of 'paranormal self-deceptions' is to provide means of coping with an 
'otherwise terrifying world' (p.lO). In emphasising the social or cultural dynamic behind the 
onset of extraordinary beliefs, all these approaches tend to view paranormal explanations as a 
type of explanatory discourse which can be resorted to, or drawn upon in response to social 
crises. Also, there is a common tendency to trace both conspiracy theories and paranormal 
beliefs to a culturally founded faith in a higher, transcendental power, that is to religion or 
superstition of some kind. Popper (1966, 1972) and Hofstadter (1966) both recognised the 
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roots of conspiracy theories in 'ancient superstitions' or religious belief. Popper (1972), for 
instance argued that the conspiracy theory of society 'comes from abandoning God and then 
asking "who is in his place'" (p.123) 
Bearing in mind the functional similarity and assumed historical link between conspiracism 
and beliefs in the paranormal, it should not be surprising to find that the two belief systems 
are seen as emerging from similar social conditions. For example, in the analysis of the 
development of the spiritualist movement in the 19th Century United States, Nelson (1969) 
suggested that the popularity of spiritualism was brought on by increased secularisation and 
rationalism. The challenge to 'traditional cultural patterns' and 'old beliefs', required a novel 
form of transcendentalism which would provide a means of dealing with human transience. 
Interestingly, in The Politics of Unreason, Lipset and Raab (1978) see the development of 
anti-Masonic conspiracism in the US in the 1820s as a consequence of the same 
Enlightenment-induced secularisation of American society. However, anti-Masonism was the 
means by which those unwilling to abandon religious orthodoxy explained their increasingly 
marginal position in American society. Although spiritualism and anti-Masonism represent 
two different consequences of the onset of rationalism and Enlightenment, they nonetheless 
seem to have emerged from the same period of transition and normative crisis. 
In Chapters 8 and 9 it will be suggested that the proliferation of conspiracy theories in 
Yugoslavia in the 1990s was accompanied by an increase in the popularity of paranormal 
beliefs. Significantly however, it will be argued that paranormal explanations and conspiracy 
theories were not rival discourses, but complementary explanations of a social and national 
crisis. As will become apparent, paranormal explanations were often constructed within the 
broader explanatory framework of conspiracy theory. Consequently, the emergence of 
paranormal beliefs will be examined within the relevant cultural and ideological context, and 
in terms of the broader ideological dynamic which led to the proliferation of conspiracy 
theories. 
4.6. Social psychology as history: social constructionism and the study of collective 
beliefs. 
On the basis of the examination of psychological approaches which have been applied to the 
problem of conspiracy theory, it is possible to draw a number of general inferences about the 
contribution of traditional psychology to the understanding of this phenomenon. First and 
foremost, psychological explanations of conspiracy theory typically approach the belief in 
conspiracy as a manifestation of one or more universal social-psychological processes. 
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'Causal attribution', 'scapegoating' or 'projection', for instance, all refer to fairly basic 
cognitive and motivational mechanisms which are essentially independent of the. historical 
and ideological specificities of the environment in which they occur. It is taken for granted 
that people attribute causes to events using identifiable rules and strategies; that scapegoating 
is an inherent feature of inter-group dynamic; and that projection is a natural and ubiquitous 
mechanism of ego defence. A similar pattern is visible in psychological research on 
paranormal beliefs, where underlying dynamic is generally examined as a function of 
cognitive or perceptual biases. 
The assumption about the universality of psychological processes stems from the positivist-
empiricist philosophy which underpins traditional approaches within sociobehaviourist 
sciences (Gergen, 1973, 1994). The essence of this metatheoretical set of assumptions is that 
psychology, as the science of the human mind, can, and should endeavour to identify general 
laws and principles which govern human behaviour (e.g. Morgan et al., 1979; Mills, 1969, 
Krech, et a!, 1962). Ideally, by formulating such laws, the science of psychology should be 
able to explain, predict and control human thought and actions (Glenn et all, 1976; Houston et 
al., 1981, all cited in Gergen, 1994). 
The positivist-empiricist philosophical basis of traditional psychology gives psychological 
explanations a pronounced ahistorical dimension. The mechanisms of the human psyche 
which social psychology aims to uncover are thought to be universal across time and space 
and essentially independent of the broader mechanisms of history, ideology or culture. The 
reductionist tradition in social psychology even attempted to reduce various aspects of 
ideology (and, by extension, history itself) to particular psychological mechanisms (Eysenck 
& Wilson, 1978; Adomo et a!, 1950, etc.). Berkowitz (1962) once said of intergroup 
behaviour and conflict, that these social phenomena 'ultimately become problems of the 
psychology of the individual. Individuals decide to go to war, battles are fought by 
individuals and peace is established by individuals'. 
As Billig (1996) points out, more recent writing in social psychology exhibits greater 
awareness of the limits of the narrow, universalist assumptions of traditional psychology. The 
idealistic aim of explanation, prediction and control, has been substantially modified in recent 
years. Many psychologists today admit that their discipline failed in its quest for universal 
laws which could explain and predict behaviour (see Gergen, 1982). Social psychologists who 
subscribe to traditional approaches and methodologies will typically acknowledge the 
significance of social context, and recognise the potential contribution of other social sciences 
and history to the understanding of social phenomena (e.g. Hogg & Abrams, 1988; Hogg & 
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McGarthy, 1990; Hogg and Vaughan, 1995). Hogg & Abrams (1988) for instance recognise 
that 'content [of a social phenomenon] or culture' cannot be explained 'by recourse to 
psychological processes alone' (p.l8, cited in Billig, 1996). Yet in spite of the apparent 
appreciation of the influence of culture, ideology, or social institutions on social-
psychological dynamic, the essence of Hogg and Abrarns' (1988) analysis conforms to the 
established metatheoretical and philosophical tradition. It focuses primarily on the 
examination of psychological processes in isolation, and the identification of common 
psychological underpinnings (such as 'social identification') of outwardly different 
phenomena (identification with race, national religious, professional groups, etc; Billig, 
1996). 'Culture' and 'ideology' are thus kept separate from 'psychology' and relegated to the 
position of residual explanatory categories, used merely to account for observations which 
appear to deviate from the predicted behavioural or cognitive pattern. 
In response to the ahistorical approach to social phenomena found in traditional social 
psychology, there have been attempts to redefine the discipline as an essentially historical 
endeavour (Gergen, 1973; Moscovici, 1984a; Tajfel, 1981, etc.). In his seminal paper on 
social psychology as history, Gergen (1973) argued that the purpose of social psychology is 
not to describe scientific principles and build general laws of psychological functioning, but 
to explore the historical nature of social phenomena. Gergen challenged the two basic axioms 
of traditional psychology. First, the existence of stable relationships between events in nature 
which can be formulated in terms of transhistorical laws; and secondly the assumption that 
the ontology of various psychological mechanisms is in the human mind, or as Gergen (1985) 
put it, 'in the head'. Gergen proposed that social psychological phenomena are 'largely 
nonrepeatable' and 'fluctuate markedly over time' (Gergen 1973, p.310). Consequently, 
patterns of thinking and behaviour are not contingent upon some underlying principles of 
'universal' social psychology, but are historically situated 'social performance' (Gergen, 
1985). A similar sentiment was expressed in Serge Moscovici's (1984a, 1988, 2000) writing 
on social representations. The theory of social representations also revolves around the idea 
that social psychological concepts are socially and historically created and irreducible to 
individual psychological functioning. Also, Tajfel (1984, 1981) spoke of 'beliefs' and 'mental 
states' of individuals as historically situated, and argued that social psychology must study 
ideology and social conditions that produce different patterns ofthinking and behaviour. 
Many of the above points have become part of the broader social contructionist perspective in 
psychology (see Burr, 1995; Smith et al. 1995), including the various discourse-based 
approaches such as the discursive and rhetorical psychology (Antaki, 1994; Billig, 1987b, 
1990; Potter & Wetherell, 1987; Wetherell and Potter 1992; Edwards, 1997; Edwards and 
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Potter, 1992). Within the discursive approaches, psychological states are not thought ofas the 
hidden essence behind an observable linguistic expression. Rather, they are treated as being 
constructed within and through that expression. Aspects of human psychology such as 
'emotion' {Averill, 1982, Edwards, 1997), 'disorder' (Garfink:el, 1967), 'attitude' (Billig, 
1987b; Potter & Wetherell, 1987), 'attribution' (Edwards and Potter, 1992), even 'memory' 
(Middleton and Edwards, 1995) have all been investigated not as universal processes and 
structures located within the 'psyche' or 'the brain', but as discursive constructs which are 
constituted through the practical activity of communication. For instance, within discursive 
and rhetorical psychology, the study of 'identity' does not assume the subject matter to be a 
hidden mental structure, which somehow needs to be tapped through a study of its linguistic 
manifestation. Instead, 'identity' is regarded as nothing other than a discursively 
accomplished activity and the practice of self-description and self-definition which is 
occasioned by the specific rhetorical context. Similarly, discourse analytic work is interested 
in what emotion-talk, identity-talk, memory-talk, jealousy-talk or race-talk does for the 
speaker in a particular context (Potter and Wetherell, 1987). Discourse analytic taking on 
causal attribution emphasises the fact that causal inferences are not the outcome of some 
'causal calculus' through which objective or perceived reality is interpreted, but are discursive 
practices inherent in the occasioned descriptions of reality (Edwards and Potter, 1992). 
Therefore, within the broader discourse analytic perspective, utterances and accounts are 
treated as 'the phenomena of social psychology, not the second best approximation for the 
real, but hidden psychological events' (Billig, 1997; p.219). 
General assumptions of discursive and rhetorical psychology are applicable to the phenomena 
of conspiratorial or paranormal explanations. These explanations can be seen not as outward 
manifestations of some universal processes, but as discourses which accomplish a particular 
rhetorical function in the process of reality construction. The implication of this assumption is 
that a conspiratorial claim, together with its rhetorical construction and function, are 
themselves a worthy topic of interest and material for analysis, not a phenomenon behind 
which lies an identifiable cognitive or attributional bias. 
4.7. Social psychology and the study of ideology 
Following the general social contructionist assumption that psychological 'states', 'beliefs' 
and 'attitudes' are socially and materially constructed, it can also be suggested that these are 
constituted through ideology (Billig, 1997). Speakers providing an utterance or an account 
must locate their speech act within an existing conceptual framework, or ideology, which 
prescribes what can or should be said in a given context. Ideology, as a pattern of ideas, 
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values and interpretations about the world and relations within it, delineates the boundaries of 
any discourse. Significantly however, language also has an original dimension and a creative 
potential in that utterances always occur in response to a novel conversational situation. As 
Volosinov (1973) wrote, all utterances are conditioned 'by the social organisation of the 
participants involved, and also by the immediate conditions of their interaction'. Moscovici's 
(1984a, 2000) theory of social representations contains a reference to the same duality. 
Representations are thought to be prescriptive, in that they determine the possibility of an 
utterance, while being at the same time dynamic and transformed through the 'babble of 
everyday talk' (Moscovici, 1984b, p.950). In that sense, every utterance is shaped by the 
historical and social context in which it occurs, while being able to challenge, reformulate, 
and reconstitute some aspect of the ideology within which it is situated. It is this 'dialectic of 
communication' (Billig, 1997), inherent in every speech act, that makes one simultaneously 
the 'master and slave oflanguage' (Barthes, 1982). 
The perpetual transformation of ideology through communication is made possible by the 
argumentative and dialogic nature of ideology (Billig, 1987b, 1990). Ideologies are not 
internally consistent constructions, but often collections of contrasting claims. For instance, 
nationalist ideology in Western democracies contains competing notions of 'citizenship' and 
'ethnic origin' as criteria for belonging to a nation. Each of these notions is a historical as 
much as a social psychological category. In everyday talk about nation and nationhood, ethnic 
and civic nationalist discourses are negotiated, contrasted, endorsed or rejected. Similarly, in 
the case of conspiracy theory, various broader types of conspiratorial discourse identified 
earlier, such as classical or world elite conspiracy theories, reflect different aspects of the 
same ideological tradition. Within this tradition, the mystical or the antisemitic heritage is 
pitted against the need to present the conspiratorial claim as a reasonable, pertinent and 
moderate explanation of politics. As will become apparent later (Chapters 6 and 7), much of 
the rhetorical work within each type of conspiratorial discourse is contingent upon the 
existence of an alternative construction of the world as ruled by conspiracy. 
Also, ideologies and ideological traditions do not exist in isolation or as hegemonic 
discourses. Instead, each ideology is engaged in clashes with opposing constructions of reality 
(Billig, 1990, Billig et al. 1988). For instance, those who speak of conspiracy or of 
paranormal phenomena must position their claim (logos) in relation to alternative discourses 
(antilogoi) such as conventional history or natural science. The counter-position to which a 
particular discourse orients varies with the argumentative context, so claims have to be 
constantly reconstructed and reconstituted, thus contributing to their perpetual transformation. 
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The proposition concerning the dynamic nature of ideology goes against the traditional 
Marxist conceptualisation of the term (Billig, 1990). According to the Marxist philosophical 
tradition, ideology is a unitary system of ideas which occupies a hegemonic position within a 
society (Marx and Engels, 1846/1986). Recipients of ideology are seen as 'helpless dupes' 
whose thinking (or 'false consciousness') is shaped by ideas imposed by the ruling classes 
(Billig, 1990, 1997; Hall, 1988). Traces of this tradition of thought are visible in the writing 
of a number of Serbian commentators and political analysts who reflected on the proliferation 
of conspiracy theories and paranormal beliefs in the 1990s. In many cases, the popularity of 
extraordinary explanations was attributed to the successful propaganda of the Milosevic 
regime (Colovic, 1999; Popadic, 2000; Pavlovic, 2001). It was suggested that conspiratorial 
and paranormal explanations were deliberately imposed by the authorities in order to divert 
public attention from the regime's own responsibility for the deteriorating social crisis. At 
first sight, this idea does not seem all that farfetched. Both historical and empirical evidence 
can be cited to support it. For instance, many masters of propaganda in history have 
recognised the PR potential of paranormal explanations. In 1942, Goebels noted in his diary 
that Nazi propaganda should include some occult themes, and that relevant agencies should 
seek to recruit as many experts in occult prophesies as possible (Howe, 1968; cited in 
Popadic, 2000). Also, there is experimental evidence to suggest that lasting exposure to a 
particular stimulus or idea is often sufficient to induce an attitude change (Zajonc, 1968; 
Grush, 1976). It seems that sometimes it is enough to repeat the same idea over and over 
again, for it will eventually catch on, or at least appear reasonable, even if not believed. At the 
same time however, propaganda-based explanations paint a rather unflattering picture of 
Serbian society, or any other society for that matter. They construct an image of an 
'unthinking society', one that is easily hoodwinked by propaganda experts. This implies that 
people readily accept communication from relevant power-structures, without challenging, 
doubting or disputing ideological claims.4 As has already been mentioned, recent 
conceptualisations of ideology have emphasised its dynamic quality and its constant 
transformation through everyday language use (Billig, 1990). Also, post-structuralist theories 
of culture and communication suggest that people are not passive recipients of ideology, but 
agents engaged in a 'free play of signification', able to create their own readings of dominant 
ideas, as well as to challenge, dispute and undermine the ruling ideologies (Billig, 1997, 
Thompson, 1984). 
The suggestion that the argumentative and dynamic nature of ideology is played out through 
inter- and intra-ideological clashes which take place on the level of discourse and 
communication, implies that aspects of 'ideology' and 'culture' (as well as the related social 
psychological phenomena), can be explored through the study of everyday discourse within 
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which the dynamic of ideology is played out. The following section will address the question 
of method and examine the ways in which the ideological aspects of discourse might be 
studied, specifically in relation to conspiracy theory. 
4.8. The idea of method and the practice of 'traditional scholarship' 
In traditional psychological approaches, the aforementioned ahistoricity of psychological 
theory is reflected in the choice of research method. The emphasis on carefully controlled 
experimentation as the preferred method is based on the assumption that social, political and 
cultural influences are little more than potentially confounding variables, mere pollutants 
which contaminate the 'pure' psychological processes which are of interest to social 
psychologists. 
Behind the focus on experimentation lies a more general interest • and belief- in the value of 
method. The practice of science, and this includes much of social science as well, is founded 
upon the idea that scientific findings, insights and discoveries must be devoid of personal 
bias. 'Objective reality' is thought to exist independently from the perspective of the observer, 
so science, with its prescribed methods of inquiry and strict procedures, offers an impersonal 
and objective viewpoint from which reality can be observed and studied. From this 
assumption follows the emphasis on replicability as an epistemological criterion. If a 
scientific observation is 'objective', then any other person ought to arrive at the same 
conclusion, providing he or she follows the same methodological rules (Billig, 1988a). In 
traditional psychological writing, procedures and methods are held in high esteem. Method is 
described in great detail, so that other researchers can go and replicate a particular fmding, 
thus enhancing its status as a scientific 'fact' (Gergen, 1973, 1994). 
Because traditional science consists of a systematic accumulation of relevant knowledge and 
research, there is an implicit drive among scientists towards the standardisation of scientific 
practice. Scientific findings are thought to be more easily compared and combined if they are 
derived from similar methodologies, so the need to integrate scientific knowledge leads to the 
emergence of distinct research paradigms. Content analysis commonly used in the study of 
media material is a case in point. A well-established method involves the coding of messages 
from a carefully chosen sample of newspapers, or electronic media broadcasts (Deacon et al., 
1999). The frequency of specific words, messages or themes is noted and expressed 
numerically before being subjected to statistical analysis. Everything is done to minimise the 
subjectivity of readers and coders (often two coders are used, whose results are then 
compared) in order to eliminate bias and ensure that the results are independent from the 
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. influence of the researchers involved. Such standardised and 'objective' procedures have 
made it possible for different studies to be compared, and integrated from time to time within 
larger meta-analyses. In social psychology, the use of standardised questionnaires serves a 
similar purpose in that it facilitates comparison between different studies. 5 
In spite of the practical advantages inherent in the application of established research 
paradigms and standardised procedures, it is questionable to what extent the adherence to a 
specific methodology is useful in the study of ideology. Traditional questionnaire studies for 
instance are of little use as they undermine the aforementioned idea about the argumentative 
and dynamic nature of ideology. As discourse analytic research often points out, inherent in 
attitude surveys and questionnaire studies is the idea of stable attitudes as enduring cognitions 
about, and emotions towards, a specific topic (Billig, 1987b; Potter and Wetherell, 1987; 
Wetherell and Potter, 1992). Once the concept of an 'attitude' is brought into line with the 
argumentative conceptualisation of ideology, it becomes evident that 'attitudes' cannot be 
adequately investigated by fairly static questionnaire-type investigations. Questionnaires 
cannot explore 'attitude' as a rhetorical stance in a matter of controversy or as an occasioned 
response to a particular argumentative context (Billig, 1987b, 1990). Similarly, in examining 
the ideology of the National Front in Britain, Billig (1978) reflected on the shortcomings of 
methods such as content analysis, when it comes to providing insight into the conspiracy 
tradition. In order to demonstrate the presence of the conspiratorial explanatory tradition 
within British Fascism, it was necessary to show that the rhetoric of the National Front shares 
an ideological heritage which goes back to the writings of Robison and Barruel. This is a task 
that content analysis could not adequately tackle. For instance, looking for the prevalence of 
specific words such as 'conspiracy' or 'conspiracy theory' in National Front propaganda 
would have been quite unrevealing. Conspiracy theorists rarely refer to their work as 
'conspiracy theory', and may not even mention the word 'conspiracy'. Even if they did, that 
would not in itself be sufficient to locate a text within an ideological tradition. Reference to a 
'conspiracy' is neither necessary nor sufficient to demonstrate the belief in a 'conspiracy 
theory of society' nor to suggest the presence of the conspiratorial explanatory 'style'. As 
Beardsworth (1980) noted, locating or counting particular words says nothing about their 
meaning or connotations. Also, George's (1959) analysis of Nazi propaganda emphasised the 
rhetorical implications of uniquely occurring messages, of the kind that quantitative analyses 
would miss (cited in Billig, 1988a). Moreover, as subsequent chapters will show, the 
conspiracy tradition often reveals itself in the shape of very subtle conceptual links, coded 
references, allusions, etc. Consequently, the study of the conspiracy tradition requires in-
depth lmowledge of conspiracy culture, its ideology and its rhetoric, rather than extensive 
training in a particular methodology. 
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In earlier sections it was noted that explanations, including those of an extraordinruy nature, 
are historically-placed discourses which reflect relevant ideology. Consequently, the study of 
an explanation ought to focus on uncovering where (in relation to the broader social and 
historical pattern) the particular explanation comes from and how it is played out in specific 
argumentative context (Billig, 1988a). This idea is inherent in Billig's critique of traditional 
social psychological methods. Billig suggests that the study of social explanations requires a 
piece of ordinary discourse (i.e. an explanation) to be situated within an ideological tradition. 
Such a proposition is in line with the idea of social psychology as history (Gergen, 1973) in 
that it involves a type of inquiry that traces specific explanations to their cultural origins and 
demonstrates their historical contingency." For instance, Billig (1988a, 1990) traced the 
arguments of young racists to the ideology of Voltaire and the enlightenment. Similarly, he 
demonstrated the way in which the conspiratorial ideological tradition informed the political 
outlook ofEnoch Powell (Billig, 1988a), the National Front propaganda (Billig, 1978; 1989), 
the thinking within the British Far Left (1987a) and the French Right (1989). 
In the above studies, all of which were as much historical as social psychological inquiries, 
there was no discernible method or technique involved. Words were not counted, and 
responses were not quantified. There was not even a specific sample of texts which was 
analysed in minute detail. For instance, although the analysis of Enoch Powell's rhetoric 
began with an examination of a specific speech, the transcript of the speech was not treated as 
'data' in any accustomed sense of the word. Instead, it was a starting point which drove the 
search for more information and new interpretations of Powell's political discourse (Billig, 
1988a). Billig referred to this type of inquiry as 'traditional scholarship' arguing that 
'Part of the scholar's skill is not to follow a pre-set programme, laid down in advance by a 
methodologist, but to gather up clues which can nudge the search one way or another. Scholars 
have to feel their way around the library and archival sources, backing hunches as they 
proceed.' (p.207) 
The emphasis on the skills of traditional scholarship reflects the idea of social psychology as a 
historical endeavour. After all, historians do not have carefully identified techniques or 
procedures which they follow in their investigations. The same can be said of those who study 
ideology (Thompson, 1984; Billig, 1982; Eagleton, 1984, etc.). In this type of inquiry, as in 
traditional scholarship, 'hunches and specialist knowledge are more important than formally 
defined procedures' (Billig, 1988a, p.199). Moreover, Billig emphasises that 
'individual quirkiness is very much part of traditional scholarship. It was taken for granted by 
the traditional scholar that one should read as widely as possible, and in as many languages as 
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possible. Through wide reading, breadth and depth of knowledge would be gained, as well as 
the ability to make connection between seemingly disparate phenomena. The learned scholar 
would be able to interpret individual texts with an acuity not available to those of restricted 
reading. Traditional scholars are not particularly bothered with the origins of their insights, in 
the sense that they do not attempt the impossible task of laying bare all the intellectual 
experiences which lead up to the ability to make a scholarly judgement. Nor do they presume 
that other scholars will read the same texts in just the same way as they have. In fact scholars 
spend a great deal of energy in criticising the readings of their fellow scholars' (Billig, 1988a; 
p.200) 
Consequently, the spirit of scholarly enterprise is essentially anti-methodological in that it 
contains none of the epistemological or practical advantages of a well-defined research 
paradigm. Moreover, the practice of scholarship requires a kind of knowledge and erudition 
which can never be fully accomplished. As new knowledge and expertise is gained, old work 
will look as if it needs expanding, updating or rewriting. In that sense, scholarly analysis will 
never provide definitive explanations or solutions, but mere insight and arguments. More 
often than not, the outcome of scholarly inquiry will be criticised by other scholars. As Billig 
(1988a) warns, a scholar cannot hide behind a method and the illusion of objectivity which 
surrounds it, but will always remain fully accountable for his arguments and claims. 
Scholarship is therefore in itself argumentative and rhetorical, just like the ideology which it 
can help understand (Billig, 1988a). 
Finally, it should be noted that the study of ideology in the aforementioned way should go 
beyond merely situating specific explanations within established ideological traditions and 
showing how specific historically-situated ideas have informed contemporary explanations. In 
previous sections, the critique of traditional psychological approaches to social phenomena 
was often formulated by contrasting psychological explanations with the relevant sociological 
or historical alternatives. For instance, numerous socio-historical studies on conspiracy 
theories have demonstrated the limits of a purely psychological explanation by highlighting 
the historical contingency of this type of belief and identifying specific social and ideological 
conditions which contribute to their emergence. At the same time however, socio-historical 
explanations have their own shortcomings in that they seldom reflect on the actual processes 
by which a marginal explanatory discourse (such as conspiracy theory or the paranormal) 
gains popularity in times of social crisis. Social and cultural explanations rarely elaborate on 
the dynamic behind what amounts to collective 'attitude change'. Instead, they either assume 
that they are dealing with an 'unthinking society' or look to psychology, and especially social 
psychology, to provide the relevant answers. However, as was shown in earlier sections, in its 
quest for transhistorical and universal laws of human behaviour, traditional psychology has 
neglected the notion of interdependence between the individual and society, and ignored the 
contingency of psychology upon history. 
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In the present thesis, an attempt will be made to go beyond the socio-historical explanation by 
examining specific conspiratorial and paranormal accounts and explanations, and analysing 
their rhetorical and argumentative structure. The study will look not only at where these ideas 
came from, but also examine what it is about them and about how they were told that made 
them so popular at the time of the war. As will become apparent, the popularity of conspiracy 
theories was made possible by a gradual broadening of the boundaries between acceptable 
and unacceptable explanation, which propelled both conspiracy theories and paranormal 
explanations into the realm of legitimate explanatory discourses. Crucially, behind the 
proliferation of these beliefs was not simple propaganda manipulation, nor some universal 
psychological mechanism but a more complex discursive and ideological dynamic at the heart 
of which is the argumentative nature of the conspiracy tradition. 
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Chapter 5: 
Data and Materials 
The data analysed in the present thesis consists primarily of articles published during the Nato 
bombing of Yugoslavia (23rd March - lOth June 1999) in a number of Serbian daily 
publications (Politika , Borba, G/as Javnosti, Blic and Danas), periodicals 0/reme, Nin, 
Duga, Nedeljni Telegraf, Vojska, Velika Srbija) and military magazines and journals (Vojska, 
Vojno Delo, Vojni Glasnik). The bulk of this material was obtained, in printed form, during 
the visit to Belgrade in the summer of 1999. With most periodicals and journals it was 
possible to get hold of complete sets of issues published during the three and a half months of 
war. Copies were either bought, or obtained free of charge from the publishers. As far as daily 
publications are concerned, some ( Glas Javnosti, Blic) were available over the internet. The 
rest were obtained in printed form either from the publishers or by other means.' Thirty seven 
issues of Politika, 33 issues of Borba and 41 issues of Danas (out of 77 published during the 
eleven week long conflict) were obtained in this way. Considering that the dates of the printed 
copies did not always correspond to certain key events in the war (such as the bombing of the 
Serbian television centre, the accidental targeting (by Nato) of the Albanian refugee convoy, 
the bombing of the Chinese embassy, or the first and last days of the bombing), additional 
material was obtained by photocopying relevant issues from copies held at the Serbian 
National Library or at the newspaper archive belonging to the independent weekly magazine 
Vreme. Even with these additional measures it was not possible to obtain every copy of every 
daily newspaper published during the conflict. However, bearing in mind the nature of the 
analysis, the absence of individual issues was not deemed to be a hindrance to the analytic 
process. 2 
Although most of the material analysed in subsequent chapters consists of texts which 
appeared in the Serbian press during the 11 weeks of Nato bombing, the analysis was by no 
means limited to the Serbian press during the 77 days of hostilities, or to conspiratorial 
explanations which emerged at the time of the conflict. Texts published in this period were 
neither historically nor ideologically isolated from the preceding years and could therefore not 
be examined independently of the broader cultural trends which marked the development of 
Serbian society throughout the 1990s. Consequently, in order to explore Serbain conspiracy 
culture at the time of the conflict with Nato, it was necessary to take into consideration 
conspiratorial discourse, as well as the content of the national press, in the years preceding the 
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war. Newspapers and magazines published outside the 11 week period of bombing were 
therefore looked at, and are also referred to in subsequent chapters. This material was 
obtained from the archives of the Serbian National Library. 
The broad range of printed material gathered in the first instance was examined in the context 
of a preliminary exploration of the coverage of the war in the Serbian press. A13 will become 
apparent, analytic chapters tend to focus on a smaller proportion of magazines, newspapers 
and periodicals. The selection of publications for closer scrutiny was made on the basis of 
their relevance to specific issues dealt with in the analytic chapters as well as on the basis of 
their influence in Serbian society. For example, the most commonly referred to publication is 
Politika, a mainstream daily newspaper which occupies a special status in Serbian society 
(Nenadovic, 1996; Thompson, 1999; Colovic, 1999). On the other hand, in chapters 8 and 9, 
where the analysis focuses on conspiratorial discourse in Serbian military publications (for 
reasons which will be made clear later in the thesis) most relevant examples are taken from 
military magazines and journals such as Vojska, Vojno Delo and Vojni Glasnik. What follows 
is a brief description of the most commonly cited newspapers, magazines and journals.3 
Information pertaining to other publications which are only occasionally referred in the thesis 
will be provided in the form of footnotes in the analytical chapters. 
~~A~J~KD !I ~-£ Politika (Politics) is Serbia~s oldest and best-~~wn ma~nstrea~ ~ily 
~.,.,,'"''''·'""~~ newspaper. It was founded m 1904 by the pubhc1st Vladislav Ribmkar. 
Before the Second World War, Politika was an independent and centre-left newspaper. 
During Tito's communist regime, the newspaper was under the control of state institutions · 
such as the People's Front and the Socialist Alliance of the Working People. In spite of the 
influence of the state apparatus, in the context of the Serbian media, Politika was widely 
regarded as a fairly liberal newspaper. For many decades, Politika was the most widely read 
and most trusted daily publication (Thompson, 1999). The credibility of Politika has suffered 
since the late 1980s, when it was taken over by the Milosevic regime and turned into one of 
the most notorious ideological weapons of the Serbian political establishment. Because of its 
links with the Serbian regime and a developed network of local correspondents, Politika's 
coverage of the war with Nato was more detailed and comprehensive than that of rival daily 
publications (Danas, Blic, Glas Javnostz) which were severely affected by various censorship 
rules and informal pressures which existed at the time. During the weeks of the bombing, an 
average issue of Politika was printed on twice as many pages as its rivals, and, together with 
Serbian state television and radio, was the principal source of information (albeit not always 
accurate) about developments at home or abroad. 
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~ li!) e~ Glas Javnosti (The Voice of the Public) is an independent daily newspaper 
~ _+~ founded in the mid-1990s. Although a fairly recent addition to the Serbian 
daily press, Glas claims to originate from the newspaper of the same name which was 
published in the city of Kragujevac before the Second World War. Glas Javnosti was 
generally opposed to the Milosevic regime. At the same time, the newspaper frequently took a 
'patriotic' and conservative stance on many social issues. This was reflected in its negative 
attitude towards the West. In the summer of 2000, G/as Javnosti serialised the book Opus Dei 
written by Smilja Avramov, one of Serbia's best known conspiracy theorists (see below). 
I
Rfl'ftA, Duga (The Rainbow) founded in 1945, is one of Yugoslavia's oldest news 
_IIUQI&_ magazines. It is published fortnightly. In the late 1980s Duga became the 
principal voice of Serbian nationalism. Dragos Kalajic, a known antisemite had a regular 
column in the magazine. Also, Duga glorified Serbian 'heroes' such as the paramilitary leader 
Arkan, and the Bosnian Serb leaders Radovan KaradZic and Ratko Mladic. Serbian 
conspiracy theorists such as Durdevic, Vlajic, Avrarnov and Radisic (see below) all either 
wrote for, or were interviewed by Duga at some point during the 1990s. For many years, 
Mitjana Markovic, Slobodan Milosevic's wife, published her weekly diary in Duga so it has 
been suggested on more than one occasion that the editors of the magazine were close to the 
former Serbian regime (e.g. Mediji pred ogledalom, NIN, No.2398, 13 December, 1996). 
Four issues of Duga were published during the 11 weeks of bombing. 
Nedeljni Telegraf (The Weekly Telegraph} was founded in 1996 by 
Momcilo Dorgovic. Nedeljni Telegraf is an independent weekly political 
tabloid consisting mainly of sensationalist stories about individuals from the world of Serbian 
politics and entertainment. It boasts the largest circulation in Yugoslavia, in the category of 
weekly news magazines. Although often critical of the Serbian authorities, Nedeljni Telegraf 
is a profoundly 'patriotic' publication, and is in that respect similar to Duga. Telegrafs 
patriotic orientation became particularly prominent during the months of the Nato bombing. 
The fortnightly magazine Revija 92 (Review 92) first appeared in 1989. It 
was initially devoted primarily to law enforcement issues which is 
reflected in the publication's title. In Yugoslavia, '92' is the emergency telephone number of 
the police force. Over the years the magazine shifted its attention to military matters as well 
as to what are often referred to as 'geopolitical issues'. In terms of its editorial policy, Revija 
92 is thought to be close to the Yugoslav military establishment. 
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Vojno Delo is Yugoslavia's most prestigious military journal founded in 
1949 by the Ministry of Defence. Its aim was to provide a forum for 
informed discussion on matters of military strategy and skill. Issues of Vojno Delo also 
contain articles on global trends and the relationship between Yugoslavia and the 
international community. 
,:;, Vojni lnformator (11ze Military Informer) was founded in 1947 by the 
(ll''!l''-')t UVI' _..;.:.~·'"··•- Military Publishing Institute. It is in many ways similar to Vojno Delo 
except that issues contain a larger number of shorter articles, often with black and white 
illustrations. Like Vojno Delo, Vojni Glasnik is published between four and six times a year. 
As will become 
Vojska (11ze Army) is a fortnightly magazine distributed free of charge to 
Yugoslav Army personnel. It is also available from selected newsagents. 
apparent, articles printed in Vojska were occasionally quoted in the 
mainstream media including Politika. During the 11 weeks of bombing, 40 special 'war 
editions' of the magazine were published. The war issues were generally shorter and 
contained stories of the bravery and heroic accomplishments of the Yugoslav army as well as 
articles on global political issues. 
In the thesis, names of newspapers, periodicals and journals will appear in the original, 
Serbian language (e.g. Politika not Politics). However, titles of articles and books written by 
Serbian authors will appear in English. It should therefore be borne in mind that all these texts 
were published in Serbian. All translation into English was done by the author of the present 
study solely for the purposes of the thesis. 
• •• 
Apart from looking at various daily newspapers and periodicals, the thesis examines a number 
of books (approximately 20 titles), published in Yugoslavia in the period 1995-2001, which 
contain more detailed and elaborate accounts of contemporary world politics. Many of these 
have been written by leading Serbian conspiracy theorists. These examples of conspiracy 
theory provided important insight into the broader framework of conspiratorial explanation 
within which accounts appearing in the Serbian media are situated. Also, extracts from books 
written by leading conspiracy theorists will be used to illustrate the rhetoric and 
argumentation of the conspiracy tradition, What follows are brief biographies of the 
conspiracy theorists whose work is analysed in subsequent chapters. Titles of books printed in 
bold refer to books which are examined in the analytical chapters. 
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Professor Smilja Avramov (born in the town of Palcrac in 1918) is a 
retired professor of international law at the Belgrade Law Faculty. 
A vramov studied law in Belgrade and Vienna in the 1930s. During the 
Second World War she volunteered as a nurse. In the 1950s she continued 
her academic career as a postgraduate student at the Hague Academy of 
International Law, Columbia University (New York) and the London 
School of Economics. Avramov is one of the best-known Serbian experts in intemationallaw. 
She is also the honorary vice-president of the World Association of International Lawyers 
based in London. At one point in her career she presided over the World Federation for 
Disarmament and Peace. 
Although author of over 150 articles and a number of specialist books in the field of 
international law, Avramov is best known as the former advisor to President Milo§evi6 on 
matters of international law and foreign relations. Avramov met Milo§evi6 as early as the 
1960s when she supervised Milo§evi6's Masters thesis (which he never completed). From 
1990 to 1992 Avramov was a member of the team of experts which represented Serbia at the 
Geneva peace talks chaired by Lord Carrington, as well as at other international conferences 
devoted to the resolution of the Yugoslav crisis. 
In Serbia Avramov is also known as an 'expert' on world elite organisations such as the 
Trilateral Commision, the Bilderberg Group or Opus Dei, and their involvement in Balkan 
politics. Throughout the 1990s, she was frequently interviewed by the press and appeared in 
numerous televised discussions on this topic. Three of Avramov's most recent books- The 
post-heroic war of the international community against Yugoslavia (Post-herojski rat 
medunarodne zajednice protiv Jugoslavije, 1995), Trilaterala (The Trilateral; 1998) and 
Opus Dei (2000) - deal with the role of secret and semi-secret international organisations in 
the disintegration of Yugoslavia. She is also vehemently opposed to the institution of the 
Hague War Crimes Tribunal. After Milo§evic's extradition to the Hague she appeared on 
BBC television where she condemned the 'kidnapping' of the former president. She is a 
founder member of the International Committee for the Truth About Radovan KaradZic, a 
recently formed panel of 'experts' and public figures aimed at uncovering the 'political 
manipulation' behind the indictment of the former Bosnian Serb leader. 
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Dr Ratibor (Ray) Durdevic' (born in the Serbian village of Ristovac in 
1915), received a BSc in forestry from the University of Edinburgh before 
returning to Serbia in 1938. Upon his return, Durdevic took up a secretarial 
post with the Serbian Christian Youth Organisation. During the Second 
World War, Durdevic worked for the propaganda department of the 
collaborationist government of General Milan Nedic. In the fmal months of the war, he fled to 
Slovenia together with other collaborators, before escaping first to Italy and then Germany. In 
exile Durdevic worked as a secretary at the YMCA. In 1950 he moved to the US where he 
trained as a social worker. He received a PhD in clinical psychology from the University of 
Denver in 1958. Durdevic is the author of two books in the field of psychology, No Water in 
My Cup: Experiences and a Controlled Study of Psychotherapy in Delinquent Girls published 
in 1968, and Direct Psychotherapy: 28 American Originals published in 1973. For 25 years 
he was a member of the American Psychological Association. It is indicative ofDurdevic's 
political views that he left the Association in protest against the latter's 'pro-homosexual 
stance', following the decision by the AP A to erase homosexuality from the DSM. 
In the 1980s Durdevic founded 'Ichtys Press' a publishing company based in Kansas which 
published primarily his own antisemitic conspiracy literature, including titles such as The 
Contemporary Faces of Satan (!985) Christian Revolt, Long Overdue- Towards American 
Freedom From Aliens (1991), 'The Fear Of Jews Syndrome in America, VolA: Bamboozled 
Americans & Their Vile Brainwashers (1988), The Fear Of Jews Syndrome in America, Vol. 
B: Americans- A Nation of Dupes, Sheep, & Wimps? (1988). In 1992 Durdevic returned to 
Serbia, where he founded the St Sava Youth and Student Organisation aimed at re-educating 
the Serbian youth in the 'healthy spirit of Orthodox Christianity'. After the failure of the 
youth project, Durdevic turned exclusively to publishing. He established the Serbian branch 
oflchtys Press which has so far published over 30 titles, mostly Durdevic's own work. Apart 
from publishing Serbian translations of the aforementioned titles which first appeared in the 
US, Durdevic also brought out books such as: Karl Marx: the servant and victim of Satan 
(Karl Marks: Sluga i irtva Satane, 1996); The Gay Brigade (Pederska Brigada, 1996); On 
the Senselessness of Antisemitism and Anti-antisemitism (0 Besmislu Antisemitizma i 
Antiantisemitizma, 1997); Superbankers: the vampires of the contemporary world 
(Superbankari: vampiri savremenog sveta, 1997); Western ideological and spiritual 
poisoners (Idejni i duhovni trovaci sa Zapada, 1997), Masonry: a conspiracy against God 
and man, through the centuries and today (Masonerija: Zavera protiv Boga i coveka, kroz 
vekove i danas); Five Bloody Revolutions of Judeo-bankers and their Judeo-masonry (Pet 
Krvavih Revolucija Judeo-bankara i njihove Judeo-masonerije; 1999); and Freud's False 
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Science (Frojdova Lai Nauka, 2000). All of Durdevic's books contain the same mixture of 
antisemitic and quasi-religious conspiratorial material which is examined in later chapters. 
Spasoje Vlajic, (Born in Belgrade, in 1946) is an engineer of 
crystalography, and a teacher of information technology in a secondary 
school in Belgrade. Vlajic is best known to the Serbian public for his ideas 
concerning parapsychological warfare and his pseudoscientific work on the 
so-called 'universal formula of light' (see Chapter 8). His ideas have had 
some coverage in the press, although mostly in fringe magazines such as 
Trece oko (Third Eye), Cudo (Miracle), Nostradamus and others which specialise in 
paranormal phenomena. More important for Vlajic's public image were his appearances on 
the popular sensationalist television chat-show Black Pearls (Cmi Biseri; produced by the 
private BKTV channel) which often discusses the world of the paranormal. Vlajic claims to 
have taken part in the programme more than eight times. Significantly, the frequency of his 
appearances increased in the months preceding the Nato intervention in the Spring of 1999. 
Vlajic has featured in the Western media too. His extraordinary views have been noted for 
instance in The Independent and the American daily USA Today (Aliens are in control of 
Blair, say Serb psychics, The Independent, 10 August 1999; Amid strikes, fortune tellers' 
fame soars, USA Today, 6 April1999). 
Vlajic regularly receives his followers and other members of the public in his office, situated 
in a block of flats in the Belgrade suburb of Zemun. These meetings, held six days a week 
throughout the year, are attended by up to fifteen people (mostly women) who seek Vlajic' s 
guidance and discuss various aspects of his work. The sessions are free, and are occasionally 
advertised in the magazine Trece Oko, at the bottom ofVlajic's regular column. 
Vlajic is also a prolific writer. His prophesies and quasi-scientific theories are described in 
great detail in over ten titles all of which have been published by a fringe publishing company 
'Miroslav'. Vlajic's books are on display in most larger bookshops. His work includes titles 
such as Formula of Light (Svetlosnaformula, 1992); New (Meta)physics (Nova (meta)fizika; 
1992); Intent (Naum, 1993), Torch (Luca, 1994), A Word on Pure Energy (Slovo o cistoj 
energiji, 1995), The Prophecy of the Formula of Light (Prorocanstvo svetlosne formule, 
1996), and most recently the trilogy The First World Parapsychological War (Prvi svetski 
parapsiholoski rat, 1998) The First World Anti-Christian War (Prvi svetski antihrisi:anski 
rat, 1999), and A History of the Future (Istorija budui:nosti, 2000). 
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Colonel Dr. Svetozar Radisic (born in the Southern Serbian city of 
Leskovac) began his military career as a teenager. In the late 1980s he 
obtained a PhD in military studies. From 1992 to 1994, Radi~ic held the post 
of editor-in-chief of the military journal Vojno Delo. From 1994 to 1995, 
Radi~ic worked in the Section for Psychological and Propaganda Operations 
affiliated to the Yugoslav Army Bureau of Information. In late 1995 he was 
reinstated as the editor of Vojno Delo (see Chapters 8 and 9 for a more detailed account of 
Radi~ic's career). In May 2000 Radisic became the official spokesperson of the Yugoslav 
Army. He teaches at the Centre for Higher Military education. 
Since 1995, Radi~ic has published regularly in Revija 92, Vojno Delo, Vojni Glasnik, Vojska, 
etc. In 1997, he wrote a pamphlet 'Defence doctrines- the concept of full-dimensional 
defence' which was published by the Yugoslav Army's Centre for higher military education. 
Two years later his book Neocortical War (Neokartikalni Rat) was published by the Yugoslav 
Army Publishing Institute. In 200 I, a second, revised edition of the book appeared in the 
bookshops. Radi~ic's work is examined in greater detail in Chapters 8 and 9. 
Nebojsa Krstic, a sociologist of religion and property developer, was born 
in the Southern Serbian city of Nis in 1964. Krstic is the author of four 
books as well as of numerous articles in the field of Orthodox theology, 
philosophy, politics, and international relations. Most of Krstic's articles 
appeared in fringe rightwing publications such as Zbilja (Reality), Beli 
Orao (White Eagle), Beogradski Dijalog (Belgrade Dialogue), Vizantijsko 
Ogledalo (Byzantine Mirror), Monarhija (Monarchy) and others. In 1995 Krstic founded the 
rightwing nationalist journal 'Obraz' (Dignity). He also edited the notoriously rightwing and 
antisemitic religious journal Logos published by the Orthodox seminary in Belgrade. 
Significantly, Krstic's publishing activity was not confined to fringe journals. He occasionally 
published in the Yugoslav military magazine Vojska (The Army), in the official Serbian 
Orthodox Church publication Pravoslavlje (Orthodoxy), in the daily Glas Javnosti as well as 
in the culture supplement of Politika. 
In 1991 Nebojsa Krstic received the St Sava Prize, awarded by the Patriarch of the Serbian 
Orthodox Church, for his study The concept of Logos in the philosophy of St John which 
appeared in the journal Logos. Two years later, the collection of essays Orthodoxy and 
Politics, edited by Krstic, was awarded the annual prize of the Yugoslav Association for the 
scientific study of religion. Krstic was a member of the Serbian Writer's Union. 
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In 1998, Krstic founded the extreme right wing organisation Otacastveni Pokret Obraz 
(Patrotic Movement Dignity) which propounds the ideology of Dimitrije Ljotic and Nikolaj 
Velimirovic. The activities of this organisation are examined in Chapter I 0. Krstic died in a 
car crash on 3'd December 2001.5 
As well as examining the written work of A vramov, Durdevic, Vlajic, Radisic and Krstic, the 
thesis is also based on the analysis of recorded conversations with Spasoje Vlajic and Smilja 
Avramov. Encounters with Vlajic and Avramov took place during visits to Belgrade in 
December 2000 and July 2001 respectively. 
The recorded meetings with Vlajic (two two-hour sessions) could be described as an ad hoc 
mini-ethnographic study. Vlajic was visited during two of his regular afternoon encounters 
with members of the public. Vlajic was informed that the researcher was a 'postgraduate 
student' doing a 'sociological study' related to his ideas (see chapter 8 for a more detailed 
description of the encounter). Upon arrival in Vlajic's office, the researcher was introduced to 
regular attendants as a 'special guest from England', and was allowed to sit close to Vlajic 
and ask specific questions. Vlajic consented to the sessions being recorded. It should be 
pointed out that the encounters with Vlajic did not constitute 'interviews' in any formal sense. 
Vlajic's status as a 'guru' and the researcher's as a 'guest' eager to learn more about Vlajic's 
esoteric skills, limited the latter's contribution to the conversation to occasional comments 
which merely guided Vlajic's discourse towards specific topics ofinterest.6 
In June 200 I a recorded conversation with Smilja A vramov was conducted in her flat in 
Belgrade. As with Vlajic, contact with A vramov was established through her publisher. 
A vramov was told that the researcher was writing a thesis on the 'influence of trans-national 
organisations on Balkan politics' and could therefore benefit from her 'expertise'. The 
conversation lasted approximately one hour. Again, the researcher's contribution to the 
conversation was limited to occasional comments. At the same time, the face-to-face 
encounter provided an opportunity to question A vramov on specific aspects of her 
explanatory framework which were not elaborated upon in her written work. 
It was explicitly made clear to Vlajic and A vramov that recorded material would be used 
solely for academic purposes. However, details of the study were not discussed. Vlajic and 
A vramov were not told that the main topic of research was conspiracy theories or that the 
researcher would take a critical stance towards their work. Bearing in mind that the 
conversation was very much in the public domain, the failure to disclose details of the study 
was not judged to be in violation of standard ethical considerations. 
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Chapter 6 
Protoconspiracy theory and the proliferation of suspicion in the Serbian media 
and political discourse 
In Chapter 3 it was suggested that the revival of Serbian nationalism in the 1980s was 
accompanied by the emergence of what Dilas (1993) referred to as 'historical nihilism'. A 
number of prominent members of the Serbian intelligentsia, who played a crucial role in the 
nationalist resurgence, attributed the lack of understanding for Serbian nationalist concerns 
among 'other Yugoslav nations and the Western powers, to some hidden agenda and sinister 
motive. The ensuing conflict with the international community was blamed on a deliberate 
and premeditated policy aimed at undermining the national integrity and sovereignty of the 
Serbian state and nation. 'Historical nihilism', and the idea of conspiracy which emanated 
from it was said to have become, in the early 1990s, an essential component of 'regime 
populism' (Popov, 1993), the ideological orientation which was endorsed and propagated by 
the ruling political establishment in Serbia. 
In Popov's (1993) study of Serbian populist culture in the 1990s, 'regime populism' is 
distinguished from 'opposition populism'. The latter, associated primarily with fringe right-
wing opposition parties and sections of the Serbian Orthodox Church, was also said to contain 
a xenophobic element and the notion of an international anti-Serbian plot. Crucially however, 
only the opposition populist version of conspiracy theory can be said to constitute a direct 
continuation of the conspiratorial cultural tradition as manifested in the work of the likes of 
Velimirovic and Ljotic. In contrast, the notion of conspiracy inherent in 'regime populism' 
cannot be so easily linked to the elaboration of Serbian conspiracism in the 1930s and 40s. As 
will become apparent in the present chapter, the allusions to an international conspiracy in the 
rhetoric ofMilosevic's establishment and state controlled media belong primarily to the type 
of explanation defined in Chapter 2 as protoconspiracy theory. 
In the earlier chapter, protoconspiracy theory was said to be the most sophisticated and 
ostensibly the most 'reasonable' type of conspiracy theory within the proposed threefold 
classification of conspiratorial discourse. While drawing heavily on the notion of the 'hidden 
hand' behind world politics, this type of explanation was said not to contain the more 
controversial and problematic aspects of the conspiracy tradition such as the mystical and 
quasi-religious themes and arguments. Also, it was suggested that protoconspiracy theory 
seldom makes explicit references to the identity of the conspirator, so the monomaniacal 
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attributional style characteristic of other forms of conspiratorial discourse is not made 
transparently obvious. Most crucially, protoconspiracy theory does not link the alleged 
present-day conspiracy either to conspiracies, or conspiracy theories, of the past. 
The present chapter will examine in greater detail the specific features of protoconspiratorial 
explanation, as manifested in the mainstream Serbian media and political discourse, both in 
the early 1990s and during the Nato bombing. The similarities and the differences between 
protoconspiracy theory and the other types of conspiratorial discourse, namely classical and 
world elite conspiracy theories, will be explored. The chapter will demonstrate that, in spite of 
a number of distinguishing features of protoconspiracy theory, which give it a more 
reasonable and acceptable guise, this type of account draws upon many of the themes and 
arguments characteristic of the conspiratorial explanatory style. It will be suggested that the 
idea of secrecy and a hidden agenda in world politics, which is inherent in protoconspiratorial 
explanation, draws the protoconspiracy theorist into adopting the rhetoric associated with the 
conspiracy tradition, including the references to manipulation of the many by the few, the 
Manichean distinction between good and evil, the apocalyptic tone, etc. 
After demonstrating the presence of elements of the conspiratorial explanatory style in 
protoconspiratorial discourse, the chapter will propose that the proliferation of this type of 
explanation at the time of the bombing played an important role in the discursive and 
ideological dynamic (examined further in the next chapter) which enabled the mystical and 
antisemitic conspiratorial themes to emerge in the mainstream press during the war with Nato. 
6.1. Protoconspiratorial argument and MiloseviC's political rhetoric in the early 1990s 
From the early 1990s, the notion of a hidden agenda in world politics was a regular feature of 
Serbian government propaganda. The causal attribution implicit in the allusion to a 
conspiracy enabled the ruling regime to avoid responsibility for various political, economic 
and social crises which hit Serbia in the 1990s.1 The theme of foreign threat and conspiracy 
was also used, by the regime propaganda, to dent the credibility of Milosevic's political 
opponents. 
At the time of Serbia's first multiparty elections in December 1990, two largest opposition 
parties, the Democratic Party and the Serbian Renewal Movement, advocated a pro-European, 
and generally a pro-Western political option. In order to undermine Milosevic's main political 
rivals, the state-controlled media and government propaganda accused the opposition of 
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'treason' and of participation in the plot to subjugate Serbia. In one of his pre-election 
speeches, Milosevic himself pointed out that: 
'we must face the danger which looms over our independence. We are faced with a deliberate 
policy aimed at the economic destruction of our industry, all with the aim of causing an 
economic crisis in Serbia, and provoking social unrest through which the noose would be 
tightened around our necks, aided by new Serbian traitors. Debts in the game of border changes 
in this part of Europe would once again be settled with Serbian lives.' (reported in Politika, 22 
November, 1990, p.2) 
The reference to the 'deliberate policy' invokes the theme of conspiracy, especially when the 
policy is aimed at causing destruction and subjugation of a nation. Also, the gambling 
metaphor evident in the reference to the settlement of debts and 'the game', conjures up the 
imagery characteristic of conspiracy theories, where small nations are portrayed as little more 
than gambling chips in a game played by some evil and powerful minority. 
The reference, in the above quotation, to the 'economic destruction' of Serbia as the ultimate 
aim of Western involvement in the Balkans, became a regular feature of government rhetoric 
in subsequent years. Following the imposition of international economic sanctions in May 
1992, the idea that the whole world was conspiring against the Serbs enabled Milosevic to 
avoid the blame for the disastrous consequences of the 'unjust and undeserved' sanctions: 
'We simply found ourselves under overwhelnring pressure from the interests of the powerful, 
the calculations of the greedy, and the vindictiveness of those whom we defeated in past wars.' 
(reported in Politika, 10 October, 1992) 
The use of the word 'simply' to describe the causes of an economic crisis reveals the 
attribution style characteristic of conspiracy theory. Social problems are not presented as 
requiring complex explanations, but as a matter which can be 'simply' explained away by 
reference to someone's 'interests' and 'calculations', and therefore to deliberate actions. 
Finally, throughout the 1990s, the allusion to an international conspiracy provided Milosevic 
and his regime with the means of maintaining national cohesion at times of social unrest. In 
March 1991, during anti-government demonstrations organised by the students from the 
University of Belgrade, Milosevic met with a number of prominent local officials from 
around Serbia.2 The purpose of the meeting was to ensure the co-operation oflocal authorities 
and prevent the unrest from spreading outside the capital. During the meeting, the President 
of Serbia revealed that: 
'[The unification of Germany)led to the revival of very significant aspirations regarding the 
restoration of the Austro-Hungarian empire, and I can tell you quite freely, since this is not a 
public meeting, that we have information, very serious information that they are counting on the 
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whole of Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Vojvodina, part of SandZak, that their strategy 
is to give the whole of Kosovo to Albania, because according to their sources only 8.4% of its 
population is Serb and Montenegrin, that with this demographic explosion all this should be 
joint with Albania so that on their map, Serbia would be reduced to what would amount to the 
Belgrade Pashaluk .... They say between them that there can be no peace in the Balkans as long 
as Serbs are the largest people, that they are a savage people which will cause trouble and 
political conflict, so they must be reduced to borders which will make them powerless, where 
they won't be a threat to the new order. They have been working on this for some time.' 
(reported in Vreme, 12 April, 1991; p.64) 
Milosevic's reliable 'evidence' of a secret plot against Serbia's territorial integrity helped 
divert the attention from Serbia's internal problems, at a time when anti-government 
demonstrations in Belgrade were at a peak. More significantly, Milosevic claimed to be 
revealing to his collocutors some reliable, yet secret and confidential details regarding the 
plan to destroy Serbia. Secrecy surrounding a devious plot is a crucial element in every 
conspiratorial narrative. Conspiracy theorists always deal with information obtained from 
leaked documents, secret meetings, confessions of renegades, etc. which provides them with 
'bidden knowledge' to be revealed to the public (Hofstadter, 1966, Billig, 1978). The 
reference to the secret document proving the existence of an anti-Serbian plot, positions 
Milosevic's account of Serbia's predicament well within the domain of conspiratorial 
explanations. 
In spite of the implicit allusion to the secret machinations of the world's power structures, the 
explanatory framework of the former Serbian leader lacks a critical feature of the 
conspiratorial ideological tradition. None of the above examples clearly state the identity of 
the 'hidden hand'. In the first quotation Milosevic does not elaborate on who it is that pursues 
the 'deliberate policy' to destroy Serbia. In the third quotation he only mentions that 'they are 
counting ... ', that 'they say ... .', that 'they have been working on this ... .', without stating 
exactly who 'they' are. Milosevic refers to the 'interests of the powerful and the calculations 
of the greedy' without specifying to whom this reference applies. The 'vindictiveness of those 
whom we defeated in past wars' mentioned in the second quotation probably refers to 
Germany. The speech was delivered at a time of widespread animosity towards Germany 
provoked by that country's early recognition of the breakaway states of Slovenia and Croatia. 
Nevertheless, the vindictiveness of the Germans is cited in addition to the 'interests' and 
'calculations' of the (unspecified) powerful and the greedy. 
Similarly, there is a reference, in the above quotation, to the 'aspirations regarding the 
restoration of the Austro-Hungarian empire'. However, it is unlikely that Milosevic was 
referring to actual territorial aspirations of either Austria or Hungary. The allusion to a new 
'Austro-Hungarian' or 'Habsburg' empire should, in this context, be interpreted in a symbolic 
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sense, as signifying any kind of foreign colonial administration in south-eastern Europe. 
Similar symbolic reference was evident in the article entitled The reconstruction of the 
Habsburg monarchy which appeared in the Yugoslav Army publication Vojska in August 
1999. In spite of the prominent place in the title, the Austro-Hungarian empire is mentioned 
only once, right at the end of the article: 
'Considering that German administrators are already overlooking Bosnia-Herzegovina, it can 
be said that the borders of united Europe already match those oftbe Habsburg monarchy, with a 
tendency (under the mandate of international forums!) for further expansion towards the South' 
(Stojkovic, Vojska, 26 August 1999, p.8) 
Apart from this passing allusion to the former occupiers of the Balkans, the text in Vojska 
dealt mainly with the intervention in the region by the international community. The Austrian 
empire was therefore invoked, not as a specific conspiratorial body, but merely as a symbol of 
foreign occupation and the antithesis of Serbian national freedom. 
The absence of a clear reference to a group or organisation engaged in the plot against Serbia 
makes the conspiracy theory explicated by Milosevic 'conspiratorless'. Having a conspiracy 
theory without an identifiable conspirator constitutes a departure from the conspiratorial 
explanatory style. The reference to specific groups, organisations or movements which are 
supposedly orchestrating historical and social events, is one of the distinguishing and defming 
characteristics of conspiracy theories. As was noted in Chapter 4 the personal attributional 
style characteristic of conspiracy theory not only traces all events to deliberate decisions taken 
by specific individuals or organisations, but also always attributes the causes of social events 
always to the same and identifiable conspiratorial group (Billig, 1978, 1989). Also, in 
everyday discourse, conspiratorial constructions of reality are usually labelled in terms of the 
identity of the 'hidden hand'. People typically refer to 'the Jewish conspiracy', 'the Masonic 
conspiracy', 'the Vatican-Comintern conspiracy' or the 'Bilderberg conspiracy'. 
Equivocation regarding the identity of the conspirators plays an important role in the overall 
rhetoric of protoconspiracy theory. By not naming the individuals or groups behind the plot, 
this type of explanation presents itself as a reasonable and plausible alternative to the more 
simplistic and naive types of conspiratorial causal explanation. This crucial feature of 
protoconspiratorial discourse will be illustrated further later in the chapter, using examples 
from articles featured in Politika during the war with Nato. 
In spite of the lack of a clearly identifiable 'conspirator' in protoconspiratorial discourse, 
there is a feature ofMilosevic's rhetoric in the early 1990s, which links it to the conspiratorial 
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explanatory style. It is the already-noted reference to secrecy which is as crucial to a theory of 
conspiracy as the existence of the conspirator. Pidgen (1995) for instance defined conspiracy 
as a 'secret plan on the part of the group to influence events partly by covert action', while 
Cohn's (1957) definition of Jewish conspiracy theory includes the assumption that the alleged 
'Jewish government' is secret. Other authors have indirectly referred to the notion of secrecy 
by, for instance, defining the activity of the conspiracy theorists as a 'discovery' (Popper, 
1966) or by comparing them to the 'treasure hunter', engaged in uncovering something that 
was (deliberately) hidden (Billig, 1978). In many ways, secrecy constitutes the conspiracy 
theorist's raison d'etre. It underpins the idea that there is more to social and political reality 
than meets the eye and, therefore, that there is something to be explained and revealed. 
A consequence of the emphasis on secrecy is that every conspiratorial explanation must 
account for the fact that the sensational information it exposes has, until then, been kept 
secret. The theorist must explain how it is that the masses, whom he or she implicitly 
addresses, have been hitherto kept in the dark about the existence of a sinister plot. For that 
reason, considerable time and space in every conspiratorial narrative, even in protoconspiracy 
theory, is devoted to exposing the different ways by which the manipulation of the masses is 
accomplished. In Chapter 2 it was noted that the means of mass manipulation invoked in 
conspiracy literature ranges from the plausible to the ridiculous and includes anything from 
news management and customary wartime propaganda, to the transmission of subliminal 
Satanic messages and brainwave manipulation. Such broad scope of available means of mass 
manipulation, gives the conspiracy theorist some flexibility of choice when it comes to the 
description of this aspect of the conspiracy. As will become apparent, in protoconspiratorial 
explanations, the notion of mass manipulation tends to be limited to the more plausible 
methods and techniques, primarily media manipulation. The focus on the media makes the 
protoconspiracy theory seem reasonable because basic conspiratorial claims can be easily 
assimilated within the more general debate about the role of the media in the shaping of 
public opinion. In the following section the notion of media manipulation in 
protoconspiratorial discourse will be explored using the example of the reports, reactions and 
commentaries which appeared in Politika in the aftermath of the bombing of Serbian Radio 
Television. 
6.2. Protoconspiracy theory vs. the conspiracy tradition: the important differences 
6.2.1. Protoconspiracy theory and the use of metaphor: theatre. factory and drug addiction 
The military conflict over Kosovo in the spring of 1999 was accompanied by an equally 
intense propaganda war. On a daily basis, Nato officials presented their side of the story at 
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regular press conferences held in Brussels, London and Washington. The Serbian regime 
attempted to c01mteract the stories of 'precision strikes', 'collateral damage', 'legitimate 
military targets' and 'humanitarian intervention' with footage of civilian casualties and 
destroyed hospitals and schools. The propaganda war reached fever pitch in early April 1999, 
when a Nato official announced that the headquarters of the Serbian state television (RTS) -
the mouthpiece of the Milosevic regime - would be included on the list of 'legitimate military 
targets'. The threat to bomb the RTS was executed on 24 Aprill999, when the station's head 
office in the centre of Belgrade was destroyed with a single air strike. 
Around the time of the bombing of the state television centre, the propaganda aspect of the 
war with Nato was frequently discussed in the Serbian media, especially in that owned and 
controlled by the government. Crucially, the way in which the propaganda warfare was 
conceptualised involved references to mass manipulation thought to be aimed at concealing 
some sinister motive underlying the military intervention in Yugoslavia. 
Following the first indication that the Serbian Radio Television might be targeted, one of the 
station's chief news editors read out, live in the main news bulletin, an open letter to the Nato 
general Wesley Clark. The letter was subsequently reprinted verbatim in Politika. In the 
message to the General, the Yugoslav media, portrayed as dedicated to 'truth' and 
'professionalism', were contrasted with the manipulative western media: 
'We know, and we broadcast this, that thousands of Albanians from Kosovo and Metohija have 
fled in fear of your Nato bombs, as well as that hundreds of them are being manipulated by 
CNN and Christiane Amanpour, in the big-stage managed performance about a humanitarian 
catastrophe, financed by Soros, which is supposed to justify every Nato crime against our 
civilians' (Let Clarke shoot, we are waiting, Politika, 9 April1999, p.18) 
Similar allegations were made in an editorial in Politika which appeared the following day: 
'The Western followers of Goebels have surpassed their role model. The mighty media 
machinery, led by the turbo-manipulators CNN, Sky news, the BBC and other make-up artists 
for truth have fought in vain for our souls, with means unseen in the history of propaganda 
activity' (Petrovic, The pinnacle ofNato 's media agony, Politika. 10 Aprill999, p.l4) 
Other articles on the western media which appeared in Politika during the bombing campaign 
dealt specifically with the modus operandi of foreign media manipulators. In the text When 
ideas rnn out, there are always mass graves (Politika, 22 Aprill999, p.21), the journalist A. 
Apostolovski, writes of 'death and lies which spread, like a poisonous cloud, through the 
world's airspace' and about the imminence of yet another 'polluted overdose' for millions of 
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viewers of Western media around the world.3 The aim of Apostolovski's article was to 
explain how the 'state of hypnosis' is maintained among the Western population: 
'The whole mechanism of international relations connected with events in the former 
Yugoslavia is based on an ordinary bluff and a cheap editing trick worthy of 'Funniest home 
videos'' (ibid.) 
In all three of the above descriptions of the Western media which appeared in Politika, the 
notion of mass manipulation is constructed through the use of metaphors drawn from the 
world of theatre, television and film. References to 'cheap editing tricks', 'make-up artists for 
truth', 'stage-managed performance', 'funniest home videos' are cases in point. According to 
Billig (1978), metaphors taken from the world of puppetry and theatre are a common feature 
of conspiracy theory. Conspiracy theorists typically talk of 'well-orchestrated', 'hidden 
conductors', 'pulling strings'. All these metaphors reinforce the idea about the non-
spontaneous nature of events and actions. In the case of Politika the cinematic and theatrical 
metaphors enhance the claim that material shown in the Western media is deliberate 
fabrication rather than truth. 
Another set of metaphors used in the above examples are the mechanistic ones. CNN, Sky 
and the BBC are defmed as 'turbo-manipulators' who provide the basis for a system of 
international relations constructed as a 'mechanism'. Similarly, 'enemy' media agencies and 
personnel are referred to as propaganda 'machinery' and 'factory of lies'. The use of 
mechanistic metaphors to refer to enemy institutions has become a regular feature of modem 
war-time rhetoric (Tay! or, 1992). The rhetorical purpose of the construction of the enemy as a 
'machine' is manifold. First of all, the enemy, on this occasion the opponent in the 
propaganda war, is dehumanised and constructed as part of the military infrastructure. Such a 
representation does not only serve to undermine the credibility of the enemy media as the 
source of information. It also legitimises certain courses of action, such as the targeting of TV 
stations (in the case of Nato) or the expulsion of foreign journalists on grounds of 
involvement in subversive activities (in the case of the Yugoslav authorities). Neither of these 
actions would have been appropriate if the journalistic activity had been constructed as a 
human endeavour, separate from the depersonalised military confrontation. In addition, the 
mechanistic representation of the enemy introduces into the 'us' vs. 'them' dichotomy 
inherent in any war narrative a related distinction between man and machine. 1brough the 
metaphor, the humanity of 'us' is contrasted with 'them' as an amoral, insensitive and 
inanimate contraption. So, during the Nato bombing of Yugoslavia, the 'factories of lies', 
which are the Western media, were often contrasted with the Serbian media as the 'spirit of 
freedom' or the 'voice of truth'. The day after the bombing of the television headquarters, the 
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anthropomorphic representation of the Serbian media offered by a journalist contained a 
double biological metaphor. It was alleged that 'this barbaric act by the criminals has stricken 
in the heart of our voice of truth' (By trying to assassinate President Milosevic and the 
bearers of the public word, the criminals are trying to break the freedom-loving spirit of our 
people, Politika, 24 Aprill999, p.20).4 
The use of a mechanistic metaphor in protoconspiratorial discourse also emphasises the 
notion of manipulation. The media 'machinery' has to be both owned and operated by 
someone. Consequently, the media are represented as mere tools in the hands of others. 
Significantly, the 'enemy lies', which the media produces are described as a 'polluted 
overdose' and 'poisonous cloud'. Enemy 'machinery' is thus constructed as a source of 
contamination (pollution, poison), as something which deliberately corrupts things which are 
pure and natural, in most cases 'the truth'. This broader ecological metaphor overlaps with a 
psycho-medical connotation. The allusion to a polluted overdose introduces the imagery of 
drug addiction. Similarly, there is talk of a 'state of hypnosis' which is maintained, through 
the media, among the population in the West. Both drug addiction and hypnosis refer to 
wilfully and deliberately invoked altered states of consciousness. As such they constitute 
suitable metaphoric representations of mass manipulation. The mechanistic metaphor, 
conunonly found in the representation of the enemy in a military conflict, thus becomes also a 
reference to mass manipulation and effectively to a conspiracy. Overdose and hypnosis 
simultaneously account for a particular mental state (of submission and passivity) and for the 
fact that these cannot occur spontaneously but as a result of (deliberate) intervention: 
someone has to do the hypnotising or administer the overdose. 
The reference to psycho-medical intervention in Politika is purely metaphorical. There is no 
suggestion that overdoses are actually being administered, or that TV broadcasts have a 
genuinely hypnotic effect. In contrast, classical conspiratorial discourse often refers literally 
to psycho-medical methods of mass manipulation. For example, in an interview published in 
Duga in May 1999, Dr Todor Jovanovic (introduced in the article as 'an expert in the field of 
inununology') offered a comprehensive account of the pharmacological component of the 
world conspiracy: 
'Through the constant effect of tablets targeted at a certain segment of the population, and one 
should include vaccines in this category, it is possible to act directly upon the human brain, 
which on average weighs 1,400 grams. Its weight can be reduced to 500 grams, and you can 
imagine what consequences this can have on the changes within it. Take a look at an average 
American. Anyone can spot the dumb expression on his face, which is in many ways the effect 
of the pharmaceutical industry. This man accepts anything he is told. How many times have you 
been surprised by the comments of average Americans interviewed in the streets. Surprised 
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both by their appearance and the answers. Total dumbness.' (Fascism can be spread with a 
syringe, Duga, May 1999, p.l7) 
In Jovanovic's revelation there is no sign of metaphorical meaning. The American population 
is said to be kept in a state of submission through the literally constant administration of 
specialised drugs which reduce intellectual ability. A similar claim was made in the article 
The aggression of profit against the soul, published in an earlier issue of Duga. The piece, 
written by the journalist Miso Vujovic focused on the satanic aspects of the international 
conspiracy. It suggested that international drug trafficking is a means of mass manipulation: 
'Oliver Stone protested publicly against the murder of Blacks with powerful synthetic drugs. Is 
there a country in the world with such a deep division between the rich and the poor? Addicts 
are the easiest to manipulate' (Duga, Apri\1999, p.30) 
Vujovic went on to suggest that 'in the last ten years, more people died of drug abuse in great 
Russia than anywhere else in the world' (ibid.). The rise in drug abuse in 'great Russia' is 
interpreted as a deliberate means of subverting the 'return to Orthodoxy, tradition and roots' 
(ibid). This type of explanation, with reference to a satanic conspiracy aimed at destroying 
Russia and the rest of the Orthodox world, belongs to the domain of classical conspiracy 
theory. 
The reference to literal drug abuse in classical conspiracy theory reflects the common 
pseudo-scientific aspect of this type of explanation, which will be examined in more detail in 
later chapters. For the present purposes, the distinction between metaphorical and literal 
allusion to psycho-pharmacological aspects of mass manipulation illustrates an important 
difference between protoconspiracy theory and classical conspiracy tradition. One of the ways 
in which protoconspiratorial discourse constructs a more reasonable and acceptable account 
of a world plot is by preserving the distinction between metaphor and reality. Protoconspiracy 
theory thus appears to be devoid of the more controversial quasi-scientific aspect of classical 
conspiratorial explanations, while at the same time preserving, through the employment of 
suitable metaphoric representation, the underlying idea of a deliberately-induced altered state 
of mind with the purpose of manipulation. 
6.2.2. 'Conspiratorless conspiracy': the use o(agentless passives and euphemisms 
As was the case in Milosevic's speeches quoted earlier, references to mass manipulation 
which appeared in the mainstream Serbian press lacked a direct reference to the organisation 
or body behind the manipulation. For example, in the quotation from the article When ideas 
run out there are always mass graves, the manipulation of the masses is formulated in a 
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passive tense, in that the 'bluffers' and those who stand behind the 'editing trick' are not 
identified. The reference to the Western media as 'poisonous clouds that pollute the airspace' 
does not identify the source of the poisonous cloud. The very title of the article When ideas 
run out there are always mass graves omits a direct reference to who it is that ran out of 
ideas. According to Hodge and Kress (1993), the syntactic construction of a statement has 
important implications for the way in which the audience interprets its content. So, the 
passive form a sentence, which omits any reference to the agent behind an action, can have 
the effect of suppressing the existence or relevance of specific agents. However, agentless 
passives can also be seen as a way of managing ambiguity regarding the agent's identity. By 
concealing the agents, the passive syntactic form contributes to their mystification, and 
enables the uncertainty surrounding their identity to be maintained (Hodge and Kress, 1993). 
With that in mind, the regularity of the passive in protoconspiratorial discourse should be seen 
as a strategy within the overall management of reasonableness which takes place in this type 
of explanation. Passives facilitate the avoidance of reference to an all-powerful body behind 
the covert actions, enabling protoconspiracy theory to evade the accusation of simplism which 
is frequently directed at classical conspiratorial explanations. 
A related strategy employed in protoconspiracy theory to manage the ambiguity regarding the 
identity of the conspirators is the use of euphemisms. When the syntactic structure of a 
sentence demands the agent to be named, the conspirators are referred to as 'directors of 
horror', 'producers of this war', 'the evil management from Washington' etc. Many of these 
terms reflect the aforementioned use of theatrical analogies in conspiratorial discourse and 
can therefore be seen as an extension of the reference to the 'cheap editing trick', 'make-up' 
of truth, a 'stage-managed' performance or the repetition of the Bosnian 'scenario'. In 
Chapter 3 it was noted that Dimitrije Ljotic referred to Jews as 'the Great Director'. Crucially 
however, Ljotic did not use metaphorical language in order to conceal the identity of the 
alleged conspirators. The metaphor was used merely to illustrate a feature of a Jewish 
conspiracy. In protoconspiracy theory on the other hand, euphemisms are used as the only 
descriptions of the conspirators, thus contributing to their vagueness. 
The preference for vague concepts and code words when referring to the conspirators is not a 
novel development within the broader context of conspiratorial discourse. In the 1960's, the 
propaganda of the John Birch society frequently omitted a clear identification of the 'enemy'. 
Instead, general and ambiguous terms such as 'communism' were favoured. Similarly, in the 
UK, National Front literature tended to use broader categories such as 'capitalism', 
'American bankers', etc. (Billig, 1978). In the Serbian media the 'enemy' behind the anti-
Serbian plot was most frequently constructed merely as 'the West'. The non-specific nature of 
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the term made it malleable, thus enabling the protoconspiracy theorists to set its boundaries in 
different places, depending on the requirements of the specific context. 
The choice of the phrase 'the West' to refer to the source of the anti-Serbian plot may not be 
considered all that controversial considering that Nato, Serbia's formal enemy in the war, is 
widely alluded to, even in Nato countries, as the 'Western military alliance'. In that sense the 
use of the phrase 'the West' could be interpreted as a relic of Cold War rhetoric, or a geo-
political reference. At the same time, as was noted in Chapter 3, the category of 'the West', as 
the source of conspiracy has deeper roots in Serbian conspiratorial culture and invokes the 
imagery characteristic of Slavophile discourse. Although references to 'the West' in 
mainstream Serbian press and electronic media were by and large devoid of the religious 
connotations apparent in the anti-Western rhetoric of the likes ofVelimirovic or Durdevic, the 
choice of phrase constitutes a potentially significant conceptual link between protoconspiracy 
theory and the classical conspiracy tradition. 
6.2.3. Who controls the Western media: the nameless. the World's elite or the Jews 
So far it has been suggested that protoconspiracy theory maintains its more reasonable and 
respectable image by obscuring the identity of the conspirators and by formulating the theme 
of mass manipulation in a way that does not invoke the more controversial and farfetched 
claims about the actual techniques involved. The present section will explore these features 
further, by contrasting the representation of the Western media in the Serbian press with that 
found in world elite and classical conspiracy theories. 
In the quotes from Politika cited earlier, the BBC, CNN and Sky were singled out as the main 
'turbo-manipulators' of public opinion. These and other Western media companies were often 
constructed, in the Serbian pro-government press, as the main agents of the conspiracy, whose 
principal task was to hide the truth from the (Western) public and conceal the real motives 
behind the intervention in the Balkans: 
'[Second condition for American intervention abroad is that) American public must be 
convinced that the attack will save some other people from suffering. The task of fabricating 
heartbreaking footage and texts is performed by the media, those great masters of mystification 
and manipulation, trained to maximise on every mistake of the future victim' (Cynical moral of 
the aggressor, Politika, 17 April, 1999, p.27) 
'[Serbian Information minister Aleksandar Vucic) illustrated the speeding up of the propaganda 
campaign with what he says are directions received by the CNN correspondents in Yugoslavia, 
instructing them not to report on any military successes of Serbs, but to talk only of demoralised 
Serbian forces, to create a list of intellectuals who would attack the Serbian authorities and 
support the Nato aggression, and fmd some military installation in the vicinity of the 'Dragisa 
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MiSovic' hospital, in order to justify its bombing' (Missiles cannot silence Serbian media, 
Politika, 31 May, 1999, p.l3) 
'The foreign media are the extended arm of multinational companies which are trying to triple 
their capital by exploiting the resources of others' (Extended arm of capital, Politika, 28 April 
1999; p.25) 
In the first two quotations, it is alleged that journalistic activity is the result of 'training' and 
'instruction', sharing with the last quotation the idea that the media are the 'arm' rather than 
the brain of the conspiracy. This fairly typical portrayal of journalists as tools in the hands of 
the conspirators was further expanded in the article by D. BeCirevic entitled The dictionary of 
journalistic lies published in Politika at the end of May 1999. The article reveals the 
'instructions given to journalists who are in the service of the aggressor's propaganda on how 
to report from our country' (Politika, 31 May 1999, p.13). The 'instructions', which were 
supposedly issued by the Nato HQ in Brussels, include guidelines regarding the choice of 
interviewees and the manner of questioning, and the vocabulary to be used when referring to 
Serbian soldiers, Albanian refugees or civilian casualties. The alleged reason for issuing these 
instructions to the Western media is noteworthy. The move by the Nato HQ was said to have 
been a response to the fact that 'certain media in Nato countries have escaped control'. 
Implicit in this suggestion is the notion that the Western media were, and to a large extent still 
are, under someone's control. The 'inaccurate' reporting of foreign journalists is therefore not 
attributed to low professional standards or journalistic incompetence, but to the existence of a 
deliberate strategy, masterminded by those who use the media to hide the real motives behind 
the Nato aggression against Yugoslavia. 
Significantly however, none of the above mentioned articles went into much detail when it 
comes to revealing who it is that controls the media or operates the mechanisms through 
which foreign journalists are kept under control. The fmal quotation contains a vague and 
euphemistic reference to 'multinational companies', but the reader is still left none the wiser 
about the specific aspects of mass manipulation. 
Similar vagueness was present in articles on the same topic which appeared in other 
publications. This was the case even in texts where the subject of media manipulation was 
explored in more detail. For instance in the final weeks of the bombing, the weekly 
newsmagazine Nedeljni Telegrafpublished two longer articles on the Western media entitled 
Five riders of the Apocalypse (26 May 1999, p.18-19) and The world's 50 media emperors (9 
June, 1999, p. 26-27). Both articles tread on conspiratorial ground by suggesting that media 
manipulation is made possible by the fact that a large amount of power over the European 
media is concentrated in the hands of a small number of people who could be using it for 
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sinister purposes. In Five riders of the Apocalypse the author Dejan Berkovic argues that the 
European media is dominated by five moguls (Leo Kirsch, Silvio Berlusconi, Silvio Ringi, 
Otto Beusheim, and Johan Rupert) who are not only connected by a complex network of 
business ties (which is illustrated in the magazine with a very elaborate and largely 
incomprehensible chart) but also by a common conservative political outlook and friendly 
connections with the European political establishment. The power of the 'big five' is seen as 
so great that 'it is practically impossible to publish a piece of news anywhere in Europe, 
unless it has been approved by one of these people' (p.l8). Similarly, in The world's 50 
media emperors, the same author recognises the potential danger of the concentration of 
media ownership, in relation to mass manipulation: 
'the fact that the world of mass communication and information lies at the disposal of only a 
few centres of power leads directly to hegemony and the unlimited possibility for control and 
domination' (Nedeljni Telegraf, 9 June 1999, p. 26-27) 
Although the power is seen as located in the hands of a small group of connected individuals, 
the accounts in Nedeljni Telegraf resisted from explicitly implicating the world's richest 
media moguls in any kind of conspiracy. Also, control, domination and abuses of power were 
presented more as a dangerous possibility, even probability, but not actuality. 
Berkovic's equivocation can be contrasted with examples from world elite conspiracy theory, 
where the issue of media manipulation is resolved more clearly and neatly by assimilating the 
topic of mass manipulation within the more explicit Bilderberg-style conspiracy. In world 
elite conspiracy theory, the Bilderberg group and related organisations, such as the Trilateral 
Commission and the Council on Foreign relations are typically constructed as the forum that 
binds together political, media and industrial elite. For instance the author of the book The 
Trilateral, Smilja Avramov (1998), whose work will be discussed in more detail in the next 
chapter, argues that the control over 'the press, telecommunications and computer industry is 
a fundamental component of the power of the Trilateral Commission'. A vramov suggests 
that: 
'According to the strategists of the Trilateral, the masses must be pacified, and brought into a 
state of total apathy; total control must be established, through the application of modem 
technology and the implementation of the most recent fmdings in the domain of 
psychology ... Tbrough a monopoly over the mass media, a planned manipulation of the masses 
and the shaping of human choices is made possible.' (Avramov, 1998, p.58) 
Later in the book, A vramov discusses the network which links the largest media companies 
around the world, concluding that 'the communications market has been left to the main 
players in the Trilateral' and that trans-national media companies, controlled by world elite 
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organisations, have become 'pioneers of the "new order" and the so called "global culture" 
(p.77). 
In addition to specific media companies or their owners, the Serbian mainstream media 
frequently cited the American public relations company Rudder and Finn, as a crucial player 
in the process of global mass manipulation. Over the past decade, Rudder and Finn earned a 
special place in the heart of Serbian conspiracy theorists. In the early 1990s this company 
promoted the interests of Croats and Bosnian Muslims, before taking on the job of advocating 
the political cause of the Kosovo Albanians. As a result, the firm became synonymous with 
the alleged 'satanisation of Serbs' in the West and the manipulation of the world public 
opinion. 
On 27 April, 1999, Politika published a report provided by the Yugoslav state news agency 
Tanjug which reflected on the 'satanisation of Serbia, its people and its president' (Genocide 
over Serbs with the help of exposed media lies, 27 Aprill999, p.20) The anonymous author of 
the report attributed a 'leading role in the denigration of Serbs in the World media' to Rudder 
and Finn, a PR company which in the past 'protected the interests of Croats and Muslims, and 
now does the same for Kosovo Albanians'. The company's work was portrayed in the article 
as 'deadly', considering that it robs the victim of aggression (i.e. the Serbs) of public support 
and assistance from international organisations such as the UN Security Council or the Red 
Cross as well as from various non-governmental organisations and charities .5 
A reference to Rudder and Finn was also found in an article written by the journalist Zoran 
Petrovic-Pirocanac which appeared in Duga: 
'Following the already experienced pattern of Rudder and Finn, the principle Western media 
are simply 'bludgeoning' their public with the footage of crying children, Albanian women who 
are fainting precisely at the time of the filming, children lying in mud fighting for food brought 
byNato soldiers ... ' (Disposable spiral of Death, Duga, May, 1999, p.6) 
The attribution of uncanny powers to a single public relations company is a pattern 
characteristic of conspiracy theories, especially when Rudder and Finn is constructed as 
having a 'leading role' in mass manipulation. However, although considerable power and 
influence is attributed to Rudder and Finn, both in Politika and in Duga, the precise role of 
the company in the overall conspiracy is never unequivocally stated. Neither article explains 
where the company's influence sterns from, or how it is able to fool the whole world (except 
of course the Serbian pro-government media) about what is 'really' going on in the Balkans. 
What is clear is that Rudder & Finn are not themselves conspirators, in that they are paid to 
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protect the interests of 'the Croats, Muslims and now, Albanians'. Similarly, it is not the 
'clients', that is the Albanians (or before them Croats and Muslims), who are cited as 
conspirators. As can be seen in the earlier quotations from Politika, Albanians are portrayed 
either as accomplices in the conspiracy (through their participation in various 'staged 
performances') or as fellow victims, who are fleeing the Nato bombing. Consequently, once 
again, the identity of those who have ordered the 'spreading of the lies' and who orchestrate 
the manipulation of the masses remains unspecified. 
In contrast to the vague protoconspiratorial discourse stands the classical conspiracy theory of 
Dr. Ratibor Durdevic. In the book On the senselessness of antisemitism and anti-antisemitism 
Durdevic 'reveals' in more detail the dynamic behind Rudder and Finn's anti-Serbian 
campaign: 
'The boss of the lobby firm Rudder & Finn ... will be remembered for his famous statement: "The 
very moment we got the Jews in America on our side, the battle (against the Serbs) was 
won"'(Durdevic, 1997b, p.49) 
According to Durdevic, after this PR coup within the Jewish community 'the Jew Roy 
Gutman "invented" the concentration camp in Omarska and got a Pulitzer prize for it' while 
'the Jew Frank Cesno of the CNN brought greater evil to the events in Yugoslavia than the 
war itself ... Not to mention the ''philosophers" such as Levi in France or the scandalous 
writing in Jerusalem Post, etc.' (ibid., p.50). 
Durdevic thus places the activities of Rudder and Finn in the context of a global Jewish-
Masonic conspiracy. Similar allegations concerning the Jewish involvement in mass 
manipulation were found on the antisemitic website, www.compuserb.com, where Rudder and 
Finn's motives are also 'explained' through the reference to Mr Finn's Jewish origin.6 
Interestingly, even in classical conspiracy theory the Jewish involvement is somewhat 
unclear. In Durdevic's explanation, Jewish public opinion is initially seen as the target of the 
PR exercise. Only later are Jews 'promoted' into the role of masterminds behind the various 
media manipulations through which Serbs are maligned before the Western public. 
Nonetheless, the assumed link between Rudder and Finn's anti-Serbian activity and the 
influence of Jews in Western media and politics, leaves the reader in no doubt as to whom 
Durdevic believes to be behind the mass manipulation. The anti-Serbian activity on a global 
scale could not have been initiated without the involvement of those who have always been 
'pulling the strings' in world affairs, i.e. the Jews. 
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6.3. Protoconspiracy vs. the conspiracy tradition: the similarities 
In spite of the important differences between protoconspiracy theory and other types of 
conspiratorial explanation there are aspects of protoconspitorial discourse which link it to the 
conspiracy tradition. In the following sections it wiii be suggested that by invoking the idea of 
secrecy, protoconspiracy theory is, often inadvertently, drawn into adopting the conspiratorial 
explanatory 'style'. Protoconspiratorial discourse will therefore be shown to contain some of 
the rhetorical moves characteristic of the conspiracy tradition. 
6.3.1. Inconsistent portrayal o(foreign iournalists 
In spite of the frequent portrayal ofWestemjournalists as accomplices in the overall plot, the 
mainstream Serbian media did not always treat the Western media as bad. More positive 
treatment of western press manifested itself in two ways. Firstly, foreign journalists were 
sometimes portrayed as feiiow victims of Western imperialist tendencies: 
'The federal Minister (of Information, Matic] stated that the majority of (foreign 
journalists] report as correctly as they can, adding that this has led to attacks from their 
governments, like Tony Blair does with the BBC correspondent [John Simpson). Such a 
position and the attitude of journalists is encouraging and promises that there may be 
some healthy forces which might stop and reverse this madness and evil.' (Truth cannot 
be murdered, Politika, 24 Aprill999, p.l6) 
'Vujovic emphasised that in Belgrade and Yugoslavia there are currently around 500 
journalists and other support staff from the media from around the world and that the 
bombing of the Television was at the same time an attack on all of them, that is on their 
profession, truth and honesty.' (Vujovii:: Nato is trying to silence truth, Politika, 24 
April, 1999, p.5) 
On these occasions, Western journalists were presented as victims of political pressure, and 
guardians of the integrity of the journalistic profession. The positive stance towards Western 
journalism was also evident in the fact that information reported by the Western media was 
not always a priori disregarded as false. On some occasions, reports in the Western media 
were invoked to support the position of the Yugoslav government. For example, the day 
before the RTS was bombed, President Milosevic presented the Russian envoy Victor 
Chernomyrdin with the draft of a peace proposal. The proposal was immediately rejected by 
NATO as it feii short of the Western alliance's key demands. The Yugoslav political 
establishment and the media contended that the proposal contained maximum concessions 
which Yugoslavia, as a sovereign state could make and that NATO's demands were 
unreasonable. In Politika this argument was presented not only as the view of the Yugoslav 
government, but as one that has been taken by the Western media too: 
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'The protagonists of this farce, without precedent in modem world history, are the 
American War president and the British prime minister, who, only a few hours after the 
issuing of a statement about yesterday's talks between the Yugoslav president Slobodan 
Milosevic and the Russian envoy Victor Chemomyrdin, rejected the most recent 
proposal from Belgrade, which was, as many of the world's media claim, the maximum 
that Yugoslavia could offer ... This maximum, as many news agencies noted, is contained 
in the declaration concerning foreign presence in Kosovo under the auspices of the UN 
and the safe return of refugees.' (Response to a peace initiative from Belgrade -
bombing of the RTS, Politika, 24 April, 1999, p.5) 
Similarly, editorials from the Western press which were against Nato aggression were 
regularly reported verbatim in Politika and other pro-government and patriotic publications.7 
For example, Nedeljni Telegrafprinted an article taken from The Independent in which Philip 
Hammond, Professor at London's Southbank University 'discloses the propaganda war 
against the Serbs' (Nedeljni Telegraj. 14 April, 1999, p.20). Also, the same publication 
featured an articles from The Times in which 'the propaganda war which uses "poor Albanian 
refugees" is uncovered' (Nedeljni Telegraj. 31 March, 1999; p.13) The most positive 
reactions from the Western media, such as Julie Burchill's article The age of reason: A war of 
words which lists '40 reasons why Serbs are not Nazis' (The Guardian, 10 April 1999, p.3) 
were subsequently reprinted in a collection of articles entitled Twilight of the West (Verzal 
Press, 1999). 
The inconsistent treatment of the foreign media in the Yugoslav press might appear to 
undermine the conspiratorial narrative, bearing in mind that the reference to foreign 
journalists as fellow targets of conspiracy contradicts the view that the media are part of the 
conspiracy and the principle 'instrument of seduction' (Lipset and Raab, 1978). On the other 
hand, consistency of this kind is not generally a requirement of conspiracy theories. Similar 
incoherence can be found in much of modem antisemitic literature, regarding the portrayal of 
'ordinary Jews'. While 'ordinary Jews' are mostly constructed as innocent fellow victims of a 
conspiracy carried out by the evil Jewish elite, the criticism of Jews is sometimes generalised 
on the whole population. 
For example, Dr. Ratibor Durdevic often makes the distinction between ordinary Jews and the 
conspiratorial 'Judaists'. In one of his more recent books Five Bloody Revolutions byJudeo-
bankers and their Judeo-Masonry, Durdevic (1999) makes a slight digression from his 
conspiracy narrative to make the following point: 
'Before I move on and quote the analysts and critics of Jews, I think it would be appropriate to 
draw the reader's attention to a fact that is often overlooked. We are talking about the crimes 
committed by Jews, and that is a fact: criminals known as Jewish fmanciers and their allies 
Pharisees-Rabbis have been some of the chief planners of crimes in the form of the majority of 
contemporary wars and revolutions. However, in some sense, this statement is false, since these 
deeds were not committed by all Jews, but by a small number of Jewish activists, perfidious 
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conspirators, who do not comprise more than 1 to 2% of the Jewish people. We do not blame 
all Italians for the crimes of the Mafia, or all Irish Catholics for the crazy bombings and murders 
committed by the IRA. In the same way, ordinary Jews must not be blamed for the crimes of 
Judeo-bankers.' (Durdevic, 1999, p.23) 
Similarly in his other writing, Jewish majority is seen as a collection of 'quiet citizens, and 
mostly ordinary, respectable people' who pose no threat to 'us or the whole world' (Durdevic, 
Western ideological and spiritual poisoners, 1997a, p.29) and as such is contrasted with 
Judaists, 'the spawn of Satan, the descendants of the Pharisees, nihilist conspirators against 
God and man in the Western world: Judeo-Masons, Judeo-bankers, leaders of the New World 
Order, directors of financial institutions, proprietors of World media and industry, destroyers 
of morals and good customs, masterminds of revolutions and world wars, proponents of 
decadent culture, poisoners of Christian youth' (p.29). 
However, this proposed distinction within the Jewish community is not always adhered to. 
The distinction between the 'respectable Jewish majority' and the Judaic conspirators is 
obscured by linking the anti-Christian, demonic and Satanic aspect of the Judeo-Masonic 
conspiracy to the very core of the Jewish religion, and attributing it to all Jews. 
For instance, Durdevic often talks about the psychopathology of the Jews, one which is 
characterised by its racial specificity. The brutality of the bombing of Yugoslavia is 
attributed to the fact that 'Jews are susceptible to intensive and sadistic hatred. As the 
proverbial elephant they never forget, and in accordance with their Satanic subjection they 
never forgive. They are not a spiritual people like Russians and Serbs used to be, and to an 
extent still are' (Durdevic, Five Bloody Revolutions by Judeo-bankers and their Judeo-
Masonry, 1999, p.lll). In this instance no distinction was made between Jews and 
'Judaists'. 
Similarly, in Western ideological and spiritual poisoners, Durdevic refers to Serbia's Jewish 
community as 'our' Jews, adapted to life in the Balkans [who] do not pose a threat to Serbs, 
or any other people on Yugoslav territory' (p.30). However, only a few pages earlier, the 
same Jewish community was said to be 'profiteering from the Jewish control over the 
World's and even the Serbian media, and seduced by the secularist, Judeo-Masonic, 
ideological antagonism towards Christ' (p.23). Moreover, in Durdevic's positive evaluation 
of 'our' Jews, it is unclear what being 'adapted to the life in the Balkans' means. It is possible 
that Durdevic is referring to the relative secularisation and assimilation of the Jewish 
community. Therefore, although the statement places Serbian Jews on the 'good' side of the 
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moral divide, they are only seen as being good and unthreatening because they are assimilated 
into Serbian culture and appear to have abandon their Jewish cultural roots. 
The contradictory portrayal of the Western media in Serbian protoconspiratorial discourse and 
the description of Jews in antisemitic literature can be said to have similar rhetorical 
implications. In some sense the coexistence of contradictory references and the persistent 
fluctuation between positive and negative portrayal contributes to the overall 'paranoid' 
image of the conspiracy theory. It opens the possibility that everyone may turn out to be part 
of the conspiracy. Although the honourable majority is praised and celebrated, its link with 
the conspirators (through professional, religious, political or ethnic ties) opens the possibility 
that their true colours might be revealed in the future. The majority of journalists or Jews are 
seen as being on 'our side' but should circumstances change the contradictory construction 
provides a way of accounting for the change in allegiance. So for instance, after the bombing 
of the RTS when some Western journalists refused to join their Yugoslav colleagues in 
condemning the targeting of the TV station, the editor of Politika's television channel 
revealed that: 
'Many journalists around the world have found themselves aligned with Nato, ready to enter 
history by the wrong entrance.' (Kozic, chief editor of TV Politika, quoted in Politika, 26 April, 
1999, p.13) 
The apparent permeability of the boundaries between good and bad also contributes to the 
never-ending quality of the conspiratorial hermeneutic as it provides the source of a 
practically infinite number of new revelations to be made. 
6.3.2. Protoconspiracy theory and the figure o(the renegade 
It has already been mentioned in Chapter 2 that conspiracy theories pay particularly 
important attention to the figure of the renegade from the enemy cause (Hofstadter, 1966). 
The importance attributed to confessions of ex-masons, former nuns and priests, ex-
communists, etc in classical conspiracy literature is derived from the emphasis on secrecy 
surrounding the alleged plot. The renegade 'brings forth with him or her the final verification 
of suspicion which might otherwise have been doubted by a sceptical world' (Hofstadter, 
1966; p.35) During the war with Nato, the 'confessions' ofNato pilots, German politicians, 
Albanian refugees, etc. received a lot of coverage in the Serbian media, especially in the 
weekly news magazine Nedeljni Telegraf, whose more general enthusiasm for sensationalist 
material made it particularly suitable for publicising these revelations. The confessions of 
defectors from the enemy cause usually revealed the 'real motives' behind the international 
intervention and the mechanics behind the implementation of the devious plot. 
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In April 1999, Nedeljni Telegraf published an article allegedly written by the Indian Army 
General Satish Nambiar, former commander-in-chief of the UN forces in Bosnia. In the 
article, the General claimed that 'there was no genocide [in Bosnia], it was all invented by the 
media' (14 April, 1999, p.10). Similarly, Nedeljni Telegraf published a testimony by a 
returning Kosovo Albanian refugee who revealed that 'at the border crossing they would 
shove us all into camps so that foreign journalists could film us' (12 May, 1999, p.10). The 
same magazine published the article Our colonel was transferred when he refUsed to order us 
to throw cluster bombs on Pristina and NiS, written by someone with the Spanish name Jose 
Luis Morales (Nede/jni Telegraf, 16 June 1999, p.S). The article contained a 'confession' of a 
Spanish Nato pilot 'Martin de la Oz', who, among other things, blamed the Spanish 
government for 'lying to the Spanish public in the press, radio and television, via foreign 
correspondents and agencies'. In his confession, the pilot claims to reveal the 'truth' behind 
the attacks: 
'A country is being massacred, bombarded with new types of weapons, toxic gases, surface 
mines which are parachuted to the ground, uranium bombs, black napalm, biological weapons 
which ruin the crops, as well as other weapons we don't even know about yet. .. The Americans 
have committed one of the greatest atrocities against humanity ever ... All this, according to 
those who have spoken to American and British commanders, was done to subjugate Europe, 
and keep it under occupation for many decades.' (Nedeljni Telegraf, 16 June 1999, p.5) 
A particularly interesting example of the use of renegades in protoconspiratorial discourse 
was the alleged confession of a 'high official of the government in Bonn', which was 
published in Nedeljni Telegrafin April 1999. The confession, heard by a priest belonging to 
the 'Order of Peace', was said to have been provoked by the inability of the anonymous 
official to 'keep silent about the lies surrounding Nato's war in the Balkans'. The fact that the 
revelation took the form of a religious confession is significant because it implies a guilty 
conscience, rather than some other less respectable motive for the revelation. Also, it suggests 
that what is to be revealed is in some way particularly wicked or sinful. Finally, the religious 
nature of the confession is a testimony to the dangerous and secret nature of the disclosed 
information. The German official stated that the medium through which he decided to 
disclose the truth was partly motivated by the 'confidentiality of a confession, so that no 
detail regarding my identity could ever be revealed'. Interestingly, the admission was made 
in written form, which is somewhat unusual for a religious confession. However the 
availability of written evidence is accounted for by the indication that the unnamed priest was 
authorised to 'pass on the confession to those who must know the truth' (Nedeljni Telegraf, 
21 April, 1999, p.S). In other words, the official was not just trying to get things off his chest, 
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but was actively trying to undermine the conspiracy by uncovering its secret and dangerous 
mechanisms. 
In the 'confession' reported in Nedeljni Telegraj. the anonymous official claims that the 
'infernal trio: Shroeder, Sharping and Fisher, here in Germany, are shamelessly lying to the 
public with almost every 'fact' that they offer about the war in the Balkans, while the media 
willingly and eagerly spread those lies, without bothering to check them, as if they were the 
evangelical truth ... The federal government knows the real reasons why people are fleeing and 
cynically plays on the deliberately provoked misery of the refugees in Kosovo's border regions, 
in order to maintain the comparison with Second World War deportations and 'ethnic 
cleansing'.' (ibid.) 
He goes on to argue that 'Sharping spreads the lies' about concentration camps, and mass 
detention in the Pri~tina stadium, in spite of the fact that the German government knows that 
these allegations are false, and that 
'on the border crossing, the American and European private media offer up to US$ 200,000 for 
video footage of massacres, real or staged' (ibid.) 
At the end of the article, the unnamed German government official reveals the real purpose of 
the mass manipulation, and the reasons behind Nato's intervention in Kosovo: 
'Under the codename 'Roots', there lies a secret operation planned by the CIA, which prepared 
the war in the first place, with the aim of destroying Yugoslavia through the loss of Kosovo, 
Montenegro and Vojvodina ... Ever since the fi!St day ofC!inton's administration, the USA (CIA 
and DIA) have been working- backed by Gennany- on the secret operation 'Roots'. The aim is 
a military and ethnic destabilisation of Yugoslavia, the last bastion of resistance in the Balkans.' 
(ibid.) 
The confession of the German official provides first hand evidence, from a credible (albeit 
anonymous) witness, about the plot which lies behind the bombing of Yugoslavia. Also, it 
reveals the mechanisms through which these motives are kept secret. Particularly interesting 
is the way in which the conspiracy is packaged into a well defined formal 'secret operation' 
of the CIA, the epitome of covert subversive activity in conspiracy literature. It is also 
noteworthy that the confession alleges that the real motive behind the anti-Serbian plot is to 
destroy the 'last bastion of resistance'. The article thus exposes the basic conspiratorial claim 
that the bombing is not a local conflict between Serbia and Nato, as western media are trying 
to present it, but is a final stage in the implementation of a global conspiracy aimed at world 
domination. 
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According to Hofstadter (1966) the role of the renegade in a conspiratorial narrative is not 
merely to provide first hand proof of conspiratorial claims, but also to bring 'promise of 
redemption and victory' (p.35): 
' ... there is deeper eschatological significance attached to the person of the renegade: in the 
spiritual wrestling match between good and evil which is the paranoid archetypal model of the 
world struggle, the renegade is the living proof that all conversions are not made by the wrong 
side.' (p.35) 
In other words, implicit in the emphasis on the renegade are a number of features 
characteristic of the conspiratorial explanatory style including the 'Manichean psychology', 
the apocalyptic tone and the naive optimism. All of these features tend to reflect the influence 
of Millenial thinking in the conspiracy culture (Hofstadter, 1966; Cohn, 1957) and therefore 
constitute a link between protoconspiratorial discourse and other forms of conspiracy theory. 
Further examples of this link will be offered in the following section. 
6.3.3. Protoconspiraey theory and the conspiratorial explanatory 'style' 
The notion of secrecy which underpins the emphasis on mass manipulation assumes that 
behind the false visible reality lies truth which needs to be exposed. In the earlier sections it 
was already noted that the bombing of the Serbian State Television, as the 'voice of truth' was 
widely interpreted, in the regime media, as being motivated by the desire, on the part of the 
unnamed conspirators, to conceal the real motives behind the attack on Yugoslavia. The same 
theme runs through the following examples, all which have also been taken from Politika: 
'[The bombing of RTS demonstrates] the unscrupulous and mindless nature of those who 
think that real information about the evil acts of the proponents of the New World Order and 
their failure to subjugate the freedom-loving and brave Serbian people will not reach the world.' 
(Dragan Bozanic, deputy foreign minister of Bosnia-Herzegovina, quoted in Proof that 
journalists have become legitimate targets, Politika, 24 April, 1999, p.5) 
'When they could not stop the truth in any other way, they resorted to bombs. These are nothing 
but criminal, terrorist acts which demonstrate that Nato and the USA wanted our country as the 
offering on the altar of Nato on its 50th anniversary, and to make Kosovo the victim of New 
World Order. The real aim ofNato is to occupy our country in order to destroy the last island of 
freedom and independence in this part of Europe.' (lvica Dacic, the spokesperson for the ruling 
Socialist party of Serbia quoted in Today, Nato 's targets only civilians, Politika, 25 April, 1999, 
p.l5) 
'In the last three days the Board of Evil from Washington has put into place all the bloody 
pieces of the jigsaw puzzle thus revealing even to the blind a basic fact which our leaders have 
been pointing towards for months: the aim of the pressure and barbaric aggression against FR 
Yugoslavia is its sovereignty and integrity, while Kosovo, the Albanians, human rights and 
everything else that was used as a medium and grounds for manipulation in the past is only a 
criminal camouflage for the attempt to rule over our complete territory.' (Petrovic, Political 
misses by Nato 's cross-eyed marksmen, Politika, 24 May 1999) 
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'Truth, justice and right cannot be murdered ... these are people who are trying to create a New 
World Order with force, corpses and crimes ... anyone who raises his voice against the new 
totalitarianism will probably be warned with a similar criminal act.' (Minister Goran Malic, 
quoted in Truth cannot be murdered, Politika, 24 April 1999, p.l6) 
'The unprecedented attack on truth, through which the RTS uncovered the aggressor's tricks 
and subterfuge, is the sign of the darkened state of mind of the front-men of the NWO ... The 
attack on the RTS is an attack on truth, the symbol of freedom ... a mindless act through which 
Nato criminals definitely uncovered their murderous intentions.' (from a statement issued by the 
pro-govemmen! daily Vecemje Novosti [Evening News], quoted in By trying to assassinate 
President Milosevic and the bearers of the public word, the criminals are trying to break the 
freedom-loving spirit of our people, Politika, 24 April, 1999, p.20) 
In the above quotes the RTS is constructed as having a pivotal role in the fight against the 
aggressor. Its journalists are seen as being in the 'front line' of the battle against the media 
manipulations on which the whole conspiracy depends. Each of the condemnations of the 
bombing of the Serbian television centre imply the same thing. Firstly that the institution was 
bombed because it told the truth, and exposed the lies presented by the Western media. 
Secondly, it is alleged that the true intentions which the 'aggressor' was trying to hide and 
which the RTS successfully uncovered was the concept of the New World Order, which was 
being implemented through the attacks on Yugoslavia. Unlike in other instances, where the 
actual motive of the conspirators was either glossed over or limited to the subjugation of 
Serbia, in the above quotes the idea of world domination was openly propagated. 
The concept of a 'New World Order' was introduced into mainstream discourse in 1990 by 
the former American President George Bush, in reference to the new post-Cold War political 
reality (Time, October 1990). In the early 1990s the phrase was often used to describe the 
aftermath of the triumph of liberalism, the free market economy and the rule of international 
law (Freedman, 1992). However, as the phrase was gradually abandoned by mainstream 
politicians, academics and journalists, the idea of the 'New World Order' became confmed to 
· the world of conspiracy theories, where it signifies the ultimate aim of the world conspiracy 
(Ronson, 2000; Pipes, 1996, 1998). Crucially, in the articles in Politika the New World Order 
is not invoked as a symbolic reference to the existing trends in international relations, but as a 
sinister plan which is being executed to the detriment of the Serbian people and other freedom 
loving nations. As a result, the reference to the New World Order in Politika .constitutes a 
significant thematic link between protoconspiracy theory and other forms of conspiratorial 
discourse. 
Also, inherent in the idea about the sinister plot to create the New World Order, as manifested 
in the explanations of the bombing of RTS, is the Manichean distinction between Good and 
Evil and the apocalyptic tone, both of which are prominent characteristics of the 
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conspiratorial explanatory style. For instance at the funeral of the 16 employees of the RTS 
killed in the Nato attack, Dragoljub Milanovic, the director-general of the Serbian Radio 
Television, said that: 
'This is a war between reason and unreason, light and darkness, good and evil. As always the 
winner is already known. Tbat is why the mindless creatures targeted knowledge, profession, 
morals and patriotism.' (The enemy killed the bravest and the most devoted, Politika, 27 April 
1999, p.IS) 
In the attempt to enhance the image of the evil enemy, Milanovic described him as 
'mindless'. A similar reference to the psychopathology of the aggressors is evident in the 
following extracts: 
'What CNN, BBC and Sky are doing is a disgrace not only to these media institutions but to the 
nations that spawned such chanoels. It is evident that we are dealing with sick minds and that is 
why the fight will be tough, but I am an optimist.' (D. Kojadinovic, chief editor of Belgrade's 
TV station Studio B in For the first time in the history of war and television [a television 
station] was destroyed deliberately, Politika, 26 Apri11999, p.l3) 
'[the sending of Alistair Carnpbell] didn't help. The indisputable facts about the crimes planned 
in Washington, Bonn, and Paris have broken many barriers, thanks to our television, so the 
consortium of sick brains decided to destroy it.' (For Nato, a different opinion is a military 
target, Politika, 25 April, 1999, p.15) 
The allusion to psychopathology through the use of phrases such as 'sick minds' and 'sick 
brains' is a particularly effective and common rhetorical device in conspiracy literature used 
to explain and accentuate the evil nature of the 'hidden hand'. In his antisemitic conspiracy 
theory Durdevic often refers to the 'Talmudic perversion of personality' as a 'disease' 
specific to Jews characterised by the 'total absence of compassion for other people and their 
suffering' as well as 'total depravity, paranoia, madness, Satanisation of the spirit, brutality' 
(Durdevic, 1999, p.96). 
It should be borne in mind that both moral dualism and the reference to psychopathology are 
common features of war-time rhetoric and as such should not be automatically associated 
with the conspiratorial explanatory style. At the same time, there are further aspects of the 
protoconspiratorial narrative, as found in Politika, which offer evidence that the overall 
explanatory style may be linked to the conspiratorial tradition. 
For instance, in the above examples the reference to 'sick minds' is not only descriptive, it 
also explains why 'the fight will be tough'. This introduces the apocalyptic tone of the 
narrative, where the omnipotent enemy is presented as being at the peak of strength and 
therefore close to the achievement of their aims. This is evident in the allusion to Serbia as the 
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'last island of freedom'. Serbia is presented as the fmal obstacle to world domination, and 
therefore as the last and only hope for the rest of the world's population. 
The assumed strength of the conspirators does not only stem from their psychopathic mental 
constitution, but also from the sources of power at their disposal such as the media, unlimited 
funds, technological superiority etc. Yet in spite of the technical advantage, conspiracy theory 
portrays the conspirators as weak. As was noted in Chapter 2, the apocalyptic tone of the 
paranoid style, which is derived from the portrayal of the conspirator as the epitome of Evil, 
runs dangerously close to hopeless pessimism, but usually stops short of it. In the case of the 
reporting of the war in Politika, the apocalyptic theme falls short of becoming a declaration of 
imminent defeat. Kojadinovic, for instance, presented the bombing of RTS as an 'act of 
desperation' and the ultimate evidence that the West lost the war in spite of 'all the 
technology and money at their disposal' (Politika, 26 April 1999, p.13). Similar sentiment is 
reflected in the following examples from Politika: 
'The fact that the Nato criminals tried to smother truth, the journalistic word and television 
screens with their tomahawks, reflects their inability to cover up their unscrupulous lies which 
contributed to the destruction of industrial plants and bridges. They did this out of despair, 
trying to place their lies before the world and present them as an excuse for bombing a 
sovereign country.' (The pinnacle of inhumanity and senselessness, Politika, 25 April, 1999, 
p.l6) 
'The defeat in the media war and, above all, the failure to create panic among our citizens, as 
well as the inability to conceal the reports and facts concerning the crimes against the civilian 
population, have hit the New World Order monsters so hard that they resorted to a nervous and 
capitulating act, getting stuck even deeper in crime, and betraying the principles of the same 
democracy they tried to bring to us on their tomahawks, phantoms and flying citadels.' 
(Petrovic, For Nato, a different opinion is a military target, Politika, 25 April, 1999, p.15) 
The 'desperation' of the enemy and his 'nervous and capitulating' acts are interpreted as the 
final struggle of a dying 'New World Order monster'. Similarly, in the above example, 
Kojadinovic qualifies his apocalyptic view with the claim 'but I am an optimist', while 
Dragoljub Milanovic stated that in the war between good and evil 'as always, the winner is 
known'. Both statements reflect the archetypal belief in the victory of good over evil, and 
invoke the imagery of a technologically and financially powerful enemy whose sinister plan is 
foiled by a weaker opponent, who is victorious because of his dedication to truth and justice. 
This is an example of the kind of naive optimism which in the earlier chapter was said to be 
typical of conspiracy theories. It assumes that a successful battle against the conspiracy is the 
result of good intentions, and that the healthy spirit of the forces of Good will inevitably 
defeat the 'complex machinations of the conspirators' (Billig, 1978). 
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Besides displaying some features of the conspiratorial explanatory style, protoconspiratorial 
discourse, as manifested in the writing in Politika can also be shown to possess the key 
aspects of conspiratorial rhetoric, namely the circularity of argument which leads to the 
irrefutability of conspiratorial claims. 
For example, in the aforementioned report on Rudder and Finn, which appeared in Politika, 
the unscrupulousness of the company was illustrated by quoting its chairman, who revealed 
the modus operandi of his organisation: 
'Public relations agencies are not paid to moralise and the most important thiog is to use simple 
stories about good and bad guys for launching emotionally strong expressions such as ethnic 
cleansing and concentration camps which awake memories of Nazi Germany and Auschwitz gas 
chambers. These provoke a strong emotional charge and are difficult to resist as any refusal to 
accept them may lead to accusations of historical revisionism.' (Genocide over Serbs with the 
help of exposed media lies, Po/itika, 27 April1999, p.20) 
The quotation plays a crucial role in the overall argument of the article. Tanjug's report 
contained explicit denials of Serbian responsibility for a number of war crimes such as the 
Sarajevo bread queue and market place massacres, the Srebrenica killings, Omarska prison 
camps, ethnic cleansing in Kosovo, etc. All these events were attributed to media 
manipulation in which Rudder and Finn were supposedly involved. Through the quotation 
from the Chairman of Rudder and Finn, Tanjug's report acknowledges the fact that, because 
of the apparent similarity with Nazi crimes, the denial of the recent massacres perpetrated by 
Serbs might be regarded as a matter of controversy and as morally suspect. Crucially 
however, the idea of controversy is not introduced in order to undermine the denials of war 
crimes, but is incorporated into the overall conspiratorial argument in a way that pre-empts 
and weakens any kind of moral critique of 'historical revisionism'. The very fact that the 
denial might seem morally questionable or hard to justifY is taken as proof that what seems 
undeniable must be denied, because the apparent undeniability is itself the effect of mass 
manipulation. 
A similar rhetorical move is evident in classical antisemitic literature, when dealing with the 
accusations of revisionism and Holocaust denial (see Lipstadt, 1995; Seidel, 1986; Billig, 
1987a). For example, David McCalden of the so-called Institute for Historical Review argues 
that the 'myth of the Holocaust' was fabricated to legitimise Zionist aspirations: 'If we can 
show that [the Holocaust] didn't happen, Israelis would have no excuse for depriving the 
Palestinians of their rights' (cited in Billig, 1987a). Similarly, DurdeviC's work deals 
extensively with the so-called 'fear of the Jews syndrome' (Durdevic, The FOJ Syndrome in 
America: Brainwashing of Americans into a special neurosis: A psychosocial and political 
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inquiry about the secret US rulers, the Pharisees!Zionists, 1988). According to Durdevic, the 
Jewish conspirators have created the 'Holocaust myth' in order to make any criticism of Jews 
and their covert activities anti-normative: 
'The bogeyman of anti-Senritism was created by Zionists after the Second World War. Together 
with their compatriot, the infamous chief of Stalin's secret police Lavrentii Beria, they inflated 
the number of Jews who died in Hitler's concentration camps from around 350.000 (according 
to the Swiss Red Cross) to as many as 6.000.000. Then, through the Western media, which at 
that time were already under Judaic control, as well as via Hollywood and other film centres 
around the world, created, literally, thousands of films about the suffering of Jews in 
concentration camps. In that way they brainwashed the Euro-Americans and characterised all 
the enemies of Judaic dirty work as people similar to Nazis. 
I called this the most scandalous trick which the Judaists played on the Americans'(Durdevic, 
1997a, p.l7) 
The introduction of the FOJ syndrome is seen as 'part of a strategy to silence the enemies of 
the secret enslavement of Euro-American Christians by Judeo-bankers, or rather the Judeo-
Masonry and their New World Order. This was a strategy for creating an uneasy sense of 
security among the Jews with the aim of facilitating the extortion of donations for Zionist 
aims, as well as for silencing all criticism of Zionist crimes and their evil plans ... ' (ibid., 
p20). 
As was the case with the denial of various Balkan massacres in Politika, the introduction of 
the 'FOJ syndrome' into the explanatory framework of a Jewish conspiracy theory recognises 
the fact that Holocaust denial is regarded by most as a disreputable political claim. At the 
same time, the disrepute in which Holocaust denial is held is turned into evidence that 
supports historical revisionism. As long as the conspiracy theorist can persuade the audience 
that the moral standpoint from which his arguments can be criticised is consciously imposed 
by the conspirators - and therefor\' an essential part of the conspiracy - any criticism is a 
priori destabilised or rendered invalid. 
11ris rhetorical move, which is present in both protoconspiracy theory and classical 
conspiratorial discourse, illustrates the essence of the conspiratorial interpretative framework, 
namely its irrefutable quality. It shows the way in which any criticism (moral or 
epistemological) of a conspiratorial claim can be turned on its head, and transformed into 
further proof of the cunning and deceitful nature of the 'hidden hand' behind social and 
political events. 
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6.4. Protoconspiracy theory, the breakdown of alternative explanations and the 
broadening of the boundaries of acceptable opinion 
In Chapter 2 it was suggested that in order for an explanation to be considered part of the 
cultural tradition of conspiracy theory, it must satisfy two criteria. Firstly, it must be shown to 
possess the characteristics of the conspiratorial explanatory style. Secondly, the account must 
be shown to be part of the ideological tradition of conspiracy theory. On the basis of the 
examination of the coverage of the war with Nato in the Serbian mainstream media, 
(primarily Politika and Nedeljni Telegraj) it can be argued that protoconspiratorial 
explanation does not fully meet either of these two criteria, and therefore cannot be 
unequivocally declared part of the conspiracy tradition, on a par with classical or world elite 
conspiracy theories. As was shown, protoconspiracy theory does not possess some of the 
critical features of classical conspiracy theories, such as a focus on a specific conspiratorial 
body. More importantly, there is no allusion, either direct or indirect, to the history of 
conspiracy theory. Save for the occasional reference to the 'New World Order', there was 
little in the articles in Politika that would link them directly to the conspiracy tradition. There 
were no references to secret societies such as the Freemasons, the llluminati or the Bilderberg 
group, there were no antisemitic themes, and the conspiracy of the present was not linked to 
the conspiracies of the past. 
At the same time the coverage of the war in Politika was shown to contain many features 
characteristic of conspiracy theory. Allusion to secrecy and sinister motives in world politics, 
conspiratorial Manicheanism, apocalyptic tone, and the general circular argumentation 
characteristic of conspiratorial rhetoric were all shown to be present in protoconspiratorial 
discourse. 
The ambiguous status of protoconspiratorial discourse in relation to the conspiracy tradition 
can be said to have played a key role in the dynamic which enabled more extreme forms of 
conspiracy theory to appear in the mainstream press. As the more reasonable, and in some 
ways watered-down, exoteric version of conspiracy theory, protoconspiratorial discourse 
disseminated in a more acceptable way the idea that someone out there is pulling the strings 
of Serbian destiny. In doing so, protoconspiratorial explanations effectively exonerated the 
interpretative framework traditionally associated with classical conspiracy theory. Once the 
idea that that 'someone out there' is pulling the strings of world politics becomes recognised, 
other types of conspiratorial explanations inevitably become regarded as more acceptable. 
Crucial to this dynamic is the fact that protoconspiracy theory is in many ways an incomplete 
explanation. It alludes to secrecy in world politics and the fact that there is a organised and 
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calculated plot against Serbia whose ultimate aim is the creation of the New World Order, but 
it does not explain who is behind it. In obscuring the identity of the conspirator, 
protoconspiratorial discourse effectively invites other types of account to fill in the 
explanatory gap. The way in which this gap is filled by the world elite and by classical 
conspiratorial themes will be examined in greater detail in the next chapter. 
However, before moving on, there is a further issue regarding protoconspiratorial discourse 
that warrants attention. Earlier in the chapter it was suggested that protoconspiracy theory, as 
a feature of 'regime populism' was observable in the Serbian mainstream media and political 
discourse from the early 1990s. With that in mind, the presence of this type of explanation in 
the reporting of the war with Nato was not in itself a novel or a noteworthy phenomenon. It 
was in many ways a continuation, and in some sense the culmination of a ten-year-long 
tradition. On the other hand, there is evidence which suggests that the arrival ofNato bombs 
did bring about some change, if not in the content of protoconspiratorial discourse, then 
certainly in its status within Serbian society. As will become apparent, circumstances 
surrounding the Nato intervention greatly undermined the credibility of alternative 
explanations of the Serbian predicament, thus in some ways enhancing the apparent 
plausibility, and popularity, of protoconspiratorial explanation propagated by the Serbian 
government. 
1993 
Throughout the 1990s, protoconspiratorial 
discourse, as manifested in the rhetoric of 
regime media and government officials 
existed, within the Serbian ideological context, 
side by side with more conventional views of 
international relations. Ever since Milosevic's 
arrival on the political scene, opposition 
politicians, independent media such as Na§a 
Borba, Danas, Vreme, NIN, and numerous 
liberal intellectuals (including Nebojsa Popov and !van Colovic) openly dismissed and 
mocked the allegations about the existence of a secret anti-Serbian plot. The work of the 
cartoonist Predrag Koraksic, who in the early 1990s published regularly in the daily Na§a 
Borba provides illustrative examples of the way in which conspiratorial explanations were 
ridiculed. In 1993, one ofKoraksiC's cartoons showed a Serbian peasant pinned to the ground 
in the manner of Gulliver, and held down by images from the conspiracy culture, including 
the Star of David, Uncle Sam, the Pope and Khomeini. Milosevic and the right-wing 
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politician Vojislav Seselj were shown trying to bite the cords and set the peasant free. 
Another cartoon, published several years later, showed Milosevic and the then Prime Minister 
of Serbia, Radosav Zelenovic running away with Serbia in their hands, chased once again by 
Uncle Sam, the Pope, Khomeini, Hitler, Stalin and others. 
Koraksic's cartoons are provided on this occasion merely as an illustration of the fact that, 
although a crucial element of government rhetoric, protoconspiracy theory was for much of 
the 1990s, one of a number of available interpretations of international relations. In fact it is 
the existence of alternative explanations, 
propagated by a large proportion of the Serbian 
political opposition and the liberal public, that 
made the exponents of protoconspiratorial 
discourse accountable for their potentially 
controversial claims, thus contributing to the 
development of the protoconspiracy theory's more 
reasonable and acceptable guise.8 
Significantly however, at the time of the bombing, the scope for the dissemination of 
alternative explanations was severely limited. Independent news media (news magazines 
Vreme and Nin, radio stations B-92, Radio Index, Studio B, etc.), which in the past ridiculed 
conspiracy theories, were either shut down (e.g. B-92 radio) or subjected to stringent 
censorship regulations and informal pressures? Censorship rules were in most cases vaguely 
defmed. For instance, one clause prohibited the spreading of 'fear, panic and defeatism'. The 
category of 'defeatism' was taken to include anything short of the 'patriotic' line propounded 
by the government. Overall, the regime of censorship resulted in a greater reluctance, among 
independent media, to test the limits of free speech. While most did not openly embrace the 
overall protoconspiratorial explanatory framework found in Politika or the RTS, the 
possibility for propagating alternative explanations, or mocking the official rhetoric was 
greatly restricted. 
In addition, the bombing appears to have brought about a genuine breakdown of alternative 
explanations, something that is often considered a crucial factor in the proliferation of 
conspiracy theories. During the war, the only authentic alternative to the explanation of the 
conflict offered by the Serbian regime was that propounded by Nato officials. The Serbian 
public was aware of the Nato perspective from broadcasts, in Serbian, by Radio Free Europe, 
BBC, Deutche Welle, Voice of America or Radio France Intemationale, all of which were 
available to the Serbian population on medium wave frequencies. Also, American and British 
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news channels (SKY, BBC, CNN, etc) were widely available in Serbia and provided a source 
of information for the English-speaking population. Finally, the Serbian media regularly 
publicised the views of the Nato spokesperson J amie Shea and other officials in order to 
dismiss the somewhat cynical, anodyne wording of Nato propaganda. However, the account 
of the war propounded by Nato, which was based on the notion of 'humanitarian 
intervention', 'collateral damage', 'minimal damage to civilian infrastructure' etc. did not 
present itself as an adequate and plausible explanation of the events. It seemed hard to 
reconcile the Nato rhetoric with regular nightly bombings, destroyed infrastructure and 
civilian casualties. According to an opinion poll carried out half way through the bombing 
campaign by the independent Belgrade news magazine Vreme, 91% of respondents claimed to 
have experienced psychological problems, mostly fear; 96% stated that they were 'concerned 
about the future of their family and their country'; while 71% experienced shortages of basic 
household goods (Vreme, Special Edition No. 11, 22 May, 1999). In such a climate of fear 
and anxiety, the suggestion that the war was directed at the Milosevic regime not the Serbian 
people presented itself as a questionable proposition. 
The apparent implausibility of the alternative explanation of war led to the emergence of what 
may be called a discourse of suspicion. Even members of previously pro-Western political 
parties and organisations, liberal academics and intellectuals, began to express doubt about 
the sincerity ofNato actions and question the motives behind the military intervention. 
Examples of the emerging discourse of suspicion can be found in the contribution of a 
number of Serbian intellectuals and politicians to the program Radio Bridge, broadcast every 
Sunday on Radio Free Europe. Radio Free Europe, based in Prague, was, together with other 
Western radio services, the only medium through which traditional opponents of the Serbian 
regime could freely voice their opinion on the events in Yugoslavia. The examples that follow 
include the contribution to Radio Bridge by Sonja Liht, chair of the Yugoslav branch of the 
Soros Fund for Open Society and Zarko Korac, a psychology professor and president of one 
of Serbia's minor opposition parties, the Social-democratic Union. Both Liht and Korac were 
known throughout the 1990s as staunch supporters of the pro-Western and liberal political 
option. Moreover, they have both featured in Serbian (proto)conspiracy theory. The Yugoslav 
branch of the Soros foundation, which Liht runs, was mentioned in an earlier quotation from 
Politika as the sponsor of the 'stage-managed' humanitarian catastrophe in Kosovo. Similarly, 
the party which Zarko Korac founded was one of the myriad of smaller opposition parties 
which were consistently accused of'treason' and of being 'Nato stooges'.' 0 
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In expressing their views on the Nato intervention, the previously unequivocally pro-Western 
stance of Liht and Korac was blunted by a noticeable dose of suspicion regarding the sincerity 
of Western rhetoric: 
'It is not Milosevic and his regime who are being bombarded, but the whole country and its 
infrastructure, civilian infrastructure more than anything else. Kosovo is being bombed very 
intensively, perhaps more intensively than anywhere else. '(Sonja Liht, War against Mi/osevii: or 
the Serbian people?, Radio Bridge, 9 May 1999;) 
'In Aleksinac entirely civilian targets have been destroyed, people got killed, the same thing 
happened in Pristina, the principal square has been ruined, the post-office has been destroyed, 
there are no telephone links with Pristina.' (Korac, Life under bombs, Radio Bridge, 11 April 
1999) 
'It is not only that people are getting killed, and that all this will leave terrible traumas, but the 
fact that a whole country is being destroyed. One ofNato's leaders said, I think, that Serbia will 
be bombed into the Stone Age. I ask myself what good will that do to anyone?'(Sonja Liht, 
ibid.) 
• I must also tell you that it wonld be wrong to see this war as a computer war, as very clean and 
precise. It is not like that really. These briefings in the Pentagon, in Brussels in Nato HQ, are not 
exactly correct and honest. It is normal that warring parties will present information in a way 
that suits them. But in this war there are many civilian victirns.'(Korac, ibid.) 
None of the above quotations can be said to be either conspiratorial or protoconspiratorial , in 
that they do not allude to the existence of a secret or sinister motive behind the West's 
intervention over Kosovo. Neither Liht nor Korac offer an explanation comparable to that 
contained in the official government line. At the same time, by stating what Nato's 
intervention is not (it is not a war against Milosevic's military machine, it is not aimed strictly 
at military targets etc) the two traditional allies of the West expressed reservation about the 
sincerity of the Nato leadership. Similar sentiment is evident in Liht's comment about the 
failure of the West to support the pro-democracy movement in Serbia: 
'When I think about why the West did not support all that, I can't and won't accept that it was 
lack of understanding or ignorance. It was something worse. Simply, the world's powerful were 
not ready to accept that a democratic option in Serbia is possible. Why? That is a different 
discussion.' (Liht, ibid.) 
Liht goes on to suggest that the West missed an 'incredible chance to reconstruct Serbia from 
within', and instead 'cynically stated that [the bombing] is a way to import democracy in 
Serbia'. As a result, democracy was made 'one of the first victims of this bombing'. Again, in 
challenging the justification of the war given by Nato officials, Liht questions the actual 
motives behind the Nato intervention. The suspicion is epitomised in the question 'Why?'. 
Crucially however, Liht does not provide an answer. She dismisses misunderstanding or 
ignorance as possible explanations, but then argues that actual reasons belong to 'a different 
132 
discussion'. It could be argued that the answer to the question 'why' is evaded in order to 
avoid having to invoke the idea of international conspiracy or at least a reference to some 
clandestine interests of Western powers. Yet in spite of this implicit rejection of a 
conspiratorial interpretation, the absence of an answer leaves a gap which needs to be filled. 
The incompleteness ofLiht's account effectively becomes a silent invitation to the conspiracy 
hermeneutic and speculation on the West's true intentions. This is especially so considering 
that the 'lack of understanding' and 'ignorance', which in this case would constitute plausible 
candidate answers from the perspective of the 'cock-up theory of society', are eliminated. 
In conclusion, once Nato rhetoric, with its stories of 'collateral damage', 'humanitarian 
intervention' or 'legitimate military targets' lost credibility even among the segment of the 
population which traditionally had a positive stance towards the West, there emerged a 
widespread discourse of suspicion. This discourse, while abstaining from making allegations 
of a secret plot in the manner of protoconspiracy theory, nonetheless posed the crucial 
questions about what was 'really going on'. It was undoubtedly something sinister, otherwise 
Nato would never have had to invent the story of 'humanitarian intervention'. In these 
instances the idea of a 'hidden agenda' of a powerful Other, propagated by the regime media, 
presents itself as a credible answer to the question which Groh (1987) cites as fundamental 
prerequisite to the emergence of conspiratorial discourse: 'why do bad things happen to good 
people?'. This is especially so considering that the dissemination of alternative views was 
severely restricted. As the next chapter will show, this led to the lifting of constraints which 
until then kept the more controversial aspects of the conspiracy tradition on the margins. As a 
result, antisemitic and mystical aspects of that tradition were allowed to emerge out of the 
woodwork. 
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Chapter 7: 
The emergence of antisemitic conspiracy themes in the mainstream Serbian 
press 
In the previous chapter it was suggested that protoconspiracy theory, as the 'conspiratorless' 
conspiracy theory was in many ways an incomplete explanation. Reports, commentaries and 
editorials in Politika as well as in other government-owned and 'patriotic' publications, 
consistently attributed Nato intervention to a sinister motive and a devious plot, while at the 
same time failing to explain exactly who was behind the alleged anti-Serbian conspiracy. 
While the ambiguity surrounding the identity of the conspiratorial body made this type of 
explanation seem more level-headed and sensible, it also created an explanatory gap which 
invited other types of explanation to provide the necessary elaboration. 
The present chapter will explore the responses, in the mainstream Serbian media, to the call 
for explication implicit in the vagueness of protoconspiratorial discourse. As will become 
apparent, a number of articles published in Politika during the Nato bombing abandoned the 
ambiguity characteristic of protoconspiracy theories and expanded on the identity of the 
forces thought to be responsible for the bombing of Yugoslavia. Significantly, elaborations of 
the basic conspiratorial claim were not created de novo, but drew on a long tradition of 
conspiratorial explanations which goes back to the time of the French Revolution and the 
writing of Barruel and Robison. While most of these accounts cited world elite organisations 
such as the Bilderberg group, the Trilateral Commission or the Council on Foreign Relations 
as the centre of the conspiracy, some articles in Politika will be shown to have touched upon 
the conspiracy tradition's antisemitic legacy. The analysis of these texts will explore the 
ideological dynamic which enabled explanations that might have previously been seen as 
extreme or unacceptable to emerge in the respectable media. 
In the earlier chapters it was suggested that conspiratorial tradition has for many years been 
linked with antisemitism as conspiracy theorists often identified Jews as secretly plotting 
world domination. Since the Second World War, this tradition of explanation has been 
resoundingly discredited in mainstream Western politics. No major Western political party 
has sought power using an ideology based on the thesis of a Jewish conspiracy. In 
consequence, ideologists who have continued to peddle such ideas, have been confined to the 
outer reaches of the political spectrum. Antisemitic conspiracy theorists have found 
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themselves on the wrong side of the boundary that divides the politically respectable from the 
discredited. 
Yugoslavia, for the most part, has conformed to this pattern. According to a number of recent 
analyses of antisemitism in Serbia, anti-Jewish ideology is a marginal phenomenon, without 
strong institutional or ideological basis (Sekelj, 1997). For the past 10 years, the principal 
exponent of antisemitic conspiracy theory has been Dr. Ratibor Durdevic, whose biography 
was outlined in Chapter 5. Durdevic's antisemitic writing is published by Ichtys Press, a small 
company he himself owns. Apart from Durdevic, antisemitic conspiratorial culture is 
disseminated by a relatively small number of activists who belong to the 'stratum of half 
educated intelligentsia' (e.g. Dragos Kalajic, Radmilo Marojevic, and until recently Neboj!ia 
Krstic) as well as by isolated members of the right-wing Orthodox clergy (e.g. Father Zarko 
Gavrilovic; see Sekelj, 1997, see also Institute for Jewish Policy Research report, 1997, 
Yugoslav Helsinki Committee for Human Rights Report on Antisemitism, 2001). 
The fact that Durdevic has to publish his own work illustrates the extent to which his 
antisemitic ideas have been considered to be beyond the bounds of respectability. Similarly, 
antisemitic material has been generally absent in the mainstream press. Expressions of 
antisemitic ideology were largely confined to fringe nationalist and religious publications 
with a limited readership, such as Logos, Pravoslavni Misionar (Orthodox missionary), 
Kruna (The Crown), Glas Srpski (Serbian Voice), Ovdje (Here) and Velika Srbija (Greater 
Serbia) as well as magazines with a more esoteric and quasi-religious orientation such as 
Trece Oko (Third eye) and Nostradamus. Overall, the impact of these publications on public 
opinion in Serbia has been limited. The only more widely read publication with a history of 
antisemitic content was the sensationalist fortnightly magazine Duga. As was noted in 
Chapter 5, over the years the magazine published interviews with various representatives of 
the Serbian conspiracist community including the antisemites Radmilo Marojevic, Father 
Zarko Gavrilovic and Spasoje Vlajic. This trend continued during the months of the 
bombing. In April 1999, Duga featured an article which inferred a link between the Satanic 
and Jewish influences among those responsible for the bombing of Yugoslavia: 
'The frustrated Jewish aunt [Madeline Albright] has been dragging her animosity towards Serbs 
since early childhood, when Serbs hid her from the Nazis, thus saving her life. And if you lend a 
hand to Satan, he will try to destroy you will all the powers at his disposal, thus removing the 
complexes of his own weakness.' (Vujovic, Aggression of profit against the soul, Duga, April 
1999, p.29) 
In contrast to Duga and various fringe publications, the pages of Politika were customarily 
free of antisemitic material. In fact, although Politika's credibility had suffered since the late 
135 
1980s, the paper often provided a forum in which liberal intellectuals and mainstream 
institutions could voice their concerns regarding the re-emergence of antisemitism in other, 
less reputable publications. For example, in December 1994, following the publication of an 
antisemitic text in Logos, a theological periodical published by the students of the Orthodox 
seminary in Belgrade, a group of Orthodox Christian intellectuals chose Politika as the 
medium through which to publicise a petition denouncing the article's antisemitic content 
(Sekelj, 1997). Also, in 1995, following the publication of the first edition ofDurdevic's book 
On the senselessness of antisemitism and anti-antisemitism an editorial in Politika criticised 
the book as a manifestation of rising antisemitism in Serbia (Rankovic, Who is inciting 
antisemitism?, Politika, 18 October, 1995). The next day, Politika published an interview 
with Aca Singer, president of the Federation of Jewish Communities of Yugoslavia in which 
Durdevic was further criticised (Antisemitic incidents must be taken care of, Politika, 19 
October, 1995). Finally, in the early 1990s, Politika covered extensively the activities of the 
Serbian-Jewish Friendship Society (SJFS), a government-sponsored organisation founded in 
1988, whose representatives frequently made a point of drawing a parallel between the fate of 
the Jews during the Nazi era and that of Serbs in the 1980s and 90s. The Society was never 
officially endorsed by the Federation of Jewish Communities of Yugoslavia, and its activities 
were often seen as the 'functionalisation' of Jews and their history driven by propagandist 
motives rather than by genuine compassion and solidarity with the Jewish people (Sekelj, 
1997). In spite of the possibility that the Society's motives were not entirely sincere, the 
sentiments expressed in Politika's coverage of its activities were essentially pro-Jewish. All 
this suggests that Politika, as Serbia's oldest daily newspaper, and for many decades the most 
widely-read and trusted daily publication, was not a medium for the wilder reaches of the 
conspiracy tradition. And yet, as will become apparent, in June 1999, at the end of the war 
with Nato, a number of articles containing references to antisemitic ideology appeared in 
Politika. The present chapter will examine this development. It will be argued that the 
emergence of antisemitic themes in a reputable newspaper occurred as a disturbing by-
product of a more general proliferation ofnon-antisemitic (mainly world elite) conspiratorial 
accounts in the mainstream Serbian media, which brought into the open the less acceptable 
aspects of the conspiratorial cultural tradition. 
7.1 Politika and the Bilderberg Conspiracy 
In the spring of 1999, Politika published several articles which dealt with the activities of the 
Bilderberg group, claiming that this organisation lay at the core of a Western conspiracy 
against Yugoslavia. For example, on 28 May, Politika published an interview with Mirko 
Vranes, a relatively unknown conspiracy theorist and author of books such as The Nightmare 
136 
World and The New World Order: Where and What for?. In outlining a conspiratorial view of 
world politics, Vranes attributed particular importance to the 'Bilderberg forum', 'a secret 
organisation founded half a century ago' which plays a crucial role in world affairs 
(Mysterious 'World Government' creates nightmares around the world, Politika, 28 May 
1999, p.19). In the interview, Vranes pointed out that: 
'Everything becomes clear once it is known that for 22 years this fonun was headed by Prince 
Bernard of the Netherlands, as well as by prominent politicians such as Douglas-Rome, Waiter 
Schell, Lord Carrington ... 1bis circle also includes 120 personalities from Europe and the US. 
They meet in secret, once a year, and are sworn to secrecy. However, occasional leaks do 
happen. It is also known ... that the [Bilderberg] fonun includes persons who have played a 
crucial role in the destruction of the Former Yugoslavia.' {ibid.) 
Apart from the conspiratorial activities of the Bilderberg group, Vranes also revealed to 
readers of Politika the existence of the Committee of 300, 'the secret World Government' 
which 'intentionally provokes (and maintains) nightmares around the world'. The Committee 
is said to be devoted to the creation of a 'totalitarian and absolutely controlled new world 
community and the establishment of a single world government' (ibid.). 
Two days after printing the interview with Vranes, Politika featured the article Cunning plan 
of the Bilderberg group which contained similar conspiratorial themes (Politika, 30 May, 
1999; p. 15). The article was provided by the Yugoslav state news agency Tanjug. It was in 
fact a summary of a longer piece which had appeared in the Yugoslav Army's publication 
Vojska earlier that month (War as a lucrative business, Vojska, War Edition No.27; p.22-23) 
Just like the interview with Vranes, the article analysed the causes of the conflict with Nato. 
Its thesis of conspiracy was apparent right from the start: 
'The plan to provoke a new 'Balkan Vietnam', according to the magazine Vojska, was plotted 
secretly as early as in 1996, and was subsequently reactivated in 1998 at the meeting of the so-
called Bilderberg group .. .' (Politika, 30 May, 1999; p. 15) 
The article cited the Bilderberg Group as the force behind the conspiracy, describing it as 
consisting of 'members of the mondialistic elite, financial moguls, owners of multinational 
companies, political leaders, crowned heads and world famous scientists'. The Group's 
involvement in the Balkans was described as part of a global conspiracy: 
'We are talking of a self-proclaimed world super-government which is making money out of 
crises and wars, which, and this is the saddest part, it itself produces. In addition, explorers 
emphasise, they keep the press and television under control on a global scale.' {Ibid.) 
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On 9 June, 1999, several days after the cessation of the bombing, Politika published another 
piece on the Bilderbergers. The article Europe remains under US guardianship, also provided 
by the Tanjug news agency, reported on a Bilderberg Group meeting held in Portugal earlier 
in the year. The Bilderbergers were described as the 'informal world government'. The piece 
was printed on page four of Politika and dominated the regular 'World news' section. It was 
published as a genuine report on an important aspect of international relations, without any 
critical comment regarding its conspiratorial content. Notably, the emphasis in this article was 
not so much on the role of the Bilderbergers in provoking armed conflicts, but on the Group's 
desire to establish 'puppet regimes' in developing countries around the world, and especially 
in Yugoslavia. Tanjug's reporter revealed to Politika 's readers that, in Portugal, the 
Bilderberg group agreed that the next step on the road to world domination was: 
'the creation of a 'partner' in Belgrade, a government which is 'democratic' and 'co-operative'. 
They want a government that would not care for the state, its people or their future, but would 
simply represent the interests of 'globalisation', executing orders from abroad, from across the 
Atlantic.' (Europe remains under US guardianship, Politika, 9 June, 1999; p.4) 
The change in emphasis in this article becomes clearer if one bears in mind the time of its 
publication. The report on the Bilderberg conference appeared several days after the cessation 
of the bombing, at a time when the Serbian regime was celebrating its 'victory' over Nato. 
There was no longer any need to remind the public of who was behind the Western military 
intervention. Moreover, doing so would necessitate for the victory over the 'rulers of the 
world' to be explained. Instead, the state-controlled media turned its attention to the battle 
ahead, against the Serbian opposition parties. As will become apparent in Chapter 10, 
references to Serbian opposition politicians as 'traitors', 'Nato stooges' and 'servants of the 
New World Order', intensified in the state-controlled media in the post-war period. 
In the previous chapter it was argued that, from the early 1990s, the Serbian political 
establishment and government controlled media (including Politika) actively disseminated the 
idea that Western involvement in the Balkans was motivated by a hidden agenda aimed at 
subjugating Serbia and its people. With that in mind, the emergence of a small number of 
articles on the Bilderberg group may not appear all that remarkable. However, the three 
articles in Politika are noteworthy for two reasons. Firstly, unlike in the case of 
protoconspiracy theory examined earlier, there was no attempt to conceal the identity of the 
conspirators. Instead, blame and responsibility were attributed directly to an identifiable 
group consisting of the world's elite, namely the Bilderbergers and the Committee of 300. 
More importantly, in elaborating the theme of an anti-Serbian conspiracy, two of the three 
articles drew upon the 'classics' of conspiracy literature. The author of Cunning plan of the 
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Bilderberg group talked of the 'third Balkan war' which the Bilderbergers were allegedly 
trying to provoke in Kosovo. In support of this claim, the author suggested that the same idea 
was 'indirectly hinted at by Gary Alien in his 1986 best-seller Say No to New World Order'. 
Gary Alien is one of the principal exponents of world elite conspiracy theory in the US. His 
best-selling books (None dare call it conspiracy is said to have sold over five million copies 
world-wide) have been endorsed and distributed by the John Birch Society and other far-right 
organisations ever since the late 1960s (Billig, 1978; Lipset & Raab, 1978) By citing his 
work, the article in Politika was presenting Alien as a reputable political source. Similarly, in 
the interview in Politika, Mirko Vrane§ supported his claims about the 'Committee of 300' by 
citing 'a certain John Coleman, who, some ten years ago wrote a book about this Committee'. 
Just like Gary Alien's work, Dr. John Coleman's book The Conspirator's hierarchy: The 
story of the Committee of 300 focuses on the conspiratorial machinations of the Trilateral 
Commission, the Council on Foreign Relations and the Bilderberg Group. Although Dr. 
Coleman may not be as famous as Gary Alien in his native USA, he is probably better known 
to the Serbian public. In the months after the Nato bombing, Coleman's book The 
Conspirator's Hierarchy competed with Noam Chomsky's What does America really want? 
for the top spot on the best-sellers list in most of Belgrade's larger bookshops. 
During the months of the bombing, conspiracy theories referring to the activities of the 
Council on Foreign Relations, the Bilderberg Group and the Trilateral Commission, were also 
advanced by certain segments of the Serbian intellectual establishment. On 30 May, 1999, 
Politika reported a public lecture given by Professor Mihajlo Markovic, an eminent Serbian 
philosopher and dissident during the 1960s and 1970s. In the late 1980s Markovic had 
became a high ranking official and ideologue ofMilo§evic's Socialist Party of Serbia. In the 
lecture given at the 'Europe at the crossroads' conference, held in the Kolarac cultural centre 
in Belgrade in May 1999, Markovic reflected on the world elite conspiracy theories. 
Professor's words were reported by Politika's journalist B. Radivoj§a: 
'In relation to the globalisation trend, professor [Markovic] reflected upon the so-called 
conspiracy theories. He said that these theories turned out to contain a lot of truth, considering 
that a large part of the world is run by secret organisations. He mentioned some of them: the 
Council on Foreign Relations, founded in 1921, the Bilderberg group, established in 1954, and 
the Trilateral commission established in 1973. Members of these orgartisations are leading 
politicians, eminent business personalities, even some crowned beads. These powerful 
orgartisations function as some sort of 'secret world government'. They have fust of all brought 
into question the sovereignty of the state, declaring universal human rights to be older and more 
important than national sovereignty.' (B. Radivojsa, Fourth attempt to conquer the world, 
Politika, 30 May, 1999, p.16) 
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Markovic went on to argue that, like Austro-Hungary, Hitler's Gennany and Stalin's USSR 
beforehand, this 'kind of "secret world government"' is trying to 'introduce dictatorship into 
the sphere of international relations', and ultimately 'rule the world in the name of the so-
called New World Order'. 
The conspiratorial triad of the Council on Foreign Relations, the Bilderberg Group and the 
Trilateral Commission featured in the explanation of the Yugoslav crisis offered by another 
established Serbian academic. The year before the war with Nato, Smilja Avramov, a retired 
law professor and fonner advisor to President Milosevic, (see Chapter 5 for biographical 
details) published the second edition of her book The Trilateral (Avramov, 1998). In this 
work, A vramov exposes the conspiratorial machinations of the Bilderberg Group, the Council 
on Foreign Relations and the Trilateral Commission, both in the context of global 
international relations and Balkan politics. Like in the aforementioned articles published in 
Po/itika, many arguments put forward in The Trilateral are based on the 'classics' of 
Western, primarily US, conspiracy literature, including the work of Gary Alien (1968), and 
his 'followers' such as Dr. John Coleman (1992) and Richard Gaylon Ross (1995). 
7 .2. Links between the world elite conspiracy theory and the classical conspiratorial 
tradition 
The fact that the world elite conspiracy theories received regular coverage io the mainstream 
press and were endorsed by at least two respected academics, suggests that at the time of the 
war, this type of conspiratorial account was regarded as more respectable, credible and 
acceptable outside the communities which are traditionally associated with conspiracy 
theories, namely the extreme Right. One way in which world elite conspiracy theory managed 
to achieve respectability is by distancing itself from the classical conspiracy theory. In 
Chapter 2, it was suggested that a distinction can be made between the world elite conspiracy 
theories of A vramov, Markovic, Gary Alien or John Coleman and the classical conspiracy 
theories propounded in Yugoslavia by Ratibor Durdevic and other antisemites. The fonner 
type of explanation cites existing organisations (Council on Foreign Relations, the Trilateral 
Commission and the Bilderberg group) as the hub of the world conspiracy and does not see 
these organisations as ciphers for the hidden esoteric workings of Jews, Freemasons or the 
llluminati. Most crucially, Gary Alien, John Coleman and others do not identify an ethnic 
group as controlling organisations such as the Bilderberg Group. In contrast, for writers such 
as Durdevic, as for other antisemitic theorists, groups such as the Bilderbergers and the 
Trilateral Commission are merely instruments for a deeper, hidden Jewish plot.' In this 
regard, the Bilderberg conspiracy theory need not be linked to the long-standing tradition of 
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antisemitic conspiracy theories, and might, just like protoconspiracy theory, appear as more 
acceptable. 
Although it might be possible to make a theoretical distinction between world elite and 
classical conspiracy theory, in practice the boundaries can be blurred. As was established in 
Chapter 2, the conspiracy theorist is operating in an ideological space with a long antisemitic 
tradition that cannot be easily discarded. In the present section the linkage between the more 
'reasonable' face of conspiracy theory and the less respectable ideological tradition of 
conspiracy notions will be illustrated by the example of The Trilateral and a recorded 
conversation with Avramov which took place in July 2001.2 
In the introduction to The Trilateral, A vramov makes an explicit attempt to distance herself 
from the wilder reaches of the conspiracy tradition. She argues against the 'mystification of 
secret societies' and the placing of 'all secret organisations in the same basket'. (p.12) 
Avramov claims to favour careful 'evaluation', and 'observation'. (p.lO) and proposes that 
the explanation of the anti-Serbian activities of the world's elite requires 'extensive, 
multidisciplinary research' (p.l4). Similarly, during the recorded conversation, Avramov 
revealed that the writing of The Trilateral was motivated by the need to 'demonstrate the 
complexity of the anatomy of the contemporary world'. In emphasising the complexity of 
international relations, A vramov positions her argument away from the naive and simplistic 
classical conspiratorial explanations. 
A more direct form of distancing from classical conspiracy theory occurred during the 
conversation when A vramov explicitly stated that she did not consider herself to be a 
conspiracy theorist. She was providing an account of the dissolution of Yugoslavia when she 
introduced a disclaimer: 
'no, it is not a conspiracy .. .I am not an exponent of conspiracy theories of any kind, but there 
was one thing, one basic principle which was used to resolve crises in Europe after the fall of 
the Berlin wall. It was to return everything to the previous state, status quo ante, before 
Communism. Everywhere except in Yugoslavia' 
Behind Avramov's rejection of conspiracy theory was, once again, the insistence on the 
complexity of world politics and the 'entangled threads which connect different secret 
organisations, intelligence services, etc.'. For Avramov, as well as for other world elite 
conspiracy theorists, 'conspiracy theory' is a label reserved for exponents of the classical 
conspiratorial discourse. Their own work, on the other hand, is seen as an informed analysis 
of elite organisations and their influence on international politics. Consistent with the attempt 
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to distance the world elite conspiracy theory from classical conspiratorial discourse, and 
present it as a scholarly analysis, the overall literary style of The Trilateral appears to be 
closer to mainstream analyses of international politics (e.g. that ofNoarn Chomsky) than to 
classical conspiracy literature which has strong quasi-religious, mystical and esoteric 
overtones. 
A similar form of distancing to that found in The Trilateral, was evident in the 
aforementioned lecture by Mihajlo Markovic reported in Politika. Professor Markovic did not 
declare himself to be a believer in conspiracy theory of society. Instead he stated that 'so-
called conspiracy theories' 'turned out to contain a Jot of truth'. The way in which Markovic's 
attitude towards conspiracy theories was reported in Politika has significant rhetorical 
implications. Firstly, the qualification 'so-called' which precedes the reference to conspiracy 
theories is noteworthy. To have said that conspiracy theories contain a lot of truth would have 
brought the established philosopher uncomfortably close to the likes ofRadibor Durdevic and 
other antisemites. By referring to 'so-called conspiracy theories' Markovic indicates that 
explanations based on the machinations of the world elite (which he seems to support) are not 
really 'conspiracy theories', but something else, something more respectable and believable. 
Also, Markovic presents himself as someone who used to be a sceptic regarding the 'so-called 
conspiracy theories', but who changed his mind when the weight of the evidence about the 
Bilderberg group and its 'sister' organisations proved his scepticism to be misguided. Stated 
in this way, the apparent reservation about the conspiracy theory of society is employed 
rhetorically, to present the belief in world elite conspiracy theory as the result of empirical 
observation and rational inquiry, not superstition or naivety. 
The distancing apparent in Markovic's speech appears to have been effective. The journalist 
reporting Professor Markovic's words did not comment critically on the conspiratorial claims 
made in the lecture. Instead, Radivojsa reported Markovic's explanation as the voice of 
intellectual authority. Conspiratorial interpretation of the Yugoslav crisis was treated as a 
legitimate position endorsed by a well-established and respected academic and an opinion 
worthy of a mention in a mainstream daily newspaper. 
7.3. World elite organisations: between reality and the conspiratorial imagination 
As has already been noted, an important characteristic of world elite conspiracy theories, 
which makes it easier for them to be presented as serious and informed analysis (rather than 
as a wild or paranoid 'conspiracy theory'), is that they deal with existing elite organisations, 
most notably the Council on Foreign Relations, the Trilateral Commission and the Bilderberg 
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Group. The influence of these organisations is widely recognised, even by political analysts 
and journalists who do not subscribe to the conspiratorial world view (Peters, 1996; Gill, 
1990; see also Ronson, 2000). Examples from the British media illustrate the point. In 
December 1999, The Observer published an article about the whereabouts of Peter 
Mandelson, following his sacking from Tony Blair's cabinet earlier that year. The Observer 
revealed that the former minister spent some time with the Bilderberg group, 'an international 
talking shop for the world's business and political elite. Participants are hand-picked; the 
press is strictly at bay' (Antony Bamett, Revealed: Mandelson's £20,000 of junkets, The 
Observer, 26 December 1999, p.7). Similarly, in February 1999, The Guardian cited 
membership of the Trilateral Commission and the Bilderberg group as an important aspect of 
the credentials of President Clinton's friend Vemon Jordan, and testimony to his political 
influence: 
'But it is as a political powerbroker that Mr Jordan has made himself into what the White House 
counsel Charles Ruff last month called 'one of this country's greatest citizens'. A director of the 
Ford Foundation and the Brookings Institution, as well as a member of the Trilateral 
Commission and the Bilderberg group, Mr Jordan has known six presidents, but Bill Clinton 
best of all.' (Martin Kettle, Nervous prosecutors ask Jordan about his "best friend' Bill Clinton, 
The Guardian, 3 February, 1999, p.14) 
In these articles there is no mention of a Bilderberg conspiracy. At the same time, secrecy, 
exclusivity and the power of the Bilderberg group are emphasised. These are the exact 
qualities of world elite organisations which made them so appealing to conspiracy theorists in 
the 1960s and 70s. As a Financial Times colwnnist once noted, 'even if the Bilderberg group 
is not a conspiracy of some sort, it is conducted in such a way as to give a remarkably good 
imitation of one' (quoted inPassnotes No:1218, The Guardian, 13 May, 1998). 
It should be pointed out however, that when the Bilderberg group is mentioned in the British 
media, this is not always in a non-conspiratorial context. In April, 1999, The Guardian 
featured a report from the Serbian town of Pancevo, in which Maggie O'Kane, The 
Guardian's Belgrade correspondent, commented on the conspiracy theories circulating in 
Serbia: 
'As an information blackout remains in force on state television, the explanation for their 
country's tragedy is left to such people as Aradunik Mihailovic, an academic writing in 
yesterday's Politika. According to Mr Mihailovic, the crisis was triggered by the 'Bilderberg 
group', a secret organisation of companies, politicians and businessmen who want to control 
Serbia. He goes on to reveal, in Serbia's most popular newspaper, that the shadowy group is 
chaired by Lord Carrington, that Bill Clinton is on the board and that the US special envoy, 
Richard Holbrooke, and Sadako Ogato of the United Nations are also secret members.' (War in 
Europe: Rage unites battered town, The Guardian, 13 April, 1999, p.5) 
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In contrast to previous citations of the Bilderberg group in The Guardian and The Observer, 
O'Kane places the name of the organisation in inverted commas, suggesting that the group is 
the product of the imagination of (Serbian) conspiracy theorists.3 Similarly, the description of 
the Bilderberg group as 'a secret organisation of companies, politicians and businessmen 
who want to control Serbia' (which is most probably a quote from Politika rather than 
O'Kane's own defmition) is not contrasted with what the Bilderberg group really is. 
O'Kane's article leaves the impression that 'the Bilderberg group' belongs strictly in the 
domain of conspiratorial imagination. Significantly however, unlike her Serbian colleague B. 
Radivojsa, Maggie O'Kane did not treat the allegations made by the academic as a serious 
and noteworthy comment on international relations, but cited them as an example of the 
unusual and farfetched explanations of the conflict publicised in the Serbian media. 
Examples from the British press reveal that that articles published in the same newspaper only 
a few months apart refer to what are effectively two, in an ontological sense, very different 
Bilderberg groups - one which is 'real' but non-conspiratorial, and the other which is 
imagined and conspiratorial. A possible explanation for the dual existence of the Bilderberg 
group is that once the Bilderbergers and similar organisations were incorporated into the 
conspiracy tradition in the 1960s, they became so strongly associated with conspiracy theory 
that their link with reality was to some extent severed. As a result, world elite forums are 
today occasionally treated, as in O'Kane's report, solely as the product of conspiracist 
ideology. What is important however, is that in the British press, world elite organisations are 
examined either as real discussion forums of the financial and political elite, or as an aspect 
of contemporary conspiratorial discourse. There is seldom any blurring of boundaries 
between the two conceptualisations, and the possibility of Bilderberg conspiracy is never 
seriously entertained. 
The situation is different in world elite conspiracy literature, where the basic argument rests 
heavily on the blurring of those boundaries. For instance A vramov acknowledges the public 
nature of world elite groups. During the conversation, she recognised that these organisations 
are 'a necessity' and even pointed out that she attended conferences organised by the 
Trilateral Commission. Similarly, in The Trilateral A vramov substantiates various claims 
about the nature and the activities of these organisations by citing reports (Trilateral 
Commission's Task Force Reports) and journals (Foreign Affairs) published by the Council 
on Foreign Relations and the Trilateral commission. In doing so she recognises the existence 
of these organisations in the public domain. 
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However, parallel with this 'innocent' portrayal of world elite organisations, which is no more 
conspiratorial than The Guardian reports on Vernon Jordan or Peter Mandelson, runs a rather 
different representation of these groups, one that emphasises their secret character and 
involvement in world conspiracy. For instance, Avramov contrasts the 'public image' of these 
organisations with their secret dimension: 
'It should be noted that it is sometimes very difficult to classify these organisations, as in some 
cases they at the same time are and are not secret. Their existence is not a secret, and neither is 
the outer circle of members. Their decisions are secret and are implemented via secret channels, 
and in indirect ways. What is strictly conspiratorial is the inner circle of members' (A vramov, 
1998; p.13) 
Similarly, A vramov reflected on the stratification of elite organisations during the 
conversation. She said that the Trilateral Commission 'has three circles of members'. Again, 
'the inner circle' was the most secret but also the most sinister. The second circle, Avramov 
argued, was 'more elastic, on a higher intellectual level'. 
The significance attributed to the dual nature of the Bilderberg group, the Trilateral and the 
Council on Foreign Relations, and the secrecy surrounding the 'inner circle' of their 
membership, brings Avramov's explanation closer to the domain of the 'paranoid', 
conspiratorial explanatory style. For instance, wrule recognising that world elite organisations 
appear to have fairly 'honourable aims' regarding the wellbeing and prosperity of the whole 
of humankind, Avramov goes on to challenge tills positive image: 
'The question that imposes itself spontaneously is: why the need for secrecy, if their aim is to 
benefit the whole humanity? Why the conspiracy, if they are motivated by such highly 
humanistic ideals?' (Avramov, 1998, p.l3) 
A vramov attributes the secrecy to sinister motives, and provides an explanation which draws 
on conspiratorial explanatory tradition. The most important allegations regarding the 
conspiratorial activities of world elite organisations are not corroborated by what is printed in 
the Trilateral Commission Reports and other journals, but by what is absent from them: 
'Crises in various parts of the world were a customary subject matter for the Trilateral 
Commission, and regular reports were written about these crises, such as for example the one on 
the Middle East, or the Israeli-Palestinian war ([Task Force Reports] No.20 and 38). On the list 
of published reports there are no special reports about Yugoslavia, which should not be taken to 
mean that no such report exists, but rather that it is secret ... The precise time and place where 
the idea about the dissolution of Yugoslavia, the biggest crime in Europe since the Holocaust, 
was made, will remain a secret for a long time.' (A vrarnov, 1998, p.ll7} 
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While the precise citation of Task Force Reports gtves Avramov's work a scholarly 
appearance, the reference to secret documents signals a leap of the imagination, and 
progression from the 'undeniable to the unbelievable' (Hofstadter, 1966). The same applies to 
the differentiation between 'inner' and 'outer' circles of members. In The Trilateral, 
Avramov notes that, while the 'outer circle' functions in the public domain, among the 'inner 
circle' 'absolute discipline is a sacred principle' (p.l3). A breach of discipline can cost 
members of the Trilateral their life - she cites Olaf Palme, JF Kennedy and Aldo Moro as 
recent victims. Not only is the death of these individuals attributed to a single evil 
conspiratorial cause - in line with the monomaniacal conspiratorial attributional style - but 
the allusion to secrecy sets in motion the basic conspiratorial argument: the absence of proof 
about the conspiracy is taken as incontrovertible evidence of its existence and of its hostile 
nature. Moreover, the alleged ability of the conspirators to keep the public in the dark about 
their plans and about the 'truth' behind the death of well-known and popular politicians is 
used to enhance the image of the conspirators as the epitome of power and evil in the world. 
7.4. World elite conspiracy theory and the historical continuity of conspiracy 
Further evidence that the differentiation between 'reasonable', world elite conspiracy theories 
and classical conspiratorial discourse is not hard and fast, can be sought in the way in which 
the 'reasonable' writer attempts to understand the present political situation in terms of a 
longer history of conspiracies. A conspiracy theory, regardless of whether it focuses on the 
world's political and fmancial elite, the Freemasons or Jews, has at its core the 'conspiracy 
theory of society': the assumption that things happen because people, groups or organisations 
want them to happen (Popper, 1966). It would be implausible to make this general 
metatheoretical assumption about the functioning of society historically specific and argue, 
for example, that before 1921, when the Council on Foreign Relations was founded, things 
happened by chance, while since then everything has been the result of a conspiracy. 
Conspiracy theory of society is a view of the world not only as it is at present, but also as it 
always was. Consequently, world elite organisations, as conspiratorial bodies, cannot be 
conceived as historically isolated. 
The assumption of a historical continuity of conspiracy creates an ideological dilemma for 
exponents of world elite conspiracy theories. While distancing their work from classical 
conspiracy literature, authors of this type of account must at the same recognise the historical 
significance of past conspiracies. In the introduction to The Trilateral, A vramov links the 
conspiracy behind the current Western involvement in the Balkans to a whole chain of 
'influences' which have shaped the history of Serbia and the rest of the world: 
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'It used to happen, not at all infrequently, in the history of not only small but also big countries, 
that politicians who found themselves at the head of these states were not the persons who 
directed the political and economic trends of those countties, but were just the communication 
links for invisible governments; so the people inevitably became the object ofmanipnlation. The 
former high ranking CIA official Dr. John Coleman says the following about his country: 'We 
are not an independent nation, and we will not be one as long as our country is ruled by the 
invisible government- Committee of300'. Yugoslavia too has been faced with similar problems: 
three times in its seventy-year-long history it has found itself in the hands of secret and semi-
secret organisations.' (Avramov, 1998, p.9) 
Avramov goes on to mention the influence of Freemasons in Yugoslav history ('functioning 
continuously for three centuries'; p.IO), the Comintern ('that vanguard organisation of the 
world proletariat'; p.9) and most recently the Bilderberg group. 
During the encounter in July 200 I, A vramov was asked to expand on her views about the 
three organisations and the relationship between them: 
'I am not saying that they have succeeded one another, but some mutual influence is beyond 
doubt. If you take for instance the influence of the Jllurninati on the Freemasons, or the 
Freemasons on the true Marxists, regardless of the fact that their ideologies and strategies were 
different, there are absolutely some conunon points ... the contemporary globalisation ideology, 
as understood by the Trilateral. .. that was also the idea of the Conununists: the destruction of the 
state through proletarian internationalism.' 
Later in the conversation, Avramov also pointed out that 'almost all ... in fact, not almost, but 
all members of Trilateral are Freemasons'. She explained that contemporary world elite 
organiSations consist of the most prominent members of the Freemasons, who organised 
themselves into new, more exclusive groups after the Second World War, when '[traditional] 
Freemasonry reached its lowest point in history'. Consequently, in spite of the attempts at 
differentiating the explanations based on the activities of world elite organisations from 
classical conspiratorial discourse, A vramov presents the Bilderberg group, the Trilateral 
Commission and the Council on Foreign Relations as the most recent manifestation of an 
ancient conspiracy. Similarly, in the penultimate paragraph of the book A vramov warns that 
even if the ideology of the Trilateral fails, the fight is not over: 
'The centres of transnational capital will not surrender easily; one should not exclude the 
possibility that, even as soon as tomorrow, it may emerge in a new form. The Trilateral is 
neither the first nor the last in that chain' (p.l40) 
By alleging that there may be a 'chain' of conspiracies behind which stands 'transnational 
capital' Avramov once again recognised the temporal dimension of the conspiracy. 4 
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The reference to the historical continuity of conspiracy is not an idiosyncrasy of Serbian 
conspiracy theorists. In Chapter 2 it was already noted that in 1967 the John Birch Society 
reissued Robison's 1797 book Proofs of Conspiracy. The fact that an organisation which 
propounds world elite conspiracy theories published a classic piece of 18th Century 
conspiracy literature is itself a significant indication that the ideologues of the John Birch 
Society regarded the accounts of past conspiracies to be relevant to the understanding of the 
contemporary world plot. Moreover, in the introduction to the reprint of Robison's book, an 
anonymous commentator established a direct connection between the llluminati and the more 
recent world elite organisations. The latter were presented as the contemporary manifestation 
of a classical conspiratorial organisation, the llluminati: 
'the main habitat [of the Illuminati] these days seems to be the great subsidised universities, tax-
free foundations, mass media communication systems, government bureaux such as the State 
Department, and a myriad of private organisations such as the Council on Foreign Relations' 
(quoted in Lipset and Raab, 1978, p.258) 
Going back to The Trilateral, further thematic links between the world elite conspiracy theory 
and classical conspiratorial themes can be found in the account of the origins of the 
Bilderberg group. Avramov describes the group's 'ideological father' Joseph Retinger, as a 
'catholic priest of the Jesuit order' and a 'Freemason of the 33nl degree' (p.30). Retinger's 
membership of the Freemasons is invoked as a description of his 'political stance'. His 
attempts to create various supranational political organisations such as the 'the world 
government' are therefore explained by the reference to his Masonic ideological roots. In this 
way the continuity between the Bilderberg and the Masonic conspiracy is once again 
documented. 
Avramov's reference to Retinger's 'profession' and religious identity is also interesting. 
Although somewhat neglected in recent years, anti-Catholic conspiratorial themes were a 
common feature of Serbian rightwing nationalism during the war in Croatia (1991-95). Just 
like much of Serbian conspiracy culture, the anti-Catholic themes can be traced to the writing 
of Nikolaj Velimirovic. In the late 1930s, Bishop Nikolaj and his disciples led the campaign 
against the signing of the Concordat between Yugoslavia and the Vatican. They interpreted 
the Concordat as an attempt by the Vatican to undermine the Serbian Orthodox Church, with 
the aim of destroying Orthodox Christianity generally. In contrast to the anti-Catholicism of 
the Orthodox Right, A vramov' s reference to the Vatican conspiracy in The Trilateral contains 
no direct reference to the anti-Orthodox plot by the Holy See. As such the account in the book 
appears to be distinguishable from the Velimirovicesque ideological tradition. However, 
during the recent conversation, A vramov stated that the 'disintegration of Yugoslavia was 
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demanded by the Vatican' with the aim of 'destroying Orthodox Christianity'. Also, when 
asked to comment on the 'proliferation of religious sects in Serbia' Avramov pointed out that 
both sects and various foreign NGO 'are employed by secret services' as part of the whole 
'Trilateral movement and globalisation'. Their function, Avramov insisted, is to 'destroy 
traditional society and create a society which would not be based on traditional values'. In 
perceiving non-Orthodox religious communities and various pro-Western civil rights 
organisations as foot-soldiers in a vast anti-Serbian and anti-Orthodox conspiracy, Avramov 
drew her explanatory framework closer to Velimirovic's ideological position, where anti-
Westernism and religious intolerance are based on a similar fear of an anti-Serbian and anti-
Orthodox conspiracy. 
The allusion to the historical continuity between conspiracies past and present, which is 
evident in Avramov's explanatory framework, has a more disturbing dimension. In the 
introduction to her book, Avramov briefly mentions conspiratorial organisations such as the 
llluminati and the Skull and Bone Society, and finally the Elders of Zion, 'an elitist Judaic 
organisation ... with missionary aims, which still functions through various organisational 
forms' (p.IO) In mentioning the Elders of Zion, Avramov not only refers to the antisemitic 
version of the conspiracy, but also repeats one of the major themes of the notorious Protocols 
of the Learned Elders ofZion. She suggests that there is a Jewish group of conspirators named 
the Elders of Zion. Although she suggests that this group may have been part of past 
conspiracies and, indeed may have been more important in former times, she nevertheless 
asserts that the Elders of Zion are still operating. In doing so, she links her present 
'reasonable' conspiracy theory directly to the antisemitic conspiracy tradition. 
Avramov was asked about the Elders ofZion during the encounter in July 2001. While in The 
Trilateral the Elders are mentioned only in passing, in the conversation Avaramov elaborated 
on anti semi tic themes without any visible sign of embarrassment or resistance. 
J.B.: In your book you also mention the Elders of[Zion] ... 
A vramov: [Yes .. ] 
JB: and you mention that they are no longer ... 
Avramov: [no, they are active ... ! merely said when 
they were founded. I did not go into the Elders of Zion, but they are ... ! think that I 
mentioned it in a single sentence that they are still operating. In fact they are the most 
secret of all secret organisations, you know ... The most interesting thing, which to me 
is completely unclear, is that these Jewish organisations were in fact terribly 
Serbophobic. The main anti-Serbian campaign was led by Jewish organisations in 
America and France. What is the cause of this, I still don't know ... 
The expression of ignorance about the reasons behind Jewish 'Serbophobia' is interesting 
because A vramov falls short of attributing the causes directly to a Jewish conspiracy or to the 
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machinations of the Elders of Zion. Instead she expresses 'bemusement' at the fact that Jews 
failed to sympathise with the Serbs despite the fact that 
'King Alexander [of Serbia] was the first European head of state to express support for the 
Balfour declaration in !9!7 ... between the two world wars, the Zionist organisation had a centre 
in Yugoslavia, and had the blessing of the Royal family. Huge favours were done to Jews ... ' 
The construction of Avramov's antisemitic argument contains traces of historical nihilism. 
The apparent ingratitude of the Jews is interpreted as a sign of some ulterior, and inevitably 
sinister, motive. Significantly, the fact that Avramov raised the problem of Jewish 
'ingratitude' in reply to the question about the Elders of Zion, indicates that behind the 
apparent 'Srbophobia' amongst Jews she sees the kind of causality characteristic of the most 
infamous example of the antisemitic conspiracy tradition. 
In Chapter 7 of The Trilateral, classical antisernitic conspiratorial themes are also 
incorporated into the analysis of contemporary conspiracy. In the chapter entitled Yugoslavia 
caught in the net of conflicting interests Avramov reveals the Vatican's influence in the 
dissolution of Yugoslavia, partly through the mysterious 'charity organisation' Opus Dei 
(p.127).' The Vatican's aim is said to be the creation of a 'Roman Europe' a principle on 
which 'the Vatican has been building its policies for centuries' (p.131). Avramov goes on to 
discuss the alleged conspiratorial collaboration between the Vatican and the Trilateral 
Commission. The coalition between the Catholic Church and the Trilateral Commission is 
explained by reference to the 'Holy Alliance' between the US and the Vatican. She describes 
this alliance as 'an unusual, informal, Catholic-Jewish united front' (p.128). Avramov made a 
similar point during the conversation when she commented on the 'perfidy of Vatican policy' 
and noted that 'the Vatican entered a coalition both with Jews and with Muslims, all against 
Orthodox Christianity'. In both instances, A vramov equates the US establishment and the 
Trilateral Commission with the Jewish community, thus attributing to Jews a key role in the 
anti-Serbian conspiracy. In doing so she was once again drawing upon the antisemitic 
heritage of the conspiracy tradition. 
Finally, Avramov's book contains numerous other, less direct allusions to the Jewish nature 
of the alleged conspiracy. For example, in the conclusion to the book, when referring to the 
'chain' of conspiracies, Avramov alleges that behind the contemporary world elite conspiracy 
lies 'transnational capital'. She goes on to suggest that the: 
'The main exponents of the 'new' social engineering are the transnational European and 
American banking houses, the same ones which financed the Bolshevik revolution in Russia, at 
the end of the First World War.' (Avramov, 1998; p.l37) 
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In Chapter 2 it was noted that the alleged involvement of Western banking families in the 
financing of the Russian revolution originates from one of the best known antisemitic 
conspiratorial myths of the 1920s, disseminated at the time by White Russian emigres 
(Poliakov, 1987; Billig, 1978). Although Avramov on this occasion does not directly 
implicate Jews, by reproducing this myth, she effectively perpetuates a notable aspect of the 
antisemitic ideological tradition. Something similar applies to the revelation made in the 
introduction to The Trilateral about the life of Karl Marx. A vramov suggests, in a very 
matter-of-fact way, that Marx, 'who learnt a lot from [the founder of the llluminati] 
Weishaupt' (p.13) was a member of a Satanic cult, which affected his political writing. The 
allusion to a connection between Marx, the llluminati and Satanic influences, all in the 
context of a conspiratorial explanation, is once again a pattern characteristic of antisemitic 
conspiracist culture exemplified by the writings ofRatibor Durdevic. 
The presence of antisemitic themes in accounts belonging to the world elite conspiracy theory 
suggests that while apparently distancing itself from the antisemitic tradition of the Protocols 
of the Learned Elders of Zion, and portraying itself as a reasonable explanation of 
international relations, this type of explanation is at the same time a continuation and 
refinement of the same conspiratorial ideological tradition. 
7 .5. Emergence of antisemitic tradition in Politika 
Avramov's work illustrates how the Bilderberg-type conspiracy theory can make reference to 
the older antisemitic tradition, while not seeming, at first sight, to situate itself within that 
tradition. A further example of such work appeared between 4 - 6 June, 1999 in Politika, 
when the newspaper published a three-part series of articles entitled Are the creators of the 
New World Order inventing a New Age Religion?. The author, a young journalist called 
Gordana Knerevic, explored the hidden powers supposedly lying behind the 'new geo-
political map of the World'. The first article in the series, entitled Invisible clique rules the 
planet begins by outlining the basic idea shared by all the 'tireless explorers of the so-called 
conspiracy theories and interpreters of hidden symbolism in crucial world events' (Politika, 4 
June, 1999, p. 15). The 'basic idea' is the assumption that the war in Yugoslavia was part of a 
wider conspiracy: 
'Creators of New World Order leave nothing to chance. The great religious and esoteric war 
over spheres of interest and power which has been fought for years, is just the fmal crusade 
which brings us into the era of the New Age, into the new kingdom of humanism without God.' 
(ibid.) 
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The theme of hidden manipulators is then elaborated. Knezevic writes that 
'visible world politicians, such as Tony Blair, Robin Cook, Madeline Albright, even Bill 
Clinton are just proteges, toys. Behind the idea of the New World Order lies capital, which, it is 
thought, is in the hands of the most powerful world bankers, who spread their tentacles, power 
and influence via a hierarchical web of public and secret organisations'. (ibid.) 
The series of articles outlines the familiar themes of world elite conspiracy theory. The group 
of seven most developed countries (G-7), the Trilateral Commission, the Council on Foreign 
Relations and the Bilderberg group are some of the institutions which are said to belong to the 
myriad of 'public and secret organisations' implicated in the conspiracy. Significantly, the 
author also includes the TI!uminati in this list. In the second article in the series (Who is who in 
the anti-Christian conspiracy) Knezevic links the ideology and aspirations of the Council on 
Foreign Relations, the Bilderberg Group and the Trilateral Commission to the ideal of a New 
World Order, 'developed as long ago as the 18th century, within the circles of the secret 
organisation of the 'illuminated' (the TI!uminati), a heretical Christian sect, with strong 
elements of mysticism' (Politika, 5 June 1999, p.12). The source cited to support this claim is 
the Yugoslav Army publication Vojska which, 'in a series of articles published in 1994, 
claimed, with certainty, that the number of 'llluminati' in Yugoslavia suddenly increased 
prior to the beginning of the war in 1991' (ibid.) 
From the TI!uminati to the wilder reaches of conspiracy theory is a short step. Knezevic 
describes the organisation cited as the most important and the most secret of all conspiratorial 
forces: the Committee of 300, 'a gigantic, oligarchic supra-national octopus with a grip on the 
whole planet', whose members are also known as the 'Olympians' (Invisible clique rules the 
planet). The Committee is seen as the highest ruling body of the New World Order, consisting 
of 'ancient oligarchic families from Venice, Europe's Black nobility, the British Royal 
family, representatives of Wall Street's largest financial institutions and liberal politicians 
from the East Coast of the US' (Who is who in the anti-Christian conspiracy). At the head of 
this supreme ruling body is 'David Rockefeller (who holds the title of the Emperor of 
Davidian stock) and 12 of the world's most powerful fmancial moguls' (Invisible clique rules 
the planet). 
The reference to David Rockefeller is not an unusual occurrence in the context of classical 
conspiracy theory. The Rockefellers are in reality a Protestant family and some conspiracy 
theorists, wishing to distance themselves from the charge of antisemitism, sometimes make a 
point of emphasising their non-Jewish origin (e.g. Alien in None dare call it conspiracy). 
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Nevertheless, the antisemitic tradition of the conspiracy theory, which seeks to link all 
powerful financial forces into a Jewish network, have often 'Judaised' the Rockefellers. This 
is certainly the case amongst Yugoslav antisemitic conspiracy theorists. For example, in one 
of his books, Durdevic claims that 'Rockefellers are Portuguese Jews - and only a few 
Americans are aware of this' (Durdevic, 1996). 
The description of Rockefeller in the Politika article as an 'Emperor of Davidian stock' is 
revealing. The term 'Emperor' suggests something more than merely a financial mogul - an 
Emperor possesses supreme political power. As a further illustration of Rockefeller's 
authority, Knezevic describes the Trilateral Commission, the Bilderberg group and the 
Council on Foreign Relations as 'Rockefeller's agencies' (Invisible clique rules the planet, 
Politika, 4 June, 1999, p.IS). However, it is the term 'Davidian' which is particularly 
interesting. It is a code-word referring to the Jewish aspect of the alleged conspiracy. To have 
used 'Jewish' would have run the risk of introducing the key theme too blatantly. Many of 
Politika's readers might then have dismissed the piece as antisemitic. Instead a code-word is 
used whose significance might pass unnoticed by the majority of the readers of Politika. What 
matters is not whether the readers recognised what was being asserted but that the writer used 
an unusual term whose rhetoric suggests a tactic of partial concealment. Knowledgeable 
readers - especially sympathisers well-versed in the conspiracy theory and its rhetoric -
would recognise the code word. Moreover, they would pick up a further reference. The choice 
of the number of Emperor Rockefeller's 'deputies' was not haphazard. The writer mentions 
the '12 financial moguls' who work with Rockefeller. Those versed in the Protocols of the 
Learned Elders ofZion would recognise a thematic link with the twelve Jewish Elders of that 
conspiracy. In this way, the most notorious themes of the conspiracy tradition are signified. 
It is noteworthy that Knezevic did not present the views in the articles specifically as her 
own.6 She claimed to be reproducing the opinions of various 'experts', such as Pavle Matic, 
editor of a fringe quasi-religious and mystical publication Nostradamus, and Spasoje Vlajic, 
author of a number of volumes in the field of pseudo-science and para-psychology. In doing 
so, Knezevic was effectively distancing herself from the views that she was reporting. Also, 
she qualified some claims with clauses such as 'it is alleged' or 'they say'. Significantly, such 
distancing is limited within the context of the article. The main thrust of the argument is to 
suggest that there might be something in such a view - they are not to be dismissed as 
fanciful. Thus, the author claims that one does not have to be either 'paranoid' or a 'fanatic 
for hidden symbolism' in order to see 'the contours of the new kingdom which erases all 
national and religious sovereignties which stand in its way' (Invisible clique rules the planet). 
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Knezevic also made a reference to the 'esoteric war', and gave constant allusions to number 
666 which is seen as underlying the whole New World Order (see below). In such references 
there was no distancing. 
The reference to 'paranoia' and 'fanaticism' in KnezeviC's article is worthy of note because it 
reveals an orientation towards the popular conception of conspiracy theory as a feature of 
psycho-pathology, political extremism or quirkiness. Similarly, Pavle Matic, editor of the 
Nostradamus magazine, is quoted in the articles in Politika as saying that his idea of the 
'great esoteric war' 'might seem ridiculous at first' (Invisible clique rules the planet). Yet in 
both cases, the recognition of the potentially questionable nature of the conspiratorial 
explanation is not used to undermine it. On the contrary, it is used to argue that the belief in 
conspiracy theory is a normal and rational way of interpreting reality. The fact that the idea of 
an esoteric war might seem ridiculous 'at first' implies that, as one becomes better acquainted 
with what Matic refers to as 'the magic of esoterica', the mystical and quasi-religious 
conspiracy theory might prove to be credible and reasonable. Similarly, Knezevic invokes 
'paranoia' and 'fanaticism' in order to dismiss these accusations and argue that the views of 
the 'tireless explorers' should be taken seriously. 
The fact that Knezevic explicitly presents Vlajic and Matic as experts is also significant. She 
describes them as 'tireless explorers of so-called conspiracy theories and interpreters of 
hidden symbols in crucial world events' (Invisible clique rules the planet) As important as 
what Knezevic says is what she omits. She provides no word of warning to readers that the 
'tireless explorers' might belong to the discredited fringes of politics (see below). Quite the 
reverse, she presents her sources as credible figures. 
Another interesting feature of Knezevic's three articles is their mystical element, including 
numerology. For example, Francois Mitterand is revealed to be the first of the 'Seven bald-
headed rulers of the world' whose arrival was prophesised by Nostradamus, while 'G-7', the 
group of seven most developed world countries are linked to the 'Greghors', the fallen angels 
who rebelled against God (Invisible clique rules the planet). Also, in KnezeviC's article the 
presence of the number 666 in the barcode of the Shengen Visa is cited as significant in the 
context of the conspiracy (Men with the seal of the Beast, Politika, 6 June, 1999, p.IS). Since 
the 1980s, allegations concerning the Satanic nature of the barcodes have been a regular 
occurrence in literature propagated by the Christian Right in the US (Pipes, 1998). 
Interestingly, Pipes traced the roots of this curious claim to early 20th Century antisemitic 
literature which saw in (Jewish-owned) big business the representatives of Satan. Sergei 
Nilus, the first publisher of Protocols of the Elders of Zion is said to have developed a 
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'system' for detecting satanic messages in commercial trademarks (Pipes, 1998; p.231, n31). 
The overall mystical-religious aspect of the articles in Politika places the conspiracy theory 
articulated by Knezevic closer to Durdevic's work than to the more 'rational' style of 
Avramov's Trilateral. 
Something similar can be said of the portrayal of the conspiracy as having an anti-Christian 
and Satanic character. The titles of the articles set the scene: Who is who in the anti-Christian 
conspiracy (Politika, 5 June, 1999) and Men with the seal of the Beast (Politika, 6 June, 1999) 
The destruction of Christianity is seen as the ultimate aim of the conspiracy. For example, 
Spasoje Vlajic an 'expert in the field of parapsychology' is quoted in the final article: 
'The web of dark symbols from the planners in the shadows and their demonic influence are 
banging over the whole of humanity, threatening to poison it materially, mentally and 
spiritually, and code it in accordance with the requirements of the new Empire which threatens 
to replace the two thousand-year-old Christian civilisation.' (Men with the seal of the Beast, 
Politika, 6 June, 1999, 15) 
Reference to the Satanic and anti-Christian aspects of the alleged plot are a common feature 
of extreme Orthodox antisemitic writings in Serbia, where the terms 'Satanic' and 'Judaic' 
are integrally linked. This is certainly the case in Durdevic's books, as well as in some of 
Velimirovic's antisemitic writing. For instance, in Words to the Serbian People Through the 
Dungeon Window V elimirovic portrayed Jews as the representatives of Satan: 
'[Jews] had risen against Christ, and had trodden on Him and killed him ... Blinded by Satan just 
like Judas, they did not see God in Christ. Inspired by the stinking breath of Satan, they tried 
and killed Christ. And on top of everything, they proved to be worse enemies of God than the 
godless Pilate ... The Devil taught them how to rise against the Son of God, Jesus Christ. The 
Devil taught them throughout all the centuries up until today how to fight against the sons of 
Christ, the children of light, the followers of the Gospels and eternal life.' (Velimirovic, 1998, p. 
193) 
As was noted in Chapter 3, Velimirovic's teachings provided an ideological basis for a 
number of antisemitic conspiracy theorists, including Durdevic. Although Knezevic's articles 
contain no explicit antisemitic references comparable to those found in the writings of 
Velimirovic or Durdevic, the constant emphasis on the Satanic and anti-Christian nature of 
the conspiracy provides a thematic link with the antisemitic tradition of Serbian ultra-
Orthodoxy. For instance, as has already been noted, Knezevic's article Men with the seal of 
the Beast quotes 'Professor' Spasoje Vlajic. While quotations in Politika contained no 
outwardly antisemitic references, in other writings Vlajic directly implicates Jews in the anti-
Christian conspiracy. VlajiC's writing will be examined in greater detail in the next chapter so 
only a single example will be considered at this point. In a recent interview in Duga, Vlajic 
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expands on the idea of Satanic influence in Western culture and ponders on its manifestation 
in the development of the Internet: 
'The code for entering the interne! is WWW. According to the numerical coding of the Jewish 
alphabet, WWW corresponds to 666. One should also bear in mind that computer technology 
was invented and developed by the military industry with the aim of mastering our lives.' 
(Tesla 's secret in the service of the people, Duga, April, 1999, p.39) 
The numerical symbol of the Devil, the presence of which was mentioned and elaborated 
upon in Politika, was on this occasion explicitly linked with Jewish culture. Consequently, 
although Knezevic's articles do not explicitly mention the role of the Jews in the Satanic, 
anti-Christian conspiracy, they nonetheless lead the reader on a sort of 'paper-chase' towards 
the kind of antisemitism that cannot be directly expressed in a mainstream daily newspaper. 
The same applies to the treatment of Pavle Matic, the editor of the magazine Nostradamus as 
a respectable authority on 'hidden symbolism in world affairs'. Although Matic does not 
invoke any overtly antisemitic themes in his contribution to Knezevic's articles, the reader is 
directed to Nostradamus, a fringe publication known for propagating antisemitic conspiracy 
theories (Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia Report on Antisemitism, 2001; 
Colovic, 1999). 
7 .6. Antisemitism and the Serbian Orthodox Church 
So far the conspiracy tradition has been shown to have appeared in the mainstream Yugoslav 
press during the war with NATO. Despite coded references to the antisemitic elements of this 
tradition, a boundary was still maintained. A notoriously antisemitic writer such as Durdevic 
was not given space, at least not in Politika. However, Durdevic can be seen to have benefited 
from a general widening of the boundaries. He was able to publish openly in Pravoslavlje, the 
official publication of the Serbian Orthodox Church. The issue of July 1999 featured his 
article Serbs in Europe-Yes, Europe in Serbs-God forbid. In the article, Durdevic offered a 
conspiratorial explanation of the Western intervention in Kosovo, as well as depicting the 
overall 'moral and spiritual pathology' of Western civilisation: 
'Satanic Forces - conspiratorial, political, cultural, liberal, leftist - these forces gained the upper 
hand over healthy, spiritual, Christian traditions. They lead towards the New World Order 
which is in fact disorder and decay inspired by Satan.' (Pravoslavlje, no. 775; July, 1999) 
On this occasion, Durdevic's habitual crude and explicit antisemitism was carefully concealed 
and he made no reference to Jews. Reasons for moderation in DurdeviC' s article can probably 
be sought in the fact that explicit antisemitism would not have been tolerated by the editors 
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and readers of Pravoslavlje, nor by the Orthodox mainstream in general. However, in the 
article Durdevic linked the values of Western civilisation (materialism, liberalism, secularism, 
etc.) to Satan. This reflected a theme prominent both in Durdevic's overtly antisemitic 
writings and in the anti-Jewish aspects of the teachings ofNikolaj Velimirovic, who refers to 
Europe as 'Death, eternal Death' (Velimirovic, 1998; p.182), to science, industry, politics and 
individualism as 'four walls of the new tower ofBabel' (p.l90), and argues that: 
'All modem European ideas were invented by Jews, who crucified Christ: democracy, and 
strikes, and socialism, and atheism, and religious tolerance, and pacifism, and global revolution, 
and capitalism, and communism All of them are the inventions of Jews, or rather their father, 
the Devil.' (Ibid. p.l94) 
Consequently, even if unequivocal reference to Jewish involvement in the conspiracy is 
missing from Durdevic's article, the inferred connection between Satanic forces, the 
development of Western civilisation, and an anti-Christian conspiracy, constitutes a legacy of 
the semantic link between Satanism and Judaism inherent in classical conspiratorial 
discourse. Similarly, by providing Durdevic with column space, the editors of Pravoslavlje 
offered one of Serbia's most notorious antisemites the opportunity to promote his ideas and to 
continue the ideological tradition of the Orthodox Christian Right. Moreover, in the article, 
Durdevic explicitly directs the reader to his books War against Christ in America, 
Contemporary Faces of Satan and Christian Fort under Siege, where conspiratorial 
antisemitism is openly propagated. 
7.7. Psychological or ideological problematic: reactions to the emergence of 
antisemitism in Politika 
The emergence of antisemitic conspiratorial themes in Politika in June 1999 passed virtually 
unnoticed by the usually perceptive liberal public opinion. The only known reaction at the 
time came from the sociologist !van Colovic, who commented on KneZevic's articles in his 
column in the independent daily newspaper Danas. Colovic argued that what made these texts 
worthy of critical attention and scrutiny was the fact that until then, classical conspiracy 
theory, with its antisemitic, quasi-religious and Satanic themes, was virtually absent from 
Serbia's mainstream press. He went on to interpret KnezeviC's articles as a 'warning that the 
environment in which such stories breed is in chaos' and predicted that when: 
'reasons for chaos are not being sought where they might logically be found, but are sought, in a 
manner of the centuries old tradition of antisemitism, desperately, somewhere else, in the wrong 
place, [that place] is then struck by waves of hate and crime' (Colovic, Rockefel/er and the 
Seven Baldies, Danas, 7 June, 1999) 
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Six months after the publication of ColoviC's comments, in an interview with the 
Montenegrin daily Pobjeda (Victory), Serbian-Jewish author Filip David also reflected on the 
appearance of antisemitic themes in the mainstream press. Like Colovic, David interpreted 
the emerging antisemitism as a sign that Serbian social and political contexts have become 
'abnormal'. He proceeded to explain the dynamic behind this development: 
'Once other enemies- Croats, Muslims, Albanians- had been used up, the only one left was one 
that can never be used up, one that was used by many regimes, in different ages and various 
situations ... in the stories of an external conspiracy there is that final, insipid and poisonous 
stereotype: Jews rule the world. And I would like to say clearly: these racist and persecutory 
messages are not transmitted by people on the streets, by those we call the ordinary people, but 
by the influential part of the intellectual elite and media controlled by the ruling parties' (New 
stories about world conspiracies, Pobjeda, 13"' January, 2000) 
Both David's and Colovic's comments were published in daily newspapers, and were 
therefore never meant to provide thorough and scholarly explanations of complex phenomena 
such as conspiratorial antisemitism or ethnic prejudice. Nonetheless, it is possible to find, in 
these reactions, echoes of some of the conventional psychological explanations of 
conspiratorial beliefs examined in Chapter 4. For instance, both David and Colovic invoke the 
idea of scapegoating. Anti-Jewish prejudice is seen as resulting from the misattribution of 
blame for a social crisis. Significantly, both authors recognise the cultural specificity of 
antisemitism: Jews are seen as almost a residual category, a quintessential minority which can 
be used as a scapegoat once all other 'options' have been exhausted. 
As was noted in Chapter 4, the general framework of scapegoating cannot adequately explain 
the persistence of conspiratorial antisemitism in contemporary society. Reference to a 
universal psychological dynamic undermines the important differences which exist between 
antisemitism and other forms of ethnic prejudice. Jews are the only minority who are 
consistently accused of a global conspiracy. In the case of Yugoslavia, there are no 
comparable conspiracy theories which invoke Albanians or Croats as conspirators. Prejudice 
towards these ethnic groups is based primarily on negative feelings and stereotypes, akin to 
the kind of 'everyday racism' among the White Americans, which Blee (2002) describes in 
her work (see Chapter 4), or to what Baumann (1999) refers to as 'heterophobia'. The 
aetiological dynamic behind conspiratorial antisemitism is quite different. As the analysis in 
the present chapter suggested, anti-Jewish themes emerged from the more general belief in 
conspiracy, as a result of the antisemitic heritage of the conspiracy tradition. Consequently, 
different forms of prejudice in contemporary Serbia cannot be explained away by means of an 
all-inclusive social psychological dynamic such as scapegoating. 
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It is also interesting that David's explanation of the emergence of antisemitism in Serbia 
proposes that antisemitic conspiracy theories were disseminated deliberately, for reasons of 
propaganda, by the Serbian intellectual elite and by the state-controlled media. This seems 
like a curious claim considering that the advantages of antisemitic conspiracy theory, from the 
perspective of propaganda, are not immediately obvious. In Serbia, unlike in the Middle East 
for example, there was no Jewish dimension to the crisis, and therefore no visible political 
gain from an allegation of Jewish involvement. In fact, reference to anti-Muslim or anti-
Catholic themes would have been politically more pertinent considering the religious 
affiliation of Serbia's 'enemies', namely Bosnian Muslims, Albanians and Croats. And yet, as 
the present thesis repeatedly suggests, the heart of the conspiracy has been consistently 
located in the West, often implicating organisations which feature prominently in 
conspiratorial literature worldwide, namely the Bilderberg group, the Trilateral Commission 
and the Council on Foreign Relations. The suggestion that 'racist and persecutory' claims 
about Jews were 'used' or encouraged, for political reasons, by the Serbian regime is too 
simplistic. While there is no doubt that the Serbian regime and its media promoted the idea of 
a conspiracy, they did not consciously or deliberately implicate the Jews. Antisemitic themes 
emerged inadvertently, as the legacy of the conspiratorial culture. 
The present chapter has examined in greater detail the dynamic responsible for the emergence 
of antisemitic themes in Serbian media. It has been suggested that conspiratorial explanations 
which focus on various world elite organisations are neither historically nor ideologically 
isolated. Instead, they belong to the established cultural tradition of conspiracy theory, which 
in the past - from mid-nineteenth century, up until the end of Second World War - was 
donrinated by the notion of a Jewish plot to rule the world. Antisenritism became firmly 
embedded in the conspiratorial culture and remains a continuing aspect of its ideological 
heritage. This is especially so considering that the wfferentiation between world elite and 
classical conspiracy theory is incomplete, so even the 'reasonable' versions of conspiratorial 
explanations often include subtle references to the other less acceptable aspects of the 
conspiracy tradition. Consequently, the proliferation even of outwardly innocuous versions of 
conspiratorial discourse (e.g. the Bilderberg-type conspiracy), brought into the open the 
darker, antisemitic aspects of the conspiracy tradition. 
Furthermore, this dynamic was facilitated by the fact that the dissemination of the more 
'reasonable' versions of conspiratorial discourse (e.g. protoconspiracy theories or A vramov-
style world elite conspiracy theory) led to a wider acceptance of the overall interpretative 
framework based on the notion of hidden forces and motives in politics. Once this idea 
achieved the status of common sense, the more extreme and prejudicial versions of 
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conspiracy theory such as those promoted by Durdevic and the Orthodox Right, became 
perceived as more credible. Classical conspiracy theory loses a lot of the unreasonableness 
usually associated with it, if one accepts the notion that world events are, and always have 
been, the result of a conspiracy. Consequently, the more general proliferation of conspiratorial 
discourse during the war with Nato, contributed to the gradual shifting of boundaries between 
what constitutes acceptable and unacceptable explanations in a way that promoted various 
themes, previously thought to be too extreme and radical, into the realm of acceptable, albeit 
not always normative explanatory discourse. As a result of this dynamic, classical antisemitic 
conspiracy theories were allowed to appear, relatively unnoticed, in a Serbian mainstream 
newspaper such as Politika. 
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ChapterS: 
Conspiracy Theory and Paranormal Explanations 
The previous chapter examined the emergence of antisemitic conspiracy themes in the 
Serbian mainstream press at the time of the Nato bombing. This development was illustrated 
using the example of the three-part series of articles entitled Are the creators of the New 
World Order inventing a New Age Religion?, published in Politika in June 1999. However, 
the articles in question were not noteworthy solely because of the link with the antisemitic 
conspiracy tradition. The three texts by Gordana Knezevic also contained references to a 
number of esoteric and occult themes, including the symbolic significance of the number 666, 
and Nostradarnus' prophecies. In the article Men with the seal of the Beast, Kndevic even 
quoted Spasoje Vlajic as asserting that Nato's war against Yugoslavia was part of the 'first 
world parapsychological war' (Politika, 6 June, 1999, p.15). 
A number of authors have noted that, ever since the early 1990s, there has been an increased 
interest in paranormal phenomena in Serbian society (Popadic, 2000; Pavlovic, 2001). In 
Serbia today there are at least five specialist magazines which deal with paranormal 
phenomena: Zona Sumraka (Twilight Zone), Dosije X (X Files), Cudo (Miracle), Trei:e Oko 
(Third Eye) and Fenomeni (Phenomena). Importantly, none of these is distributed solely 
through networks of enthusiasts, or by mail order, but are available from newsagents 
throughout the country. The number of publications is particularly noteworthy bearing in 
mind that in Serbia newspapers and magazines are relatively expensive, so editors of most 
publications are engaged in a continuous struggle with the financial consequences of 
decreasing circulation. The fact that five magazines of the same genre are able to survive in a 
competitive media market suggests that there is a public demand for the material they 
provide. 
The increased interest in paranormal phenomena in the 1990s appears not to have been 
limited to the specialist press. Serbian mainstream press and electronic media also became 
more open to the views of various clairvoyants, fortune-tellers and astrologers, whose 
predictions and prophesies were publicised fairly regularly (Popadic, 2000, Pavlovic, 2001). 
Politika too occasionally reported the achievements of Russian parapsychologists (Pavlovic, 
2001). Significantly however, for the best part of the decade, mystical and esoteric themes 
were confined to specialist columns devoted to astrology or the world of esoterica. With 
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Knezevic's articles this was not the case. In June 1999, Nostradamus, the number of the Beast 
and the idea of parapsychological warfare were invoked in the context of a political 
explanation. 
The presence of paranormal themes in Politika, and the fact that they are invoked in a rather 
matter-of-fact way, without any critical comment, suggests that conspiracy theories may not 
be the only extraordinary type of explanation whose status in Serbian society changed at the 
time of the Nato bombing. This apparent change in the perceived acceptability of paranormal 
explanations has been noted by lvan Colovic, in the article in Danas cited in the previous 
chapter. 
'The number 666, the Mark of the Beast, has been widely discussed in local quasi-scientific and 
quasi-political literature (for example Nostradamus magazine and books by the renowned 
inventor of the "formula of light" [Spasoje Vlajic]) but I cannot recall it ever having been 
written about in [Politika] before. It seemed that our senior newspaper had not lost its level-
headedness when it came to this kind of lunacy.' (Colovic, Rockefeller and the Seven Baldies, 
Danas, 7 June 1999) 
Chapters 8 and 9 will explore fwther the proposition that, in the late 1990s, the status of 
paranormal, esoteric and mystical ideas underwent an important shift. The chapters will 
examine the dynamic which turned certain paranormal ideas, which were previously 
considered to be beyond the pale, into acceptable explanations of the war with Nato. 
The present chapter will begin by examining in more detail the explanatory logic and the 
rhetoric of one of the more widely known paranormal accounts which were disseminated in 
the Serbian media in the 1990s. The tale in question refers to the alleged activities of the so-
called Group 69, a team of enthusiasts for the supernatural, who were supposedly engaged in 
the development of a parapsychological defence system for the Serbian people. This 
particular paranormal account has been chosen for several reasons. Firstly, the principal 
exponent of Group 69 is Spasoje Vlajic, one of the 'experts' quoted in Knezevic's articles. 
Knezevic herself invoked Vlajic's connection with this group when she noted, in one of the 
articles, that Vlajic was 'an associate of the "Group 69", the former special unit of the 
Yugoslav Army for "defence against psychotronic weapons and parapsychological attacks'" 
(Men with the seal of the Beast, Politika, 6 June, 1999). Therefore, by choosing to focus on 
Group 69 the chapter will build on the argument presented in the earlier chapters. Also, Vlajic 
can be said to be a recognisable public figure and a prominent exponent of the discourse of 
the paranormal. As was suggested in the biographical details provided in Chapter 5, Vlajic 
was a frequent guest on the popular chat show Black Pearls and occasionally appeared in 
other media as well. With that in mind the story of Group 69 is probably familiar to a sizeable 
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proportion of the Serbian public, and is one of the better !mown examples of contemporary 
paranormal explanatory discourse in Serbia. 
The examination of the accounts of Group 69 will not be limited to Vlajic's work. The 
analysis will also look at the early writings of Colonel Svetozar Radi~ic, a military officer 
associated with the group, whose more recent writing will be explored in the next chapter. 
Vlajic's and Radisic's work will be used to suggest that, in Serbia, conspiracy theories and 
paranormal accounts were not competing explanatory frameworks. Rather, as is evident from 
Knezevic's articles in Politika, the two extraordinary explanations complemented each other, 
and were often blended into a single account. At the same time, the present chapter will 
suggest that, in spite of the compatibility between conspiratorial and paranormal explanations, 
in the mid-1990s the two did not occupy the same status in the Serbian ideological milieu. 
Tlris will be illustrated by the example of military publications. While the basic thesis of 
conspiracy penetrated mainstream military journals, mystical and occult themes were 
noticeably absent. In other words, while conspiracy theory was gradually becoming a 
tolerable (and tolerated) explanatory discourse, paranormal explanations were, at that time, 
still considered to be beyond the boundaries of acceptable opinion. Tlris particular argument 
will set the scene for the following chapter, which examines the convergence, in terms of 
public standing and presence in the media, between conspiracy theory and paranormal 
explanations around the time of the Nato bombing. 
8.1. Who has the secret weapon?- 'pipe dream' rumours in time of war 
In Chapter 4, it was suggested that there is a notable overlap between the phenomena of 
rumour, conspiracy theories and paranormal beliefs. Conspiracy theories and tales about 
paranormal events often take the form of rumours and are disseminated by channels 
traditionally associated with rumourmongering. Also, all three phenomena tend to emerge out 
of the same social conditions. They proliferate in times of crisis and uncertainty, especially in 
response to the breakdown of alternative explanations. 
Traditional research on rumour has paid particular attention to rumourmongering in times of 
war (Allport and Postman, 1947; Rosnow, 1974; Knapp, 1944; Nkpa, 1975, 1977). This is not 
surprising considering that wars are a typical example of the kind of traumatic conditions 
thought to be conducive to the development of rumour. Also, rumours are generally 
considered to be detrimental to the war effort and the morale of the population, so 
psychologists have been especially encouraged to focus on this aspect of the phenomenon. 
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One particular type of rumour which has been shown to appear in times of war concerns the 
alleged existence of some secret and powerful weapon (Nkpa, 1977). Most frequently, these 
rumours contend that the enemy has come into possession of some unusual means of waging 
war. Such allegations fall within the category of 'bogey' or 'fear' rumour (Knapp, 1944), in 
that they reflect the fears and the anxieties of the population. Neubauer (1999) cites the 
example of one such rumour, popular among Russian soldiers after the First World War. 
According to this rumour, the English had trained a herd of monkeys in the skills of military 
warfare. These monkeys were thought to be superior to ordinary soldiers because 'monkeys 
are immune to propaganda' and were therefore capable of defeating the otherwise invincible 
Bolsheviks (Neubauer, 1999; p.92-93). Similarly, during the Nigerian civil war (1967-1970), 
residents ofBiafra believed that the Nigerian army had developed a weapon which caused the 
death of unborn babies. Some rumours even alleged that the Nigerian army employed witches 
capable of killing the babies by eating the hearts of the foetuses (Nkpa, 1977). 
Significantly, not all rumours of secret, and often supernatural weapons are 'bogey' rumours. 
Shibutani (1966) describes a rumour which swept through England in the Spring of 1915, 
where an unusual means of warfare was cited in a positive context. According to this story, in 
the battle of Mons British troops had been outflanked by the German cavalry. As German 
horsemen advanced towards the British soldiers, a row of shining white angels allegedly arose 
and stood before the enemy, allowing the British to retreat (Shibutani, 1966; p.89). In this 
case, the tale of divine intervention served as a 'pipe-dream' rumour, an often excessively 
optimistic evaluation and interpretation of events which is thought to express the relevant 
population's hopes and wishes (Knapp, 1944; Nkpa, 1975, 1977).1 
The concept of a 'pipe-dream' rumour is interesting for the present discussion, in that many 
of the ideas contained in the account of Group 69 and its activities could be interpreted as 
reflecting the hopes and wishes of the Serbian population, caught up in the tide of war. As 
will become apparent later, the principal theme which runs through the story of Group 69 and 
its pursuits is the notion that this unit was in possession of a powerful defensive weapon, 
created on the basis of secret esoteric knowledge which transcends the boundaries of 
contemporary science. However, if examined in a broader context, the story of Group 69 does 
not appear to be a straightforward 'pipe-dream' rumour. As Vlajic's contribution to 
Knezevic's articles suggests, the optimistic account of the Group 69's endeavour is embedded 
in a much darker story about a sinister and threatening Satanic conspiracy. As such, the 
account of Group 69 is simultaneously a bogey and a pipe-dream rumour. Nkpa (1975) refers 
to this type of hearsay as 'neo-pipe-drearn' rumour. In this type of story, 'bogey' and 'pip-
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dream' rumours are fused together but in a way that allows the 'pipe-dream' component to 
neutralise the 'bogey' aspect of the tale. 
Importantly, the alleged activities of Group 69 were not the only instance of secret weapon 
rumour in Serbia in the 1990s. Shortly before the 'existence' of Group 69 was revealed to the 
public, the story about a powerful electronic device, said to have been developed by the 
Russians, began to spread across Serbia. The 'rumour' in question did not emerge 
spontaneously, but was started by the Russian nationalist politician Vladimir Zhirinovsky 
during a visit to Yugoslavia in early 1994 (Frazer and Lancelle, 1994). Interestingly, the 
rumour about Zhirinovsky' s lethal device, and allegations concerning the existence of Group 
69 were not unconnected events. As will become apparent, the existence of Group 69 was 
first revealed to the public in response to 'rumours' about the Russian electronic weapon. 
8.2. Prelude to the revelations about Group 69: Vladimir Zbirinovsky and 'elipton' 
During a brief visit to Serbia and Montenegro, in February 1994, Vladimir Zhirinovsky, 
leader of the far-right Russian Liberal Democratic Party and a known antisemitic conspiracy 
theorist (Frazer and Lancelle, 1994) made a somewhat unusual disclosure. At a press 
conference held in the Montenegrin capital Podgorica, Zhirinovsky revealed that he is in 
possession of a 'new weapon' which could 'save the Slavic world and help the Serbs defend 
themselves from the terrorist West' (Zhirinovsky from our street, Vreme, 7 February, 1994). 
He explained that: 
'Nobody in the world has such a powerful weapon. We are talking about an electronic-laser 
weapon which can be used from the ground or from the air. It leaves nothing alive, but after its 
use there is no radiation or consequences like after an atom bomb. It is in fact an ecological 
weapon which we won't use unless we have to' (ibid.) 
Zhirinovsky went on to argue that the weapon, 'elipton' would be tested, by Russian officers 
'loyal to him', on a 'small area near [the Bosnian town of] Brcko', but that the tests would be 
sufficiently convincing to 'cool the heads of Western politicians' (ibid.). 
While Serbia's independent media, such as the magazine Vreme, mocked Zhirinovsky's 
claims regarding 'elipton' (e.g. Zhirinovsky from our street, 7 February, 1994; Elipton in a 
potty, 21 February, 1994), pro-regime newspapers treated Zhirinovsky's contribution to the 
Serbian struggle against the 'terrorist West' with greater respect. Although Zhirinovsky's visit 
itself was largely ignored by the pro-regime media (because of Zhirinovsky's association with 
the then much maligned leader of the Radical Party, Vojislav Seselj), revelations regarding 
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'elipton' received some coverage. For example, Politika accurately reported a press 
conference organised, at the time of Zhirinovsky' s visit, by the Party of Serbian Unity (PSU), 
a marginal right-wing political party founded by the paramilitary leader Zeljko Ra:Znjatovic 
Arkan. Present at the press conference, besides Arkan, was Alexei Vidnyenkin, deputy leader 
of Zhirinovsky's Liberal Democratic party. The principal topic of the conference was 
'elipton'. Vidnyenkin explained, and Politika reported, that 'the weapon is based on the 
integration of protons and neutrons at high temperature'. Zhirinovsky supposedly gave the 
'elipton' to Arkan 'who will activate it should great powers decide to bomb [Bosnian Serb] 
cities'. Arkan and his Russian visitor also revealed that the 'elipton' was designed in 'a secret 
lab, by a Russian professor and his three associates' (Politika, 5 February, 1994; p.ll). Four 
days later, Politika dedicated a few inches of column space to another press conference 
organised by the Party of Serbian Unity, where it was revealed that 'elipton' would be 
produced in the Serbian town of Sabac, by a company owned by the local PSU official, 
Tornislav Sirnic (Politika, 9 February, 1994, p. 9). 
Importantly, neither of the two articles in Politika contained any scepticism regarding the 
claims made at these conferences, and did not approach the issue with the sort of irony which 
was in abundance in opposition media. The articles merely reported what Arkan and 
Vidnyenkin told the press. Several weeks later however, Politika explored the topic of secret 
weaponry within its science section. The article Is there a Russian secret weapon? Canon 
with neutron particles (Politika, 20 February 1994 p.l3), written by Stanko Stoiljkovic, 
attempted to examine, in more general terms, the possibilities of electronic warfare. The 
analysis was based on a book Scientific/technical programme and warfare written by a former 
Yugoslav Army officer, Dr Zlatko Rendulic. Stoiljkovic's article expressed some doubt 
regarding the applicability of electronic warfare. It suggested that these weapons were 
initially designed to work in space, and as such could not be easily adapted to 'atmospheric 
conditions'. However, the examination of the topic ended with the question 'What is 
happening now?'. The question was left unanswered, thus leaving open the possibility that 
Russian scientists may have overcome the problems encountered by other researchers and 
indeed managed to build this sophisticated type of weapon. 
The credibility of the claim regarding the power of' elipton' suffered a serious blow just a few 
weeks after Zhirinovsky first publicised the existence of the weapon. In late February, Vreme 
revealed that, Elektron, the company from Sabac which was supposed to manufacture the 
newly acquired electronic weapon, in fact produces children's potties which play a tune 'once 
liquid comes into contact with the inner surface of the potty' (Elipton in a potty, Vreme, 21 
February, 1994; p, 27). In addition, the author of the article claimed that relevant state 
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authorities considered the allegation about 'elipton' to be 'the pinnacle of stupidity' and 
would not even investigate whether a private company from Sabac was capable of producing 
'the most powerful laser weapon' in the world. 
8.3. 'Yugoslav army's best kept secret' is revealed to the public 
Shortly after Vladimir Zhirinovsky first revealed the existence of the 'elipton', the fortnightly 
magazine Duga published an article which attempted to 'shed some light on the field that 
links science and esoterica', assumed to be responsible for the development of the Russian 
electronic weapon. The author of the article, Svetozar Radisic, presented the arguments as a 
way of 'setting the record straight' by providing an informed analysis of the 'application of 
esoteric knowledge by the [Yugoslav] military'. (Anticipating cramp in Glint on's face, Duga, 
No. 521, 19 February 1994, p.S4-56). Radisic's article was followed by a further two pieces 
which were published in Duga over the period of two months (Involuntary suicide of Turgut 
Ozal, Duga, No. 522, 5 March, 1994, p 6-8; No More Secrets, Duga, No. 524, 2 April, 1994, 
p. 8-9).2 Like the ftrst article in the series, the sequels dealt with the topic of 
parapsychological warfare and identified a military unit, Group 69, as playing a key role in 
the maintenance of Serbia's parapsychological defence system. The unit was introduced as 
the 'Yugoslav Army's best kept secret'. 
Revelations concerning the existence of Group 69 were presented as based on conversations 
with anonymous military officials who belonged to this mysterious group. The ftrst article 
mentioned, as the main source, a 'surprisingly helpful officer' eager to discuss the topic of 
'esoterica in the military' (Anticipating cramp in Clinton 's face). In a later article Radisic 
revealed that the officer in question was a 'magically helpful colonel' and presented a further 
source, a 'second lieutenant, who is known within the group as Zombi, because he often 
directed the conversation towards the topic of "zombing" and the "Western PSI-virus'" (No 
more secrets). All three articles were presented as if they had been written by a dispassionate 
observer and outsider to the group. The majority of the readership of Duga probably assumed 
that Svetozar Radisic was an ordinary reporter doing a bit of investigative journalism. 
What the articles failed to reveal is that Radisic was in fact an active military officer (at that 
time a second lieutenant), and editor-in-chief of the prestigious military journal Vojno Delo. 
More importantly, he was also one of the founding members of Group 69. 
The reasons behind the concealment of Radisic's credentials in Duga are manifold. Firstly, 
Yugoslav army regulations prevented officers from disclosing their military status when 
presenting an unofficial position in the national press. According to Ljubodrag Stojadinovic, 
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former Chief of the Army Information Bureau, and RadisiC's superior officer at the time of 
the publication of the articles in Duga, before 1995 (when tighter regulations were 
introduced) army personnel were allowed to communicate with the media without the 
authorisation of the Information Bureau. However, they could only do so 'as citizens', and 
therefore without disclosing their rank. 3 
There is another possible reason for the absence of information regarding Radisic's military 
background. One of the motifs which runs throughout the three articles is the idea that Group 
69 was veiled in secrecy. Radisic's collocutors are referred to by means of nicknames or 
initials, and their work is said to be 'concealed in safes with "seven locks"' (No more secrets). 
The whole subject of parapsychological warfare is regarded as one that 'cannot be accessed 
without a "special permit"' (Anticipating cramp in Glint on's face). The element of mystery 
surrounding the group would have been severely undermined if it had been made obvious that 
the revelations came from an active officer and one of the group's more prominent members. 
In other words, if the group indeed was the 'Yugoslav Army's best kept secret' why would a 
relatively high ranking officer disclose its existence and describe its operation in a magazine 
like Duga? 
At the same time, it is interesting that Radisic chose not use a pseudonym, which is a common 
practice in the Yugoslav press when some disclosure is seen as sufficiently sensitive or 
controversial to warrant anonymity. It is possible that Radisic did not particularly wish to 
dissociate himself from the claims made in the articles, or to conceal his identity entirely. In 
some ways, this reveals the use of the tactic of partial concealment. For the majority of 
Duga's readers Radisic's identity would remain obscure, and his relative anonymity would 
reinforce the mystery surrounding the group. At the same time, for a small proportion of the 
readership who might be aware of Radisic's military status, or for those who share his 
fascination with the paranormal, his association with the military establishment would give 
the claims about Group 69 additional rhetorical force. This is apparent in the way in which 
Radisic's rank, which was initially concealed, becomes invoked in subsequent literature on 
Group 69. For example, in the book The First World Parapsychological War, Spasoje Vlajic 
suggests that parapsychological warfare was taboo 'until Colonel S. Radisic revealed in the 
Belgrade magazine Duga that the previously unknown Group 69, in charge of defence from 
psychotronic weapons and parapsychological attacks, operates under the auspices of 
Yugoslav Army joint Chief of staff' ( Vlajic, 1998; p.6).4 In this case Radisic's rank is cited 
in support of the claim regarding the existence of Group 69. After all, the disclosure of 
institutional secrets generally tends to be regarded as more believable when made by insiders. 
Vlajic acknowledges this later in the same book when he suggests that Radisic' s rank of 
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colonel and position within the military (as the chief editor of Vojno Delo) make his 
testimony particularly credible as it originates 'from the very sources of objective 
information' (p.31). 1n that way, Radisic's revelations about Group 69 have subsequently 
acquired, in certain circles, the kind of institutional authority which was absent from the 
articles themselves. 
Radisic's revelations in Duga constitute the first mention of Group 69 in the Serbian national 
press. Most of the ideas outlined in the articles were subsequently elaborated by Spasoje 
Vlajic, in the above mentioned book The First World Parapsychological War, published in 
1998.5 1n fact, there is not a single aspect of the activity of Group 69 which Radisic explores 
in his articles, which is not discussed in greater detail in Vlajic's books. Because of the 
similarities between Radisic's and Vlajic's accounts, the conceptualisation and the public 
image of Group 69 can be said to be the product of the intellectually fruitful (albeit possibly 
informal) co-operation between the group's two principal promoters. For that reason in 
subsequent sections, which deal in more detail with the accounts of Group 69, the work of 
Vlajic and Radisic will be examined as belonging to a single explanatory framework. The 
analysis will focus mainly on Vlajic's more detailed and elaborate writing, as well as on two 
recorded conversations with Vlajic which took place in December 2000. Further extracts from 
the transcripts of the recorded conversations with Vlajic are provided in Appendix A. Both 
Vlajic's and Radisic's biographical details have been outlined in Chapter 5. 
8.4. The structure and membership of Group 69 
Information about Group 69 and its activities does not come solely from Radisic and Vlajic. 
Evidence that an assembly of enthusiasts for the paranormal actually existed, and met on a 
regular basis in the Yugoslav Army headquarters, comes from Ljubodrag Stojadinovic, chief 
of the Yugoslav Army Information Bureau from 1993 to 1995. Since his expulsion from the 
army in 1995, Stojadinovic has been writing on defence-related matters in the independent 
press and news media.• 1n 1997, the glossy current affairs magazine Profil published an 
extract from Stojadinovic's as yet unpublished memoirs, which revealed some interesting 
facts regarding Group 69 (American jets were shot down without missiles, Profil, No.13, 
1997). Since then, Stojadinovic has written about the group in a number of other publications, 
including Veciti Fenomeni (Eternal Phenomena), Glas Javnosti, Argument and others. 
1n contrast to Vlajic's and RadisiC's account of the 'Yugoslav army's best kept secret' 
Stojadinovic is not sympathetic towards the alleged aims of Group 69. He regards the 
existence of a 'parapsychological unit' as convincing evidence of the absurd situation in 
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which the Yugoslav army found itself in the 1990s. In his writing, Stojadinovic recounts how, 
in January 1994, he was approached by Colonel Bogi Stojmenovic (possibly the 'magically 
helpful colonel' mentioned in Radisic' s article), an inconspicuous 'old man' troubled by 
numerous 'tics', who revealed to him the existence of a group of officers interested in the 
'paranormal'. The group allegedly included Stojmenovic, Svetozar Radisic, and Simeon 
Sa vie, a former sergeant who was forced to retire in 1991 on grounds of 'emotional 
immaturity'. The three officers met regularly with other 'experts' including the Serbian 
painter and nationalist Milic od Macve, Serbia's most famous astrologer and clairvoyant 
Milja Vujanovic-Regulus, and Spasoje Vlajic. According to Stojadinovic, the six constituted 
the core of Group 69. 
The structure of the group outlined by Stojadinovic largely matches that which can be found 
in the works ofV!ajic and Radisic. However, the names of the individuals involved are absent 
from the latter accounts. In The First World Parapsychological War, Vlajic suggested that the 
group consisted of 'high ranking officers of the VJ' who were primarily interested in the 
'consequences of the application of different types of electromagnetic radiation on brain 
waves', and who adhered in their research to 'scientific criteria, especially mathematical 
probability and informational entropy' (Vlajic 1998; p. 54). On the other hand, the bulk of the 
work of Group 69 was allegedly carried out by 'individuals gifted with extraordinary para-
psychological powers, eager to participate in experiments and execute specific tasks' (p.54). 
Vlajic also warned that the efforts of the group were constantly undermined by various 
'fanatics' who 'overestimated their own abilities and the power of parapsychological defence' 
as well as by 'useless charlatans', 'agents provocateurs' and 'individuals employed by foreign 
intelligence agencies' (p.55). The 'gifted individuals' are also mentioned in Radisic's articles 
in Duga, where they are describes as 'extralucid individuals whose status is equivalent to that 
of an expert in associated disciplines' (Involuntary Suicide ofTurgut Ozal). 
It is interesting that during the conversations in December 2000, Vlajic denied the 
involvement of any 'extralucid' individuals, who in his 1998 book were presented as the 
group's most active members. Instead, emphasis was placed on 'scientists' within Group 69: 
'(members of Group 69] were mainly electro-engineers, physicists and psychologists ... it was 
publicised in the press, and the former Army spokesman, who is still the spokesman (Svetozar 
Radisic] wrote that -and these are colonels who know what this is all about- the group was 
affiliated to the Yugoslav Army, it is even mentioned that it was affiliated to the Army Chief of 
Staff. Therefore discoveries are made through specialist work, by people who are experts io this 
field, electroengioeers, physicists, psychologists and probably army personnel in charge of these 
things .. .' 
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. During the second encounter Vlajic was even more explicit: 
'I have not met a single esoterist, a single astrologer, nor anyone else who comes from one of 
these, how should I say, fields which are far away from science. But I certainly did 
communicate, and in some instances co-operate, with physicists, especially electro-engineers, 
psychologists. So the stories about some clairvoyants ... who today seriously believes in 
clairvoyants?' 
This shift in emphasis could be partly attributed to the context in which the conversation with 
Vlajic was conducted. Before the first meeting, Vlajic was told that the conversation was to 
provide material for a project which 'looks at the application of heterodox (scientific) theories 
in the explanation of historical and political events' and which examines the relationship 
between Vlajic's work and 'conventional science'. Throughout the interview, Vlajic was 
eager to shun the label 'heterodox theory' (which was chosen by the author of this thesis as a 
more neutral alternative to 'pseudoscience') and attempted to present his approach as pure 
empirical endeavour (see below). The emphasis on scientists within the group, at the expense 
of 'gifted individuals with parapsychological powers', can therefore be seen as an attempt to 
manage the identity of 'real scientist'. Furthermore, the denial of the involvement of 
individuals with paranormal powers reflects a broader trend in Vlajic's more recent writing, 
where greater emphasis is placed on a blend of (pseudo )science and Christian mysticism, 
rather than on any kind of pagan 'magic' (see below). 
In spite of the fact that the group's more 'gifted' members were neglected in Vlajic's recent 
writing, one constant feature of the accounts of Group 69 which is crucial to its rhetoric is the 
alleged association with the Yugoslav military. Radi~ic's 1994 articles in Duga introduced the 
group as affiliated to the Yugoslav army, while Vlajic too, recognised the role of 'high 
ranking officers' in its activities. However, both Vlajic and Radi~ic treat the involvement of 
army personnel with notable equivocation. For example, in the earlier extract from the 
conversation with Vlajic, army personnel were said to be 'probably' involved in the group's 
activities. Moreover, the responsibility for revealing the link between the group and the army 
is shifted to Radisic, who as a colonel (and since May 2000, the official army spokesman) 
'knows what this is all about'. Yet in the articles in Duga to which Vlajic refers, Radi~ic also 
attempted to undermine the importance of army personnel by suggesting that the officers had 
only an 'advisory role' (No more secrets). The equivocation regarding the role of the military 
can be seen as an attempt to manage the issue of (military) credibility without directly 
implicating the institution of the army in a project with which it might not want to be 
associated (see below). 
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It is also noteworthy that although revelations concerning Group 69 are a regular feature of 
Vlajic's work, he is adamant that he was never an active member. For example, during the 
conversation, he explicitly stated that he is 'not a member of any group'. On the other hand he 
did admit to co-operating with Group 69 on the project to build the 'long-wave mental shield 
called the Serbian Mirror' (Vlajic, 1998; p.54). The distancing from the group on which 
Vlajic insists is, in terms of the credibility of his claims, a twin-edged sword. On the one hand 
it plays an important rhetorical function in reinforcing the veil of mystery which surrounds 
the group's membership and which is fundamental to the narrative through which Group 69 is 
constructed. Members of secret military units seldom interact with the public on a daily basis 
and talk about their activities, as Vlajic does. At the same time, Vlajic's status of an outsider 
presents a problem, in that he needs to account for his detailed knowledge of the group's 
pursuits. How could an outsider know so much about the activities of the supposedly secret 
group, and why would he be allowed to disclose its efforts in the media and in his 
publications? Vlajic addressed this issue during the conversation, when following the 
description of a recent success of Group 69, he attended to the issue of accountability: 
'I used to socialise with some people from Group 69. In fact it is as if they chose me to be some 
kind of a spokesperson for them, so a lot of information, this is unofficial, but a lot of 
ioformation had, in some ways ... we would be sitting here and the phone would ring and they 
would tell me something ... [addresses a woman in the audience] Ljiljana, you remember, you 
were here too ... and then I would look at it and realise that something important had happened' 
Vlajic presented himself as an outsider but, as a spokesperson, a 
well-informed one. The information he presents is made to appear 
credible, because it comes directly from the members, without 
undermining the secrecy and mysterious qualities of the group. In 
fact, the mystery is enhanced by the suggestion that the group 
communicates with Vlajic only by phone (Vlajic claims that he used 
to socialise with the group's members, which suggests he no longer 
does so). The phone on Vlajic's desk, through which the group's 
discoveries are supposedly revealed to him, at unpredictable times, 
is a somewhat old-fashioned and bulky piece of equipment, whose piercing ringing tone adds 
to the theatrical aspect of Vlajic's public sessions. In his meetings with fans, Vlajic sits at a 
desk, slightly elevated in relation to the visitors, almost as if on stage. He is surrounded by his 
books and religious icons, in a small, cold and dark room filled with the scent of incense, 
characteristic of Orthodox churches. It is in this already eerie atmosphere that the alleged 
phone-calls occur. Moreover, Vlajic is contacted by Group 69 during 'office hours', when the 
conversations are witnessed by people like Ljiljana whose testimony can be called upon when 
the question of accountability is being addressed. This makes Group 69 appear remote and 
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intangible, while the acknowledgement from regular visitors provides evidence that the group 
communicates to, and in some sense through, Spasoje Vlajic. 
8.5. Theoretical framework of Group 69: scieuce, religion and conspiracy theory 
The principal idea underlying the activity of Group 69, as manifested in the work of both 
Vlajic and Radisic, is that the future of warfare lies in the mastery of' sub-quantum energies' 
which bring about parapsychological phenomena. This idea is outlined by Vlajic in the 
introduction of his book, as a justification for the title The First World Parapsychological 
War. Vlajic postulates that a future 'Third World War' will take place on these sub-quantum, 
'psychotronic' levels, and that the principal target will be 'human psyche, the conscious and 
the unconscious' (1998, p.8). Similarly, in the articles in Duga, Radisic quotes members of 
Group 69 as claiming that the 'psychological, information and parapsychological war is well 
under way' and that this is why 'the application of hypnosis, telepathy, precognition, 
telekinesis, and other esoteric skills by the military' has become a legitimate concern (No 
more secrets, Duga, 2 April, 1994). Significantly, the 'parapsychological war', which is 
effectively a war between Serbs and 'World powers', is constructed entirely within a 
conspiratorial framework. In the introduction of The First World Parapsychological War, 
Vlajic suggests that 'teams which have the greatest world powers behind them' work on 
devising weapons based on 'various kinds of magic, combined with scientific findings' (p.S). 
Parapsychological war is constructed as 'part of a wider strategy undertaken by the leading 
world powers' (p.8). Furthermore, Vlajic emphasises that The First World Parapsychological 
War is not just about parapsychology, but rather: 
'The book that is before us gives a partial answer to the question: Who are the rulers from the 
shadows who call such dark and radical shots, and of course, what is their aim?' (Vlajic, 1998, 
p.6) 
In a similar fashion, Radisic refers to Serbia's enemies as 'creators of the new order in the 
Balkans, and even the whole world' (No more secrets). Also, he suggests that one of the 
mottoes of Group 69 is a passage from the Tibetan Book of the Dead: 'Don't eat the fruits 
from the tree of good and evil, which ripen on the branch which is growing for your 
offspring'. This saying was chosen 'because it provides a warning to the creators of the 
newest "New World Order"'. Radisic predicts that the failure to comply will bring defeat to 
the conspirators, in the same way that it did to 'Alexander the Great, Napoleon and Hitler'.ln 
other words, the subversion of the New World Order conspiracy is seen as the very reason for 
Group 69's existence. 
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The sections that follow will explore in more detail the idea that the account of Group 69 in 
VlajiC's and Radisic's work, is interwoven with the notion of international conspiracy. It will 
be suggested that accounts of Group 69 and its activity consist of two different, but 
nonetheless related, types of explanation, the {pseudo)scientific, and mystical/religious. Each 
of these will be shown to be inundated with themes belonging to the conspiratorial cultural 
tradition. 
8. 6. Pseudoscientific dimension of international conspiracy: 
In Chapter 4 it was suggested that there is a powerful cultural scepticism towards the 
possibility and existence of paranormal phenomena. Much of this scepticism stems from the 
fact that science and the paranormal are often constructed as mutually exclusive categories of 
knowledge. For example, Beloff (1974) defines the paranormal as 'phenomena which, in one 
or more respects conflict the accepted scientific opinion as to what is physically possible' 
(p.1 ). Considering the monopoly which Science has over what is considered the valid and 
truthful description of the natural world (as opposed to 'rejected knowledge', Wallis, 1979), 
those who proclaim belief in the paranormal often have to defend their views against 
accusations of eccentricity, even psychological deficiency (W ooffitt, 1992). 
One way in which explorers of paranormal phenomena have attempted to undermine the 
myriad of labels, inferences and prejudices which exist against them, is by denying the 
distinction between science and their own research. Drawing on the work of Harry Collins 
and Trevor Pinch, the building of scientific credibility in parapsychological theorising and 
research can be said to consist of three related components: 
1) Adoption of 'symbolic and technical hardware of science', i.e. the rigour of scientific 
method (Collins and Pinch, 1979). As early as in the 1930s, J.B. Rhine made the first 
claim to science with sophisticated experimental techniques. The application of scientific 
methods, especially experimentation, has led to the blurring of boundaries between 
science and the study of paranormal phenomena, in that the latter has become regarded, 
at least in some circles, as a legitimate and respectable scientific enterprise. 
2) Reference to institutional respectability, and the fact that parapsychological research 
has, in some cases, been accepted by the heavily guarded fortresses of knowledge 
production: the universities, research bodies etc. (Collins and Pinch, 1979).7 
3) Adoption of a theoretical framework which is compatible with, and draws on 
mainstream science. Critics of parapsychology in the 1950s and 60s have argued that the 
discipline failed to produce an adequate theoretical framework for the phenomena it 
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examines (Szasz, 1957). Many parapsychologists took on board these criticisms, so the 
most significant debates in parapsychology since the 1970s revolved around theory rather 
than method (Collins and Pinch, 1979). Theoretical conceptualisations have relied heavily 
on models and formulations originating from established natural sciences, primarily 
physics (Gardner, 1981).8 
All three of the above criteria are implicitly addressed in Vlajic's work, in the attempt to 
reject the qualification of his work as a 'heterodox theory' or pseudoscience. At the beginning 
of the first of the two conversations held in December 2000, Vlajic reflected on the scientific 
foundations of his approach: 
'In my research, in order to reject what is borderline, or as you called it 'heterodox', or in order 
to make it part of science, I adhered to one of the basic scientific postulates, which was 
pronounced by Mendelyev, the inventor of the periodic system These postulates are as follows: 
scientifically based is that which can be predicted, and which is beneficial to man. I tested some 
of my observations in this way. I would announce a prediction, and wait and see if it comes true. 
If it comes true- of course through the balance of probabilities I estimate how likely it is to come 
true-... therefore a scientific mechanism Then I move onto a strictly scientific field, and try and 
ensure that it to the advantage of benefit (sic) .. .' 
Similarly, in the first of his three articles published in Duga, Radi~ic suggests, that 'only that 
which has been scientifically validated is taken [by the Group] as possible truth' (Anticipating 
cramp in Clinton'sface). 
It is questionable to what extent the 'scientific criteria' to which Vlajic or Radi~ic claim to 
adhere are compatible with those adopted by 'mainstream', 'academic' parapsychology or 
any other scientific community. There are few scientists today who would include an ethical 
consideration such as the 'benefit to mankind' into the list of key epistemological criteria, at 
the expense of, for instance, the criterion of falsifiability. More importantly, Vlajic's ideas 
have not been subjected to any kind of experimental scrutiny or systematic evaluation. 
Instead, his work consists of thousands of very vague predictions, some of which are 
interpreted post hoc as having successfully predicted some subsequent event (e.g. Milo~evic's 
downfall, George W. Bush's election victory and, most recently, the World Trade Centre 
terrorist attack). Nevertheless, in spite of the absence of any kind of 'scientific rigour' the 
reference to a scientific method has the same underlining rhetoric as in the more sophisticated 
parapsychological research, namely a quest for recognition and acceptance. 
During the interview Vlajic also invoked the theme of institutional respectability, when he 
suggested that his approach has been studied at several universities, both in Yugoslavia and 
abroad. 
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'Let me tell you ... a doctoral thesis on the basis of my formula of light was successfully 
completed at the Faculty of Organisational Sciences, which today is one of our strongest 
faculties. Also, at the Moscow Language Institute, Irina Cerepanova defended her doctorate 
about the colour of words, colour of names. In the book 'Formula of Consciousness' I cite 
dozens of academics and Universities which research this field and which have given a positive 
evaluation of the approach based on the Formula of Light. Therefore, all this is less and less 
heterodox. And according to the evidence, in which the key role is played by these two-
successful prediction and benefit- it is becoming more and more monodox [sic), or whatever 
you want to call it, science ... or orthodox [laughter) ... Orthodox is true faith, and heterodox is 
something that is dissolved, dispersed.' 
The 'Faculty of Organisational Sciences' where the formula of light was supposedly 
researched, is not usually perceived as one of Serbia's 'strongest' academic institutions. The 
'doctorate' to which Vlajic refers was in fact an undergraduate project written in 1992 by 
Vlajic's son Sinisa, who currently works as a research assistant at the faculty. The title of the 
project, completed under the supervision of Dr Vidojko Ciric was Expert informational 
systems of the Serbian language based on the Formula of Light (reference number 186/86). 
As was the case in the instance with the adherence to scientific method, Vlajic's claims to 
institutional recognition are of dubious credibility. Nonetheless they reveal the underlying 
rhetoric, the aim of which is to present his approach as a (scientifically) valid and accepted 
account of the natural world and its functioning. 
Similar rhetorical effect is achieved by the title 'professor' which is frequently associated 
with Vlajic's name. VlajiC's publisher referred to him as 'professor', when contacted by 
phone to find out if a meeting with Vlajic can be arranged. The label was also used by some 
of VlajiC's visitors, the ones who did not feel intimate enough to call the 'professor' 
'Spasoje'. In Yugoslavia, 'professor' is a title commonly used to refer to secondary school 
teachers and in that sense the use of the term to address Vlajic is legitimate. In fact, Vlajic 
made no attempt to hide his real credentials in that he introduced himself as 'secondary school 
teacher of information technology', rather than as a 'lecturer'. Even so, the general ambiguity 
surrounding the title gives Vlajic a more authoritative voice. This is compounded by the fact 
that when appearing in the media (e.g. in the Black Pearls chat show, even in Knezevic's 
article in Politika) Vlajic is commonly introduced not only as a 'professor' but also as an 
'engineer of crystalography', and therefore an expert in a very specialised, and somewhat 
mysterious area of physics. 
In line with Collins and Pinch's (1979) third criteria for the building of scientific credibility, 
Vlajic attempted to assimilate the activities of Group 69 within the theoretical framework of 
conventional science. During the encounter, Vlajic invoked some very illustrious scientific 
and intellectual authorities such as physicist and Nobel Prize laureate Wolfgang Pauli, the 
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eminent psychologist Car! Gustav Jung, and biologist Rupert Sheldrake. Also he referred to 
some weii-publicised aspects of quantum mechanical research such as the EPR (Einstein, 
Podolski, and Rosen) paradox also known as the 'non-locality problem'. Most frequently 
however, Vlajic cited the theories and ideas of the Serbian-born physicist and inventor Nikola 
Tesla. 
When referring to the weii-known figures from the world of physics, psychology and biology, 
Vlajic most frequently invoked aspects of their work which are rarely considered part of 
'conventional science'. This, for instance, is the case with Pauli and Jung's concept of 
'synchronicity'9 or Sheldrake's idea of'rnorphogenetic field' 10• Something similar can be said 
of the reference to the EPR experiment." Most ofV!ajic's allusion to contemporary physics 
consisted of a regurgitation of parapsychological interpretations of quantum mechanics which 
have been around since the 1950s.12 
In the present discussion, specific features of Vlajic's rather complex pseudoscientific 
theoretical framework wiii not be explored in detail. Instead the discussion wiii be limited to 
the role whlch the work of the physicist Nikola Tesla plays in the accounts of Group 69. Tesla 
was chosen because references to other 'scientific' traditions such as aspects of contemporary 
quantum theory, as weii as the work of Wolfgang Pauli, Car! Gustav Jung and Rupert 
Sheldrake, are a fairly recent development in Vlajic's work. In most cases they merely build 
upon the more enduring feature of the pseudoscientific discourse of Group 69, which is the 
work of Tesla. Also, as has already been noted, the ways in which QM, Pauli or Jung are 
invoked resembles closely similar pseudoscientific literature available in the West (see 
Gardner, 1981; Collins and Pinch, 1979, 1982; Jahoda, 1972). 
The importance attributed to Tesla is Vlajic's work is reflected in the fact that the book The 
First World Parapsychological War bears the subtitle Testa's weapon is already being 
implemented. Also, the appreciation of Tesla's work is evident in Radisic's writing. In the 
articles in Duga, Radisic quotes the 'second lieutenant Zombi' as saying that 
'Officers have material for research, mainly material stored in the Musewn ofNikola Tesla [in 
Belgrade]. No army in the world has these materials so readily available and accessible. That of 
course does not mean that none of us has already 'peeked' inside the metaphysical world of 
Nikola Tesla- the Second Lieutenant added, while the mysterious grin seemed to have moved 
from his face and sparkled in his eye, as if it wanted to say that what had been said was enough.' 
(No more secrets, Duga, 2 April, 1994) 
Two out of RadisiC's three articles in Duga were illustrated with portraits of Tesla. 
Anticipating cramp in Clinton 's face included a photo of Tesla holding a pigeon which was 
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. printed over the whole page, accompanied by the caption What did military experts discover 
in Tesla 's will? (see photo). The final, and particularly important reason for singling out 
Tesla's work is that it is through the reference to Tesla's thinking that the link between 
pseudoscience and conspiracy theory is established in Vlajic's and Radisic's writing. 
Nikola Tesla (1856-1943) was a physicist and inventor of 
Serbian origin who spent all of his working life in the US. 
Over five decades, Tesla registered over 700 inventions with 
the US patents office, most notably the induction motor and 
the alternating-current power transmission. He was engaged 
in the construction of the Niagara Falls power plant where 
his work on alternating current was fist put to the test. 
However, the Serbian inventor is also known for a number 
of more eccentric projects. Tesla claimed that it was 
possible to split the earth with electromagnetic waves and 
destroy aircraft with beams radiated from a distance of 
Anticipadng cramp on Clinton 's 
face, Duga, February, 1994 
several hundred miles. Also, Tesla allegedly made attempts at communication with aliens. 
The reverence of the work of Nikola Tesla is not limited to Serbian enthusiasts for paranormal 
phenomena, although the inventor's Serbian ethnic background certainly contributed to his 
popularity in Yugoslavia. Tesla's extraordinary claims have been capturing the imagination of 
mystics and believers in the paranormal ever since the mid-20th Century. For example, the 
building in downtown New York which used to house the New Yorker Hotel, in which Tesla 
spent the last few years of his life, was subsequently bought by the Moon Unification Church, 
because of rumours that Tesla had communicated with aliens from the hotel's penthouse 
suite. Even more bizarrely, prior to the Tokyo subway poisoning, the members of the Aum 
Shinrikyu sect visited Belgrade, in search of information on Tesla's theories of wave 
amplification, which the inventor asserted could be used to create artificial seismological 
disturbances.13 It was only after the quest for 'Tesla's weapon' failed that leaders of the 
Japanese sect decided to use sarine gas. 
Most of the interest in the work of Nikola Tesla shown by Western believers in the 
paranormal focuses on Tesla's ideas about extraterrestrial life or artificial earthquakes. 
Among Serbian followers, it is the application of the inventor's ideas to parapsychology 
which takes centre stage. The 'metaphysical world ofNikola Tesla' which fascinated Radisic, 
Vlajic and other members of Group 69 is in fact a blend of quantum mechanical interpretation 
of psi energy and Tesla's work on long wave radiation. In The First World Parapsychological 
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War Vlajic explains that the activity of Group 69 is based on the transmission of brainwaves 
with frequencies below 32Hz. According to Vlajic, these waves (which Tesla referred to as 
'scalar waves') travel faster than light, and fimction at 'quantum or borderline levels' (p.J3). 
It is the mastery of the 'scalar waves' which brings victory in parapsychological war. 
In The First World Parapsychological War, Vlajic identifies, as one of the principal tasks of 
the group, 'psychotronic shooting down of enemy jets and affecting other material resources 
with the aim of cautioning, warning and defending', as well as 'undermining the activities of 
enemy politicians and invention of other means of warning off leading politicians and states 
which lead the anti-Serbian campaign' (Vlajic, 1998; p.S7-58). Both of these activities were 
said to involve the transmission of sub-quantum, 'scalar' waves. Similarly, in the articles in 
Duga Radisic explains that 'extrasenses' associated with the group countered the negative 
thoughts of Western politicians visiting Belgrade, contributing to 'the cramp in the faces of 
the visitors, which occurs as a result of the conflict between their negative energy (which 
carries cruel and hypocritical intentions) and the positive energy of their hosts and the 
extrasenses' (Ibid.). This 'sub-quantum shield', known as the 'Serbian Mirror', or the 'Shield 
of St Nikola', which members of Group 69 supposedly created, is said to have contributed the 
death of the Turkish prime minister Turgut Ozal, who was particularly active in the anti-
Serbian campaign and therefore radiated a lot of negative energy (Involuntary suicide of 
Turgut Ozal). Also the shield was allegedly responsible for the deaths of Manfred W erner 
(former NATO secretary-general), Francois Mitterand and Yitzhak Rabin, as well as for the 
family tragedies ofHelmut Kohl and Vaclav Have!, personal injuries to the Pope, Bill Clinton 
and Otto V on Habsburg, and the political decline of various foreign politicians such as 
Genscher, Kozirev, De Michaelis, Benazir Bhutto, and others (Vlajic, 1998, p.l73-174). 
Tesla's role in VlajiC's narrative goes beyond the rhetoric of science. Nikola Tesla constitutes 
the meeting point between pseudoscience and the overall idea of conspiracy which surrounds 
the notion of parapsychological warfare. As was mentioned earlier, parapsychological war is 
constructed as 'part of a broader strategy, undertaken by leading world powers' (Vlajic, 1998; 
p.8). The alleged aim of this strategy is to develop research areas which could enable the 
world powers to 'rule over subquanturn levels which lie even deeper and closer to the heart of 
nature than nuclear energy' and 'master the secret natural forces which would enable them to 
establish an earthly dominance over humanity' (p.8). Vlajic suggests that a crucial part in the 
'race for power and planetary dominance' involves the hunt for the 'secret legacy ofTesla's 
work'. Apparently, before his death, Tesla claimed to have made a discovery which 
subsequently became a topic of interest for the creators of the New World Order. In a letter 
written by Tesla in 1899, the scientist is said to have mentioned that in 'scribbles created by 
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strong electromagnetic discharges [he) discovered traces of the mind, or rather intelligent 
behaviour'. Vlajic links this to the idea that 'complex electrical circuits in the brain could be 
affected by radiation of different frequencies' (1998; p.29) and that in the West experiments 
with microwave transmitters are under way, with the aim of 'creating, by means of electronic 
impulses, false visions and auditory hallucinations, which would bring a man into different 
states such as sentimentality, insecurity, apathy, fear, panic or anger' (p.31). Interestingly, in 
support of this claim, Vlajic cites none other than Svetozar Radisic, who suggested - in a 
pamphlet published in 1997 by the Yugoslav army - that 'there is little doubt that 
psychotronic weapons have been used [in the actions against Serbs] to neutralise the will of 
the people in the war-affected areas, bearing in mind that the West is not selective when it 
comes to the application of the means and methods for achieving its interests' (cited in Vlajic, 
1998; p.32). The pamphlet in question was subsequently published in the form of a book 
entitled Neocortical War which will be examined in the next chapter. 
It appears therefore that (pseudo )science not only provides a 'rational' explanation for 
parapsychological activity in which Group 69 is supposedly engaged, but also describes a 
level on which the international conspiracy functions. Sub-quantum energies are the front line 
of the new 'parapsychological war', and members of Group 69 are soldiers in a battle against 
the international conspiracy, engaged in a race for the rediscovery of Tesla's secret weapon. 
Consequently, the notion of an international anti-Serbian plot is intertwined with the 
pseudoscientific explanatory framework. The fear of conspiracy justifies the existence of 
Group 69, while pseudoscience 'returns the favour' by providing a novel formulation of the 
idea of mass manipulation which plays such a central part in the conspiratorial narrative. The 
idea of mass manipulation by parapsychological means will be examined further in Chapter 9 
using the example ofRadisic's aforementioned book Neocortical War. 
8.7. Mystical/Religious element ofthe activities of Group 69 
In spite of the presence of a strong (pseudo)scientific element in Vlajic's and Radisic's work, 
and the claimed adherence to scientific principles (exemplified in Radisic's insistence that 
only what has been verified by science is accepted by the group) the two authors admit that 
their framework transcends the boundaries of conventional science. Radisic thus argues that 
science is 'too limited', and that Group 69 takes pride in its eclectic approach which draws on 
ideas from a variety of disciplines including 'astronomy, cosmology, systemology, 
philosophy, mathematics, theoretical physics, macro and micro physics, but also 
metaphysics, astrology and parapsychology'. Members of the group are said not to be 
troubled by the '(un)scientific nature of some suggestions'. Strangely enough, Radisic finds 
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support for the group's epistemological liberalism in the work of one of the fiercest critics of 
anti-scientific mysticism, Karl Popper. Radisic quotes Popper's The Logic of Scientific 
Discovery as suggesting that 'mysticism is the basis of all inventions and solutions, while 
science takes over only that which has been verified' (Involuntary suicide ofTurgut Ozal). hi 
some ways this pronouncement introduces into Radisic's and Vlajic's explanatory framework 
a mystical and quasi-religious element. 
The mysticism of Vlajic's and Radisic's is once again justified through the reference to 
Nikola Tesla. According to John O'Neill, a biographer of the Serbian inventor, Tesla's 
philosophical outlook was, at first glance, strictly materialistic (O'Neill, 2001). Tesla denied 
the existence of the soul and often referred to man as a 'meat machine'. However, O'Neill 
also suggests that materialism could have been a cover for a deeper mysticism, which became 
prominent later in Tesla's life. Tesla's philosophical and mystical writings have been 
collected in the book Tesla 's Prophesy (M. Matic, 1996) which Vlajic cites extensively in his 
work. The aspect of the inventor's mystical theorising which Vlajic repeatedly refers to is the 
idea of 'cosmic pain'. hi The First World Parapsychological War Tesla is quoted as saying 
that: 
'Whenever I, a person I am devoted to, or an idea I am dedicated to would be wronged by 
someone, I would experience a unique and inexplicable pain which, in want of a better tenn, I 
call "cosmic pain". Soon afterwards, those who caused the pain would regret it. After many 
such experiences, I confided in some friends who were in a position to verify the theory I 
gradually came to formulate ... This truth has been proved by hundreds of examples, and I urge 
other naturalists to devote their time to this topic, in the belief that with a common effort we 
could achieve results of inuneasurable value to the world as a whole' (Tesla, quoted in Vlajic, 
1998; p.170) 
hi the reference to 'cosmic pain', Vlajic blends the spiritual and the scientific aspects of 
Tesla's work in a way that blurs the boundaries between the two discourses. The mysticism is 
not presented as inconsistent with hardcore science, but rather as an elaboration of Tesla' s 
accomplishments in physics. Vlajic explains that research conducted by Group 69 had 
allegedly shown that when 'extralucid' individuals experience 'cosmic pain' they emit 'alpha 
waves (8-16 Hz) while some sink into deeper, delta states (below 3 Hz)' (p. 171). Tesla's 
'scalar waves' are therefore interpreted as the force behind 'cosmic pain'. By extension, the 
'Serbian Mirror', the parapsychological weapon devised by the group, constitutes a way of 
channelling 'cosmic pain' against Serbia's enemies. 
Significantly, Vlajic does not define 'cosmic pain' in purely physical terms, but describes it as 
the 'pure pain of the righteous', and a feeling 'devoid of anger, curse, vengefulness and 
181 
hatred' in the true Christian spirit of 'turning the other cheek' (Vlajic, 1998, p.l71). In the 
same vein, he refers to psi-energy as 'God's justice' or 'spiritual energy' which 'is infinitely 
more powerful than atomic energy' because 'it comes from greater depths than the atomic, 
quantum level, so we would be justified in saying that it is a source from beyond the material, 
physical world' (p.15). This blending of science and religion is further exemplified in the fact 
that Vlajic sometimes refers to Serbia's parapsychological shield 'Serbian Mirror' as the 
'Shield of St Nikola' incorporating the name of a Saint and the famous Serbian inventor. 
As the conversation with Vlajic in December 2000 progressed, the general argument 
graduaily shifted from the pseudoscientific aspect of the explanation, which dominated the 
early stages of the encounter, towards what seemed like religious preaching. Vlajic described 
a study ailegedly conducted in Gennany in the 1980s, which showed that 'hypnoticaily 
induced alpha states' cannot offer access to the 'information field' necessary for 
parapsychological warfare. These 'results' led Vlajic to conclude that the information field 
has a more spiritual dimension which goes beyond wave research: 
'I spoke to some people who researched this area and figured out that this is not just the energy 
ofbrain waves. It is not just the energy ofbrain waves that carries the message into the universal 
field. It is as if there is something adjacent, even more refmed, a part of the soul, which leaves 
the person and penetrates the universal field aiming for the spiritual and the divine, areas which 
are mystical, and only then will it materialise and become true, as if it won't come true 
completely without God's help, and God can be accessed only with the soul, not the body.' 
On this occasion, paranormal powers were not presented as reducible to brain waves emitted 
in the alpha state. Alpha state is seen as necessary but insufficient for accessing hidden 
knowledge stored in the 'universal field'. What is required is that 'bit of the soul' which 
comes only from closeness with God. This formulation of the group's activities goes against 
the rhetoric of science which attempted to locate aJieged paranormal phenomena within the 
boundaries of what is considered possible in the material world. Similarly, near the end of the 
encounter, when asked what forms the essence of the method employed by Group 69, the 
'spokesperson' of Group 69 did not sight either his own 'formula of light', or Jung's 
'synchronicity', or Tesla's 'scalar waves' but instead suggested that 'instructions come from 
Bishop Nikolaj [V elimirovic]'. 
The religious element ofVlajiC's activity is further exemplified by the fact that his encounters 
with the public occasionaJly take the form of an informal religious service. When Vlajic was 
first contacted over the phone, in December 2000, he invited the 'guest from England' to 
attend the session the foJiowing day. Vlajic then pointed out that he would have to inform his 
assistant Hristoslav (whose name means 'the one who celebrates Christ') about the change of 
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plan, and let him know that they will not be holding their 'regular [religious] service'. Also, 
the sessions in Vlajic's office always end with visitors reading out aloud a prayer which, as 
Vlajic explained, was brought back by one of his followers from the Holy Mount Athos in 
Greece. The text of this prayer, which mentions the 'righteousness of the suffering Serbian 
people' is printed on the back cover ofVlajic's recent books. 
The spiritual and religious element ofVlajic's work, especially the reference to prayer, has its 
own rhetorical purpose. It has already been mentioned earlier in this chapter that materialism, 
which dominates contemporary culture, creates a bias against belief in paranormal or mystical 
phenomena. In many ways, it is this scepticism that motivates parapsychologists, including 
Vlajic and Radish~, to employ (pseudo )scientific rhetoric. At the same time, in contemporary 
society, the misgivings about the possibility of paranormal phenomena coexist with a deeply 
entrenched belief in supernatural forces in the form of institutionalised religion. The belief in 
God and biblical miracles represents a sanctioned form of paranormal belief that does not 
invite as much scepticism or ridicule as do for instance clairvoyance or psychokinesis. The 
rites of established religious ideologies or so-called 'social' religions (Tiryakian, 1974) have 
significant magical elements and are founded on a belief in the supernatural. And yet, esoteric 
and occult movements are not graced with the kind oflegitimacy traditionally associated with 
Christianity, Judaism, Buddhism, Hinduism or Islam. Instead the former are confined to the 
domain of 'subculture', and are criticised both by the scientific and religious establishment 
(Tiryakian, 1974; Nelson, 1969). 
The social acceptability of institutionalised religions suggests that assimilating potentially 
controversial views or beliefs within an established religious ideology (such as that of 
Orthodox Christianity) can have similar rhetorical implications to the reference to scientific 
discourse. In other words, by constructing the parapsychological activities of Group 69 within 
an established belief system, Vlajic is able to make his views appear far less unfamiliar, less 
threatening and more acceptable to the public. 
Vlajic's attempt to present his approach as grounded in Orthodox Christianity was 
necessitated further by the strong antagonism which the Serbian Church authorities show for 
alternative religious movement. According to Tiryakian (1974), religious authorities are 
traditionally opposed to any kind of esoteric or occult teachings with which they would have 
to compete over the power which is bestowed on those who are believed to hold the keys to 
some hidden knowledge about the natural world and human existence. In recent years, the 
Serbian Orthodox Church has been at the forefront of the attack on smaller religious 
communities, most frequently described as 'cults' or 'sects' which are said to pose a threat to 
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the traditional Orthodox Christian belief system.14 For example, on the interne! presentation 
of the Serbian Orthodox Church, in the section devoted to religious education, it is possible to 
find an article, written by the Sisters of the Monastery of St Stefan in the town of Lipovac, 
which warns against the danger posed by religious sects. The article singles out, as 
particularly dangerous, the following organisations and movements: 
'movement for the consciousness ofKrishna, Transcendental meditation, Ordo Templi Orientis, 
open Satanists, Rosencrucians, Oso Raxens, New Age, Sai Baba's movement, White Gnostic 
Church, association of parapsychologists 'Nikola Tesla', anthroposophers and theosophers and 
many other smaller groups which surface on a daily basis and keep their location and meeting 
places secret.' (Sects- alienation from God and the destruction of God's Church: a sin against 
Christ; Serbian Orthodox Church web page)" 
In a climate of religious and ideological intolerance, there was a lot to be gained from 
aligning with official Orthodox religious dogma, especially as the 'association of 
parapsychologists ''Nikola Tesla"' was also included in the list of dangerous, 'aggressive', 
anti-Christian sects, competing for the 'Orthodox souls' of the Serbian people. 
Also, during the conversation Vlajic revealed that 'enemies' of the Group 69 in the 
parapsychological war are 'witches', and 'Voodoo Warriors' who are supposedly 
employed by the US military. 16 These individuals are said to use 'magic' which is 'the 
opposite of prayer': 
'Prayer asks .. .its says, Lord please, let it be your will, that is in accordance to God's justice, but 
help ... and then the mental images are transmitted. And magic says: this is how it should be! It 
neither asks nor seeks permission.' 
The contrast between the piety and righteousness of the members of Group 69 and the 
profanity of the 'Witches' of the West forestalls any potential accusations that Vlajic is 
involved in witchcraft or magic, thus reinforcing his status as a believer, who endorses the 
values and the way oflife of the Orthodox Christian religion. 
As the emphasis on the religious aspect of Group 69 increased, the apparent devoutness of 
the members began to undermine their alleged 'militarism'. The importance attributed to 
prayer made the members seem more like pious monks engaged in continuous worship 
than brave soldiers involved in a ruthless parapsychological battle. 
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8.8. Links with the conspiratorial cultural tradition 
Vlajic's reference to Nikolaj Velimirovic's, as the principal spiritual guru of Group 69 is not 
simply part of the attempt to attain institutional legitimacy by invoking a respected religious 
authority. The emphasis on the Satanic character of the Western world, which is ubiquitous in 
Velimirovic's writing, underlines the conspiratorial element of Vlajic's overall conceptual 
framework. According to Vlajic the objectives of Group 69 include the 'discovery of 
methods, symbols and psycho-energetic keys, through which the planners of the "New World 
Order", by means of operative magic, strive to achieve planetary dominance' (VIajic, 1998, 
p.56). The group aims to reveal the 'satanic symbolism' and the 'anti-Christian essence [of 
the planners of the NWO] which leads to the destruction of the very basis oflife: light, water, 
air, food, earth and spirit' and combat it by 'enhancing the religious feelings which would 
create a psychological force directed against the "leaders from the shadows"' (Vlajic, 1998, 
p.56). As was already hinted in earlier chapters, in Vlajic's work, 666 is shown to be 
omnipresent in Western culture, and he resorts to a series of different strategies to calculate its 
presence in the names of politicians, crucial world events, the interne!, etc. Other evidence 
cited by Vlajic includes the fact that the frequency of the word 'dollar' (calculated according 
to Vlajic's 'universal formula of light'), is 666, as well as the revelation that the word 
'America' was derived from the name 'Don Amerigo' which, it is alleged, is an anagram of 
the Serbian spelling of the word 'Armageddon' (Armagedon).17 Other countries linked to the 
number of the Beast include the Vatican, Germany, Turkey and Croatia, and their Satanic 
origins are invoked as an explanation of the fact that 'all of [them] are bearers of the so-called 
New World Order, and were implicated in the most recent war against Serbia' (1998; p.77). 
References to Satanic symbolism are apparent even in Radisic's writing, where the devotion 
to Orthodox Christian religion, is largely absent. fu Radisic's articles in Duga, Orthodox 
spirituality gives way to a medley of Far Eastern mysticism, in that prominence is given to the 
teachings of Milarepa, 18 Sai Baba, Mahatma, the Tibetan Book of the Dead, I-Ching, and 
John Hegelin, the founder of the Natural Law Party and follower of the Maharishi Yogi.19 
However, in spite the absence of explicit Christian themes in Radisic's articles, a link to 
Christianity is present through the reference to Satanic themes and the alleged significance of 
the number 666. For example, Radisic suggests that 
'many will be surprised to hear that the extrasenses awaited a man who would confirm the 
presence of the energy of three sixes in the most recent catastrophe in California (in religion, 
666 is thought to be the number of negative energies). It may be a coincidence, but Los Angeles, 
which had 42 victims of the earthquake, and 42 incidents of looting, was visited by the 42"• 
president of the US. For some, numbers mean a lot, for others they mean nothing, while group 
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69 follows the effects of numbers, words, colours, sound and different energies that carry them' 
(RadiSic, 'Anticipating cramp in C/inton 's face, Duga, 19 February, 1994) 
The episode with the Californian earthquake refers to one of the group's 'discoveries' 
outlined in two ofVlajic's books (Intent, 1993; and The First World Parapsychological War, 
1998), where 42 is also interpreted as the sign of the Beast. The Gospel according to John, 
which reveals the meaning of 666 also says that the Beast would rule for 42 months, making 
the number 42 also a symbol of Satan. Consequently, although Radi~ic defines the number 
from St John's gospel as the 'number of negative energies', and in doing so provides a 
pseudoscientific reinterpretation of the original religious symbolism of numbers 666 and 42, 
the very fact that these numbers are mentioned as significant establishes a link between the 
pseudoscientific aspects of the paranormal explanatory framework and the conspiracy 
tradition. In some sense, the persistence of Satanic themes in Radi~ic's otherwise non-
Christian discourse resembles the pattern found in Avramov's book The Trilateral, where 
indirect references to the anti-Christian aspect of the plot are embedded in an otherwise 
secular conspiracy theory (see Chapter 7). 
In VlajiC's book The First World Parapsychological War the statement about the Satanic 
nature of Serbia's enemies is supplemented with an elaboration of an international conspiracy 
which contains all the elements of a conspiratorial narrative outlined in the earlier chapter. 
Vlajic begins his account of the international conspiracy with transnational organisations such 
as the Bilderberg group, the Trilateral Commission and the Council on Foreign Relations, 
which are said to be dominated by familiar conspiratorial figures such as J.P. Morgan, David 
Rockefeller and Baron Rothschild. The Rothschilds are described as 'the ancient family of 
Judeo-bankers which had a decisive influence over the industry, finances, politics, revolutions 
and wars of the 19th and 20th centuries' (p.78) The ultimate aim of the conspiracy is supposed 
to be the formation of a world government, which would be led by Pharisees and Masonic 
rulers of Judeo-Khazarian origins (p.80). They would rule over a shadow world government 
consisting of 72 members of a Supreme Council'. Vlajic's expose ends with a quotation from 
the work of 'a famous American prophet Jeanne Dixon, who is especially renowned among 
Catholics', which conclusively links the idea of international conspiracy with Satan. Dixon is 
said to have predicted the formation of a world government, the aim of which would be to 
'prepare the world for the arrival of the anti-Christ' (Vlajic, 1998; p.79). During the encounter 
in December 2000, Vlajic also invoked the Jewish conspiracy theme when he reflected on 
conspiratorial media manipulation. He noted that the word 'times' as in The Times, when read 
backwards reads 'semit' the Serbian word for Sernite. Vlajic saw in this a coded reference to 
the Jewish control over the world's media 
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The antisemitic conspiratorial themes invoked by Vlajic, which are backed with references to 
known conspiracy theorists such as Gary Alien and Eustace Mullins, reflect most of the 
themes and logic of the mystical and quasi-religious conspiracy theories propagated by the 
likes of Ratibor Durdevic. More importantly, Vlajic does not introduce the notion of the 
international conspiracy as a mere background to the more general description of the activities 
of Group 69. Rather, conspiratorial theorising is seen as integrally linked to the group's 
existence and functioning. Details of the conspiracy (including its Satanic connections) are 
introduced as originating 'from secret files compiled by Group 69' (Vlajic, 1998, p.SO) 
indicating that the group is specifically engaged in compiling evidence of the conspiracy. 
Also, the esoteric interpretations of various events, which are the principal activity of the 
group, are carried out within the confines of the conspiratorial tradition, and are cited as proof 
of the validity of some of the principal claims of that tradition. 
8.9. What is acceptable and what is not? - conspiracy theorv and the paranormal 
discourse in Yugoslav military publications 
In the preceding sections an attempt was made to outline the pseudoscientific and religious 
elements of the paranormal explanatory discourse which surrounds the accounts of Group 69 
in the work of Spasoje Vlajic and Svetozar Radi~ic. Furthermore, it was argued that each 
dimension of paranormal explanatory discourse was constructed in the context of a broader 
assumption of an international conspiracy, of which parapsychological war is seen as an 
essential aspect. The conspiratorial element ofVlajic's descriptions of Group 69 was shown 
to reflect many of the features associated with the cultural tradition of conspiracy theory, 
including its more disturbing elements such as antisemitism. Considering that these extreme 
views were presented as an integral component of the operation of Group 69, and were shown 
to underlie the group's overall explanatory framework, it can be argued that they cannot be 
dismissed as simply reflecting Vlajic's personal opinion. Instead, conspiratorial tradition can 
be seen as constituting an inherent feature of paranormal explanations of the Yugoslav crisis 
in the mid-1990s. 
It has also been argued that Radi~ic's and VlajiC's accounts of Group 69 place a particular 
emphasis on the unit's alleged affiliation to the Yugoslav Army. The group was presented as 
consisting of army officers and was referred to as 'the Yugoslav Army's best kept secret'. 
Moreover, the paranormal unit was said to function 'under the auspices of the Army's joint 
Chief of Staff thus suggesting that Group 69 had some kind of institutional backing. 
However, the presumption that Group 69 had the backing of the Yugoslav military 
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establishment was largely unwarranted. Although Stojadinovic suggests that the group met 
regularly in the building which, before the Nato bombing, housed the army headquarters, the 
military authorities did not condone this kind of activity. Radisic's articles in Duga, in which 
the existence of Group 69 was first revealed, were not welcomed by his superiors. This was 
not because some great military secret had been disclosed, but rather because senior officers 
considered that such an extraordinary kind of explanation would leave the army open to 
mockery and undermine its integrity. Early in 1994, even before Radisic published the articles 
in Duga, Colonel Ljubodrag Stojadinovic ridiculed the whole parapsychological project in the 
Yugoslav Army magazine Narodna Armija (subsequently renamed Vojska). This critical 
article was provoked by his encounter with Colonel Bogi Stojmenovic during which 
Stojadinovic first found out about the existence of Group 69. Stojadinovic claims that 
following the publication of Radisic's articles in Duga, he was ordered by the then chief-of-
staff General Momcilo Perisic to 'remove Radisic and keep an eye on him' (Profil, 1997, 
No.l3, p. 54). In other words, Radisic's articles in Duga directly contributed to his removal 
from the position of editor-in-chief of Vojno Delo. During the recent conversation, 
Stojadinovic revealed that he had known Radisic very well in the early 1990s, because they 
used to travel to work on the same army bus every morning. Apparently, Radisic used to 
entertain fellow passengers with stories about paranormal phenomena, and was ruthlessly 
ridiculed by the more sceptical officers. Stojadinovic also pointed out that the dismissal of 
Radisic followed a lengthy interview which he, as Radisic's superior, organised with the 
purpose of fmding out 'the extent to which Radisic's thinking is dominated by mystical 
themes'. The seriousness with which Radisic approached the topic of parapsychological 
warfare convinced Stojadinovic that it would be better to move him to a post where he would 
have less influence on the Army's public image. Ironically, Radisic was transferred to the 
section for 'psychological and propaganda activities', although the nature of his work, at least 
for a while, involved minimal media exposure. 
The fact that Radisic's views were not endorsed by the military establishment seems to 
suggest that, at the time, the boundary of acceptable opinion within the military was 
positioned in a way that excluded the interpretative framework endorsed by Radisic, Vlajic 
and other members of Group 69. However, a note of caution is necessary, as it is questionable 
to what extent General Perisic and Colonel Stojadinovic, the only two high ranking officers 
whose opinion on the matter is known, can be considered representative of the Army as a 
whole. Within a year of the events described above, Stojadinovic was stripped of his rank for 
questioning certain political actions of the then President of Yugoslavia, Zoran Lilic. Several 
years later (in December 1998) Perisic, too, was forced into retirement, again for political 
reasons, which suggests that the ideological orientation of Stojadinovic and Perisic was not in 
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line with that of the ruling political clique. Although the downfall of the two officers appears 
not to be related to their scepticism towards Group 69, there remains the possibility that their 
attitude towards Radisic was a manifestation of a more progressive outlook, which other 
officers in the military may not have shared. This possibility is in some way supported by the 
fact that soon after Stojadinovic's suspension, Radisic was reinstated to his earlier position as 
editor of Vojno Delo. This would not have occurred if the mysticism which led to Radisic's 
suspension had been considered completely beyond the pale. 
However, even if Stojadinovic cannot be regarded as representative of the military 
establishment, one aspect of his account of Group 69 is noteworthy. In his writing on the 
group, Stojadinovic regularly outlines, in a mocking fashion, the more bizarre ideas 
propagated by the members. The dismissive tone which runs throughout Stojadinovic's 
description of the group's activities is also applied to the personality ofSvetozar Radisic, who 
is portrayed as the 'last person in the Army worthy of the post of editor-in-chief of Vojno 
Delo'. It is interesting however, that it is only the parapsychological and paranormal aspect of 
Group 69's activity which is subjected to Stojadinovic's mockery. Although the idea of an 
international conspiracy runs throughout the theoretical framework within which Group 69 is 
said to operate, this aspect of the group's ideology is not treated by Stojadinovic as a topic 
worthy of criticism. Also, in 1994 Stojadinovic did not hold Radisic responsible for 
propagating the wilder reaches of the conspiracy tradition, but only for his mysticism. In other 
words, conspiracy theory, even of the more excessive kind, was considered by Stojadinovic to 
be more respectable than the mystical overtones. 
Significantly, other critical writing on RadiSic's work does not make the same omission. In 
an article published in the Montenegrin daily Vijesti in August 2000, IStvan Molnar of the 
Institute of War and Peace reporting, criticised Radisic's 'xenophobia' as much as his beliefs 
in the paranormal (Pukovnik Radisii: defends the Serbs from the magic of the New World 
Order, Vijesti, 19 August 2000, p.lO). Molnar described Radisic's 'bizarre theories' as 
including 'dark forces originating from the Middle Ages, supernatural events and magical and 
evil spirits which are persecuting the Serbian people'. He went on to quote Radisic as saying 
that 'the Serbian humane model had been destroyed and replaced by the new social values of 
the West. The aim was to push us into the third race of the New World Order'. 
The disparity between Stojadinovic's and Molnar's account of Radisic's work could be 
attributed to their different backgrounds. Molnar writes for a Western institution and 
primarily for a Western audience. For him, Radisic's conspiratorial outlook probably seems 
as extraordinary as his belief in the supernatural. On the other hand, the absence of reference 
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to conspiracy theory in Stojadinovic's critical account of Radisic's beliefs suggests that for 
Stojadinovic, and presumably also for its audience, conspiracy theory is not in itself worthy of 
critical reflection. In addition, as has already been noted, when Stojadinovic describes the 
events that followed the publication of Radisic's articles in Duga, he does not refer to the 
conspiratorial dimension of Radisic's work as the justification for suspension. Instead he 
focuses entirely on the paranormal. This suggests that, at the time of Radisic's dismissal, 
paranormal explanations were considered beyond the boundaries of respectability, while on 
the other hand conspiracy theory had already become part of the military discourse. 
Evidence in support of this claim can be found in the content of Vojno Delo in the early 
1990s. A year prior to the publication of RadisiC's texts in Duga, the journal, edited by 
Radisic, published a number of articles which indicate an increasingly positive stance towards 
a conspiratorial interpretation of Western involvement in the Yugoslav crisis. The 1993 
Spring issue of Vojno Delo contained a special subsection entitled The New World Order and 
the defence policy of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. As a short editorial explained, the 
articles were based on conference papers presented at a 'round table' meeting held in the 
building of the Yugoslav Army Club in Belgrade in February 1993. The meeting was 
organised by the Directory for Strategic Studies and Defence Policies (affiliated to the 
Yugoslav Ministry of Defence) and by the editors of Vojno Delo (i.e. Radisic). The editorial 
outlined the intended objective of the gathering: 
'The aim of the academic gathering was to lay the foundation for work on the formulation of 
national interests, aims and programmes (from the perspective of defence) and for the pursuit of 
defence policies and modelling of a system of defence and protection. Eminent experts in a 
variety of disciplines, both civilians and officers, from various uuiversities and academic 
institutes, attended the conference. Academics laid out their views on recent developments and 
trends in international relations, the military and political situation in the former Yugoslavia, the 
influence of certain external and internal factors, and the basis for the development of a new 
notion of defence.' (Vojno Delo, 1993, Issue 1-2, 1993, p.S) 
At first sight there appears to be nothing peculiar about this meeting. In an earlier chapter it 
was already noted that in the early 1990s, the term New World Order was commonly used to 
refer to the post-Communist political reality. In that sense, it seems only natural that the 
military establishment of a small Balkan state would need to examine the implications of the 
end of the Cold War, and reformulate its defence policy accordingly. However, a closer 
examination of the perspectives laid out during the conference suggests that the gathering 
looked at the concept of a New World Order from a somewhat different angle. The 
participants, introduced as 'eminent experts' included, among others, two known advocates of 
conspiracy theory: Svetozar Radisic and Dragos Kalajic. The presence of Dragos Kalajic is 
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somewhat mystifying in that he is not a recognised 'expert' on international relations or a 
military figure, but a journalist and publicist. More importantly he is one of the more 
prominent Serbian antisemites, cited by Sekelj (1997) as a prime example of the 'stratum of 
half-educated intelligentsia' which disseminates antisemitic conspiracy theories in Serbia. In 
the early 1990s, Kalajic used to write a regular column in Duga, which became (in)famous for 
its anti-Western, xenophobic and often anti semi tic content. Some of his work was 
subsequently included in two volumes of selected essays entitled American Evil and 
American Evil IL Significantly, the second volume of his work includes a reprint of the article 
published in Vojno Delo. 
Bearing in mind Kalajic's public profile, it would be implausible to suggest that the 
organisers of the meeting on the New World Order were unaware that they were dealing with 
a notorious antisemite and conspiracy theorist. Therefore the fact that Dragos Kalajic was 
invited to address a conference organised by the Yugoslav MoD's Directory for Strategic and 
Defence Studies and Vojno Delo, suggests that he was someone whose views on international 
relations were deemed interesting, significant and worth listening to. KalajiC's presence at the 
'round table' meeting can be seen as another piece of evidence that, at the time, conspiracy 
theory was gradually becoming an acceptable perspective in the Serbian military, and that 
conspiratorial culture was emerging from the margins and penetrating Serbia's state 
institutions. 
Kalajic's participation becomes even clearer if one bears in mind the prevailing mood in the 
Yugoslav Army in the early 1990s. After the break-up of Yugoslavia, and the disintegration 
of the old Titoist Yugoslav People's Army (Jugoslovenska Narodna Armija), the newly 
formed Yugoslav Army (Vojska Jugoslavije) underwent a noteworthy, albeit short-lived, shift 
to the right. The embarrassing retreat from Slovenia and Croatia delivered a strong blow to 
the moral of the Yugoslav forces. In addition, Milosevic transferred many privileges which 
the army enjoyed under Tito, to the Serbian police. Dispirited and impoverished, the army, 
and especially its middle echelon, gradually turned to Vojislav Seselj, the militant leader of 
the Radical party, whose rhetoric promised a return to former glory. In the early 1990s, Seselj 
masterminded a witch-hunt against non-Serbian officers who provided convenient scapegoats 
for lack of success on the battlefield. This 'ethnic cleansing' of the military was implemented 
by General Domazetovic, deputy chief-of-staff, known for his connections with the Radical 
party. Right wing militants were also influential within the air force (Riders of fog, Vreme, 29 
Marchm 1993; p.29-31). Yugoslav army helicopters were readily available to Vojislav Seselj 
and the paramilitary leader Arkan during visits to the Croatian front. Similarly, according to 
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Stojadinovic, General Zivota Panic, Army chief of staff until late 1993, held a positive view 
of Seselj as a 'patriot' and was allegedly an admirer ofKalajic. 
KalajiC's contribution to the 'round table' discussion will be examined shortly. Before that it 
would be interesting to look at Radisic's own article, entitled 'Conspiracy theory' and 
defence policy (p. 162-186). The article is significant because in it Radisic discusses, in a 
rather incoherent and confusing fashion, the notion of 'conspiracy theory'. Radisic's position 
is to claim agnosticism, in that he argues that 'after all that has happened to us, it would be 
hard to argue against the existence of conspiracy theory, while at the same time it is not easy 
to prove the opposite' (p.185). Similarly, he claims that: 
'In relation to 'conspiracy theory' the real solutions may be suppressed and concealed if all 
necessary measures are not taken to remove or reduce the effect of a conspiracy, if one really 
exists. If it is revealed that a conspiracy towards Serbs, the Orthodox or Slavs exists- it means 
that one specific scenario needs to be followed. When the effects of foreign interests have the 
same impact as a conspiracy-a different scenario is needed. If it is discovered that the existence 
of a conspiracy is an illusion- a third scenario is required.' (p.\84) 
Radisic even suggests that conspiracy is a function of perspective: instigating changes around 
the world in order to achieve the 'American dream' may not appear to be a conspiracy from 
the American perspective, while 'for all those who find themselves in the way of this plan, it 
is a conspiracy' (p.l79) 
Radisic contends that the Yugoslav crisis was caused by a mixture of 'insufficiently 
controlled partial interests of the newest centres of power (which are sometimes achieved 
through conspiracies), the continuation of centuries-long religious war, which is also a kind of 
conspiracy, and another attempt to suppress the complexes acquired in earlier wars' (p. 168). 
Importantly, Radisic's claimed 'agnostic' view of the conspiracy theory of society falls short 
of an unequivocal denial of conspiracy. In suggesting that 'many agree that secret collusion 
against other races, nations, followers of other religions, or in order to achieve national 
interests, may exist', Radisic acknowledges that conspiracy theory is a legitimate view. 
However it is also one that is essentially advocated by others. RadisiC' s proclaimed 
agnosticism, and the attribution of conspiratorial beliefs to others reflects a common 
rhetorical strategy employed to persuade doubters. The impression that the author shares the 
same doubts as the critics provides a useful defence against the usual accusations of paranoia, 
oversimplification etc. At the same time, the fact that, in spite of all these doubts, Radisic 
presents himself as still troubled by facts and evidence, which suggests that there indeed is a 
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conspiracy, implies that this evidence must be strong, persuasive and therefore worthy of 
attention. 
Also, Radisic makes no reference to the possibility of a global, world conspiracy, which is 
usually emphasised in classical conspiratorial literature. Instead, he offers a fairly moderate 
definition of conspiracy as a 'secret agreement to hann a third party, by all means necessary' 
(p.172). The innocuous defmition plays an important rhetorical function in the overall 
argument. It introduces the term 'conspiracy' in a way that appears reasonable, but this only 
prepares the ground for the conspiratorial 'leap of imagination' when the argument shifts 
'from the undeniable to the unbelievable' (Hofstader, 1966). That way, the 'reasonableness' 
associated with the initial mild definition is extended onto the more radical conspiratorial 
claims. 
1bis becomes apparent when Radi§ic proceeds from the rather bland definition to reiterating 
some of the major themes of the conspiratorial tradition. Radisic's article invokes arguments 
common in conspiratorial explanations of the Western intervention in the Balkans. These 
include the notion that many of the war crimes allegedly committed by Serbs were 'scripted' 
in order to justify anti-Serbian actions. Also there is the claim that the Western media are 
controlled by a higher power, and that the disintegration of Yugoslavia was facilitated by the 
presence of Western stooges in the Yugoslav government, Army, Security services, etc. 
Moreover, Radisic appears to tread on mystical ground when he alludes to the existence of the 
Age of Aquarius conspiracy, an idea commonly found amongst theorists who target the New 
Age movement: 
'If we accept the existence of Plato's year, we need to address the question about whether the so 
called conspiracy of Aquarius will bring the existent conspiracies to their peak, or will it destroy 
them?' (p.l71) 
Consequently, Radisic eventually acknowledges the possibility that all the minor 
conspiracies, 'partial interests', plots and instances of collusion could be integrated into a 
global conspiracy, which has world domination as its principal aim. 
Radisic also invokes the Freemasons in suggesting that the policy of indoctrinating the public 
by keeping the masses in a state of 'ignorance and poverty' is the legacy of the influence of 
this organisation. In doing so he positions himself within the conspiracy tradition. Radisic 
acknowledges that 'legitimate planning of the future' is supplanted by 'other influences' 
including 'Masonic protocols, plans made by politicised religions and trans-national 
corporations', to the point when it becomes 'uncertain which of these is most important' 
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(p.l75). In a footnote it is explained that 'politicised religions' alludes to the forceful 
conversion of Serbs to Catholicism and Islam. Reference to Freemasons, the Vatican, Islamic 
world and World bankers indicates that Radisic is well-versed in the classical themes of 
conspiratorial culture, and acknowledges their validity and relevance. It can also be 
speculated that Radisic's allusion to 'Masonic protocols' is an indirect link to the antisemitic 
conspiratorial tradition, in that in conspiratorial culture the reference to 'protocols' is 
commonly associated with the Protocols of the Elders of Zion. Evidence for this comes from 
Radisic's most recent book, Neocortical War, which will be examined in the next chapter. In 
the book Radisic refers to the Protocols of the Elders of Zion, and then in a footnote clarifies 
that 'it is irrelevant for the present discussion whether the protocols are Zionist or Masonic' 
(Radisic, 1999; p.51 ). Bearing in mind that Radisic appears not to make any distinction 
between the 'Masonic' and the 'Zionist' protocols, the reference to the former in the article in 
Vojno De/a may therefore be seen as a coded reference to the antisemitic document. 
Consequently, in Radisic's article the principal themes from conspiratorial culture seem to 
emerge from behind the screen of intellectual scepticism towards conspiracy theory. 
Freemasons, protocols, Age of Aquarius, international capital are not invoked as examples of 
a discredited perspective but rather as describing reality. 
The other overtly conspiratorial paper presented at the conference was the article Defending 
Europe, against the New World Order by Dragos Kalajic (p.76-95). The abstract ofKalajiC's 
article lays out the basic notion of conspiracy. In the very first sentence it says that 'in the 
New World Order, the author sees the most recent project and attempt by the international 
financial capital to implement its pseudo-imperialist aspirations, by means of American 
military and political force' (p.76). Predictably, Kalajic names David Rockefeller as the 
leader of the 'secret world super-government', which consists of 'world bankers and 
intellectual elite' (p.77). Kalajic's Gary Alien-style account of the world elite conspiracy is 
later supplemented with references to Freemasons, whose influence over Dositej Obradovic, 
the 19th Century Serbian intellectual and Serbia's frrst education minister is blamed for the 
subsequent 'intellectual and moral crippling of the brains and souls of numerous generations 
of our youth' who became the 'reproductions of the nihilist orders from the strategists of New 
World Order' (p.93).2° Kalajic's account also contains an antisemitic reference in that the 
ideological roots of the New World Order are traced to the 'pseudo-imperialism of the Old 
Testament' and the 'commercial theology and miserly morality of the Jewish and Protestant 
religions' (p.78). 
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The papers presented at the round table discussion were not the only examples of conspiracy 
theory on the pages of Vojno Delo. Conspiratorial ideas were promoted in the very next issue 
of the journal, in what was effectively a 'critical review' ofGary Alien's book Say No to New 
World Order (Jovan Despotovic, Through Global Conspiracy to Anti-Utopia, 1993, Issue 3-
4; p.259-269) . Alien's 1986 book was published in the Serbian language in 1992. The fact 
that book was reviewed in a prestigious military journal suggests that Say No to New World 
Order was considered to be worthy of note. 
The author of the review, Jovan Despotovic, was somewhat critical of Alien's book. 
Despotovic suggests that although 'interesting, especially for the lay public' the book 'stands 
on the boundary between political analysis and political "fantasy"' (p.269). Similarly, he 
points out that 'advocates of "conspiracy theories" may find [in the book] the 'crucial' 
evidence to back their claims, while their opponents might claim that they have found 
justification for their own views' (p.269). Despotovic also argues that the book is not a 'piece 
of scientific work', but rather a 'popular political publication' (p.269). However, the main 
criticism of Gary Alien focuses on his political allegiance. It is argued that Alien is 'an 
American traditionalist, a member of conservative (Right wing) circles in America, who still 
believes in the "American dream" about private property, and "equal opportunities for 
everyone"' (p.261). The fundamental disagreement with Alien's political orientation is also 
reflected in the rejection of his view that capitalism and communism are the same (in terms of 
their role in the conspiracy). Despotovic implies that rather than being in collusion, the two 
systems are opposed, but that the building of the NWO required communism to be destroyed, 
'which explains some of the dramatic events taking place in Russia' (p.261). 
In spite of criticising the book as insufficiently academic and bordering on fiction, Despotovic 
also suggests that, Say No to New World Order, is 'significant' because 
'[it] broke tbe intellectual "blockade" (embargo) in which our public found itself, regarding tbe 
discussion of "New World Order" and possibly international relations in general. This "auto-
embargo" was imposed during a fiery political battle in our country over tbe last couple of 
years, during which tbe more common (intellectual) trend was to deny tbe reality of 'New 
World Order'', or present it without any criticism, in cases when its existence was at least 
implicitly acknowledged. '(p.261) 
The author then goes on to outline, Alien's principal ideas, none of which are disputed or 
challenged. New World Order is cited as 'a new term invented with the purpose of hiding the 
conspirators', who have been attempting to achieve world dominance 'since the time of the 
great Flood' (p.262). It is also suggested that 'that which was once known as the tower of 
Babe!, is today called the UN' (p.262). Fairly standard conspiratorial themes are then 
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reiterated including those concerning the world elite organisations, the financial influence of 
David Rockefeller and James Warburg, control of the media and mass manipulation. Some of 
Alien's ideas are even applied to the contemporary context in that they are invoked to account 
for the media 'satanisation' ofSerbs: 
'Maybe the rapes, the Banski Dvor incident, cannibalism, the bombing ofDubrovnik, the Vase 
MiSkin Street bombing, and many other events throughout the Former Yugoslavia, might be 
explained by a fact cited by Gary Alien, namely that "the greatest power of television 
journalism is not in transferring information, but- happiness, sadness, shock and fear.' (p.266) 
The outline ends with Alien's own conclusion that "New World Order is a conspiracy above 
all conspiracies' (p.267, original italics). This conclusion is cited as an explanation why the 
book was 'a thorn in the side of all those who denied the existence of a New World Order and 
of opponents of so-called conspiracy theories, who for months ridiculed any attempt to prove 
the influence of foreign factors in the Yugoslav crisis' (p.267). So in the end, Despotovic 
acknowledges the validity and relevance of a conspiratorial explanation of the conflict in the 
Balkans. 
Consequently, just like Radisic's article in the earlier issue of Vojno Delo, Despotovic's 
review of Say No to New World Order contains an equivocal, albeit positive, evaluation of the 
conspiratorial explanations of international relations and Balkan politics. The publication of 
the two articles suggests that as early as in 1993, the conspiratorial tradition began to emerge 
in fairly respectable military publications. In some ways this signalled a change in the 
perceived legitimacy of the conspiratorial explanatory framework. Despotovic himself 
suggests that at the time of the publication of Alien's book, the dominant view in Serbian 
public life was once of scepticism towards the notion of New World Order and conspiracy 
theory. The emergence of Radisic's, Kalajic's and Despotovic's articles, as well as the fact 
that the conspiratorial interpretation of NWO was discussed at a gathering organised by the 
military establishment suggests that the alternative perspective was gradually making a 
breakthrough. 
The content of Vojno Delo in subsequent years reveals a continuing presence of articles with 
overtly conspiratorial content, written by some of Serbia's better known conspiracy theorists 
including Mihajlo Markovic (Fascism and the New World Order, 1995, Issue 3, p.61-74) and 
the anti-Catholic conspiracy theorist Zoran Milosevic (War in the civil doctrine of the Roman-
Catholic Church, 1995, Issue 6, p.80-99; Political journeys of Pope John-Paul I!, 1995, Issue 
2, p.l88-202). However, prior to 1999 there is little evidence of paranormal themes, 
conspiratorial or otherwise, which suggests that the mystical viewpoint was still beyond 
196 
respectability. Significantly however, on two occasions the journal published articles on the 
philosophical outlook of Nikola Tesla, the physicist whose work had been shown to play a 
crucial part in the paranormal conspiracy theory (Dr Smiljana Durovic, Nikola Tesla and the 
foundations of modern civilisation, 1996, Issue 3, p. 147-156; Branimir Jovanovic, 17ze Views 
on Nikola Tesla on War, 1996, Issue 4-5, p.217-223). In some ways these articles heralded the 
gradual arrival of some of the ideas which Radisic and Vlajic propagated in the early 1990s. 
The next chapter will examine the way in which paranormal conspiratorial themes came to 
the fore around the time of the Nato bombing. As will become apparent, the crucial role in the 
legitimisation of paranormal conspiracy theory in the late 1990s was played by Svetozar 
Radisic whose post-1995 writing consists of a more 'moderate' and 'respectable' version of 
the ideas identified in this chapter. Radisic's more recent paranormal theorising will be 
examined on the example of the book Neocortical War (1999). It will be suggested that in his 
recent writings Radisic incorporated, into the paranormal conspiracy theory, concepts and 
arguments originating from US literature on information warfare, which gave his views a 
more credible and acceptable image. More importantly, it will be suggested that the 
legitimisation of Radisic's 'neocortical war' perspective in the late 1990s was facilitated by 
the more general proliferation of conspiratorial explanations within which RadisiC's views 
continue to be embedded. 
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Chapter 9 
'Neocortical Warfare': conspiratorial re-presentation of a biological metaphor 
As was noted in the previous chapter, RadisiC's banishment to the relative obscurity of the 
Yugoslav Anny's Section for Propaganda and Psychological Operations was short-lived. 
Soon after the much-publicised expulsion from the army of Ljubodrag Stojadinovic, the 
officer who demoted Radisic in 1994, the latter was reinstated as the editor in chief of Vojno 
Delo. following his reinstatement, RadisiC's analyses of the Yugoslav predicament were 
published fairly regularly in the Serbian national press, especially in Revija 92, a magazine 
which specialises in police and military matters and whose editorial policy is considered to be 
favourable towards the Yugoslav army. Radisic's articles which appeared in Revija 92 were 
subsequently published in the form of a pamphlet distributed internally by the army (Defence 
doctrines- the concept of full-dimensional defence, 1997) and two years later as a book 
entitled Neocortical War. 
The examination of Radisic's recent work, which will focus on the 1999 book Neocortical 
War, will begin with the suggestion that, in his post-1995 writing, Radisic effectively 
continued to promote the blend of mystical and pseudoscientific explanations which, like his 
earlier writing on Group 69, is integrated into a more general conspiratorial thesis. However, 
it will also be argued that the openness with which Radisic has been able to discuss non-
conventional, paranormal aspects of warfare in recent years is partly due to a noticeable 
change in emphasis which gave his extraordinary views the appearance of respectability and 
reasonableness. In recent years, Radisic has incorporated into his strand of paranormal 
conspiracy theory various concepts which originate from mainstream Western military 
literature. The concept of 'neocortical war', which Radisic chose for the title of his book and 
which plays a central role in his more recent writing, was itself taken from US military 
literature on information warfare, a subject which has become increasingly popular among 
military theorists world-wide. 
The way in which information warfare terminology was incorporated into Radisic's 
explanatory framework will be examined in the light of the theory of social representations 
developed by Moscovici and others (Moscovici, 1976; Farr & Moscovici, 1984; Moscovici 
2000). It will be suggested that aspects of Moscovici's theoretical work on social 
representations can offer valuable insight into conspiratorial hermeneutics and the dynamic 
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which contributed to the proliferation of paranormal and mystical conspiratorial themes in 
Serbia in recent years. Specifically, the semantic transformations of the concept 'neocortical 
war' - en route from US literature on information warfare to Serbian paranormal conspiracy 
theory- which contributed to the broader acceptance ofRadi~ic's extraordinary ideas, will be 
considered as a manifestation of the processes of anchoring and objectification (Moscovici, 
1976, 1984a). 
The chapter will conclude with the suggestion that the legitimisation of paranormal themes 
was not the only conspiracy theory-related development in Yugoslav military discourse in the 
late 1990s. At the time of the Nato bombing, military publications will be shown also to have 
become more open to the conspiratorial anti-Western ideology of the Orthodox Right. This 
development will be illustrated using the example of an article on Nikolaj Velimirovic which 
appeared in Vojno Delo in the months after the bombing. It will be suggested that the positive 
evaluation of Velimirovic's ideology in Vojno Delo cannot be attributed to any shift to the 
Right within the military, but that it emerged as a legacy of the conspiratorial cultural 
tradition which transcended the habitual political divisions between Left and Right. 
9.1. llindu Mysticism and modern warfare in Radisic's recent work 
The examination of Radi~ic's 1999 book Neocortical War provides ample evidence that 
Radisic's post-1995 writing constituted a continuation of the explanatory discourse outlined 
in the previous chapter. As will become apparent, Radi~ic continued to propagate a blend of 
mysticism and pseudo-science. This is evident, for instance, in RadisiC's elaboration on the 
nature of contemporary warfare used by foreign powers: 
'There is a tendency in the area of military skill which warrants special attention. While on the 
one hand high technology weapons are being devised, keeping the insatiable military industry 
and trade in business, at the same time, destructive forces are shifting their activities beyond the 
physical sphere, through energy, to the sphere ruled by superstrings' {p.ll) 
In a footnote, Radi~ic clarifies that the term 'superstring' comes from the works of 
'theoretical physicist John Hagelin', and that 'strings are vibrations (waves) of the universal 
field of consciousness'. Apart from being a renowned expert in quantum physics, Dr Hagelin 
is also founder of the Natural Law Party of Yogi flyers, and was its presidential candidate in 
two US elections (1992 and 2000). He is best-known for offering a 'scientific', quantum-
mechanical basis for a version of ancient Hindu mysticism propounded by Maharishi Mahesh 
Yogi (Stenger, 1993).1 As was noted in the previous chapter, Maharishi Yogi featured in 
Radisic's articles in Duga published in 1994. 
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Radisic's continuing interest m esoteric theories of universal lmowledge goes beyond 
Hegelin's interpretation of Maharishi's theory of transcendental meditation. In Chapter 4 of 
Neocortical War, entitled The Information Shell, Radisic poses the following questions: 
'I) What can be achieved through the mastery of the unified field? 2) Are the 'Akashic 
records', Maharishi's universal field of intelligence and Hegelin's superstring field, Steiner's 
spiritual panorama, Borhes's cosmic memory, Eschenbach's cosmic chronicles, Earth's 
information shell (linked to the space 'database' described by B.S. Elepov and V.M. 
Chistyakov), Tesla's scalar field and Jung's collective unconscious as a treasury of memories, 
Murphy's infmite intelligence and universal mind- one and the same thing?' 3) Can the 'field 
that remembers everything' only be observed, read, interpreted, or also used and changed?' 
(p.57) 
In these questions Radisic displays an awareness of a variety of theories concerning 
'chronicles of the universe', 'universal lmowledge' etc., which originate from Hindu 
mysticism, theosophy, occult teachings, Russian pseudoscientific theories, etc. The allusion 
to all the different theories is indicative of the level (and persistence) of Radisic's interest in 
the world of the paranormal and the occult. Later in Neocortical War, Radisic even mentions 
the Holy Grail (which is nothing more than 'intuition' that offers access to the cosmic 
database; p.70) and the lost continent Atlantis, whose inhabitants apparently had paranormal 
powers due to some 'anomalies in the world's magnetic field' (p.72). 
The presence, in Radisic's work, of mysticism, pseudo-science and even mythology reflects 
the explanatory discourse identified in the previous chapter. Furthermore, not only is the 
general framework the same, but specific ideas outlined in Neocortical War are directly taken 
from the Group 69 tradition. So, at one point, Radish) introduces the distinction between the 
'material, astral, spiritual and archetypal existential planes'. This classification, which 
originates from the Kabbalah, is also offered by Vlajic in The First World Para-psychological 
War. Vlajic uses the same categories to describe the metaphysical framework within which 
Group 69 is said to operate. Also, Radisic cites 'Maharishi's followers' as claiming that ideas 
could be 
'implanted via the unified field, with absolute certainty that they would be received and 
accepted, if a critical mass is established, that is if the square root of the total population in an 
area is concentrated upon the same thought. A unification of ideas is thus established on the 
most basic level of nature, the so-called superstring field' (Neocortical War, p.64). 
This is more or less a direct Hindu-mystical reformulation of Vlajic's ideas about 
synchronicity and the 'creation of the future'. Moreover, it is identical to a claim which 
Radisic made in 1994, in the article which contributed to his downfall: 
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'According to John Hagelin, when a critical mass of thought energy is achieved, space will 
move and take the shape which was imagined by the greatest number of people. It would be 
dangerous if all this were true, because it would mean that Serbs would have to abandon key 
spots in Bosnia, under pressure from the Americans' (Involuntary suicide ofTurgut Ozal, Duga, 
18 March, 1994, p.8) 
Further evidence of continuity in Radisic 's work comes from the fact that the name of Spasoje 
Vlajic, Radisic's old associate from the days of Group 69, is invoked on several occasions in 
Neocortical War. Radisic cites Vlajic as an expert on matters related to short frequency 
waves, formula of light, etc. Also, in the final paragraph of Chapter 6, entitled The magic of 
words the author of Neocortical War gives a flattering evaluation of Vlajic's work. Radisic 
quotes 'Professor Dr Miloje M Rakocevic', one of the reviewers ofVlajic's book Formula of 
Consciousnes : 
'If future research confrnns that everything is the way it is described in chapter 8.1. [of Formula 
of consciousness] 'The Basic Code' then it will quite certainly become apparent that this section 
of the book contains an epochal discovery. The fact that it is not a coincidence that the genetic 
code contains 64 codons, just like the number of hexagrams in the I-Ching book of changes, for 
me is beyond dispute; but if it turns out to be true that the 'end product of the interaction 
between the physiological and the psychological' is also 'based on the number 64' then the book 
Formula of Consciousness will be read and re-read, for years to come.' (Neocortical War, p.56) 
Such positive description of Vlajic's writing confirms that RadisiC's Neocortical War is 
constructed within a framework that does not depart significantly from that which Radisic 
endorsed in 1994. 
A further parallel between the ideas contained in Neocortical War and the tradition of Group 
69 can be found in the fact that paranormal themes found in Radisic's book are incorporated 
within a conspiratorial narrative. Besides constant references to the 'creators of the New 
World Order' etc., Radisic refers to some of the classics of conspiracy literature. It has 
already been mentioned in the previous chapter that Neocortical War contains a reference to 
Protocols of the Elders ofZion. In Chapter 6 of his book Radisic noticed that 'it is interesting 
that the newest doctrinal rules in the West remarkably coincide with the basic assertions of 
the famous Protocols of the Elders ofZion'. In the footnote which accompanies the citation of 
Protocols Radisic claims that it is irrelevant whether the protocols are 'Zionist or Masonic'. 
He goes on to suggest that it is also irrelevant whether Protocols are 'original or a forgery. 
What is important is that this text, which is occasionally reprinted, exists and is de facto 
misused for aggressive and inhuman doctrinal solutions' (p.Sl, original emphasis). 
In spite of the apparent scepticism about the document's genuineness, Radisic failed to affirm 
the established fact that Protocols are a forgery (Cohn, 1957). Instead, he reasserted the well-
known conspiratorial notion that Protocols provides an insight into the contemporary world 
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of politics. Also, the fact that Protocols is quoted from, suggests that Radish\ is acquainted 
with the content of one of the most notorious examples of the conspiratorial tradition, and 
considers it worthy of mention in his book. 
Besides Protocols of the Elders of Zion, Radisic also cites in his book numerous well-known 
conspiracy theorists. In listing the authorities on the politics of the New World Order, Radisic 
mentions 'Chomsky, Gary Alien, Dragos Kalajic, Ratibor Durdevic and many others'. 
Chomsky apart, all the authors are right-wing conspiracy theorists, whose significance in the 
Serbian conspiratorial culture has been noted in earlier chapters. Also present in Radisic's 
book is the high-priest of Serbian conspiracism, Bishop Nikolaj Velinrirovic. Although the 
Christian element which dominates Vlajic's work is absent from Radisic's writing, the 
spiritual significance of Velimirovic is nonetheless acknowledged. Bishop Nikolaj is briefly 
mentioned twice in the book, on both occasions in the context of drawing a distinction 
between the 'qualitative' and 'spiritual' Serbian culture, and the 'quantitative' and 
'materialistic' Western civilisation: 
'Of course, those belonging to quantitative civilisations haven't got people like Bishop Nikolaj, 
Justin Popovic, Petar Petrovic Njegos ... ' (p.4 7) 
'Can the West understand the thoughts of Bishop Nikolaj: "It is madness that the sheep gave 
itself for a handful of grass, when grass is for life and not life for the grass", and fmd a way of 
abandoning empty dreams and adopt a qualitative way of life?' (p.143) 
Velinrirovic is also present in Radisic recent writing in other, less conspicuous ways. For 
example, the title one of Radisic's articles published in Duga in 1996 (see below) was A 
world of slaves or a world of omnihumans. The term 'ornnihuman' comes from Velinrirovic's 
religious philosophy and signifies a new type of individual devoted to God and the principles 
of Orthodox Christian dogma and way of life (see Chapter 3). Consequently, in Radisic's 
work, Velimirovic's teachings are invoked specifically to amplify the division between Serbia 
and the rest of the world, thus reinforcing the moral dichotomy implicit in the Manichean 
dimension of conspiracy theory. 
9.2. The change in emphasis in the post-1995 writing of Svetozar Radish! 
In spite of the persistence, in Radisic's more recent writings, of pseudo-scientific and mystical 
themes, following his reinstatement in 1995, Radisic's ideas were no longer perceived to be 
beyond the bounds of respectability or as in any way damaging to the integrity of the Army. 
Evidence for this comes from, for instance, the way in which his work was presented in the 
national press. The aforementioned article A world of slaves or a world of omnihumans, 
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(Duga, 27 April, 1996) which, in terms of content, was not dissimilar to Radisic's articles 
published in Duga two years earlier, was introduced in the following way: 
'The world today stands before two possible paths. One leads to a slave-driving order in which 
the population would be controlled with drugs and hy means of electronics. The other path leads 
to an all-dimensional war for the liberation of the revived humanity. This is how Colonel 
Svetozar RadiSic, the editor-in-chief of Vojno Delo sees the future, exclusively for Duga.' (A 
world of slaves ora world ofomnihumans, Duga, 27 April1996) 
Thus in 1996 the author's affiliation to the military, his rank and his position as the editor of 
Vojno Delo were made visible.' Moreover, Radisic's credentials were specifically invoked to 
augment the significance of the ideas presented in the article. What makes the disclosure of 
the author's rank and position even more noteworthy is the fact that, shortly before the article 
was published, Yugoslav military authorities introduced tighter regulations regarding the 
media exposure of its officers. According to Ljubodrag Stojadinovic, after 1995 the army was 
keen to restrict unauthorised contact with the media by military personnel. Bearing in mind 
RadiSic's rank and previous record, it is highly likely that Radisic sought and obtained 
approval from the Army's Information Bureau. Consequently, Radisic's article in Duga, and 
presumably most of his subsequent writing, seem to have been sanctioned by the Yugoslav 
military authorities. 
Further support for the claim that Radisic's recent writing was approved by his superiors 
comes from the fact that his 1999 book Neocortical War was published by the Yugoslav 
Army's official publishing house, the Military Publishing Institute. The list of the book's 
editors includes some high ranking officers, including Major-General Zlatoje Terzic and 
Colonel Mirko Bojanic, which suggests that the content of Neocortical War was judged by 
senior officers to be pertinent and valid. Moreover, in an interview to the daily Politika in 
October 1999, the director of the Military Publishing Institute, Colonel Slavko Brstina singled 
out Radisic's book as one of the more significant titles promoted by the Institute at the 
Belgrade International Book Fair and one that is likely to attract considerable public interest 
(Military Publishers at the Belgrade Book Fair: numerous important titles, Politika, 15 
October, 1999). 
The most striking evidence that Radisic's views eventually became perceived as normative 
within the military establishment is the fact that in May 2000, the author of Neocortical War 
was promoted to the position of the Yugoslav ~y's official spokesman. In other words, the 
man whose extraordinary world-views had been considered unworthy of a military officer in 
1994, was deemed, five years later, to be suitably qualified for the most public profile job in 
the Yugoslav military. 
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A possible reason behind Radisic's rapid ascent up the military hierarchy, and transformation 
from being dismissed as a liability to becoming the Army's face and voice, lies in the shift in 
emphasis apparent in Radisic's more recent writing and subtle dissociation from his earlier 
work. For instance, the book Neocortical War concentrates almost entirely on the way in 
which parapsychological weaponry is used by Serbia's enemies in the context of international 
conspiracy. The issue of parapsychological defence, which was the focus of the articles in 
1994, is totally neglected. There is no mention of the Serbian successes in the 
parapsychological showdown with forces of the New World Order. No unsubstantiated claims 
are made about the 'psychotronic shooting down of enemy jets' and there are no references to 
the 'Serbian Mirror' and other means of parapsychological protection. Importantly, Group 69, 
the unit whose activities Radisic first revealed to the world in 1994, and which was the focus 
of his interest at the time, appears only once in his recent writing. The group is mentioned in 
passing in the article Washington aims for the enemy's brain published in Revija 92 in April 
1998 (subsequently reprinted in Neocortical War, Chapter 5): 
'following the revelation about the existence of extra-lucid experts in Yugoslavia who function 
within the so-called group 69, the American journal ''The Military Review" announced that 
Nato's special parapsychological forces ''voodoo warriors" have been transferred from the Gulf 
to the Balkans, and were preparing for a final showdown with Belgrade's "Group 69"' 
(Washington aims for the enemy's brain, Revija 92,3 Aprill998). 
The phrase 'so-called' which precedes the reference to Group 69 indicates some equivocation 
on Radisic's part regarding the status of the group. Also, when first mentioned the word 
'group' is not printed with a capital 'G', which gives the impression that the unit is not in any 
way acknowledged as a formal organisation. Moreover, Radisic fails to mention that it was he 
himself who made the 'revelation' referred to in the text, which suggests an attempt at 
dissociation from the group. Interestingly, when the above paragraph was reprinted in the 
book Neocortical War, the modifier 'so-called' was for some reason excluded. Either way, it 
is clear that Radisic no longer wished to attribute to the group the importance manifest in his 
earlier writing, where Group 69 was given the illustrious title of 'the Yugoslav army's best 
kept secret'. However, in spite of the distancing, the Group's activities are neither dismissed 
nor criticised. In fact, the claim that revelations concerning Group 69 provoked a response 
from Nato implies that the actions of 'extra-lucid individuals' need to be taken seriously. The 
allusion to the contribution of Group 69 to the overall parapsychological struggle thus binds 
Radisic's more recent perspective with his early work, and offers yet another indication that 
his post-1995 writing constitutes a refinement of the pseudo-scientific and mystical ideas 
outlined in the previous chapter. 
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In the context of the overall rhetoric, the general shift in emphasis in Neocortical War -from 
the activities of Yugoslav parapsychologists to those of World powers - makes Radisic's 
account seem more reasonable and acceptable. As will become apparent shortly, attributing 
parapsychological manipulation of the masses to the technologically superior world power 
(primarily the US) is not difficult to integrate within the conspiratorial framework which 
already constructs the enemy as omnipotent and unscrupulous. Also, over the years, the US 
Army has achieved notoriety within conspiratorial culture in terms of the implementation of 
weapons aimed at subtle brain manipulation (e.g. Miller 1995). These conspiratorial themes 
concerning mass-manipulation provide a suitable point where paranormal claims can be 
meaningfully incorporated into the overall narrative of conspiracy, and promoted side by side 
with the ideas of the international anti-Serbian plot which had already engrossed the Serbian 
ideological milieu. 
9.3. From esoteric to information war 
One aspect of Radisic's post-1995 writing which has played a crucial role in the 
legitimisation of the paranormal conspiratorial perspective is the fact that paranormal fighting 
is discussed as an aspect of information warfare. Information war is a topic that has attracted 
considerable interest among Western military analysts in recent years (e.g. Whitehead, 1997; 
Stein, 1995; Arquilla & Ronfeldt, 1997; etc.). According to George Stein of the US Airforce's 
Air War College, 'information warfare' refers to a variety of techniques, ranging from the 
interception of enemy communication to psychological operation, all of which are aimed at 
achieving military objectives through persuasion, without the use of violent means' (Stein, 
1995). Since the early 1990s, the notion of information as a weapon has been discussed at 
length in books, articles in professional military journals and official publications in the US 
(DiNardo and Hughes, 1995). The concept of information warfare has even entered the 
United States Airforce Basic Doctrine (21 May 1996), where it is defined as any activity 
which 'can enhance power projection by diminishing the adversary's will and capacity to 
fight' 0 
In his more recent writing, Radisic grounds his claims within the framework of information 
warfare, and occasionally refers to established foreign authorities on the subject. In the above-
mentioned article published in Duga in 1996, as well as in his later work, Radisic quotes what 
has become known as the bible of information warfare literature, the book War and anti-War: 
suTVival at the dawn of the 21st century by Alvin and Heidi Toffler (1993). According to 
DiNardo & Hughes (1995) the popularity of this book in military circles is greatly responsible 
for the rising interest in information warfare in the 1990s, and its authors are cited in 
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practically every piece of literature on the topic.' In War and Anti-War the Tofflers (1993) 
applied their well-known 'wave theory' of history (Toffler, 1981) to the military context and 
argued that in the contemporary world (which entered the third, 'information age') the 
supremacy on the battlefield depends on the mastery of information technology (Toffler and 
Toffler, 1993). Radisic cites the book in support of a similar claim that 'in the "third wave" 
the battle for supremacy will be fought with the power of information systems, through 
knowledge and fast communication' (A world of slaves or a world of omnihumans, Duga, 27 
April 1996). Also, the Tofflers are cited as referring to future conflicts as '"wars of 
knowledge" because in them a crucial role would be played by the information technology of 
highly developed societies' (Ibid.). Significantly, the Tofflers are not the only authorities on 
information warfare cited by Radi~ic. The views of Eliot A. Cohen, (Professor and Director of 
Strategic Studies at the Johns Hopkins University and former professor at Harvard and the US 
Air War College) and Andrew Marshall (Director of Net Assessment in the Office of the 
Secretary of Defence) both of whom have written on information warfare in the past are also 
mentioned. The citation of American sources has significant rhetorical implications because 
their authority gives Radi~ic's perspective an air of respectability. Through the reference to 
US military literature, Radisic's rhetoric shifts from esoterical and pseudo-scientific 
theorising towards what is widely perceived as an established and legitimate area of interest. 
The grounding ofRadi~ic's argument in the information war paradigm is also apparent in the 
fact that the concept of 'neocortical war', which plays a central role in Radi~ic's work and 
provides the title of his most recent book, originates from US military literature on the 
subject. The term was first coined by a retired Colonel of the US Army, Richard Szafranski, 
in the article Neocortical war: the acme of skill, published in the US military journal The 
Military Review in November 1994. In the forthcoming sections, the way in which 
Szafranski's idea of neocortical warfare was incorporated in Radisic's work will be examined 
in more detail. It will be suggested that in Szafranski's original formulation, the term 
'neocortex' was used in the context of a biological metaphor the aim of which was to 
facilitate the understanding of the relatively novel concept of information warfare. In 
Radisic's work, on the other hand, 'neocortical warfare' is interpreted as the targeting of 
actual brains, in the context of mass manipulation orchestrated by international conspirators. 
The discursive and hermeneutic processes involved in this transformation of neocortical war 
from metaphor to literal interpretation will be examined in the light of Moscovici's social 
representations theory. 
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9.4. Creating a reasonable version of conspiracy theory: a process of representation 
In Chapter 2, it was suggested that one feature of conspiracy theory which contributed to its 
endurance and persistence in modern society is its fluid and dynamic quality. Over the past 
two hundred years, conspiracy theories have been continuously transformed. The perpetual 
evolution was fuelled by the need to make the notion of conspiracy more plausible and 
relevant in response to the changing political and social reality. The example of this process 
cited in Chapter 2 was the transformation from classical to world elite conspiracy theory in 
the 1950s and 60s. In the aftermath of the Nazi Holocaust, antisemitic conspiracy theories, 
which dominated the conspiracist culture from the mid-19th Century, were relegated to the 
outer reaches of the political spectrum. However, the marginalisation of conspiratorial 
antisemitism did not mean that conspiracy culture was itself banished from public discourse. 
Many conspiracy theorists abandoned the notion of a Jewish plot, and turned their attention 
towards non-ethnic world elite organisations such as the Council on Foreign Relations or the 
Bilderberg Group (Lipset and Raab, 1978; Billig, 1978). 
Significantly, as was pointed out in Chapter 7, the Bilderberg group, the Trilateral 
Commission and other organisations which feature in the more 'reasonable' and seemingly 
innocuous world elite versions of conspiracy theory were not invented by the conspiracy 
theorists themselves. Instead, these real and existing world elite organisations were imported 
into the conspiracy tradition from other contemporary discourses, such as various 
explanations of current affairs, international relations, world politics, etc. In other words, 
instrumental in the transformation of conspiratorial culture after the Second World War was 
the process of communication and exchange between conspiracy theories and other more 
socially acceptable and respectable worldviews. Through this kind of interaction, concepts, 
arguments and ideas originating from reputable, non-conspiratorial discourses were 
incorporated within the conspiratorial tradition, transforming it in a way that gave the basic 
thesis of conspiracy a more acceptable and convincing image. 
The inter-ideological communication and exchange which underlies the continuous 
transformation of conspiracy theories can be said to reflect the dynamic of re-presentation 
(Moscovici, 1976, 1984a). In his work on the interpretation of psychoanalysis in the French 
press in the 1960s, Moscovici examined the way in which concepts belonging to a specific, 
specialist discourse (i.e. psychoanalysis) were re-presented (anchored, objectified) in 
everyday language before becoming part of the commonsense understanding of the world. A 
similar process can be said to underlie the way in which concepts, images and metaphors 
from reputable discourses are incorporated and assimilated within conspiracy theory before 
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becoming a regular feature of the conspiratorial explanatory framework. This aspect of 
conspiratorial rhetoric will be illustrated using the example of the way in which the initially 
metaphorical reference to 'neocortical war' in US military literature was anchored into the 
Serbian conspiratorial culture, and the way in which this process contributed to the 
legitimisation ofRadisic's explanatory framework. 
As will become apparent, the representation of 'neocortical warfare' in Serbian conspiracy 
theory consisted of two distinct stages. In the first stage of representation, the term was 
anchored within world elite conspiracy theory. At this stage, the phrase retained its original, 
metaphorical meaning. Only in the second stage was 'neocortical war' anchored into the more 
extreme, classical conspiratorial discourse. At this point the concept was objectified, and its 
original metaphorical meaning was transformed into a literal reference to attacks on the 
human brain. Each of the two representations will be examined in turn. Before doing so, the 
original meaning of the term 'neocortical war', as featured in US literature, will be briefly 
examined. 
9.5. 'Neocortical warfare' in US military literature 
As was already mentioned, the phrase 'neocortical war' originates from US literature on 
information warfare which has been largely inspired by the writings of Alvin and Heidi 
Toffler. According to the some c_ritics of the information warfare paradigm (e.g. DiNardo & 
Hughes, 1995) the Toffleresque wave theory of warfare is somewhat simplistic in its 
assumption that history, and by extension warfare, can be divided into three distinct, and 
radically different periods or 'waves'. One implication of such strict categorisation of history 
is that the emergence of the so-called 'information age' is presented in much of relevant 
literature as a radically new development, which warrants the reorganisation of the entire 
military doctrine and the formulation of innovative ways of waging war. For example, in the 
introduction to a recently published collection of essays on information warfare entitled In 
Athena 's Camp: preparing for conflict in the information age, the editors, John Arquilla and 
David Ronfeldt (1997) of the RAND corporation consistently refer to the information age as a 
new 'epoch' which has transformed the battlefield. Significantly for the present discussion, 
the novelty of the 'information age' is seen as warranting the construction of new metaphors. 
So, Arquilla and Ronfeldt suggest that 
'Epochal shifts call for new metaphors. Metaphors and analogies help convey new concepts by 
providing simplified images that encapsulate complex points' (Arquilla & Ronfeldt, 1997, p.8) 
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The title of their book, In Athena 's camp is itself a metaphor. As the authors explain, in the 
information age, Athena, the Greek goddess of wisdom, is the new goddess of war. The era 
of brute force epitomised by Ares or Mars is over, in that 'where war is about information, 
[Athena] is the superior deity' (p.9). 
The use of metaphor to make the relatively novel concept of information warfare more 
accessible to the uninitiated reader is also evident in the work of Colonel Richard Szafranski, 
who, in 1994, introduced the concept of 'neocortical warfare'. Szafranski, a retired US army 
colonel and military analyst, outlined neocortical warfare in two articles, Neocortical 
warfare? The acme of skill published in The Military Review in 1994 and A Theory of 
Information Warfare: Preparing for 2020 which appeared in Airpower Journal in 1995. The 
former article was reprinted in Arquilla and Ronfeldt's (1997) recent edited collection of texts 
on information warfare. 
In Neocortical warfare? The acme of skill, Szafranski endorses one of the main themes of 
information war theory, and argues that the principle aim of war is to subdue the enemy's 
hostile 'will', rather than to destroy it physically: 
'object of war is quite simply, to force or encourage tbe enemy to make what you assert is a 
better choice, or to choose what you desire tbe eoemy to choose. Said in another way, tbe object 
of war is to subdue tbe hostile will of tbe enemy. We cannot meet tbe immediate objective of 
war unless we subdue hostile will' (Szafranski, 1994/1997; p.397) 
While traditional warfare achieves this aim through violent activity that 'resides at the high 
end of the spectrum of coercion' (p.397), Szafranski argues in favour of subduing the enemy 
through a more 'peaceful' technique based on persuasion. Szafranski proposes this kind of 
'persuasion' as an alternative to traditional war, where tbe subjugation of hostile will could be 
achieved without force: 
'What if we viewed war not as application of physical force, but as a quest for metaphysical 
control? What if we pursued tbe possibility tbat war might have as much to do witb tbe idea of 
willpower and non-fighting tban it does witb tbe idea of physical power and fighting?' (p.399) 
The aim of 'neocortical warfare' is thus 'to cause the enemy not to fight by exercising 
reflexive influence'. In other words, 'military power resides in the domain of the mind and the 
will; the province of choice, "thinking", valuing and "attitude", and insight or "imagination"' 
(p.395). 
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Interestingly, Szafranski acknowledges that his re-discovered interest in the importance of 
'the moral, the mental and the will in conflicts' reflects the ideas of some of the principal 
theorists of warfare, ranging from Krishna of the Bhagavad-Gita, through Machiavelli and 
Clausewitz, to Mao and Napoleon. Among all the 'classics' cited in his work, Szafranski 
appears to have special affmity towards the ancient Chinese thinker Sun Tzu, whose 
aphoristic statement that 'subduing the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill' appears to 
be the author's favourite. However, the recognition that the psychological dimension of 
warfare is almost as old as war itself did not prevent Szafranski from bringing in a new term, 
'neocortical warfare', to describe what Sun Tzu acknowledged, many centuries earlier, to be 
'the acme of skill'. The introduction of new terminology was in some ways necessitated by 
the fact that 'information age' is seen as a radically new epoch which demands irmovative 
modes of thinking and new 'paradigms', rather than the reliance on classical texts. Therefore, 
consistently with Arquilla and Ronfeldt' s ( 1997) dictum about new epochs demanding new 
analogies, Szafranski incorporated his conceptualisation of 'third wave warfare' within a 
distinctive biological metaphor where the human brain is used to represent the characteristics 
of war in the information age. 
In using the analogy of the human body to aid the understanding of an aspect of social life (in 
this case modern warfare), Szafranski followed a trend that dates back to antiquity (Gergen, 
1990) . In the Republic, Plato drew an analogy between classes in a society and different body 
parts. Similarly, in St. Paul's letter to the Corinthians, different functions of individuals in a 
society were compared to roles of different parts of the anatomy. Essentially the same 
metaphor underlies Hobbes's Leviathan (1651), Herbert Spencer's Principles of Sociology 
(1876), as well as Durkheim's writing on 'collective representations' and McDougall's 
Group Mind (Gergen, 1990). Moreover, biological metaphors appear to be particularly 
common in war-time rhetoric, when they are often used to represent the enemy state or 
society. References to the striking at the 'heart' of the Serbian regime, or breaking it's 
'backbone' are some examples used by Nato propaganda during the bombing campaign. 
Even relatively neutral sources such as Amnesty International, described the bombing of the 
Serbian state television building as a way of destroying 'the nerve system and apparatus that 
keeps Milosevic in power' (paragraph 76) and referred to the RTS as a propaganda 'organ'. 4 
To justify the use of a biological analogy, Szafranski cites the work of two historians, Will 
and Ariel Durant (1968) who are quoted as saying that 
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'the laws of biology are fundamental lessons of history. They describe nations or states as 
biological organisms, human organisms ourselves multiplied, our good and evil natures writ 
large' (quoted in Szafranski, 1994/1997, p.396). 
The metaphor itself is constructed on the basis of a number of neuro-physiological theories, 
including Ornstein's and Thompson's (1984) work on the hemispheric division of the cortex. 
However, crucial to the labelling of the new form of warfare as 'neocortical' is Paul 
McLean's idea of the 'triune brain' which proposes a threefold differentiation of the human 
central nervous system, based on different stages of evolutionary development. After 
outlining the distinction between the reptilian, paleomammalian and 
neomammalian/neocortical parts of the brain, Szafranski (1994/1997) notes that 'the triune 
brain suggests an analogy. Might there also not be three approaches to warfare?' (p.403). The 
'neo-mammalian brain' or the 'neocortex', which is capable of 'organisation, integration and 
the conceptualisation of time and space' is taken to represent war in the information age. The 
suggested aim of 'neocortical warfare' is 'influencing, even to the point of regulating the 
consciousness, perception and will of the adversary's leadership: the enemy's neocortical 
system' (p.404). 
Throughout Szafranski's article, the term 'neocortex' is used primarily as a metaphor 
referring to the enemy's (collective) decision making structures, i.e. their leadership. 
Consistently with the cerebral analogy, the metaphorical 'brain' is portrayed as having its 
own psychological mechanisms. Szafranski argues that the collective 'neocortex', needs to be 
presented with 'perceptions, sensory and cognitive data' in order to influence its 'patterns and 
images'. Also, he advocates the use of 'tools similar to Bandler's and Grinder's 
neurolinguistic programming to understand how the adversary receives, processes and 
organises visual and kinaesthetic perceptions.' (Szafranski, 1997, p.405) 
Literature on metaphors, especially those used in psychological writing, suggests that when 
analogies are employed to facilitate the understanding of a novel idea, there is often a 
slippage from metaphorical to literal expression (Soyland, 1994). As the analogy becomes 
more elaborate, concepts originally used for comparison within a figure of speech tend to 
become treated as if they are the actual object under discussion. Soy land (1994) for example 
discusses the way in which the analogy of a hologram was used in neuro-psychological 
literature in the 1960s to refer to the way in which memory is stored within the brain. Soyland 
suggests that as the analogy was elaborated by researchers, the explanation gradually shifted 
from the metaphoric to the literal, and memory became treated 'as if it were holographic' 
(Soyland, 1994; p.43). Similar slippage is visible in Szafranski's text. On occasions the word 
'brain' is used not as a metaphor for enemy leadership, but as a metonymy for individual 
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enemy soldiers. For example, Szafranski describes traditional warfare as consisting of 'more 
elaborate means and methods of destroying brains', as an indirect way of getting at the 
collective will: 
'Destroy enough brains, or the correct brains, our studies seem to encourage us, and 'will' 
necessarily dies along with the organism' (Szafranski, 1994/1997, p.398) 
The metaphorical status of the 'neocortex' is further obscured when Szafranski challenges his 
own biological analogy by recognising that 'analogies suggesting that states are like 
biological organisms are convenient, simplistic and of course flawed' (p.396). The 
equivocation regarding the validity of his choice of metaphor leads Szafranski to adopt a 
reductionist stance which acknowledges that the 'chain of events that culminates in war' is 
attributable to the 'human factor' ('crazy leaders') rather than to the qualities of some 
metaphorical organism ('crazy state'). Reductionism of this kind undermines the metaphorical 
status of the psychological jargon employed in the rest of the article. Furthermore, if 
collective 'psychology' is portrayed as reducible to individual psychological functioning, then 
only a short hermeneutic step is needed before the references to 'sensory and kineasthetic' 
perceptions or neurolinguistic programming are interpreted as aimed as actual, individual 
'neocortices' rather that at their metaphorical, collective equivalent. 
As will become apparent later, the literalisation of the metaphor was precisely what happened 
when the idea of 'neocortical warfare' was represented within the wilder reaches of Serbian 
conspiracy culture. However, although the ambiguity of the original metaphor may have 
contributed to the nature of the representation of the concept in Serbian conspiracy literature, 
it is important to remember that in the original text, 'neocortical warfare' was explicitly 
introduced as an 'analogy'. It was also interpreted as such in US military literature which 
commented on Szafranski's article (e.g. Whitehead, 1997; DiNardo &Hughes, 1995). 
Although the idea of 'neocortical warfare' has been heavily criticised by numerous Western 
military analysts, none of the criticisms imply that Szafranski's article proposes a 
revolutionary method aimed at actual brain manipulation.' This can be taken as evidence that 
the interpretation of Szafranski's ideas in Yugoslav conspiracy literature cannot be attributed 
solely to the ambiguity of the original metaphor. Instead, as the following sections will 
demonstrate, instrumental in the literalisation of the 'neocortical' metaphor was the process of 
re-presentation and, more specifically, anchoring and objectification. 
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9.6. First phase of conspiratorial re-presentation: transforming a personal view into 
'doctrinal rule' 
Approximately a year after The Military Review published Szafranski's article in the US, 
Yugoslavia's principal military journal Vojno Delo featured a text entitled Information 
operations - a further examination of US military doctrine. As the author - retired navy 
captain Zivko Lukic - explained in a footnote, the aim of the article was to 'provide the 
outline of a series of texts' published in The Military Review in November 1994, and shed 
some light on the conceptualisation of information warfare in the Doctrine FM 100-5, which 
had been adopted by the US military in 1993 (Lukic, 1995, p.210). Because Lukic's article 
was intended as an appraisal of the whole issue of The Military Review, specific contributors 
were not individually identified. Instead, authors were collectively referred to, again in a 
footnote, as 'a group of eminent authors from the Fort Leavenworth Military Academy'. 
Consequently, although Lukic's article devoted four pages (out of the 20-page text) to 
Szafranski's formulation of 'neocortical warfare', the latter's authorship was never 
acknowledged. Even though the omission can be dismissed as poor scholarship on Lukic's 
part, the misattribution of authorship has had important rhetorical implications. By associating 
Szafranski's ideas with 'eminent authors from the Fort Leavenworth Military Academy', the 
notion of 'neocortical warfare' was given institutional legitimacy which it would not have had 
if it had been accurately presented as a widely criticised personal view of a retired army 
colonel. Moreover, Lukic not only presented 'neocortical war' as an idea promoted by 
prominent policy makers within the US military establishment, but also treated it as an 
established 'doctrinal rule' that had already been implemented in the Balkans, to the 
detriment of the Serbian people. Lukic commented that 'Americans have never publicised a 
doctrinal rule without trying out most of its postulates whether on polygons or in practice- on 
one of the victims of their foreign policy' (p.226). He went on to attribute the widespread 
anti-Serbian bias in Western media to the successful application of the 'doctrine of 
neocortical warfare' (p.226). 
The transformation of 'neocortical warfare' from the vision of an individual analyst to an 
important aspect of US military doctrine can be seen as the first step in the re-presentation of 
'neocortical warfare' in Yugoslav conspiracy literature. According to Moscovici, the process 
of re-presentation is a manifestation of the universal need to make the unfamiliar familiar. 
Novel concepts and ideas become part of common sense by being assimilated within an 
existing world view. 1n other words: 
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'The images, ideas and language shared by a given group always seem to dictate the initial 
direction and expedient by which the group comes to term with the unfamiliar' (Moscovici, 
1984a, p.26) 
Instrumental in the process of re-presentation is anchoring which aims to 'reduce strange 
ideas to ordinary categories and images, to set them in a familiar context' (Moscovici, 1984a, 
p.29) and '[integrate] new information within a system of familiar categories' (Abric, 1996, 
p.72). The same dynamic can be said to underlie Lukic's reading of Szafranski's formulation 
of 'neocortical warfare'. The world view which dictated the direction of Lukic's 
interpretation was the conspiratorial cultural tradition. 
As was noted in the previous chapter, ever since the early 1990s, the journal Vojno Delo 
played an important part in the dissemination of conspiracy theories. Although some articles 
published in the journal were shown to contain traces of classical conspiratorial tradition, 
most focused on the world elite conspiracy aimed at the creation of a 'New World Order'. It 
is within this tradition of explanation that Lukic's article can be located. 
As was noted in Chapter 2, one of the basic premises of conspiratorial culture is the idea of 
mass manipulation (Hofstadter, 1966; Billig, 1978). Conspiracy theorists believe that visible 
reality is just a fa9ade that hides the intentions of evil organisations which are plotting world 
domination. Within the conspiracist culture, the idea that it may be possible to affect 
perceptions and thinking patterns is not treated as, at best, a vision of warfare in the future, 
but is accepted as a crucial feature of contemporary reality. Consequently, as the idea of 
'neocortical warfare' was anchored into a conceptual framework which takes the reality of 
the New World Order conspiracy for granted, (Szafranski's) personal vision was re-presented 
as describing existing and effective methods of manipulation. 
Significantly however, LukiC's article, as the first stage of re-presentation of 'neocortical 
warfare' in Serbian conspiracy literature, did not question the metaphorical dimension of 
Szafranski's argument. Although Lukic did not reflect on Szafranski's elaborate discussion of 
the cortical anatomy, he nonetheless interpreted and described 'neocortical warfare' within 
the confines of the biological analogy. For example, the original formulation of the 'enemy's 
neocortical system' as referring to 'its leadership' was faithfully reported, thus preserving the 
metaphorical connotations of the 'neocortex'. At the same time, some of the original 
ambiguity of the metaphor was further accentuated when Lukic noted that 
'The authors then direct their attention to the characteristics of the human brain, consulting 
various experts in the sphere of psychology and the human mind and will, and conclude that 
"war is the only thing that simultaneously allows and demands the employment of all human 
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capacities, the highest as well as the lowest". This means that the human brain is capable of 
organising the strength and the means for killing and destruction, but at the same time it allows 
the limitation of the application of brute force' (Lukic, 1995; p.224) 
'Various experts' (presumably Ornstein, Thompson and McLean) whose work was originally 
cited in order to justify the cortical analogy, were on this occasion represented as being 
actually 'consulted' by US policy makers. This, and the fact that 'the brain' is presented as 
the subject of the authors' attention, constitutes a significant departure from the otherwise 
mainly metaphorical allusion to the cortex. Importantly, although the ambiguity obscures the 
metaphor, Lukic at no point suggests that 'neocortical warfare' directly aims at the brains of 
individuals. 
Lukic's relatively 'moderate' interpretation of neocortical warfare, in spite of the ambiguous 
nature of the metaphor, can again be attributed to the fact that Lukic's work belongs to the 
more 'reasonable', world elite conspiracy theory which tends to avoid the more controversial 
mystical and pseudo-scientific themes characteristic of classical conspiracy literature. In 
world elite conspiracy theories, allegations concerning the implantation of microchips in 
people's brains, interference with neural functions, etc. are largely absent. Therefore, the 
retention of the metaphorical meaning of 'neocortical war' in Lukic's writing can be 
attributed to the fact that this was a meaningful, and rhetorically advantageous way of 
anchoring Szafranski's ideas within the tradition of explanation which featured in Vojno Delo 
in the mid 1990s. 
9.7. Second phase of re-presentation: objectification of the 'neocortex' in the writing of 
Svetozar Radmc 
Several years after 'neocortical warfare' was introduced into Serbian conspiratorial discourse, 
the term became incorporated into the wilder reaches of the Serbian conspiracy culture. The 
key role in this process was played by Svetozar Radisic. Radisic first used the term in the 
article Washington aims for the enemy's brain published in Revija 92 in April 1998. As has 
already been mentioned, arguments laid out in this article were subsequently reprinted, and 
developed, in the book Neocortical War (1999). 
The title of RadisiC's book suggests that Szafranski's concept of 'neocortical warfare' 
captured his imagination. However, a closer examination of the book's content offers no 
indication that the author actually read any of Szafranski's work. Instead, descriptions of 
'neocortical warfare' found in the book consist entirely of paraphrases of Lukic's 
representation of the concept. For example, Radisic notes that: 
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'in articles which have been published in the journal 'The Military Review", in November, 
1994, a group of eminent authors from the Fort Leavenworth military academy confirmed, in 
their analysis of US military power in the 21" Century, that the Pentagon examined various 
aspects of the operationalisation of"neocortical warfare". It only confirmed that the (un)popular 
methods of mind control found their way into military doctrines' (Radisic, 1999; p. 15-16). 
The misattribution of authorship and the interpretation of Szafranski's article as describing 
actuality rather than a vision of the future, match, practically word for word, Lukic's 
representation of'neocortical warfare'. However, although Lukic's article seems to have been 
Radisic's only source of information on the subject of 'neocortical war', the latter treats the 
phrase as signifying much more than a metaphorical reference to methods used to influence 
the decision-making processes of the enemy leadership. As the above paragraph suggests, the 
concept is taken to signify the '(un)popular method of mind control'. Crucially, the 'mind' 
does not refer to the collective will of the metaphorical enemy as in Szafranski 's or Lukic' s 
texts, but to the actual mind of individuals. This is evident when Radisic suggests that: 
'the working defmition of this increasingly popnlar term could be stated as: neocortical war is a 
conflict in which one side uses the totality of methods aimed at the cortex, so that by deforming 
specific areas and by interfering with their functions, a person's relationship with his innate 
'voice of conscience' would be disrupted, thus creating conditions for manipulating individuals, 
groups and peoples, in a way that would lead them to incorporate particnlar ideas, most 
frequently those which are inconsistent with their real interests' (p.12) 
Radisic proposes that this new method of war 'includes the so called inactivation or blocking 
of neural functions which can cause death, because we are talking about the pinnacle of total 
war and its crucial characteristic' (Radisic, 1999; p.ll). These allusions to the attacks on the 
neocortex and the interference with neural functions are not in any way metaphorical, but 
refer literally to techniques aimed at the organic brain. This becomes clear later in the book 
when Radisic examines the techniques of neocortical war in more detail, invoking many 
themes associated with the pseudoscientific and mystical strands of classical conspiracy 
theory such as the implantation of microchips, brainwashing, the use of subliminal messages, 
Satanic ritual abuse, etc. 
The literalization of Szafranski's biological metaphor apparent in Radisic's interpretation of 
'neocortical war' can be seen as an instance of objectification, a process which, according to 
Moscovici, often accompanies anchoring in the creation and maintenance of social 
representations. Objectification refers to the process that turns the 'invisible' and abstract 
concepts into something 'perceptible' and concrete (Farr, 1984), leading to a state of affairs 
where 
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'distinction between image and reality is obliterated. The image of the concept ceases to be a 
sign and becomes a replica of reality, a simulacrum in the true sense of the word. Then the 
notion or entity from which it had proceeded loses its abstract, arbitrary character and acquires 
an almost physical, independent existence. It has the authority of a natural phenomenon for 
those who use it.' (Moscovici, 1984a, p.40) 
Like much of social representations terminology, the idea of objectification lacks a precise 
defmition. Arguably, objectification involves the use of metaphor per se. Moscovici (1984a) 
suggested, for example, that the analogy with the 'father' objectifies the idea of a 
transcendental God by providing a figurative nucleus through which 'God', as an abstraction, 
is suffused with concrete meaning, and thus given a more real and tangible existence. 
However, the process of objectification seems to involve more than just metaphoric 
representation. It also assumes that 'the figurative paradigm [is] detached from its original 
milieu' and an abstract idea is 'let loose in a society [where] it is accepted as a reality, a 
conventional one but nonetheless a reality' (Moscovici, 1984a, p.39). In that sense 
objectification entails the literalisation of a metaphorical expression. Literalisation of a 
metaphor objectifies because it 'de-contextualises' a concept by removing it from the initial 
theoretical discourse and organising it in a different and original way (Abric, 1996). In 
Radisic' s book, the reference to the 'neocortex' was dissociated from the discourse of 
information warfare where it had a metaphorical meaning, and was re-organised or re-
presented in a way that transformed the metaphor into a literal allusion to the organic brain 
targeted by the malicious cabal behind the evil conspiracy. 
Importantly, objectification, which can be said to underlie RadiSic's use of the phrase 
'neocortical war', was accompanied, and in some sense instigated by the process of 
anchoring. The literalisation of the original metaphor was steered by the 'images, ideas and 
culture' inherent in the more extreme pseudoscientific versions of conspiracy theory within 
which the concept was being imported. A common feature of classical conspiracy theories is a 
profound interest in the way in which conspirators use scientific achievements, real or 
imagined, to advance their evil causes. Conspiracy theorists who subscribe to this view place 
particular emphasis on the progress in the field of neuro-physiology or brain-wave research 
(Miller, 1995; Constantine, 1997; Keith, 1999, V1ajic, 1998, 2000) reflecting the conspiracy 
theorist's preoccupation with the notion of mass manipulation on which the alleged plot 
depends. Within these more outrageous strands of conspiratorial cultural tradition, the 
possibility and actuality of brain manipulation is treated as crucial to the process of deceiving 
the masses. Therefore, the anchoring of 'neocortical' warfare within the pseudo-scientific 
conspiratorial system of thought, prepared the ground for the process of objectification and 
the resulting Iiteralisation of Szafranski's biological metaphor. 
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9.8. Rhetorical implications of re-presentation 
The above sections attempted to illustrate the dynamic which underpins an important aspect 
of conspiratorial rhetoric, namely the tendency to incorporate, within the conspiratorial 
narrative, arguments and concepts which originate from relatively uncontroversial and 
commonsense discourses. In some sense, this process can be said to lie at the foundation of 
what Hofstadter (1966) called the 'leap of the imagination' frequently found in conspiracy 
theory. The accumulation of 'convincing evidence' which, according to Hofstadter, precedes 
the conspiratorial leap from the 'undeniable to the unbelievable' can be said to involve the 
process of representation through which concepts and arguments from less contentious 
perspectives and discourses are anchored within the conspiratorial interpretative framework. 
When various extraordinary conspiratorial claims, such as the possibility of parapsychological 
warfare, appear rational or convincing to the audience, this is frequently because they are 
coated in a set of otherwise sensible and reasonable representations. 
As far as the actual process of re-presentation is concerned, it nright be tempting to interpret 
anchoring and objectification described above as manifestations of various cognitive biases 
which mar the psychological functioning of Lukic, Radisic, or other conspiracy theorists. In 
fact, there is a tendency among some advocates of the social representations approach, to treat 
anchoring and objectification as taking place on the level of individual cognition (van Dijk, 
1991; Potter and Billig, 1992). Traces of cognitivism in social representations theory have 
attracted some criticism, especially from the discourse analytic perspective (Potter & 
Wetherell, 1987; Potter & Litton, 1985; Potter & Edwards, 1999). Discourse analysts have 
been particularly critical of the frequent neglect, in social representations research, of the 
communicative aspects of representations, and its occurrence in everyday talk and 
interaction. 6 Also, the cognitivist interpretation of anchoring and objectification can be said to 
neglect the strong social dimension and purpose of re-presentation. The assinrilation of 
concepts within an existing representation reproduces and maintains the world-view 
contained in that representation, and propagates the broader cultural tradition of the group that 
shares it (Billig, 1993). So, incorporating, redefining and reinterpreting novel concepts from 
the conspiratorial perspective binds the conspiracist community together and enriches the 
explanatory framework to which it subscribes. Moscovici (1984a) himself suggests that the 
function of social representations is not just to guide interpretation of social phenomena and 
facilitate understanding of novel concepts, but also to bind groups together, groups which are 
defined by the very fact that they endorse the same world-view and belong to the same 
culture. Consequently, rather than being a mechanical process, akin to traditional socio-
psychological notions of categorisation or assimilation, re-presentation can be said to involve 
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a dynamic and a fundamentally social activity. In other words, in the present chapter, Lukic's 
and Radisic's writings have been used as illustrative examples of a broader social and 
ideological dynamic which takes place at the level of discourse and communication. 
Also, conspiratorial re-presentation illustrated the dynamic quality of social representations. 
Representations are in a state of perpetual transformation, which entails continuous creation 
of novel and more convincing ways of stating particular claims, and justifying a stance in a 
matter of controversy. Anchoring and objectification are therefore functional practices which 
reflect the epistemological orientation of language and the rhetorical nature of communication 
(Billig, 1987, 1991). In the case of conspiratorial discourse, re-presentation plays an essential 
part in the permanent battle against the widespread 'intellectual presumption against 
conspiracy theory' (Pidgen, 1995) and popular scepticism towards conspiratorial claims. 
The rhetorical impact of the dynamic of representation is evident in the role which 
'neocortical war' presently occupies in Serbian conspiratorial culture. Since the publication of 
Radisic's and Lukic's work, the term has become a regular feature in Serbian conspiratorial 
literature. 'Neocortical war' is used to refer to practically any aspect of conspiratorial mass 
manipulation. More importantly, Radisic's and Lukic's writing has provided those who 
promote the idea of mass manipulation with a credible and respectable authority to support 
their claims. Writers who use the concept of 'neocortical war' seldom omit to acknowledge 
that revelations concerning the reality of this aspect of contemporary warfare originate from 
'a group of eminent authors from the Fort Leventworth Military Academy' or from the 
writing of Svetozar Radisic whose military credentials augment the rhetorical force of his 
extraordinary conspiratorial argument. 
One particularly interesting example of the increasing popularity of the concept of 
'neocortical war' is the fact that the third, revised edition of the book Religious Sects, 
published in 2000, contains a ten-page chapter entitled Neocortical warfare (Lukovic, 2000). 
This book, which has been endorsed by the Yugoslav Army, the Serbian Ministry of Interior 
and the Serbian Orthodox Church, is used as a textbook at the Serbian Police Academy. The 
author of the book is Zoran Lukovic, a lecturer at that institution. However the chapter on 
'neocortical war' was the special contribution of Aleksandar Senic, an expert on sects who 
has been writing on the subject for various religious publications as well as Revija 92. In the 
chapter in Lukovic's book, Senic interpreted the emergence of new religious movements in 
contemporary Serbia as an instance of 'neocortical war', i.e. as part of an attempt at mass 
manipulation the aim of which is the subjugation of the Serbian people. It has already been 
mentioned in the previous chapter that attack on religious sects is an important feature of 
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Serbian conspiratorial discourse. In Religious Sects, various legitimate religious communities 
(such as the Hare Krishna movement, Jehovah's Witnesses or the Adventists) are discussed as 
belonging to the same category as Satanic cults, the Freemasons, Ordo Templi Orientis, or the 
llluminati, and therefore are constructed as instruments in the anti-Serbian plot. 
The inclusion of Senic's chapter in the third edition of Lukovic's book suggests that by the 
year 2000, the concept of neocortical war had become established as a normative category 
used to refer to conspiratorial mass manipulation. Moreover, the idea of neocortical war was 
considered to be significant enough to warrant a separate chapter, written by a different 
author. Interestingly, the description of 'neocortical war' in Religious Sects resembles Lukic's 
interpretation closer than Radi§ic's, in that direct and literal brain-manipulation (through 
electromagnetic and psi-weapons) is not mentioned. At the same time, Radi§ic's 1997 
pamphlet (which was subsequently published as Neocortical War) is referred to, so the reader 
is directed towards Radi§ic's more extreme ideas. The pamphlet is cited as evidence that 'the 
defence against neocortical war- the idea of full-dimensional defence- is being taught in the 
School of National Defence and the Military Academy [Generalstabna Skola]' (Senic, 2000; 
p.302) which gives the whole discourse of'neocortical war' further institutional legitimacy. 
The respectability which paranormal and esoteric themes achieved through the association 
with the information war paradigm appear to have propelled these themes into the domain of 
acceptable (political) explanation. This is apparent in the recognition which paranormal 
theorising attained among members of the regime of Slobodan Milo§evic. In the Spring of 
1999, around the time of the Nato bombing, two senior members of the Party of the Yugoslav 
Left which at the time was part of the ruling coalition (and led by Mitjana Markovic, 
Slobodan Milosevic's wife), proposed the formation of a 'Yugoslav committee for coherence 
and invincibility' which would train one thousand Yogi fliers who would protect Yugoslavia 
with their positive energy (Pavlovic, 2001, Popadic, 2000). The two officials, Jara Ribnikar 
and Prvoslav Markovic (who at the time was chairman of the board of Belgrade's main 
mental hospital) got the backing for their project from a number of state-owned companies 
(including the Post Office and the Electricity Board) as well as from the Ministries of Health 
and Defence. The presence of the Ministry of Defence on this list is especially noteworthy. It 
suggests that in 1999 the military not only endorsed a venture based on the mystical theories 
of Maharishi Yogi, but also formally backed the same project - the building of a 
parapsychological shield over Serbia - from which some five years earlier (at the time of 
Group 69) it was so eager to distance itself. With this in mind, it no longer seems surprising 
that in the spring of 2000, Radisic was considered a suitable candidate for the main 
spokesman of the Yugoslav military. 
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9.9. Conspiracy theory beyond left and right: Bishop Velimirovic in Vojno Delo 
So far the chapter focused on the emergence of paranormal conspiratorial themes in Yugoslav 
military discourse in the late 1990s. However, this development was not the only conspiracy 
theory-related ideological shift in the Yugoslav military at the time. The Army publications 
also became more open to the Velimirovicesque ideas propagated by the Orthodox Right. 
Earlier in the chapter it has been noted that, unlike Radisic's articles in Duga in 1994, the 
book Neocortical War contains several references to Bishop Nikolaj Velimirovic. On both 
occasions, it was Velimirovic's anti-Westernism - such as the allusion to the idea of the 
omnihuman, or to the 'qualitative' Serbian spirit- that appealed to Radisic. Further evidence 
that, in the late 1990s, the Army was becoming more open to the views of the Orthodox Right 
comes from an article published in the Autumn 1999 issue of Vojno Delo. The article in 
question, entitled The philosophical thought of Bishop Nikolaj Velimirovi/: on War and 
Europe was written by Zoran Milosevic, a sociologist of religion, whose articles on the 
Vatican conspiracy were published in Vojno Delo at various points in the 1990s. The piece 
outlined V elimirovic 's life and work, and summarised his views on war and the Western 
world. Velimirovic's overtly antisemitic book Words to the Serbian people through the 
dungeon window was introduced as containing Bishop's 'most significant thoughts on 
Europe' (Milosevic, Philosophical thought ... , p.180). These 'significant thoughts' include the 
reference to Europe as the 'white devil' (p.l79}, and the antithesis to Christianity (p.182). 
Velimirovic's view of Europeans as betrayers of Christ and representatives of Satan were 
cited in the article without critical reflection. 
In Milosevic's article, as in VelimiroviC's writing, the anti-European and anti-modern 
sentiments gradually slip into antisemitism. In the article's conclusion, where the author 
endorses Velimirovic's idea that Serbia should turn away from Europe towards Russia, 
Velimirovic is quoted as saying that the required re-orientation is 'not towards anti-Russian 
and Jewish Russia, but Orthodox Russia' (Milosevic, 1999; p.l83). The reference to 'Jewish 
Russia' alludes to the Communist Soviet Union. The article therefore not only resonates 
VelimiroviC' s antisemitism, but also echoes a well known right-wing conspiratorial myth 
concerning the Jewish origins of communist ideology and the alleged role of Jews in the 
Russian revolution. Once again, no critical commentary of Velimirovic's antisemitism or his 
right- wing ideas was offered by the author. 
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The endorsement of a right-wing conspiratorial myth in Zoran MiloseviC's article is 
noteworthy because unlike in 1993, when Vojno Delo published the article by the right-wing 
journalist Dragos Kalajic, on this occasion there was no comparable shift to the right which 
might explain the openness to right-wing conspiratorial myths. As will become apparent 
shortly, by 1999 the Yugoslav Army had by-and-large returned to its Titoist, leftist roots. 
Also, around the time of the publication of the article in Vojno Delo the relations between the 
army and the Orthodox Church deteriorated significantly. 
In the summer of 1993, Slobodan Milosevic became increasingly aware of the danger posed 
by the influence of right-wing political forces within the military. The purge of army generals 
which ensued saw the departure of most officers with open links to the Right (Military Coup, 
Vreme, 7 June 1993, p. 19-21; Panic ate lamb, Vreme, 19 July 1993, p.13-16.). The army was 
subsequently infiltrated by the Party of the Yugoslav Left (YUL) an organisation led by 
Slobodan Milosevic's wife Mitjana Markovic. Total control of the military by left-wing 
parties was finally established in December 1998, when General Dragoljub Ojdanic, an 
officer with affiliations with the Party of the Yugoslav Left, became the Army Chief of Staff 
(General spring cleaning, NIN, 3 December 1998. Ongoing reshuffle, Vreme, 28 November 
1998, p.6-8.). 
With the rising influence of YUL in the military came a return to the old Titoist tradition. In 
February 1995, one of the leaders of YUL, Zoran Cicak, told a journalist that the army was 
'tom between its tradition, the tradition of the old Yugoslav People's Army which was 
freedom-loving, anti-Fascist and (why hide it) leftist, and the hysterical demands from 
sections of the public for its "depolitisation" (Who marches with the Left?, NIN, 24 February 
1995, p.l0-13). It was clear that YUL favoured the restoration of the leftist tradition ofTito's 
Partizans. 
The shift to the left was also visible in the Army's stance towards the Serbian Orthodox 
Church. This is significant with respect to the article on Velimirovic, considering that he 
represents not only the Serbian Right, but is also a highly esteemed Church figure. Although 
from the early 1990s senior military officers paid occasional visits to the Patriarch of the 
Serbian Orthodox Church, the Army consistently refused to allow church services for 
soldiers, continuing the secular tradition of the Communist Yugoslav National Army.7 In 
addition, frequent allegations of clericalism, directed against the Orthodox Church by the 
Serbian regime, were reiterated in military publications, including Vojno Delo. Incidentally, 
one such article, Pros and cons of spiritually guided policies, published in 1995, was a critical 
review of a book by Zoran Milosevic, author of the subsequent article on Velimirovic. The 
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reviewer, Jovan Despotovic (mentioned earlier as the reviewer of Gary Alien's Say no to 
New World Order), criticised the claim, made in Milosevic's book, that clericalism was 
absent from Orthodox Christian dogma. Despotovic accused the Serbian Orthodox Church of 
interference in state matters and of siding with extreme right-wing elements in Serbian 
society. Criticism was directed especia11y at those within the church who attempted to 
rehabilitate 'quislings and fascists' from the Second World War (Despotovic, 1995, p.193). 
The article echoed the old Communist assessment of the Church as the extended arm of right-
wing Nazi collaborators, and as such was implicitly criticising the rehabilitation of 
Velimirovic by the Church authorities. 
In the months after the bombing, the relations between the Serbian regime, including the 
Army, and the Serbian Orthodox Church were particularly strained. Following the end of the 
war with Nato, the Church openly sided with Serbian opposition parties and demanded reform 
and the establishment of a 'government of national salvation'(He touched my finger, Vreme, 
19 June 1999, p. 8-10). The response of Milosevic's regime was, yet again, to accuse the 
Church of interference in state affairs. Some prominent Church figures were even labe1led 
'puppets of the West'. Significantly, the Yugoslav Army openly sided with the regime: two 
senior generals, Dragoljub Ojdanic and Nebojsa Pavkovic publicly stated their readiness to 
defend the Serbian regime from all 'Nato stooges' and 'traitors'(The misuse of oak leaves, 
Vreme, 24 July 1999, p. 2). 
It appears, therefore, that a positive evaluation of the work of Nikolaj Velimirovic, one of the 
principal exponents of right-wing clericalism, appeared in Vojno Delo at a time when the 
Army was contro1led by left-wing parties, and when accusations of clericalism and right-wing 
bias were regularly directed at Church authorities. What is especially remarkable is that the 
article in Vojno Delo focused on precisely those aspects of the Bishop's teachings which have 
significant political and ideological implications and which reflect his devotion to right-wing 
politics governed by Christian religious teachings. 
The paradoxical situation where a publication belonging to a left-wing, secular institution 
implicitly endorses a right-wing, clericalist political outlook, becomes more comprehensible 
once the proliferation of conspiratorial discourse in the 1990s is brought into the equation. 
Throughout the years ofMilosevic's rule, the habitual antagonism between Left and Right, or 
between 'regime' and 'opposition' populism was continuously eroded by the increasing 
popularity of the shared notion of international conspiracy against Serbia. The proliferation of 
conspiracism eventua1ly brought on, as the dominant categorisation in the Serbian ideological 
context, an alternative distinction between pro- and anti-Western political stances. The 
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emergence of a united anti-Western front, defined by an ideology which circumvented the 
traditional distinction between Left and Right, had the idea of conspiracy at its core. One of 
the most significant institutional manifestations of this ideological convergence of contrasting 
political outlooks was Serbia's ruling 'Red-Black' coalition, which brought together the 
Socialist Party, the Party of the Yugoslav Left and the nationalist Serbian Radical Party of 
Vojislav Seselj. 8 
If the Serbian ideological context is observed in terms of the distinction between pro- and 
anti-Western stances, then it becomes evident that, at the time of the publication of the article 
on Velimirovic, the Orthodox Right and the Army were effectively on the same 'side'. 
Significantly, the distinction between pro- and anti-Western stances never totally superseded 
the Left-Right division in Serbian politics. Instead, the two different classifications of ideas 
interacted and clashed with each other on the level of political discourse, with the salience of 
each depending on the rhetorical demands of specific situations. That is why it was possible 
to accuse the Church of right-wing bias on one occasion (as Despotovic did in 1995) and 
praise its leading right-wing ideologist on another. 
In summary, the positive evaluation of Velimirovic 's work in Vojno Delo cannot be attributed 
to a shift towards the Right in the military. Instead Zoran Milosevic's article should be seen as 
a tribute to Bishop Nikolaj's contribution to the anti-Western conspiratorial discourse and a 
testimony to his role as the high-priest of contemporary Serbian conspiratorial culture. The 
dynamic which enabled the text on Velimirovic to appear in Vojno Delo can be said to have 
involved the broadening of the boundaries of acceptable opinion similar to that described in 
Chapter 7. As the idea of an international conspiracy came to be regarded, in Serbian military 
discourse, as the standard way of perceiving politics and history, it was only a matter of time 
before aspects of the conspiracy tradition, which at first sight might seem incongruous, 
emerged from the woodwork and became treated as respectable. The continuing presence of 
Velimirovic's religious ideology in Yugoslav military discourse will be considered in the 
following chapter, which examines the fate of conspiracy theories following the fall of 
MiloseviC's regime in October 2000. 
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Chapter 10 
Conspiracy culture in post-Milosevic Serbia: the return to the margins 
In the previous chapters, it was suggested that at the time of the Nato bombing of Yugoslavia, 
conspiratorial explanations of the Western intervention in Kosovo gradually came to 
prominence in Serbian political, media and everyday discourse. Although the basic thesis of 
conspiracy played an important role in Milosevic's political rhetoric ever since the early 
1990s, the presence of conspiratorial culture in Serbian society was never as pervasive and 
ubiquitous as at the time of the war with Nato. In the Spring of 1999, and for many months 
afterwards, Serbia resembled Daniel Pipes' description of contemporary Middle East as a 
place where conspiracy theory 'suffuses life, from the most private family conversations to 
the highest and the most public levels of politics'; where it flourishes 'on the street and in the 
palace and everywhere between' (Pipes, 1996, p.2). 
The proliferation of conspiracy theories in Serbia in the fmal years of the 20th century can be 
at least partly attributed to the traumatic nature of the 11 weeks ofNato bombing. Outbreaks 
of conspiracism are usually sparked by disturbing social or political events which lead to a 
breakdown of traditional explanations. Conspiracy theories, and indeed other extraordinary 
beliefs (e.g. the paranormal), fill the explanatory vacuum by providing simple and coherent 
accounts of relevant social strains and traumas. 
Another important reason why the belief in sinister international plots imposed itself with 
such force and conviction on Serbian political culture is that this type of explanation 
presented a convenient and culturally available explanatory framework which could account 
for years of international isolation and the confrontation with the Western military alliance. In 
the contemporary world, conspiracism is typically found among cultures (Middle East), 
societies (North Korea, Russia in the mid 1990s) or political movements (John Birch Society, 
Liberty Lobby, International Action Centre, etc.) which feel in some way marginalised or 
threatened by the US-dominated post-communist political reality. Across the globe, critics of 
Western military, economic and diplomatic supremacy, and those eager to challenge the 
authority of the liberal-democratic political discourse, appear to project their fears and 
discontents into a general thesis of conspiracy. In that sense, Serbia in the late 1990s, 
impoverished by lengthy international economic sanctions and under threat from Nato attack, 
constituted the ideal breeding ground for conspiratorial culture. In addition, the international 
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aspect of the Yugoslav crisis brought into the open the significant anti-Western dimension of 
Serbian nationalist discourse which contains, at its core, the notion of an anti-Serbian plot. 
The assumed significance of the conflict with the Western world as a contributing factor in 
the proliferation of conspiracism in Serbian society, implies that an improvement in the 
relations between Serbia and the relevant international power structures would influence the 
status and importance of conspiratorial culture. The events of October 2000, which resulted in 
the collapse of the twelve year-old regime of Slobodan Milosevic, provide an opportunity for 
testing this proposition. The transition of power in Serbia instantly changed the country's 
international standing. Once a 'pariah state', Serbia suddenly became inundated with 
promises of financial aid and offers of membership in various international political and 
economic organisations. Many of these organisations, including the OSCE, the World Bank 
and the International Monetary Fund had been habitually portrayed by Milosevic's media as 
the extended arms of the anti-Serbian conspiracy. In other words, more or less overnight, 
international isolation, as a predicament which had to be accounted for and which generated 
conspiratorial explanations, disappeared from the political agenda. The present chapter will 
attempt to explore the fate of conspiracy theories in the new political climate and examine the 
extent to which the political changes affected the status of conspiracist ideology in Serbian 
society. 
The chapter will consist of four separate sections, which will deal with different issues 
relating to the status of conspiracy theory in post-Milosevic Serbia. The first of the four 
sections will examine the transition of power in October 2000 in the light of the pervasiveness 
of conspiratorial beliefs at the time. If anti-Western sentiments, articulated in terms of a belief 
in an international conspiracy, were as strong and widespread as earlier chapters suggest, then 
how is it possible that the Serbian electorate decided to substitute the anti-Western regime of 
Slobodan Milosevic for a government which brought about a reconciliation with the Western 
world? A brief examination of the events leading to the downfall of Slobodan Milosevic will 
suggest that the transition of power was not brought about by a sudden ideological 
transformation in Serbian society, or a widespread endorsement of liberal and pro-Western 
ideas by the electorate. Instead, the fall of the Milosevic regime was precipitated by the fact 
that the Serbian political opposition took on board the prevailing anti-Western sentiments, and 
opted for a campaigning strategy which brought together the rhetoric of national pride and the 
necessity for political change. It will be suggested that the rise to prominence of Vojislav 
Kostunica, who played an instrumental role in the ousting of Milosevic, was largely 
attributable to his strong anti-Western credentials, and a defiant stance, which in the past had 
incorporated elements of conspiratorial rhetoric. 
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In the second section it will be suggested that, as predicted, once the problem of international 
isolation had been removed from the political agenda, the thesis of conspiracy lost most of its 
explanatory value, giving way to a more reconciliatory tone with regard to Serbia's relations 
with the Western world. Since the events in Autumn 2000, conspiratorial culture has been 
relegated to the margins of politics and public life. The rnarginalisation of conspiratorial 
culture will be illustrated by the example of Otacastveni Pokret Obraz (Patriotic Movement 
Dignity), a fringe far-right organisation which became active after Milosevic's ousting, and 
which is today the principal exponent of the wilder reaches of conspiratorial culture. This 
section will also reflect on the different ways in which known conspiracy theorists Spasoje 
Vlaji6 and Smilja A vramov, whose work was examined in earlier chapters, interpreted the 
recent political changes and accounted for the decline in their public standing. 
The third section will suggest that one important state institution in Serbia has managed to 
resist the overall rnarginalisation of conspiracy theories. The institution in question is the 
Army, which has not, as yet, undergone significant personnel and systemic changes since the 
transition of power. As a result, military publications continue to promote the kind of 
explanatory discourse examined in earlier chapters. This section will focus particularly on the 
way in which the exponents of conspiratorial anti-Westernism in military publications 
reconcile this somewhat anachronistic perspective with the all-embracing changes in the 
relations between Serbia and the international community. 
Finally, after examining the general disappearance of conspiracism from the mainstream 
media and its continuing presence in military publications, it will be suggested that in spite of 
the overall marginalisation of conspiracy theories and those who promote them, this type of 
ideology still features in Serbian political life. Moreover, it occasionally manages to penetrate 
the mainstream media. The enduring presence of conspiracism will be attributed to the fact 
that conspiracy theory still constitutes a culturally available explanatory discourse which is 
occasionally invoked to explain and criticise various Western influences in Serbian society 
and its greater liberalisation. As such, conspiracism is becoming a integral part of at least the 
more extreme elaborations of a conservative, nationalist and traditionalist political option 
which is gaining ground in post-Milosevic Serbia. 
10.1. Conspiracy theory and the transition of power in October 2000: 
In the introductory chapters, it was indicated that an important feature of the conspiracist 
worldview is the Manichean view of politics. Conspiracy theorists often interpret the 
227 
everyday political struggle as a battle between the irreconcilable forces of Good and Evil. As 
a result, in societies dominated by conspiracism, everyday political disputes are seen as a 
confrontation between right and wrong and as the final showdown between the two moral 
opposites (Hofstadter, 1966; Lipset & Raab, 1978). 
In the aftermath of the war with Nato, the Serbian political arena was dominated by the spirit 
of conspiratorial Manicheanism. In the eyes of the regime and its media, the political sphere 
was divided between two diametrically opposed alternatives. One was the superior, freedom 
loving and patriotic option epitomised by the 'heroic' efforts of Slobodan Milosevic in the 
fight against the 'New World Order'. The other, which included anything short of 
unequivocal support for Milosevic and his political regime, was branded 'collaborationist' 
and regarded as the continuation of the aggression by Nato and other Western imperialists. In 
the regime media, Serbian opposition parties were regularly referred to as 'puppet-like 
political structures' whose every move was 'instructed' by 'mentors' from Washington or 
Brussels. At a reception organised in honour of the representatives of the Serbian Diaspora in 
August 1999, Milosevic personally accused the opposition parties of trying to 'implement the 
aims of the Nato alliance' and vowed that 'patriotism and the love of our country would 
defeat treason', and that 'good would triumph over evil' (quoted in Serbian Dialogue between 
Machiavelli and Montesquieu, Vreme, 14 August 1999, p.S). 
The dualism inherent in Serbian government rhetoric reflects the important 
countersubversive dimension of conspiratorial discourse. As Berlet & Lyons (2000) suggest, 
the search for the 'fifth column', and the witch hunt against groups which are portrayed as 
wanting to overturn the established political order, constitutes an important element of 
contemporary conspiracy culture. In many ways the counter-subversive dimension of 
conspiracism is a manifestation of the inherently reactionary nature of the conspiracy culture. 
In Serbia for example, the escalation in the hunt for 'collaborators' in the months after the war 
with Nato helped maintain the status quo by making it difficult for Milosevic's opponents, 
who were known for their pro-Western views, to formulate a political programme which 
could not be easily dismissed as an act of 'treason' plotted by international powers. 
In the first months after the bombing, the Serbian opposition tried to ignore the constant 
vilification in the state media, and openly propagated a reformist, pro-Western agenda. For 
instance, opposition representatives (Vuk Draskovic, Zarko Korac, Dragoljub Micunovic, 
Vesna Pesic) met with the one of the most denigrated Western politicians, the US Secretary of 
State Madeleine Albright, in an attempt to negotiate the lifting of sanctions against Serbia. 
Vuk Draskovic, leader of the Serbian Renewal Movement, even kissed Madeleine Albright's 
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hand, in an act of gentlemanly courtesy which turned out to be also an act of political suicide. 
Behind such openly pro-Western campaigning strategy stood the belief that Serbian public 
opinion would not be deceived by the paranoia whipped up by the pro-regime media, and that 
verbal assaults on the opposition parties would actually lead to public outrage culminating in 
widespread protests against the government (veteran Serbian opposition politician Dragoljub 
Micunovic in Are fair elections possible?, Vreme, 21 August, 1999). However, the predicted 
uprising in defence of the opposition's integrity failed to materialise. Instead, the public 
display of pro-Western sentiments only fuelled the ongoing witch-hunt against 'Nato 
mercenaries'. For instance, the footage of Draskovic's 'intimacy' with Mrs. Albright was 
subsequently replayed over and over again on Serbian state television, often in slow motion 
and accompanied by vulgar innuendoes. I van Markovic, one of the leaders of the Party of the 
Yugoslav Left commented that 'citizens of Serbia and voyeurs around the world were given 
the opportunity to watch a live broadcast of the fable about the stupid wolf [Vuk is Serbian 
for Wolf] and the evil pig' (Politika, lOth January, 2000, p.14). For months after the event, 
images of Draskovic kissing the 'bloody paw' were regularly invoked as the ultimate proof of 
the collaboration between the Serbian opposition and the West. 
The opposition's disregard for the widespread anti-Westernism seriously undermined the 
perceived legitimacy of the democratic political option in the months after the bombing. The 
prevailing sentiment among the voting public was that of apathy. The only two, and both 
equally unattractive political options that seemed to be on offer at the time were the existing 
regime - which proposed the preservation of national pride at the price of poverty and 
economic instability; and the opposition - which promised democratisation and economic 
development in exchange for what was perceived to constitute outright capitulation to Nato 
and the West. The prevailing 'they are all as bad as each other' attitude, accompanied by a 
general disillusionment regarding the prospects for political change, favoured the status quo 
and contributed to the continuation ofMilo§evic's rule. 
The unenviable position in which the Serbian opposition found itself in this period became 
particularly acute late in July 2000, when Milosevic's Socialist party of Serbia formally 
announced the date of the presidential elections. For the first time since 1992, the election 
entailed a direct one-to-one 'face-off between Milosevic and an opposition candidate. 
Finding a suitable challenger proved to be a difficult task for Serbia's recently united 
opposition. Independent opinion polls conducted at the time indicated that around 30% of 
voters were hard-core opposition supporters, who would vote for the opposition candidate 
regardless of their character or political profile (Ripe for a candidate, Vreme, 5 August, 2000) 
Milosevic on the other hand could count on a steady portion of around 33 percent of the 
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electorate. The remaining 37 percent were the indifferent and apathetic floating voters, whom 
the opposition needed to woo in order to ensure victory over Milosevic. However, neither of 
the two main contenders, Vuk Draskovic and Zoran Dindic, was able to make inroads into the 
undecided proportion of the vote. The main problem was that both had dubious patriotic 
credentials. Dindic fled the country during the bombing which was widely perceived as an 
unpatriotic and almost treacherous act, while Draskovic had had the unfortunate and 
unforgivable encounter with Madeleine Albright. The popularity of each of the two 
opposition leaders was likely to diminish as the election date approached, considering that 
candidature would bring about an even more intense and more focused vilification in the state 
media. 
However, an intriguing result which emerged from the same opinion polls conducted during 
the summer of 2000, was that 43% of those questioned by pollsters replied that they would 
vote for the opposition if the candidate was Vojislav Kostunica. Kostunica was then leader of 
the relatively minor Democratic Party of Serbia (DPS) which in previous elections had 
attracted (on its own) around 6% of the vote. And yet, Kostunica suddenly emerged as the 
preferred candidate of the united opposition. Furthermore, the 43% of the vote attracted by 
Kostunica included an unprecedented 5% swing away from Milosevic, whose percentage was 
reduced to 28%. It subsequently emerged that the main quality which distinguished Kostunica 
from other opposition leaders, and which enabled him to infringe upon Milosevic's proportion 
of the vote, were his impeccable patriotic credentials and a firm and uncompromising anti-
Western stance. 
Throughout the 1990s Kostunica and the DPS propagated a political ideology based on the 
ideas of patriotism, national pride and the revival of Serbian cultural traditions. Hand in hand 
with this conservative and nationalist political agenda went a strong anti-Western rhetoric. 
This latter aspect of Kostunica's political orientation became particularly prominent at the 
time of the bombing, when he emerged as one of the fiercest critics of the military 
intervention. Kostunica's anti-Westernism was often formulated in way that echoed the 
official governrnent rhetoric. As a result Kostunica's Democratic Party of Serbia was 
practically the only credible opposition organisation in Serbia whose press-releases were 
regularly reported in the regime media, including Politika and state television. In Politika, the 
views of the DPS were habitually given a few square inches of column space, usually among 
a variety of other, similar texts which expressed an outrage at the Nato intervention and 
praised the bravery of the Serbian people. The same press releases were also read out in 
television news bulletins. Siguificantly for the present discussion, the anti-Westernism 
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evident in the views ofKostunica and the DPS often included themes characteristic of what in 
earlier chapters was referred to as protoconspiracy theory. 
For instance, DPS press releases contrasted the 'real' intentions of the Nato bombing with its 
assumed humanitarian purpose. Predictably, the 'real' motives, which the DPS exposed in its 
statements were far more sinister, and involved the destruction of Serbia: 
'The systematic bombing of bridges, railroads and industrial plants which are far away from 
Kosovo, clearly suggests that the aim of William Jefferson Clinton and his European satellites is 
not the solution to the Kosovo problem, which they themselves created, or the protection of the 
Albanians whom they have themselves endangered ... 
The real purpose of the bombing, is to impede Serbia's economic development, and reduce it to 
the status of a backward American colony, incapable of performing an active role in the 
international community. One thing which this man [Clinton], who has defiled the idea of 
democracy, has lost sight of is the vast force of resistance possessed by the Serbian people .. .' 
(Politika, 11 April, 1999) 
Although the statements consistently referred to the 'conquest of Serbian territory' as the aim 
of the campaign (e.g. Politika, 16 April, 1999, p.14; 17 April, 1999, p.14; 31 May, 1999, 
p.l4), sometimes the assumed hidden. motives of Nato were extended to include the 
destruction of the Serbian people. DPS claimed that Nato was deliberately targeting Serbian 
civilians, as it supposedly did when it bombed 'the first floor of a 23 storey tower-block, 
ensuring that no one inside could get out alive'. This particular argument was used to suggest 
that the real objective of the Nato campaign, orchestrated by 'Madeleine Albright and other 
similar creatures', was the 'deliberate annihilation of a whole [Serbian) people' (Politika, 23 
April, 1999). 
Also, Nato's assumed desire to destroy Serbia and its people was presented by the DPS as 
simply a stepping stone towards global control. For instance, in early April 1999, Kostunica 
gave an interview to the sensationalist political magazine Nedeljni Telegraf, in which he 
condemned the 'mixture of [American] imperialism and totalitarianism', aimed at 
'conquering new territories, and ordering the whole world in a new way' (Nedeljni Telegraf, 7 
April, 1999; p.12-13). The reference to the 'ordering of the whole word' reflects the New 
World Order theme characteristic of conspiracy theory. 
Finally, as in other instances of protoconspiratorial discourse, which were examined in an 
earlier chapter, significant emphasis in the rhetoric of Kostunica's DPS was placed on the 
notion of mass manipulation, the aim of which was to conceal the West's colonial or even 
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genocidal aspirations. For instance, Kostunica compared Nato to Nazi Germany and argued 
that the policy of retaliation against civilian targets is 
'accompanied by unprecedented manipulation and the presence of the most transparent lies. 
Since the bombing has up to now been a political and military failure, various exoduses, 
executions, mass graves, concentration camps and rapes are more and more frequently being 
invented in Brussels' (Politika, 20April, 1999; p.l4) 1 
As in much of Serbian government discourse, the plight of the Albanian refugees was either 
ignored, blamed on Nato's bombing campaign, or in most cases portrayed as a product of 
media manipulation. 
An important consequence of the thematic compatibility between Kostunica's explanation of 
the Nato intervention, and that found in Serbian government discourse, is that Kostunica's 
patriotism was never questioned by the regime media. Unsullied patriotic credibility provided 
Kostunica with valuable political capital. His anti-Westernism not only appealed to the 
substantial percentage of voters for whom the idea of an international anti-Serbian conspiracy 
seemed a plausible explanation of the Nato intervention, but it also made Kostunica immune 
from the accusations which Milosevic's media habitually directed at other opposition leaders. 
Not even Milosevic's propaganda machine could argue convincingly that Kostunica was a 
'Nato stooge' or a 'mercenary'. This became evident during the election campaign, when 
much of the propaganda on state media revolved around rather lame personal insults, such as 
that Kostunica had no children (an argument which had been used against Vuk Draskovic on 
numerous occasions throughout the 1990s, and one which carries some weight in patriarchal 
Serbian society) or that he was a cat lover, which was meant to portray the opposition 
candidate as something of an eccentric and an oddball. Interestingly however, in spite of his 
anti-Western credibility, Kostunica did not manage to escape the wrath of the extremists. 
During the election campaign a graffiti appeared in central Belgrade which said 'Kostunica 
son of a Jew', while one of the large billboards in the Slavija square in Belgrade had the star 
ofDavid sprayed over a photo ofKostunica's face. 
In summary, Kostunica's unexpected popularity and political success in Autumn 2000 can be 
attributed to his capacity to transcend the radical dualism which dominated Serbian politics at 
the time. Unlike other opposition politicians, Kostunica was able to promote the idea of social 
and political reform without undermining the national and patriotic credibility of the anti-
Milosevic political front. In that sense, Kostunica matched Jowitt's (1992) definition of a 
charismatic leader as someone who is able to 'combine (with varying degrees of success for 
varying degrees of time) orientations and commitments that until then were seen as mutually 
exclusive' and recast 'previously incompatible elements into a new unit of personal identity 
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and organisational membership' (Jowitt, 1992; p.2). In other words, Kostunica managed to 
bring together the ideas of reformism, liberalism, moderate nationalism and traditionalism. As 
will become apparent latter, this combination continues to feature in Kostunica'a political 
rhetoric. 2 
The examination of Kostunica's anti-Western posture as a factor which contributed to his 
popularity and rise to prominence is important because it reinforces the assertion that political 
changes in Serbia were not brought about by a widespread abandonment of conspiratorial 
beliefs and the endorsement of (pro-)Western political values by the broader public. On the 
other hand, although the rhetoric of anti-Western conspiracism was never explicitly and 
overtly rejected, the new political climate and the improvement in relations between 
Yugoslavia and the international community led to a significant marginalisation of this type 
of explanatory discourse. Evidence for this comes from the examination of the Serbian media 
in the aftermath of the political changes in October 2000. 
10.2. The marginalisation of conspiratorial discourse in post-Milosevic Serbia 
One of the immediate consequences of the popular uprising of October 2000 was the 
'liberation' of the state-controlled media, and their placement in the hands of independent 
trades unions. The greater freedom of the press led to a drastic change in editorial policy. 
Xenophobic and paranoid themes which constituted the essence of Milosevic's propaganda, 
many of which have been examined in earlier chapters, were by and large banished from the 
pages of Politika and the news bulletins of Serbian state television. Gone were the lengthy 
editorials which revealed, on a daily basis, new 'evidence' about the existence of an anti-
Serbian conspiracy orchestrated from Washington or Brussels. Instead, Politika, the RTS and 
other media suddenly became preoccupied with the diplomatic activities of the new 
leadership, praising the improved relations between Serbia and the international community. 
The changed stance towards conspiratorial discourse in the Serbian media can be illustrated 
by the example of the private television channel Palma. Although it was never under the 
direct control of the regime, Palma was notorious for promoting conspiracy theories in a 
regular evening chat show, hosted by the channel's owner Miki Vujovic. Only a few hours 
after Milosevic's downfall, in the evening of 5 October 2000, Vujovic's guest in the live show 
was none other than Zoran Dindic, a leader of the Serbian opposition widely known for his 
pro-Western views. Dindic found himself sitting in the familiar black leather chair previously 
occupied by the likes of Smilja Avramov or Dragos Kalajic. On this occasion, Vujovic set 
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aside his profound interest in the vast anti-Serbian conspiracy, and treated the former 'Nato 
stooge' and 'German spy' with a notable dose of sycophancy. 
The emergence of new political reality also contributed to the marginalisation of individuals 
who had promoted conspiracy theories in previous years. Many foreign 'heroes' of the 
Serbian struggle against the New World Order and media celebrities such as the Belgian 
journalist Michel Colon (who wrote extensively on media manipulation) or the former US 
attorney general Ramsey Clark, ceased to be praised on television and in the press. Smilja 
A vramov, Spasoje Vlajic and other domestic promoters of conspiratorial culture suffered a 
similar fate. A notable exception to this general trend was the article How the war in Bosnia 
started published in Politika on I! December 2000. The article was a report on a 'round table 
discussion' featuring Smilja Avramov and another well !mown conspiracy theorist, historian 
Milorad EkmedZic. Avramov's contribution to the discussion, which the article described as 
'important' and 'interesting', revealed the existence of a 'strategic alliance between the New 
World Order and radical Islamism, and reiterated a number of themes typical of the world 
elite conspiracy theory. However, the publication of this report proved to be an 'isolated 
incident', significant only as a reminder that the legacy of the Milo~evic regime could not be 
erased overnight. On the whole, A vramov, now well into her 80s, has been forced into 
retirement, at least from the mainstream media. 
The marginalization of conspiracism also affected Spasoje Vlajic. During the encounter in 
December 2000, the inventor of the 'formula of Light' and the self-proclaimed spokesperson 
for Group 69 admitted, with a dose of sadness and surprise, that cans from journalists were 
becoming increasingly infrequent. Vlajic's media exposure is now restricted to his column in 
the fringe magazine Trei:e Oko and to books which he continues to write and publish. 
The absence of explicit references to conspiratorial material and to those who promote it, 
which was evident in the aftermath of the transition of power, appears to have persisted. In 
May 200 I, the Media Centre conducted a content analysis of the Serbian electronic and 
printed media, concentrating specifica11y on the portrayal of the US and its administration.' 
The analysis was conducted at a particularly sensitive period in terms of Yugoslav-American 
relations, as it coincided with the announcement by the Bush administration that it would 
boycott the impending donors conference for Yugoslavia. The contentious issue was 
Yugoslavia's reluctance to extradite Milosevic to the Hague. Significantly, diplomatic tension 
failed to revive the anti-Western sentiments which had characterised the Milo~evic years, and 
which in the past had generated conspiratorial explanations. Instead, references to the US and 
its administration remained neutral. Rather than downplaying the incident or criticising the 
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American government, the media emphasised the need for reconciliation and co-operation. In 
fact, the only explicit criticism of the US during the period monitored by the Media Centre 
concerned the controversial missile defence plan proposed at the time by George W. Bush. 
10.3. Acconnting for political change: the case of Avramov and Vlaiic 
Bearing in mind that in the aftermath of the political changes in Serbia, the leading promoters 
of conspiratorial culture were excluded from the mainstream press and electronic media, it 
would be interesting to examine briefly the way in which the conspiracy theorists themselves 
accounted for their altered status and interpreted the political changes which brought their 
marginalisation. 
One possible rhetorical strategy open to conspiracy theorists when faced with a sudden fall 
from grace, is to admit defeat and, in the case of the recent events in Serbia, interpret the fall 
of Milosevic as yet another success for the transnational oligarchy on the road towards world 
domination. This is exactly the way in which the likes of Michel Colon and Ramsey Clarke 
interpreted the events of October 2000. On the website of Ramsey Clarke's International 
Action Centre (lAC), Michel Colon and others among Clark's associates interpreted the fall 
ofMilosevic as a victory for international power structures and the CIA, which would lead to 
the inevitable 'Nato occupation of Yugoslavia'. 
A similar strategy was adopted by various public figures who had direct links with the former 
Serbian regime. For instance, the philosopher Mihajlo Markovic, a former ideologue of the 
Socialist party of Serbia (mentioned in an earlier chapter as one of the members of the 
intellectual establishment who endorsed the idea of world elite conspiracy) predicted, in an 
interview posted on the lAC website, that Serbia would become a 'half colony of foreign 
capital and the New World Order, primarily the USA'.4 Milosevic's daughter Marija went a 
step further. After her father's extradition to the Hague, Marija Milosevic told the 
Montenegrin newspaper Istok (East) that since October 2000, Serbia had been ruled by 
'Gypsies, Tzintzars, Jews, and everyone else except the Serbs'. The presence of Jews on the 
list of current 'rulers' of Serbia is clearly a legacy of the antisemitic tradition within 
conspiratorial culture. Zivorad lgic, one of Milosevic's close associates, made a similar 
allegation on television during the stand-off between the police and Milosevic's bodyguards 
on the evening ofMilosevic's arrest. Also, in a telephone interview given to the American TV 
channel FOX News from his Hague prison cell, Milosevic himself stated that Serbia's new 
administration 'is a marionette regime' brought about by the Western powers as a way of 
'occupying Serbia' (24 August 2001). Since the beginning of his trial in February 2002, 
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Milosevic has been propagating a similar type of protoconspiracy theory, much to the 
annoyance of the prosecutors and the judge, Justice Richard May. 
The view that political changes in Serbia constitute an (at least a temporary) victory for 
Serbia's archenemies appears to be characteristic of those believers in the international 
conspiracy who had more or less direct political involvement in the former Serbian regime. 
Their allegiance to Milosevic's political project was so immense, that no amount of rhetorical 
gymnastics could enable them to interpret the recent developments as anythlng other than a 
catastrophe. On the other hand, conspiracy theorists such as Vlajic or A vramov, who 
habitually portrayed themselves as 'not belonging to any political party', and who insisted 
that they were 'impartial scientists' (VIajic) or 'independent researchers' (Avramov) adopted 
a very different rhetorical strategy. Both Vlajic and A vramov expressed acceptance, and even 
approval of the new political establishment. During a conversation in July 2001, Avramov 
insisted that political changes in Serbia were 'long overdue'. Similarly, during a meeting in 
December 2000, Spasoje Vlajic, whose books consistently equate the West with Satan, kept 
thanking God that Yugoslavia was no longer in conflict with the West. 
Importantly however, Avramov's and Vlajic's positive assessment of the recent political 
developments does not signify a substantial ideological shift which in any way undermines 
the validity of their past revelations regarding the conspiracy. Instead, both authors try to 
reconcile their belief in an international conspiracy with the new political reality. 
For instance, as was noted in the earlier chapter, during the same conversation in which she 
greeted Milosevic's downfall, Avramov reiterated many of the conspiratorial themes found in 
her books. She even referred to the more controversial claims, such as that about the 'Elders 
of Zion' being an actual organisation and 'probably the most secret of all secret 
organisations'. At the same time however, Avramov admitted, somewhat surprisingly for a 
conspiracy theorist, that she had always believed that fighting the international conspiracy 
was futile. Rather than resisting the Trilateral and the Bilderbergers, as most other conspiracy 
theorists advise, A vramov insisted that Serbia ought to infiltrate these organisations and use 
them to its own advantage. A vramov even suggested that this particular belief caused the rift, 
in 1992, between herself and Milosevic, leading her to resign from the Serbian expert 
negotiating team: 
'I have my own views on the Trilateral, but I would be happiest if we had someone in the 
Trilateral who would say a few good words about and for Serbia. Therefore, in these times we 
need some channels which will link us [to the Trilateral]. So, then [in 1992] I told Milosevic: 'It 
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is not something you or your establishment could do, so you must resign'. But he wouldn't. So, 
the changes were necessary' 
In other words, while still promoting the idea of an international conspiracy, A vramov 
suggested that Serbia's new political establishment must negotiate a place for Serbia within 
the New World Order. The implication of this rhetorical strategy is that it brings Avramov's 
explanatory discourse in line with the recent political developments in Serbia, while at the 
same time, it does not visibly undermine the basic tenet of conspiracy. As a result, A vramov 
is able to continue to believe that her work is relevant and useful. For instance, during the 
recent conversation, she insisted that a demand for her writings still exists: she mentioned that 
her publisher was interested in bringing out a new and revised edition of her first book The 
post-heroic war of the international community against Yugoslavia (1995). As far as her 
diminished public profile is concerned, A vramov has frequently appealed to her advanced 
age, suggesting that responsibility for the implementation and promotion of her ideas now lies 
with the younger generations. However, whether her 'retirement' from public life is as 
voluntary and age-related as she suggests, or whether her explanation of it is simply a 
rationalisation of her diminishing social status, it is difficult to judge. 
The way in which Spasoje Vlajic accounted for the recent political changes in Serbia is even 
more remarkable. During the encounter in December 2000 Vlajic presented 'conclusive 
evidence' that he himself had predicted, as early as in 1992 that only Vojislav Kostunica or 
the Montenegrin president Milo Dukanovic had the capability to bring down Milosevic (page 
83, Serbian book of predictions, 1992). Even more bizarrely, Vlajic suggested that the activity 
of Group 69 was instrumental in the improvements in relations between Yugoslavia and the 
US. He revealed that the group 'predicted', using its secret and esoteric knowledge, that 
reconciliation between the two countries required the presence of two names: George and 
Richard. Members of Group 69 then used their paranormal skills to 'send a mental chip' to 
the 'universal field' and bring about individuals with these names. The result was the political 
victory of George Bush and Richard Cheney, whose take-over of the American presidency 
signalled an immediate end ofhostilities between Serbia and the US (see Appendix A, Extract 
1). 
What makes Vlajic's explanation noteworthy in the context of conspiratorial rhetoric is the 
suggestion that Serbs, or more specifically Group 69, have effectively brought an end to the 
conflict between Serbia and the forces of the New World Order. Although Vlajic does not 
explicitly suggest that Serbs triumphed over the conspirators, he clearly recognises that the 
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world has entered a new and more peaceful era, in which Serbs have an important educational 
role in providing spiritual guidance for the rest of the world: 
'The west has a lot to learn from the Serbs, if it wants to survive. That is where the alliance 
between the Serbs and the West lies. We are not going to be simply blind followers who listen 
to everything they are telling us. What purpose would that serve? That would lead both them 
and us into desolation. One thing that president Ko~tunica sensed very nicely, which is 
important and salutary for the Serbs and their place in the world, is the message of Saint Sava 
that Serbs are East in the West and West in the East. A bridge, not only physical but also 
spiritual, not only spiritual but a bridge between the spiritual man and nature. That is what they 
can learn from us ... ' 
'Bishop Nikolaj [Velimirovic] writes about the revival of the internal spiritual senses, which 
has nothing to do with a technique or a method. This is where our advantage lies, because we 
have kept our spirituality. That is where Europe can learn a lot from us. It can help that 
spirituality to survive, and take some for itself. The advantages will be immeasurable. For both 
the individual, and for the whole nation. Also, through the co-operation of nations, for Europe, 
to which we belong, and through the co-operation of continents, for world civilisation.' 
It should be noted, however, that within Vlajic's rather bewildering explanatory framework, 
the reconciliatory and to some extent celebratory sentiments are intertwined with the 
traditional paranoid and apprehensive tone of conspiracy theory. The above paragraphs were 
uttered in the context of the same conversation quoted in the earlier chapter, during which 
Vlajic elaborated on classical conspiratorial themes. This suggests that, as in the work of 
A vramov, the recognition of the new political reality is formulated in such a way that it does 
not undermine the validity of the conspiratorial framework which Vlajic continues to promote 
in his books and articles. 5 In other words, the interpretation of recent political events is 
anchored into the existing conspiratorial framework. Significantly however, attempts to adapt 
the paranormal conspiratorial framework to the new political conditions proved insufficient to 
rescue Vlajic from the rnarginalisation which affected Serbian conspiracy theorists. 
A common feature shared by A vramov and Vlajic, as representatives of Serbian conspiratorial 
culture, is that they both function, and always have functioned, as individual authors and 
researchers. For both of them, the subject of international conspiracy was a personal 
fascination, and although they were always keen to share their expertise with the broader 
public, they never participated in broader political projects and organisations. However, 
conspiratorial culture is not the prerogative of solitary enthusiasts. In much of the Western 
world, conspiracism is also the fundamental feature of political extremism, and is promoted 
by organisations which subscribe to radical political ideologies (Lipset & Raab 1978; Berlet 
& Lyons, 2000, etc.). A similar trend has begun to emerge in Serbia in recent months. As 
Serbian conspiracist culture was pushed away from mainstream politics, it gradually started 
gaining ground on the fringes of politics. As will become apparent, exponents of the more 
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extreme, right-wing forms of conspiracist ideology organised themselves within a small 
number of radical clerico-nationalist political groups, creating the category of 'extreme Right' 
on the Serbian political map. 
10.4 Radicalisation of the Orthodox Right: the emergence of Obraz 
After the fall of the former regime, Serbia saw a rise in hate crimes and instances of 
antisemitic prejudice. In March 2001, the monument erected in the town of Zrenjanin in 
honour of the Jewish victims of the Holocaust was desecrated. Around the same time, posters 
and stickers with Nazi symbols were posted on a synagogue in Belgrade. Behind this new 
development were not just the 'usual suspects' such as the Serbian branch of 'Blood and 
Honour' or various neo-Nazi and skinhead groups, but also activists of several emerging 
organisations of the Christian Right. The appearance and increased activity of these 
organisations can, in many ways, be seen as the legacy of the marginalisation of conspiracism 
in Serbian society. 
In Autumn 2000, the Patriotic Movement Obraz emerged on the political scene as a youth 
movement which propagated the ideology of Serbian right-wing clericalism, as found in the 
writings of Bishops Nikolaj Velimirovic and Justin Popovic. Obraz (meaning Dignity or 
Honour) was founded by Nebojsa M. Krstic (b. 1964), a sociologist of religion and 
businessman from the Serbian city of Nis (see Chapter 5). Obraz currently operates from its 
base at Belgrade's Philosophical Faculty, where the organisation's stickers and promotional 
material have become a disturbingly common sight. Obraz also has a website which features 
the leaders' biographies, the organisation's political program as well as a variety of articles 
with conspiratorial content. Significantly, Obraz is openly antisemitic. It blames Jews for the 
plight of the Serbs, and lists 'Zionists- Jewish racists' (also referred to as 'judeo-rnasonic 
murderers') as the principal 'enemies' of the Serbian people.• The organisation promotes the 
same kind of extreme Velimirovic-like conspiratorial anti-Westernism and antisemitism, 
which began to emerge, in a coded form, in Politika during the Nato bombing (see earlier 
chapter). 
Although Obraz was founded in 1997, the movement was relatively unknown and inactive 
until late 2000, when, as Nebojsa Krstic himself acknowledged, the organisation 'increased its 
activities'.' The proclaimed need for increased 'activity' was brought on by the liberalisation 
of Serbian society which Obraz vehemently opposed. In November 2000 Obraz activists 
disrupted the meeting of the Serbian Writer's Union during which a group of liberal 
intellectuals attempted to challenge the authority of the Union's existing and much 
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compromised nationalist leadership. Members of Obraz explained their presence by the need 
to 'supervise the activities of the Jewish lobby' (Whose is Obraz?, Danas, 20 November, 
2000), thus equating the impending liberal reform of the Union with a Jewish conspiracy. 
More recently, members of Obraz were involved in the violent disruption of the first Serbian 
Gay Pride parade organised in Belgrade in June 2001. Predictably, Obraz interpreted calls for 
sexual tolerance and equal rights for homosexuals as a deliberate attempt to undermine 
Serbian society and its 'spiritual being'. 
The emergence of Obraz and its involvement in aggressive public campaigning suggests that 
in the aftermath of the political changes, exponents of extreme right-wing conspiracism have 
become funnelled into various dissident and subversive organisations. Significantly, the 
emerging political category of 'extreme Right', is obliged to propagate its ideas using 
methods characteristic of fringe political organisations. This includes not only public protests 
and street violence, but also the increased reliance on the Internet. According to Pipes (1998) 
cyberspace provides the 'ideal back channel for those who are excluded from the mainstream 
media' (p.l99). Although a small number of Serbian websites with conspiratorial content 
existed in the past (e.g. the anti-Semitic www.compuserb.com) most of these were run by 
right-wing organisations within the Serbian diaspora. Serbian based websites, representing 
domestic groups or organisations, were practically non-existent until the emergence of 
Obraz.8 
The relegation of radical conspiracist ideology to fringe political movements, stands in stark 
contrast to its status before the fall of Milosevic. Prior to October 2000, the ideologists of 
Obraz did not need to resort to leaflets, the Internet, or public disturbance to promote their 
ideas. Instead, they were regularly represented in the mainstream media. As was noted in 
Chapter 5, The founder of Obraz, Nebojsa Krstic, was on the editorial board of a number of 
religious publications including Pravoslavlje and Svetigora. More importantly, he was an 
occasional contributor to Politika's culture supplement. His views appeared even in 
publications which were not sympathetic to Milosevic's regime, such as the dailies Blic and 
Glas Nedelje and the weekly magazine Reporter. In those days Krstic was typically 
introduced as 'author, publicist, theologian, analyst of globalisation and geopolitics' (Glas 
Nedelje, 3 March, 1999), without any critical references to his antisemitism or racial, sexual 
or religious bigotry. Today however, when mentioned in the media, Krstic is presented as 
leader of a 'far-right', 'extremist' or 'nationalist organisation' (e.g. Impression of the week, 
TV show on Studio B channel, 28 July, 2001). This suggests that the status of this kind of 
ideology is changing, and that the ideas propounded by Obraz are once again regarded, at 
least by the mainstream press, as being beyond the boundaries <if acceptable opinion. 9 
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So far it has been suggested that one of the more dramatic changes which followed the 
transition of power in October 2000 was the liberalisation of the media and the disappearance 
of the kind of anti-Westernism which had in the past generated the proliferation of 
conspiratorial discourse. The mainstream media ceased to provide the likes of Vlajic or 
A vramov with the opportunity to voice their views in public. Conspiratorial culture, and 
especially its more extreme forms, became largely confmed to fringe political movements 
which, in the new and more liberal climate, are widely regarded as 'extremist'. However, as 
the following section will demonstrate, there is an important exception to this general trend: 
publishing projects of the Yugoslav Army, which played an important role in the 
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dissemination of conspiracist culture in previous years, continue to promote this type of 
explanation, apparently unaffected by the recent political changes. 
10.5 Conspiracy theory and Yugoslav military publications 
Following the transition of power in Serbia, most state institutions, including the media and 
state-owned industry, underwent significant personnel and organisational changes. The only 
state organ which has eluded major reorganization was the Yugoslav military. The army 
Chief of Staff, General Neboj~a Pavkovic, once Milo~evic's trusted henchman and personal 
friend, who made a significant contribution to Milo~evic's election campaign by vowing to 
destroy all 'terrorists' and 'Nato stooges', remains in office to the present day. Furthermore, 
Ko~tunica's personal adviser on military matters is General-colonel Slavoljub S~ic, an 
officer who held the same post in Milosevic's cabinet. 
The reason behind the reluctance of the new authorities to reorganise the military 
establishment remains a mystery.'0 In a recent interview, Kostunica indicated that his 
unwillingness to discharge Pavkovic was motivated by the need to protect the army, as the 
'guarantor of stability' and an institution which 'together with the Orthodox church 
commands the greatest amount of respect amongst the Serbian people', from political quakes 
which disrupted the functioning of many other state institutions. An alternative explanation is 
that for Ko~tunica, as president of a disintegrating federation which the current Montenegrin 
leadership does not even recognise, the military is the only consequential federal institution 
under his jurisdiction. It is therefore possible that the preservation of the old military 
establishment, which in the aftermath of 5 October 2000 swiftly and enthusiastically 
embraced Kostunica as its new 'supreme commander', allows the federal president to exercise 
tighter control over the army, and therefore command greater authority in society as a whole. 
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Political intrigue aside, an important consequence of the preservation of the status quo in the 
military is that its publishing infrastructure remains intact. As a result, military publications 
such as Vojno Delo, Vojska, Vojni lnformator, etc., which played such an important part in the 
transmission of conspiratorial cultural tradition during the 1990s, continue to publish material 
reminiscent of the times before the transition. 
The most striking illustration of how little has changed in the military is the continuing 
presence of Svetozar Radisic as the main army spokesperson. Although Radisic avoids 
making references to neocortical war and other paranormal and pseudo-scientific themes in 
his recent public appearances, and has adopted a very reasonable and professional persona, 
there is little to suggest that the author of Neocortical War has changed his outlook since 
Milosevic's departure. Quite the contrary, as a new, revised edition of his book appeared in 
bookshops in the summer of 2001. Apart from a few additional references, the book contains 
identical material to the first edition, indicating that both Radisic and the military authorities 
who published Neocortical War still consider this kind of esoteric pseudo-scientific work to 
be worthy of promotion. Even more remarkably, a recent edition of the journal Vojni 
/nformator (Jan!Feb, 2001) contained a text by Radisic, entitled The art of political deception. 
The content of the article matches, practically word for word, one of the most controversial 
chapters of Neocortical War- chapter five entitled The Magic of Words. It is in this chapter 
that Radisic cited Ratibor Durdevic, Smilja Avramov, Gary Alien and Spasoje Vlajic as 
credible authorities. On this occasion too Radisic drew, albeit with some equivocation, the 
parallel between ideas contained in the Protocols of the Elders of Zion and the current Nato 
policy in the Balkans, thus reiterating the thesis of Jewish conspiracy. 
Although by far the most drastic example of conspiracism in recent military publications, 
Radisic's article is not the only one. In the same issue of Vojni lnformator it is possible to find 
a number of texts which deal for instance with the role of the world media in the creation of a 
'New World Order' (Borisav Popovic, Spider's web above human consciousness) or the 
participation of international humanitarian organisations and pacifist movements in the 
'neocortical war' which is being waged against the Serbian people (Colonel Milan Jovanovic, 
Objection to conscientious objection). 
Similar conspiratorial themes can also be found in recent issues of Vojno Delo (Issue I, 
2001 ). In an article entitled Political Aggression, Dr Slobodan Mikic, a retired Major-
General, suggests that the aim of the continuing attacks on Yugoslavia is the establishment of 
a New World Order which would allow the whole world to be 'controlled from Washington'. 
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Interestingly, the methods of 'political aggression' which Mikic criticises include the policies 
which the international community used to harm Milosevic's regime, such as the imposition 
of travel limitations for government officials, or the indictment of the Serbian leadership by 
the war crimes tribunal. Moreover, Mikic's argument draws on the same rhetoric of counter-
subversive conspiracism which Milosevic's media and government officials regularly used to 
discredit Serbian opposition parties and organisations: 
'[Agressors] create trades unions, student organisations, and media, [they] establish and finance 
illegal groups and organisations engaged in the bringing down of a legitimate government with 
violent means, including terrorist actions. Therefore the aggressor will try to bring into power 
his own exponents ... ' (Major General Slobodan Mikic, Political Aggression; p.l26-127) 
The idea that Western powers wish to establish their own satellite government in Belgrade 
lies at the heart of the accusations that Milosevic's opponents are 'Nato stooges' or 'traitors'. 
An important feature of the above mentioned articles is that they appear oblivious to the 
recent political changes and the improved relations between Yugoslavia and the rest of the 
world. However, among the texts published in military publications since October 2000, it is 
also possible to fmd another kind of conspiratorial writing, one which continues to promote 
the anti-Western ideology of the bygone era, while at the same time aclmowledging the 
emergence of a new political reality. 
In the text Defence against unarmed aggression published in the same issue of Vojno Delo as 
Mikic's text, Colonel Aleksandar Simic outlined the modus operandi of the West's continuing 
'offensive' against the Serbian state and society. Simic's arguments were in many ways 
similar to those found in Mikic's article on 'political aggression'. However, unlike his retired 
colleague, Colonel Simic demonstrated that he was well aware of the political changes 
brought on by the fall ofMilosevic: 
'After the changes in power relations on the political scene in FRY, its international standing is 
also rapidly changing. Bearing in mind the events of the previous decade and the new, 
objectively better position of the FRY, and with regard to the political axiom that politics, 
especially that of the great powers is dictated exclusively by interests, we must ask ourselves 
once again the old question about what we can expect from the future' (Colonel A. Simic, 
Defence against unarmed aggression; p.57) 
The author proceeds to outline various strategic options available to Yugoslavia, including the 
previously unmentionable idea that it should consider joining the 'Partnership for peace' 
initiative and investigate the extent to which its own interests converge with those of 'US, 
Germany or the Islamic world'. These suggestions present an important departure from the 
pre-October 2000 writing in Vojno Delo (and some writing since then) where considerations 
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of closer ties with the Western alliance were noticeably absent. However, the expression of a 
more broad-minded approach towards co-operation with Western military powers is 
permeated with conspiratorial themes which were ubiquitous in Vojno Delo in previous years. 
For example, Colonel Simic acknowledges that the UN 'is taking over the functions of the 
projected "World government"' and asserts that the 1999 bombing was caused by Serbia's 
defiance against the forces of the creators of the 'newest New World Order'. Also, Simic 
quotes Avramov's most recent book on the machinations of the Vatican-based organisation 
Opus Dei and reiterates the well known conspiratorial allegations about the sinister activities 
of the Soros foundation, and the world's media." 
Significantly, Simic also establishes a link with Radisic's paranormal framework when he 
interprets the new, non-violent, 'unarmed' methods of aggression as an aspect of 'neocortical 
war', whose 
'main characteristics include all-dimensionality and totality, with an emphasis on the 
psychological dimension, that is the impact on the neocortex (Latin for the surface of the cortex) 
and the "communication with other minds" as R. Szafranski seemingly innocently suggests.' 
(p.61). 
The reference to Szafranski's 'seemingly innocent' allusion to the nature of 'neocortical war' 
indicates that the concept in reality refers to something much more sinister.12 This 
interpretation reflects Radi~ic's conceptualisation of neocortical war which was examined in 
earlier chapters. A further tie with Radisic's explanatory framework is established when 
Simic examines the possibilities for resisting 'unarmed aggression'. He proposes the creation 
of various 'institutions and agencies' which would be engaged in 'information and 
propaganda activities' and which would explore the aims and methods of the 'creators of the 
"New World Order"'. Simic explains in the footnote that such bodies would consist not only 
of 'psychologists, historians, sociologists, priests, cultural theorists, connoisseurs of other 
cultures and religions, propaganda experts, journalists, computer experts - the so-called 
hackers' (p.82) but also members of 'alternative professions and interests whose activities 
concern the exploration of the human mind and emotions' (p.82) Although the precise 
meaning of 'alternative professions' is unclear, it is possible to speculate that it is a reference 
to the kind of 'experts in fringe disciplines' - mystics, parapsychologists, etc. - which 
Radisic refers to in his work. 
Consequently, although Simic appears to approve of the political changes in Serbia, he 
continues the promote the tradition of conspiracy theory (including its more controversial, 
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mystical elements) which characterised segments of the Yugoslav army discourse throughout 
the 1990s.13 
In many ways, the continuing presence of the conspiracist culture in Yugoslav military 
publications could be dismissed as isolated and inconsequential in the broader social context. 
Military journals have a limited readership, and, since the political changes, they have not 
been quoted in the mainstream media as they were before. However, at the same time, the 
Army is far too influential an institution in Serbian society to be left to the mercies of 
conspiracy theorists. An important reason for this is that exponents of conspiratorial tradition, 
especially when under threat of isolation, tend to flock together and form at least an informal 
ideological partnership (Berlet &Lyons, 2000). In the case of contemporary Serbia, this 
means the disturbing possibility of an ideological alliance between certain elements in the 
army and the exponents of extreme right-wing nationalism, such as Ohraz. 
The existence of such an 'alliance' became evident in December 2000, when the army 
leadership announced that, after 60 years of absence, a chaplaincy service would be 
reintroduced into the Yugoslav army. The decision to allow religious activity in the military 
followed numerous consultations between representatives of the army's Section for morale 
and the Orthodox church, various experts on the subject, and the relevant government 
institutions. As part of this consultation process, the Yugoslav Ministry of Defence organised 
a 'round table discussion' on the topic of 'faith and the military' (December, 2000). The 
contributions of various participants were subsequently published in the book Army and Faith 
(200 I, Military publishing institute). Extracts from the book were also printed, as a special 
supplement, in the military magazine Vojska. 
The relevance of this particular event for the present discussion comes from the fact that the 
round table discussion gathered together some very prominent members of the Serbian 
conspiracist community. In some ways this is not surprising, considering that the meeting was 
chaired by Svetozar R.adisic. 'Experts' invited to give their informed opinion on the subject of 
'faith and the army' included Neboj5a Krstic from Obraz, and the notorious Orthodox priest 
Zarko Gavrilovic, a known antisemite, religious extremist and one of the first publishers of 
Velimirovic's antisemitic books in the early 1990s. The status of 'expert' given to Gavrilovic 
and Krstic contravenes the aforementioned emerging tendency to refer to them as 
'extremists'. More importantly, both participants interpreted the need for a clerical presence 
in the army in terms of the international conspiracy. Krstic's expose referred extensively to 
R.adisic's work on 'neocortical war' and outlined the way in which the ideas of Nikolaj 
Velimirovic could be used to resist the onslaughts by the exponents of the 'geopolitics of 
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chaos' who aim to destroy 'Serbs', 'Russians' and other Orthodox people (Army and Faith, 
p.42). Similarly, Gavrilovic spoke of the 'atheist-mondialist bells' which will 'chime' (p.1!6) 
against the spiritual revival of the Yugoslav Army, and warned against the continuing 
'destructive influence of sects and satanists' (p. 119) in Serbian society. The views ofKrstic 
and Gavrilovic resonated in the presentations of other participants. For instance, Milen Simic, 
head of the Army's Section for Morale who gave the introductory address, suggested that in 
spite of the 'current process of the all-round opening of FRY towards Europe and the rest of 
the world, after the events of September/October [2000]' one should anticipate 
'even stronger assaults on the spiritual being of the Serbian people. This is why it is necessary to 
create a strong dam against the spiritual colonisation through the activities of various religious 
sects, cults and occultism of all kinds, which is at the same time the certain path towards the 
protection of our spiritual and national identity.' (M.Sirnic, Regulating religious affairs in the 
VJ, Army and Faith, 2000; p.7) 
Milen Simic, like his namesake and other colleagues mentioned earlier, preserved the 
paranoia inherent in conspiratorial culture in spite of the recognition of the new political 
reality. Once the continuing threat of an anti-Serbian and anti-Christian conspiracy was 
recognised in this way, the elaboration of the topic by 'experts' like Krstic or Gavrilovic was 
a natural progression. 
The fact that the idea of an international, and essentially anti-Orthodox conspiracy underpins 
the interpretative framework of some prominent military officers, representatives of the 
Orthodox Church and exponents of the far Right, and the fact that they are able to discuss 
such ideas together, in an official capacity, illustrates the existence of an at least informal 
conspiracist united front. Again, it should be stressed that the direct influence of these 
individuals in Serbian society is marginal. For example, when Politika reported on the 
aforementioned round table discussion, it mentioned neither Krstic nor Gavrilovic. Also, none 
of the conspiratorial arguments uttered during the discussion found their way into Politika. 
At the same time, bearing in mind the influence which both the Army and the Orthodox 
Church have in Serbian society, the 'partnership' between sections of the officers corps 
(especially those responsible for 'morale' and public relations), extremist Orthodox clergy 
and clerico-nationalist organisations like Obraz contributes to the perpetuation of the 
conspiratorial cultural tradition. The continuing indirect presence of conspiratorial culture 
will be examined in the final section. 
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10.6. Indirect presence of conspiracist ideology: rhetoric of conspiracy and the 
conservative political option 
At this point it may be necessary to elaborate on the proposed distinction between the direct 
and indirect presence of conspiracy theories in Serbian society. In Milo~evic's Serbia 
conspiracy theorists were regularly interviewed, cited and quoted in the media, and were held 
in high esteem as 'experts' in the field of international relations. This constituted a direct 
presence of conspiratorial culture, as a specific, and in many cases preferred, explanatory 
framework attributable to the conspiracist elite - the 'experts', 'researchers' and 
'connoisseurs'. As was demonstrated earlier, with the exception of the army, this type of 
presence largely perished after the transition of power. Elaborate conspiratorial narratives 
disappeared, and the former 'experts' were either forgotten or relegated to the status of 
'extremists'. On the other hand conspiratorial themes continue to feature in the Serbian 
political context in a more indirect form. Arguments from the conspiratorial rhetorical arsenal 
are still occasionally invoked even in the mainstream media. However, such conspiracist 
arguments appear in isolation, as mere fragments, rather than as part of an elaborate narrative, 
which explains the totality of Yugoslavia's position in the world. Bearing in mind that 
conspiratorial rhetoric contains significant anti-Western and antiliberal connotations, the 
continuing and indirect influence of conspiratorial culture is most clearly noticeable on 
occasions when tighter links with the West and the liberalisation of the Serbian society are 
criticised. 
Evidence for the continuing presence of conspiratorial themes comes from the daily 
newspaper Glas Javnosti. Glas is an independent publication which, although in principle 
opposed to the Milo~evic regime, nonetheless often promoted the conspiratorial worldview. 
For instance in early 2000 G/as serialised the book Opus Dei by Smilja Avramov thus 
promoting a conspiratorial interpretation of the machinations of this Vatican-based semi-
secret organisation. However, after the transition of power, Glas no longer promoted 
conspiratorial culture in a direct way. On the other hand, conspiratorial rhetoric can be 
detected in individual articles appearing in this publication. 
For instance, in July 2001, G/as published the article Is it OK to be gay? written by the 
journalist Natasa Kordic. The publication of the article reflected the increased public interest 
in the topic of homosexuality which followed the disruption of the first Gay Pride parade in 
Belgrade on 30 June 200 I. The physical attack on the participants of the parade and members 
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of the police who tried to intervene sparked a debate in most media on the topic of gay rights. 
The article Is it OK to be gay?, quoted a number of professionals, including psychiatrist 
Danijela Tiosavljevic, sociologist Petar Opacic, criminologist Dusan Davidovic and theologist 
Ljubivoje Stojanovic. All four experts expressed a negative attitude towards homosexuality, 
regarding it as a mental aberration and a significant social problem which faces Serbian 
society. Among other things the article reflected on the link between 'homosexuality and 
politics'. Dr Opalic stated that: 
'Hwnan rights, the indisputable value of the modern western civilisation, which often conceal 
something quite different and in the name of which countries are sometimes bombed, have 
become the smokescreen for the implementation of western (American) interests. That is why it 
is interesting that George Soros - and a lot had been written about his political activities, as well 
as his Fund for Open Society, and the Fund for humanitarian law- are the main sponsors of the 
Yugoslav associations supporting gay rights. With this in mind, one gets the impression that 
someone's sexual orientation and personal suffering [sic] are being used for some ulterior 
reason.' (G/as Javnosti, 8 July 2001, p.l2) 
The portrayal of human rights as a cover-up for more sinister motives, as well as the targeting 
of George Soros, are both reminiscent of the Serbian conspiratorial discourse which 
dominated Serbian pro-government media in the late 1990s. A further link with the 
conspiracy tradition was established when the 'political implications' of homosexuality were 
given an additional, religious dimension. LJ. Stojanovic of the Theological faculty argued that 
in demanding the legalisation of homosexuality, the Serbian authorities were 'bowing to the 
golden calf of"Europeanism"', which would lead to the 'loss of ourselves and our identity'. 
This particular argument reflects the \onspiratorial anti-Europeanism of Nikolaj Velimirovic 
and his followers. 
It should be noted that none of the homophobic 'expert opinion' mentioned in the article was 
critically examined by the author. Similarly, counter-views of various gay rights activists or 
human and civil rights organisations were ignored. Consequently, rather than providing a 
balanced review of different positions within a wider social debate on homosexuality, 
KordiC's article simply reinforced a very conservative view on the issue. However, on this 
occasion conspiratorial themes were just one aspect of homophobic rhetoric, rather than a 
topic in their own right. Conspiracism emerged as a culturally available argument against 
liberal tendencies rather than as an elaborate and all-embracing explanatory framework, 
expounded by competent conspiracy theorists. On the other hand, by disseminating the 
ideology now largely confined to Obraz and similar organisation which have become the 
beacons of conspiracism in post-Milosevic Serbia, Glas and other similar publications 
preserve this tradition of explanation on the visible and audible margin of Serbian political 
and ideological space. 
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The indirect presence of conspiratorial culture does not only manifest itself in isolated articles 
in the press. In spite of the evidence that the boundaries of acceptable opinion in Serbian 
society are gradually narrowing, and that militant conspiracy theorists are being reduced to 
the status of 'extremists', occasional 'incidents' act as reminders that the same boundaries of 
opinion are in places stretched beyond reasonable limits. Specifically, there is some evidence 
to suggest that instances of unacceptable conspiratorial extremism are sometimes tolerated by 
the new authorities. Behind such tolerance is not necessarily the endorsement of this type of 
ideology, but rather a lack of sensitivity left over from the Milosevic years. 
For example, shortly after the fall of Milosevic, a re-print of The Protocols of the Elders of 
Zion, (Centar, 2001) edited by a certain Dorde Katic, appeared in Serbia's bookshops.14 This 
edition of the Protocols included an introduction, written by Katic, in which he not only failed 
to challenge the historical authenticity of Protocols, but also highlighted their relevance in 
contemporary Serbia: 
'the sowing of bombs across Yugoslavia with the aim of destroying the obstacles to (Nato's] 
Eastward offensive resembles in many ways the claims made in the Protocols ... The Jews had 
neither the necessary military potential nor the arms to execute the planned conquest of the 
world, but they had the money which could be materialised for such ambitions' (Katic, p.2) 
The publication of Protocols provoked the Union of Jewish municipalities to take legal action 
against Katic. Representatives of the Jewish community claimed that both the book, and its 
introduction 'incite national, racial and religious hatred and intolerance', an offence 
prohibited by the Serbian constitution. The legal action, as well as the reaction of much of the 
liberal media and human rights organisations led many bookshops to withdraw the title from 
their shelves. However, the book was never formally banned, as the deputy district public 
prosecutor Milija Milovanovic decided that there were no legal grounds for prosecuting Katic 
or banning the book. Milovanovic suggested that, after a 'formal conversation with Katic and 
a careful reading of the introduction', he decided that 'there appears to have been no 
intention, either in writing the introduction or in the act of publishing, to incite religious or 
ethnic hatred and intolerance'. He also suggested that Protocols 'contain no elements of the 
stated criminal act'. With regard to the quotation from the introduction, which was used as an 
illustration ofKatic 's antisemitic views, Milovanovic suggested that: 
'this quotation exists, but in the context of the whole introduction, the passage itself, quoted in 
the way it is, does not indicate that the defendant, by writing that sentence, incited, neither is 
there reasonable suspicion that he incited, national hatred and racial intolerance' (Radio B-92, 
Morning News, 28 July 2001) 
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The failure of the judicial authorities to undertake decisive action against exponents of anti-
Semitic ideology plays into the hands of various right-wing organisations which have 
emerged in Serbia since the transition of power in Autumn 2000. By suggesting that the 
publication of the most notorious example of conspiratorial antisemitism constitutes a 
legitimate act vindicates the views of those who propagate extremism, and facilitates the 
continued existence (as well as physical presence on bookstalls) of conspiratorial cultural 
tradition in Serbia. Like the endurance of conspiratorial rhetoric in the media, the lack of 
initiative in the fight against racism and religious intolerance maintains conspiratorial culture 
on the visible margin of Serbian political life. 
Finally, the indirect presence of conspiracist culture is evident at the highest levels of politics. 
For instance, in spite of the recent discovery of numerous mass graves containing the bodies 
of Albanian civilians, President Kostunica still refers to these graves as containing 'alleged 
victims'. Such statements not only constitute a morally suspect denial of Serbian participation 
in war crimes, but also reflects the conspiratorial idea, which Kostunica himself propagated 
during the bombing, that the 'alleged' victims of ethnic cleansing and mass murder were 
simply the product of 'manipulation'. Similarly, in the summer of 2001, Kostunica's DPS 
joined the Serbian Radical party of Vojislav Seselj in condemning the broadcasting, on 
Serbian state TV, of a British documentary on the Srebrenica massacre. The documentary was 
branded a hoax, intended to demonise the Serbian people. Although it would be unfair to 
regard Kostunica as a conspiracy theorist in the traditional sense, there is little doubt that his 
pledge to political conservativism, nationalism and anti-Westernism, often leads him to draw 
upon arguments from conspiratorial culture, thus perpetuating its existence. 
10.7. Conclusion 
The aim of the present chapter was to examine the fate of conspiracy theories in the aftermath 
of the political changes in October 2000. After considering the transition of power in Serbia 
in the light of the prevalence of conspiratorial culture at the time, it was suggested that the 
improved relations with the West and the general liberalisation of society and its media drove 
conspiratorial culture and its main exponents to the margins of politics and media discourse. 
The only exception to this general trend are military publications which, pending a more 
substantial and far-reaching reform of the military establishment, continue to promote the idea 
of an ongoing international plot against Yugoslavia. However, the chapter also suggested that 
although the direct presence of conspiratorial culture and its exponents was dramatically 
reduced following the fall of Milosevic's regime, conspiracist culture nonetheless continues 
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to be present in Serbian society. Arguments which originate from conspiracist ideology 
continue to feature in conservative political rhetoric in the media and political disocurse. 
As far as the future of Serbian conspiracism is concerned, the described trends will probably 
continue in the years to come. With the further liberalisation of Serbian society, and with the 
tightening of the newly-formed bonds with the international community, conspiratorial 
culture will continue to lose its relevance and with it its position in public discourse. At the 
same time, it should be noted that roots of conspiratorial culture in Serbian society go deeper 
than the 12 years of Milo~evic's regime. Conspiratorial anti-Westernism was always an 
integral part of the anti-liberal tendencies within Serbian nationalist discourse (Colovic, 
1997). With that in mind, the removal ofMilo~evic's legacy does not necessarily imply the 
eradication of conspiratorial culture. This is especially true when one considers that, 
concurrently with the rising pro-Western and liberalising trends in Serbian politics and public 
life, post-Milo~evic Serbia has also seen the emergence of a conservative, traditionalist 
political option, epitomised in its moderate form by Vojislav Ko~tunica and his increasingly 
popular DPS. It is this political option that maintains, and benefits from the indirect presence 
of conspiracist ideology, which keeps the flame of anti-Westernism burning. 
With this in mind, it would be dangerous to perceive either the present or the possible future 
status of conspiracism in Serbia in terms of a centrist/extremist perspective. Although 
conspiracy theories are, and will continue to be over-represented on the fringes of politics, 
especially on the extreme right, it is unlikely that they will be altogether banished from 
mainstream politics. Instead conspiracism will flow between extreme political groups, such as 
Obraz, and mainstream political structures, such as the DPS. It has recently been reported that 
the inauguration of regional branches of Obraz in provincial Serbia often takes place in 
offices belonging to the Democratic Party of Serbia (Helsinki Committee for Human Rights 
Report on Antiserntisrn, 2001). Similarly, in 1996, Kostunica wrote an article for the 
magazine Obraz, whose editors subsequently founded the political organisation of the same 
name. More recently, Kostunica contributed a text to the religious publication Pravoslavna 
Misao, edited by Father Zarko Gavrilovic. These and similar instances led the Yugoslav 
branch of the Helsinki Committee for Human Rights to conclude that in Serbia 'aggressive 
antisemitism is being generated from the highest structures of power' (HCHR Press release, 
25 July, 2001). 
Although the conclusion reached by the Helsinki Committee might seem excessive, the 
informal links between Obraz and the DPS illustrate the complex relationship between the 
political centre and extremist organisations. This kind of relationship is not a strictly Serbian 
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phenomenon. In American Populism, Berlet and Lyons (2000) suggest that a similar 
connection exists in the United States between elements in the Republican party and the 
exponents of the extreme Right. In the UK as well, the links, on an ideological level, between 
the fringes of the Conservative party and the BNP have also raised some concerns in recent 
months. On the other hand, what makes the Serbian case different is the fact that the country 
is in a period of transition following 12 years of Milosevic's autocratic rule. The continuing 
presence of conspiracism holds back attempts to introduce a broader ideological change in 
Serbian society. It will be hard to get Serbs to come to terms with all the horrors which have 
been committed in their name in previous years, when the president of Yugoslavia and the 
country's most popular politician is himself reluctant to admit that the horrors are 'real'. More 
importantly, Serbia does not have a party-political infrastructure like the US or Britain, which 
keeps extremists at bay. Consequently, the possibility remains that, if the economic reforms 
fail, and the improved relations with the West turn 'sour', the mood of anti-Westernism might 
be revived, and with it the belief in an international conspiracy. 
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Chapter 11 
Conclusion 
The aim of the present thesis was to examine Serbian conspiracy culture at the time of the 
Nato bombing of Yugoslavia. Specifically, the thesis looked at the general broadening of the 
boundaries of acceptable opinion in Serbian society which enabled some more objectionable 
and contentious aspects of the conspiracy tradition - such as the antisenritic and 
esoteric/mystical themes - to come out of the margins and find their way into the mainstream 
press and political discourse. 
The thesis began with a critical review of psychological explanations of conspiracy theories 
which highlighted the shortcomings of approaches that interpret conspiracy theory as a mere 
manifestation of general psychological processes such as attribution, scapegoating or 
projection. Also, it was suggested that purely sociological or historical explanations often fail 
to reflect on the actual dynamic through which extraordinary explanations, like conspiracy 
theory or paranormal beliefs, rise to prominence in specific cultural or political contexts. The 
present thesis suggested that a better insight into conspiracy theory as a periodically occurring 
collective belief might be gained by exploring the rhetorical and argumentative structure of 
specific conspiratorial explanations, while paying special attention to the historical and 
ideological context within which these explanations are situated. By approaching conspiracy 
theory in this way, the cultural and historical contingency of the phenomenon was 
acknowledged, while, at the same time, it was possible to explore the ideological dynanric of 
boundary change which contributed to the proliferation of conspiratorial discourse at the time 
of the Nato bombing of Yugoslavia in the spring of 1999. 
On the basis of the material examined in the empirical chapters, the process of boundary 
change which affected Serbian society around the time of the Nato intervention can be 
summarised as follows: 
Throughout the 1990s, the political establishment of Slobodan Milosevic propagated the 
notion that the dissolution of Yugoslavia, and the ensuing economic and political crisis, were 
the result of an international conspiracy, i.e. of deliberate intent and actions by the world's 
power structures. For the most part, the conspiracy theory propagated by the ruling regime in 
Serbia belonged to the category of protoconspiracy theory. The specific body behind the 
conspiracy was seldom named. Metaphors, euphemisms and agentless passives were used 
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instead. The 'conspiratorless' nature of the protoconspiracy theory, and the absence of quasi-
religious or right-wing conspiratorial themes, gave this type of explanation a reasonable and 
acceptable appearance. 
For much of the past decade, protoconspiracy theory was merely one of a number of 
explanations of the Serbian crisis available on the local 'market-place of ideas'. Serbian 
opposition parties, the independent media and liberal intellectuals often mocked the 
xenophobic element of the conspiracy notion, and propagated a more open, democratic and 
pro-Western political option. However, with the arrival of the Nato bombs, the status of the 
alternatives to protoconspiracy theory changed dramatically. The imposition of a number of 
formal censorship rules and the application of informal pressures on the liberal media and 
public opinion made it increasingly difficult for pro-Western political option to be articulated 
in public. More importantly, the bombing brought about a discourse of suspicion which 
reflected the widespread disillusionment with the Western powers and which questioned 
Nato's motives. Although the discourse of suspicion did not necessarily take the form of 
protoconspiracy theory, the fact that it questioned the nature of visible reality and asked 'what 
is really going on' gave conspiratorial interpretations of the war greater credence and 
contributed to their legitimisation. 
While protoconspiracy theory, with the assumption of an anti-Serbian plot at its core, 
provided a simple, coherent and for many a comforting explanation of the war, it was in many 
respects an incomplete explanation. It claimed that someone out there was pulling the strings 
of Serbia's destiny, without revealing who the mysterious individual, group or organisation 
might be. The explanatory gap left by protoconspiracy theory paved the way for the world 
elite conspiracy theories which blamed the anti-Serbian plot on a number of specific and 
existing organisations of business and political elite, such as the Bilderberg Group, the 
Trilateral Commission, or the Council on Foreign Relations. World elite conspiracy theory 
also had a fairly 'respectable' guise. After all, the elite organisations described in this type of 
explanation actually exist, and few people would question their influence on the economic 
and political trends in the world. Also, writers of world elite conspiracy theories often 
enhanced the reasonable image of their thesis by contrasting it with simplistic, naive and 
'paranoid' classical conspiratorial explanations which invoke mysterious groups from the past 
such as the Freemasons or the llluminati. 
Crucially however, in spite of the attempt at dissociation, the boundaries between world elite 
and the classical conspiratorial discourse were shown to be not watertight. World elite 
conspiracy theories propagated in the Serbian media and by some well-known and otherwise 
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respectable intellectuals were not created de novo. Instead they drew upon the established 
ideological tradition of conspiracy theory. The presence of the conspiracy tradition was 
particularly visible in the way in which writers attempted to place contemporary anti-Serbian 
plots in the history of world conspiracy. The reliance on the conspiratorial ideological 
tradition meant that many controversial conspiratorial claims, such as antisemitism or the 
quasi-religious themes, affected the discourse of world elite conspiracy theory. As a result, 
the proliferation even of the outwardly 'reasonable' and acceptable forms of conspiracy 
theory brought into the open the darker, antisemitic aspect of the conspiracy tradition. 
Eventually, many conspiratorial themes that were previously thought to be too extreme or 
radical gradually became promoted into the realm of acceptable, albeit not always normative 
explanatory discourses. This dynamic, which was illustrated using the example of the daily 
Politika, enabled antisemitic and quasi-religious conspiratorial themes to emerge, relatively 
unnoticed, in this mainstream newspaper which has no history of antisemitism. 
The thesis also examined the way in which paranormal and esoteric explanations of the 
conflict with Nato became regarded as respectable in the spring of 1999. The investigation of 
this topic focused mainly on the Yugoslav military and its publications. Specifically, the 
thesis looked at the example of Group 69, a team of enthusiasts - including some active army 
officers - who were supposedly engaged in the building of a parapsychological shield over 
Serbia. The fate of this 'unit' was used to suggest that, in the mid-1990s, military authorities 
cosidered the pseudo-scientific and quasi-religious theorising promoted by Group 69, to be 
beyond the boundaries of acceptable opinion. On the other hand, the idea of a conspiracy, 
which this group also propagated, was shown to have been perceived, at the time, as fairly 
unproblematic. 
In subsequent years, the discrepancy between the status of conspiracy theory and paranormal 
explanations diminished. By the time of the Nato bombing, many of the ideas from which the 
army was keen to distance itself in the mid-1990s became regarded as acceptable. The 
dynamic which turned paranormal explanations into an acceptable view was shown to be in 
many ways similar to the process which underlined the proliferation of conspiracy theories in 
the Yugoslav media. The development of a moderate and 'reasonable' version of a seemingly 
objectionable view led to a general shifting of the boundaries of respectability in a way that 
eventually brought the previously rejected outlook within what are seen to be acceptable 
limits. After 1995, the pseudo-scientific and mystical theoretical framework was propagated 
in a ostensibly more palatable way by incorporating, within the paranormal explanation, 
various concepts and arguments which originate from uncontroversial discourses, such as 
(Western) military literature on information warfare. The transformation of paranormal 
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explanatory discouse was explored in the context of Moscovici's (1984a; 2000) theoretical 
work on social representations, and was illustrated using the example of the concept of 
'neocortical war'. The way in which this phrase was taken from US military literature and 
incorporated into the work of Svetozar Radisic was examined as a manifestation of the 
processes of anchoring and objectification. The rhetorical implications of the representation 
of 'neocortical war' was that the association with the US military gave Radisic's paranormal 
perspective an air of respectability, making it possible for ideas about paranormal warfare to 
be promoted in a more acceptable and convincing way. Significantly, the legitimisation of 
mystical and esoteric themes in the late 1990s was closely intertwined with the proliferation 
of conspiracy theories. The way in which Radisic formulated the idea of 'neocortical war' and 
the subsequent positive reception of his work was made possible by the fact that the concept 
of 'neocortical warfare' was anchored into the already established conspiratorial explanatory 
framework, and presented as a method of conspiratorial mass manipulation. 
The thesis ended with an examination of the fate of conspiracy theories in the aftermath of the 
political changes in October 2000. It was suggested that with the end of the conflict with the 
international community, conspiracy theories lost much of their explanatory value. This led to 
an overall marginalisation of the conspiracy tradition, which today is largely confmed to the 
fringes of politics, sections of the Serbian Orthodox Church, and the military establishment, 
which still awaits reform. 
However, the final empirical chapter also suggested that dismissing conspiratorial culture as 
the prerogative of extremists or disenchanted political minorities may prove complacent. Over 
the last fifteen years, the notion of an international conspiracy entrenched itself in Serbian 
nationalist discourse and has become an enduring feature of conservative political ideology 
and populist political culture. As a result, conspiracy culture persists, albeit in fragments, as a 
culturally available set of arguments invoked mainly to argue against the liberalisation of 
Serbian society in the post-Milosevic era .. The continuing presence of the conspiratorial 
tradition is likely to diminish with the success of the ongoing political reforms. At the same 
time, one should not dismiss as fanciful the possibility that, should these reforms fail, or 
should the relations with the West deteriorate, the political potential of anti-Western 
conspiracism might prove not to have been exhausted. This is especially so considering that 
conspiracy theory continues to be propagated by two institutions that command great respect 
in Serbian society, namely the Serbian Orthodox Church and the Yugoslav Anny. In that 
sense, the status of conspiracy culture within the argumentative context of Serbian politics 
remains tied up, in an inverted way, with the impending development of democracy in Serbia 
and the building of a truly liberal society. 
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Appendix A 
Extracts from transcripts of recorded encounters with Spasoje Vlajic 
(31 December, 2000 and 2 January, 2001) 
What follows is a collection of extracts from the transcripts of recorded conversations with 
Spasoje Vlajic. The recordings were made during two ofVlajic's regular afternoon encounters 
with his followers, on 30 December 2000 and 2 January 2001. Vlajic's meetings with the 
public take place in a small office, located on the ground floor of a seven-storey apartment 
block in the Belgrade suburb of Zemun. The transcripts are intended to complement the 
analysis in Chapter 8, by providing additional examples of Vlajic's extraordinary paranormal 
and conspiratorial explanatory framework. 
The recorded sessions lasted approximately two hours. They were attended by between eight 
and twelve people (mostly women), some of whom claimed to be regular visitors. Most of 
those present were in their late thirties and forties, and appeared to be economically 
disadvantaged. However, they all gave the impression of being reasonably well educated 
which suggests that they belong to the middle class section of Serbian society which suffered 
economic demise under the Milo§evic regime. Some of the Vlajic's more enthusiastic visitors 
stayed for the full duration of recorded sessions, others came and left as they pleased. While 
this led to occasional interruptions in Vlajic's eXPose, it also created a more informal 
atmosphere. 
In the transcript, pauses of half a second and longer are noted in brackets within the text. 
Pauses have been included in the transcription in order to draw the reader's attention to the 
Vlajic's somewhat unusual manner of talking, which includes numerous, often lengthy 
silences. The pauses add to the mysterious and 'prophetic' appearance of Vlajic's discourse. 
Overlapping utterances are indicated with large brackets [ ]. 
Each of the 5 extracts is preceded with information regarding the date of the meeting and how 
for into the recording the particular extract took place. 
*** 
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Extract 1: 30 December 2000; 11 min- 18min 
Vlajic Here, I will show you a concrete example 
(2. 0) 
of how this force of meaning works. When I give examples, I 
usually try and ensure they are totally up to date, topical 
as they say. Look now (1.0) In the book History of the 
Future1 ((Looks in book)) 
( 4. 0) 
on page sixty two it says (1.5) ((reads from book)) in the 
book Intent, from September 1993, a prediction was made that 
a lasting co-operation between Serbs and Americans would be 
heralded by signs connected with the names Borde2 and 
Richard. This can always be checked on the page 135 of the 
book Intent (1.0) because science consists of verifying 
(2. 0) 
What happens then? (1.0) Political changes (1.0) take place 
in Yugoslavia, which make it possible (1.0) for relations 
with the Americans to improve. Now, where is the name Borde? 
and where is the name Richard? (0.5) And then the name Borde 
appeared, and at the very top: George Bush. The first part 
came true (1.0) I won't go into all the branching, I am 
talking only about the basics, there are many other 
manifestations of the force of meaning. And then we thought 
where will the name Richard appear? After the president 
comes the vice-president. Now take a look at this. A text is 
published, this is from an issue of Nedeljni Telegraf 
((rummages through a copy of the magazine)) which states 
((reads)) In Bush's entourage, Serbs have acquired a strong 
base: mother of the Vice-president is a Serb. It goes on 
•according to sources from our Diaspora in America, the 
mother of the new Vice president of the USA, Dick Cheney is 
Serbian', and Dick's real name is Richard. Bruce. Cheney. 
(1.0) And that is not all. For example, the American 
magazine 'Time' in 1989 asked the question: how come the 
then secretary of state for defence Dick, or rather Richard 
Cheney, speaks the Serbian language. The answer was because 
his mother is of Serbian origin. And look now (1.0) In 
ninety three (0.5) ((folds back the newspaper)) out of all 
the possible names (1.0) precisely those two names were 
given. And they were confirmed in September in the book 
History of the Future. 
( 3. 0) 
And then 
(2.0) 
it happened that those two names, at the very top and 
crucial for the possible improvement of relations between 
Americans and Serbs. Now watch. Is this just the case of 
prediction? (1.5) I repeat: if it were only for these three 
examples, I would not even consider them because they would 
not have statistical significance. There are hundreds of 
such examples. (0.5) What is happening? I am more and more 
convinced, but on the basis of scientific facts, that this 
is not prediction, but the creation of the future (0.5) 
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Through the force of meaning the future can be created and 
the force of meaning so to speak, directs and is present 
as a part of as something conjoined to, our brain waves. 
Now (1.0) hhhm (1.0) these energetic structures, this energy 
of thought contained in the names Borde and Richard could be 
considered as distinctive mental chips. As they pass through 
the consciousness of individuals they are united with the 
brain waves, they are emitted into the unified information 
field, or Sheldrake's morphogenetic field. They are 
recognised 
( 2. 0) 
on the quantum mechanical level and they are diffused into, 
how should I say, every pore of nature and that way, 
through that the force of meaning, nature itself starts to 
help and ensure that our wishes and intentions are 
fulfilled. 
( 2. 0) 
While Americans were our enemies and thank God that they no 
longer are, and will not be 
( 3. 0) 
naturally there had been many such chips, by the means of 
which we defended ourselves and resisted. One such chip 
(0.5) was revealed in the book First world 
Parapsychological war. This is what it was about. Within the 
Yugoslav Army the so called Group 69 was formed. Group 69 
was in charge of researching phenomena in the domain of 
physics of hidden states. Physics of hidden states 
refere ... refers to the exploration of those domains which, in 
terms of energy, could be defined as near-quantum, 
borderline-quantum and sub-quantum. So, low frequency 
brainwaves and other radiation. Eh, you see, in nineteen 
ninety-eight, the co-ordinator of these defence groups, 
Colonel B.S. (0.5) revealed one of these mental chips. 
(2. 5) 
The chip was: if they pass Prokletije3 , the Zastan peak, 
Americans will be drawn into a labyrinth without an exit 
and trigger off the suicidal matrix 'Iris 301'. This was 
noted, in the book First World Parapsychological war, in 
July 1998. Americans did cross Zastan and activated the 
code Iris 301. Eh now, what does this chip mean? (1.0) Iris 
is hhh the name for perunika4 and perunika got its name 
after our God Perun and signifies the one who comes first 
the president the one who presides. And 301 can be broken 
down as 43 times 7. Forty-third American president. And in 
the books Intent and First world. .. erm, History of the Future 
as early as in '93, in September, therefore as early as in 
1993 it was indicated number seven is a code for the name 
Borde (1.5) And what is 301? The highway that connects 
Florida with Washington (0.5) What needed to be done first 
of all, was to create (1.0) among the Americans. I am 
recounting what, in 1998, was revealed to the public by 
colonel B. (0.5) What was needed was to provoke within the 
American nation such divisions and schisms, which would 
lead into a further (0.5) political constitutional and I-
don't-know-what-kind of discord. 
(2. 0) 
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Therefore the code contained the president forty third (0.5) 
8orde and a decision brought to Washington, from Florida. 
It came true completely. Thank God that Americans are no 
longer our enemies and there is no need to go further. As 
far as I am informed (0.5) errm experts from Group 69 have 
the knowledge and the ability to (0.5) hrrm, how should I 
say, de-activate certain codes so that the one that is 
cur:rently in play, which is in transmission, is the other 
code Dorde Richard through which we seek active co-operation 
with the Americans. Again if it were only for these two 
codes or these five it could still be assigned to some 
category of probability-could be, but not necessarily. But 
there are so many codes that it leaves one breathless. 
Extract 2: 30 December 2000; 31 min -36 min 
J.B. 
Vlajic 
J.B. 
Vlajic 
J.B. 
Vlajic 
I would also like to ask you another question, a question 
that is more ... considering that you are concerned with the 
exploration of political, or rather, more concretely the 
political dimension, the exploration of some political (1.0) 
developments in the world .. I noticed that in your book First 
world Parapsychological War, you reflect on who it is that 
really rules the world. So, I would like you to tell me in 
[what way 
[Well let me tell you, even the little birds in newspaper 
publishing companies know that. In Politika, in Blic, in New 
York Times, in all the other 'Times' and 'Time's. (0.5) Eight 
of the richest banking families in the world are trying to 
rule the world. (0.5) It is a kind of subterfuge. They call 
themselves Jews (0.5)but they are not. According to Rabbi 
Altman, they are Jews only by name. They are primarily of 
Khazarian origin, and according to sources, both Jewish and 
Khazarian, and Arab and Byzantine, Khazars are of Turkish 
origin. They are not Jews, they are Judaised Turks. And they 
know their origins. Ahh, the best example, as far as I know, 
is Disraeli, and that nice (0.5) I could call it a story 
(0.5) of his, the tale of Al Roy. 
(6.0) 
What tale is that? 
I think I mention it in First World Parapsychological 
War ... ( (Vlaj ic is distracted by a middle age woman walking into 
his office)) May the Lord be with you Tereza ... It says it 
nicely there, you will find it all there, I give exactly what 
it is [all about ... 
[Yes, yes] 
[I won't retell it to you now, I hope you will 
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Tereza 
Vlajic 
J.B. 
vlajic 
have the book and read it there. ((addresses Tereza in a soft 
voice)) Well where have you been Tereza? 
I am coming from my office so I brought you the video tape. 
((hands video tape to Vlajic)) This is a New Year present 
from me. 
Aaah ... thank you ... this seco ... third one made an impression ... ( 0. 5) 
people are calling ... we spoke about ( 1. 0) why, in Montenegro, 
Gauss drove out Njegos. Because our most common banknote 
here, the smallest, that of 10 dinars, (1.0) bears a picture 
of Njegos. On the German is Gauss 5 • We also spoke about 
Njegos•s curse. 
(2. 0) 
The title was: Why did Gauss - Gauss was a German 
mathematician, a contemporary of Njegos- drive out 
Njegos ... ( (pensively)) Why did a arithmetician drive out a 
Bishop. Why did a mathematician drive out a poet, why did 
some contraption, some sextant, some instrument drive out the 
Cetinje monastery. That is what we spoke about. 
(3.0) 
The English probably would not like it either, somebody in 
the Balkans accepting the German Mark as a currency, why not 
the Pound ... 
Yes ... indeed 
Well you see, there's a further issue here which is related 
to what you call heterodox. Look (1.5)There are words of 
different auditory makeup (0.5) with a similar or identical 
meaning ... These are synonyms. Or, there are words with the same 
auditory form, but a different meaning. But, you see, there 
is another thing. 
(2. 0) 
Words that have both a different meaning and a different 
auditory makeup, but a common nerve impulse, the energy which 
strikes the brain cells, and these we called ahh photonyms. 
Now ... I worked on this in Germany, and cooperated with a famous 
company there(0.5) my task was to determine, by looking at a 
name and its energy, what a particular person most likes ... what 
their photonym is. Look now. As early as in 1993, it was 
published 
( 3 • 0) 
that for Izetbegovic, the photonym is the ((German))Mark, as 
is the case with Dukanovic. 
(2. 0) 
In the brain cells, (1.0) the words Dukanovic and Mark cause 
identical vibrations. With Izetbegovic and the Mark, the 
situation is the same. On the basis of this knowledge, a 
prediction was made (1.5) and it came true. First, 
Izetbegovic accepted the Mark as his currency, and later 
Dukanovic did the same. This was calculated using a formula 
which was developed in 1976, and was published, in the form 
of a book, in 1984. Here it is, it's easy to calculate: 
Izetbegovic, that is 585 equals Izetbegovic, equals 
Dukanovic, equals Mark, equals the purity of gold (1.5) Now, 
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J.B. 
Vlajic 
if the enemy wants to pass onto us some mental chips, they 
would look for such things, and they found flukanovic who 
seems, as if hypnotically attracted to an idea which is 
inappropriate. 
( 2. 0) 
The mental chip is upon him, and he is working for someone 
else, and the poor man is not even aware of it. However, 
nature is rebelling, so something is happening (1.5) I don't 
need to tell you what is happening, but I hope that flukanovic 
(0.5) whose family is honorable, will come to his senses, and 
remember who he is. Can Gauss really drive out Njegos? (1.0) 
No way. It is very dangerous when one tries (1.0)to destroy 
the roots of a people (0.5) because deprived of its roots, a 
people disperses, disappears. 
So who are the these enemies who are able to get to flukanovic 
in this way? 
Let me tell you something. When we are talking about enemies, 
things are multi-layered (0.5) There are interest groups. 
(1.0) There is (0.5) a Turkish lobby, it is strong in 
America, hidden under the name of Jewry (1.0) but there is 
also a wider Islamic lobby, but beneath that one, maybe the 
most powerful of all is that of the Illuminati, I would not 
call it a lobby (0.5) but the Illuminati (1.5) force which 
has its own aims. Therefore, it is a combination of numerous 
interests. We would be looking for the resultant, the 
resultant of the vectors, which (0.5) is leaving its 
tentacles or its trace on Montenegro. But to point and say it 
is this person or that person, that would be inappropriate 
Extract 3: 30 December 2000; 49 min· 54min 
J.B. 
Vlajic 
Yes, yes, and one thing that I found especially interesting 
about your work, is the way you apply ((heterodox theories)) 
to social phenomena, social and historical events. 
Well you saw it. For example, specifically what 
happened.(1.5) Sometime in March last year, or maybe in 
February (1.0) A man walks into this very room. A wonderful 
man. A doctor. Cardiologist. He says, come on and tell us, 
once and for all, because he has his own political beliefs, I 
am neutral there because I am a scientist, and it is all the 
same to me, in a scientific sense .. .not in a social sense, but 
in scientific work, I research objectively. Whether it is 
Janko, Marko, Miles, Sulejman, in a scientific sense one has 
to be objective - God forbid Sulejman - to be neutral 
(inaudible) 
You see, he walks in and says, who could replace that 
Milosevic, (0.5) the man got sick of him for some reason. How 
should I tell you ... Only Kostunica. He says, don't tell me such 
nonsense. Fist of all he did not even get through to 
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J.B. 
Vlajic 
J.B. 
Vlajic 
parliament, he failed at the elections, and also he is out of 
politics now. And I showed him this book from 1992. He is 
from Cacak which should tell you something about him.• Once 
all this was over, he came back. Just like today, there were 
about 10-15 of us. He said, I must congratulate you. How did 
you know? ((laughs}} There, it is all in practical 
verification. Those who are ready to listen 
( 2. 0} 
will receive many useful instructions. Especially with regard 
to these mental chips. It's a whole science directed at that. 
How the energy of thought affects the sum of future events. 
How to turn that which is most beneficial into reality. 
( 3. 0} 
No matter what the domain, whether it is electing a 
president, the economy, or something else. That is a matter 
of opinion or the specific moment. 
And these mental chips, are they dispatched. .. is that whole 
method based on your Formula of light, [or is it 
[In some sense it is. 
Also, it is based on the teachings of Bishop Nikolaj 
Velimirovic. In some sense it is also derived from the ideas 
of Nikola Tesla, which he left through his writing on the 
energy of cosmic pain and thought-waves which can disturb the 
fine balance and cause earthquakes. So the approaches (0.5} 
are different, different means are being employed. The 
Formula of Light is useful when one is looking for a mental 
chip which resonates and guides a man in his actions. This is 
what was done with Dukanovic. And now he is as if under 
remote control (1.0} In addition, you know how this things 
go, they threaten him with Interpol and so on. The poor man 
is in a state of chaos, and hopefully God will help him. 
Nikcevic and Amfilohije Radovic are nearby. 7 
(2. 0} 
Their light can be felt (1.0} With God's help he will realize 
( 3 • 0} 
who he is - the descendant of Pavle Orlovic. Yes, the 
Dukanovic family are descendants of the Prince's young flag 
bearer, Pavle Orlovic.' If only that realization would rise 
inside him. Then, the rest, that which has been imposed from 
outside would be erased. He still has not recognized him 
( ( Orlovic} } , but with God's help ... 
You mentioned Bishop Nikolaj, as an influence [in the whole ... 
[Yes. He wrote 
an excellent booklet (1.0} entitled Symbols and signals. In 
it he talks about how to recognize the inner senses and 
recognize (0.5} what nature is telling us, and what it 
recommends (1.0} In this book ((points to his book History of 
the Future)) you will find enough about it and I am sure you 
can use it in your study. 
(3. 0} 
You will have so much material that them over there will be 
stunned. You will have some concrete things. Here I even give 
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J.B. 
Vlaji• 
instructions (0.5) about how to use (0.5) the force of 
meaning to bring about a desired outcome. For instance on the 
occasion when we sent out the name Ljiljana, as a code, a 
mental chip, into the universal field (0.5) Seven women 
turned up, five of them called Ljiljana. 
( 4. 0) 
I describe this in the book 
(15.0) 
That is interesting. You say you sent the name into the 
universal field? 
We all went quiet and agreed. .. look it says here how its done. 
It is not just the name Ljiljana, but it has to be attached 
to some powerful symbol which is recognizable in the 
universal field. We chose white ljiljan ((white lilly)) which 
is the symbol of the Mother of God (1.5) That is such a great 
force in the field. It is not just a technique, but the 
feeling of the soul. 
(2. 0) 
A part of the soul must be dispatched into the universal 
field. united with this symbol and the word. Then it 
responds. 
( 2. 0) 
That is why Bishop Nikolaj writes about the awakening of the 
inner, spiritual senses. It is not a technique, it is not a 
method. 
( 2. 0) 
That is where our advantage lies. We retained our 
spirituality. That is where Europe can learn a lot from us. 
It can make sure that the spirituality survives, and take 
some for itself. 
( 2. 0) 
The benefits would be infinite. Both individual, but through 
cooperation also for whole peoples, and through cooperation 
of peoples also for Europe as a whole to which we belong. And 
through cooperation of continents for all of the world's 
civilization. 
Extract 4: 2 January 2001; 9 min- 16 min 
Vlajic If only you knew how it is done. But it is described in 
books. The basis is derived from Jung's, or rather Jung-
Pauli's synchronicity. The states when one contemplative 
state (0.5) corresponds to one physical state. Now, the one 
who knows how to prepare a contemplative state (0.5) so that 
at some place at a certain time (0.5) it transforms itself 
into the physical, he has mastered the unified field and can 
use this method to turn spiritual energy into physical work. 
The examples I give in my book (0.5) are only hints, because 
they won't tell me about all that they are capable of. 
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Vlajic 
Experts from Group 69 are in possession of this 
knowledge. (1.0) I try ... ! am more of a independent journalist, 
I want to find out, so I ask around. However some things 
(0.5) I still [haven't figured out] 
[yes, yes] 
But my scientific 
(3. 0) 
and how should I say journalistic curiosity (0.5) is 
compelling me to keep investigating. But, I must underline 
what I told you last time. (0.5) There is every indication 
that the final victory belongs to those who are closer to 
God. Closer to God's laws.(l.5) When this is established as a 
condition for victory, then people will start competing in 
Good.(l.O) They will compete over who is closer to God, who 
is better, not only in order to win, but in order to survive. 
In that sense I really do expect that soon even that 
( 3. 0) 
which (1.5) until now has been concealed from the public will 
be revealed. For instance the files of Group 69. So far, only 
File 552 was made accessible to journalists. This file which 
consists of over 1000 pages (1.0) of densely typed text, in 
itself indicates 
(2.0) 
that they have made significant progress. 
( 3. 0) 
J.B. So this file is accessible 
(2.0) 
Vlajic 
J.B. 
Vlajic 
J.B. 
Vlajic 
to journalists? 
In fact, I have parts of File 552 and I bring them here when 
someone needs it. 
( 3. 0) 
This file was compiled, over the past ten years by engineer 
Davor Koledic and a group of his associates. They were 
directly linked with Group 69. That is one of the files 
available to the public. 
( 2. 0) 
That's the one you use in your work? 
Primarily, I primarily use that one, but I used (1.0) other 
sources, mainly stuff that was published in the press. 
(3. 0) 
Therefore I speak and talk only about things which are not 
filed under 'highly confidential' 
[Yes, yes 
[Or 'super-highly confidential', but 
only that which is available to the public. Eh, this is where 
there is another one of those riddles. 
(3. 0) 
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If all this, which is unusual and promising is available to 
the public, 
( 2. 0) 
what's the other stuff. How is it that that F117 was shot 
down so easily? And many other questions. How did the people 
stay so calm. (1.5) Unbelievably calm. In fact it is in 
England that they talked about this gene 19, but it is not 
just that. For instance (1.5) those experiments that were 
carried out in Eugene, the American town, with low wave 
frequencies, of what 7-8 Hz? They were driving the 
inhabitants crazy with the vibrations. And this was in 
peaceful times, when there were no other pressures. What 
happened with the Serbs? (1.0) Sanctions, threats of war, 
war. Then came bombing, greatest amount of force the world 
has ever seen. And the people? Unbelievably calm. So what is 
it that these experts possess? Listen, anyone normal ... imagine 
Nato is attacking you. Enough to make the hair on anyone's 
neck stand on end. And hardly any hairs were standing on end 
here. In fact people were even singing calmly. Not even 
traces of panic were anywhere to be seen' 
(2. 0) 
All this while the radiation was far higher than in Eugene, 
during a war, and at a time of great exhaustion 
(2. 0) 
Is this a sign of some of the things which the experts of 
Group 69 are capable of? This is what needs to be 
investigated. 
Extract 5: 2 January 2002; 21 min- 30 min 
Vlajic For instance, especially in Great Britain (5.0) Have the 
English, and I often ask myself this (1.0) really 
relinquished their distinctiveness as a people? Or Great 
Britain as a nation (0.5) comprised of three or four peoples. 
Which ones ... the English ( 0 . 5) the Scots ( 0. 5) the Welsh and 
partly the Irish. And you see what is happening now (1.0) the 
influx from their former colonies is so great, that the 
distinctiveness of the Englishman, as a Christian, even as a 
white race is being lost. I do not comment, I merely ask: is 
that OK? The Hindus will continue to exist (1.0) as will the 
Arabs, with their religions, and (0.5) how should I put it 
racial characteristics, while a people, whom I consider to be 
very noble in terms of their contribution to 
civilization, (0.5) is disappearing. Is that OK? Is the 
question I am asking nationalist? (1.0) No, this is one of 
those areas (0.5) where the rulers, the hidden hand, as they 
call them, the rulers from the shadows, the international 
brotherhood of bankers are doing their job. It is not in 
their interests, at least according to what is happening now 
(0.5) for European people to be preserved. As a white race, 
and (0.5) above all as Christians. Rather, (1.0) as if they 
are aiming for a creation of some oblivious medley 
( (inaudible) ) 
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(4. 0) 
And they know, again from the past experience of Serbs (1.5) 
about the aims of fundamentalist Islam. Not Islam as a 
religion, which I respect, but the fundamentalist kind which 
we experienced through the Turks, and to some extent through 
(1.0) the current goings-on. What they will bring to Europe, 
to Germany, France and England especially ... 
J.B. Do you think that the Khazarian origin of the rulers of the 
world , or their Turkish origin, is in any way connected with 
this Islamic dimension and expansion. 
Vlajic Look, in the book First world. .. It is a shame you don't have 
this book, because I describe it there in some detail. What 
is it all about? (1.0) All those who want to rule the world 
and its population, who want to have the power to rule (0.5) 
will begin by destroying nations with roots. Because with 
their spirit and faith, these nations refuse to be led for 
the sake of someone's invisible interests. The interests of 
some multinational capital. In that sense, strong faith is 
not (0.5) in their interest. They aim to destroy both 
Christianity and Islam, and Hinduism and Taoism, and all 
major religions, but gradually. In the first instance, they 
seem to have calculated that Christianity is the strongest 
and should be weakened. That are trying to achieve this in a 
number of ways. For example (1.0) the most obvious one is 
this. Since the inauguration of the Trilateral, the (1.5) 
organized institution that implements the intentions of the 
Banking brotherhood, has sided with the Muslims in every 
conflict (1.5) which involved Christians fighting against 
Muslims. Specifically, it started with East Timer in 
Indonesia. They sided with the Muslims, and almost (0.5) I 
won't say destroyed, but completely weakened Christianity, 
Roman Catholic Christianity at that, in Timer. Then came 
(2.0) 
came Cyprus, where they were against the Orthodox Greeks 
(0.5) and for the Turks. Then came Lebanon where they almost 
destroyed Christianity which used to be very strong. It was 
the hub of Christianity (1.5) in that part, around Jerusalem, 
in the Holy Land. There were Roman Catholics there, but also 
Orthodox Christians. (0.5) Then came Nagorno-Karabah. No 
first Eritrea (1.0) In Ethiopia they were once again for the 
Islamic conquest and against (0.5) Christians. Then came 
Nagorno-Karabah, where they were against the old, suffering 
Christian people, the Armenians, whom the Turks destroyed at 
the beginning of the century. The greatest genocide in this 
century was maybe against the Armenians, and later in the 
Second World War, against a number of peoples, including 
Serbs. After that comes Chechnya (0.5) where once again they 
were against Orthodox, not only Russians, but all the other 
surrounding peoples, peoples who live around Chechnya. (0.5) 
Then came Bosnia and Herzegovina. They supported the Muslims, 
against Roman Catholic Croats and Orthodox Serbs. Now came 
the their 'black crown': Kosovo (1.5) Aided by the, how 
should I say, their poor mercenaries who did not realize what 
was happening. I am talking about the young men whom I truly 
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love, for they are our kids. I am talking about these 
multinational forces, about these Christians, they haven't 
got a clue about what is going on. In the last couple of 
months the Albanians have destroyed over 150 Christian 
Churches, some of which were over six hundred years old, and 
represent the legacy of the world of Christianity. For 
instance the monastery in Sociste ((inaudible))And Kosovo and 
Metohija are themselves, if we take a broader look, the hub 
of Christianity. And don't get me started (0.5) on all the 
tricks within Roman Catholicism with the number 666, or the 
Anglican or Protestant Church which is breaking up into 
sects, which often take over, and instead of being Christian 
(0.5) tend to drift into magic, or even Satanism.(0.5) 
Christianity is under threat. And as Christians, we must 
understand that time has come to fight for our survival. 
·There is no more time for quarrelling. (1.5) Let all the big 
religions live, but I would not like Christianity to 
disappear. Now, they are not friends of the Muslims (0.5) I 
am talking about the international brotherhood which is non-
religious (1.5) and which is not even Judaist, nor Christian, 
nor Islamic. I would say that they are driven, at least 
through the prof ... principles of profit, by Satanism. This is 
because their basis consists only of that which is material. 
No spirituality. Now let me finish. They are not friends of 
Islam. 
(2.0) 
It is only that at the moment, Christianity is stronger, so 
they are targeting it. Once it is weakened, they will turn 
against Islam, because their motto (1.0) their favourite 
sentence is: the easiest victory is when the enemy destroys 
himself. That is what this is all about. (1.0) Are we going 
to allow Satanism to take over this planet. I am talking 
about the broader definition of Satanism. For me Satanism is 
all that indiscriminately, and brutally destroys nature as 
(0.5) created by God. All that is destroying the ozone layer, 
(0.5) water (0.5) air, food, forests, spirituality, morals, 
what is it in essence but Satanism? In that sense, I am glad 
that Serbia, after all these changes, and Yugoslavia, became 
part of Europe, so that we too could say things which we 
could not say in different circumstances. How can they say 
that Serbs are not part of Europe. How could they say this 
when Serbs as Europeans are more established that some of the 
great Europeans, or so called Europeans. 
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Notes 
--···--··----------
Chapter 3: Serbian Populist right-wing politics: the roots of conspiracy culture 
I) The majority of the Serbian Jewish conununity originates from the Sephardic Jews who, after 
fleeing the Spanish inquisition, inhabited regions of the Balkans under Ottoman rule. Turkish 
authorities adopted a fairly liberal stance towards the Jews, who were recognised as a milet- a non-
Islarnic religious community within the Empire. Jews were allowed to practise their religion and 
customs as long as they paid the necessary taxes and accepted the Ottoman secular authorities. Most 
Jews lived in towns, where they worked as leather craftsmen or feather pluckers (Sekelj, 1995). As 
town dwellers, Jews and other minorities such as Tsintsars, Greeks, Armenians, Gypsies and Turks 
were almost completely isolated from the Serbian peasant population, which by and large lived a self-
contained existence in the rural areas (Petrovitcb, 1976). The persecution of Jews in Serbian society, 
which began with the first Serbian popular uprising in 1804, was accompanied by the banishment of 
Jews from a number of southern Serbian cities. 
2) A British parliamentary motion passed in 1867 concluded that the 'conduct of the Servian people in 
regard to the Jewish conununity residing amongst them has been utterly unworthy of a people who 
reasonably and justly aspire to take their place among the civilised conununities of Europe' (Jews in 
Servia: Motion for Papers, Parliament, 1867; p. 839-842). 
3) The liberalisation of the Serbian society after the Berlin congress also led to the emergence of the 
anti-Masonic movement (Nenezic, 1984). Incidentally, the frnt anti-Masonic arguments came from 
Serbian left-wing thinkers who saw Freemasonry as a 'mysterious activity' of international capitalism 
aimed at subjugating the working classes. However, in 1895 the Radical Party published the book 
Freemasons in Education (Framasoni u Prosveti) a series of articles on the 'Masonic conspiracy'. This 
marked the beginning of Serbian anti-Masonic movement which in the 1920s and 30s became an 
extension of conspiratorial antisemitism. 
4) There was some speculation in the 1930s that Ljotic had sympathisers among Yugoslav army 
officers who were probably drawn to Zbor's authoritarianism and the emphasis on the powerful 
national army (Popov, 1993). 
5) Ljotic was also considered by many to be a religious fanatic. One ofLjotiC's better known 
nicknames was 'Mita [short for Dirnitrije] the bible-hasher' (Popov, 1993). 
6) The only significant dispute with the Germans occurred when Ljotic refused to send a division of 
his supporters to the Eastern front in the latter stages of the war. 
7) SDK are said to have been responsible for rounding up the victims of the notorious mass shooting in 
the town ofKragujevac in October 1941. On that occasion, over two thousand civilians (including all 
of the town's Jewish men) perished in a single day (Cohen, 1996, Martic, 1980) 
8) Published transcripts of Ljotic 's speeches include descriptions of audience reaction such as 
'rapturous applause' or 'the audience cheers ecstatically'. Although the accuracy of the transcript is 
difficult to verify, it is noteworthy that cheers and applause often follow overt antisemitic claims. 
9) VelirniroviC's personal charisma was noted by Rebecca West, who met the Bishop during a visit to 
his diocese in 1938. 
'He struck me now, as when I had seen him for the first time in the previous year, as the most remarkable 
human being I have ever met, not because he was wise or good, for I have still no idea to what extent he 
was either, but because he was the supreme magician ... He was so apt for magic that had it not existed, he 
could have invented it' (West, 1993; p.720) 
10) In 1941, Henry Ford's antisemitic ranting was serialised, in a more detailed and comprehensive 
fonn, in the newspaper Nasa Borba (Our Struggle) published by Zbor. 
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11) The 'Dinara race', named after the mountain of the same name, is the most common racial type 
amongst Southern Slav people, according to early 20th century racial theories. 
12) A more detailed discussion ofVelimirovic's ambivalence towards the West and especially Britain 
is beyond the scope of the present discussion. Historical literature appears to agree that Velimirovic, a 
former Oxford student, harboured strong pro-British attitudes and maintained links with the Anglican 
Church (Nenezic, 1984; Stefanovic, 1984, Borkovic, 1979). Velimirovic's affinity towards the 
Anglican church stemmed largely from the fact that the COE, as a national church, seemed to 
Velimirovic to be compatible with his own vision of the union between church and state (see 
Nationalism ofSt Sava, in Velimirovic, 2001). Consequently, VelimiroviC's support for the military 
coup in March 1941, in which the British intelligence played no small part part, was probably a 
reflection ofhis pro-British stance. However, as will become apparent, Velimirovic's was otherwise 
strongly opposed to Western political and cultural influences_ It is also interesting that writers on the 
Masonic movement in Serbia frequently suggest that Velimirovic's pro-British stance was the result of 
him being a Freemason (Nenezic, 1984; Lopu5ina, 1998). Bearing in mind Velimirovic's anti-Masonic 
discourse, this is unlikely to be true. However, the allegation can be seen as a reflection of the general 
tendency, in anti-Masonic writing, to attribute pro-Western attitudes to the involvement in the Masonic 
movement. 
13) Subotic (1996) even suggested that Velimirovic and the Patriarch were 'the only religious figures 
interned in Dachau' which is inaccurate_ There were several thousand religious dignitaries of various 
denominations imprisoned in Dachau, including over 1700 Polish catholic priests (see, for instance, 
Berben, 1975; Music!, 1975). 
14) According to Petranovic (1983), in 1945, German authorities in Yugoslavia proposed the 
establishment of a Serbian-Montenegrin federation which would be governed by pro-Gerrnan 
nationalist forces. Ljotic, Nedic and others, who have been hoping for a 'Greater Serbia' that would 
include parts ofBosnia and Croatia, claimed that in order to get their forces to accept the new, and less 
appealing state borders, they need to have the support of Velimirovic and Patriarch Gavrilo, who at this 
point had already been taken to Dachau. The clearance for the release of Velimirovic and the Patriarch 
came from Herman Neubacher, the German emissary for Serbia, Montenegro, Albania and Greece. 
15) In spite of the role which Ljotic and other leaders ofZbor played in laying the foundations of 
contemporary conspiracy culture in Serbia, they are seldom explicitly mentioned or cited in recent 
versions of conspiracy theory. The reason for their absence lies mainly in the controversy surrounding 
Zbor's collaboration with the Nazis, which has undermined LjotiC's public standing. Although there 
have been several attempts in recent years to rehabilitate Ljotic and present him as a saviour of Serbian 
lives and a martyr rather than a traitor and collaborator (see Popov, 1993) Ljotic's political integrity is 
still seen as questionable, even within the Serbian Right. Interestingly, for many critics on the right, it 
is often not LjotiC's antisemitism or his fascist tendencies that are regarded as objectionable, but the 
fact that, in helping the Germans, Zbor and the Serbian Volunteer Force often fought against the 
Cherniks ofDr.Z. Mihajlovic, a nationalist guerrilla force which, in the post-war years acquired a 
privileged status within Serbian nationalist mythology, as the embodiment ofWWII patriotism and 
anticommunist resistance. As the wrangle about Ljotic's political credibility continues, it is Bishop 
Nikolaj Velimirovic who has emerged as the most prominent authority within Serbian conspiratorial 
culture. 
16) Jovan Skerlic is a well-known and respected historian whose work includes some of the most 
reliable analyses of cultural, political and ideological trends of 19th and early 20th century Serbia. 
17) In 1915 Nikola Pasic sent none other than Nikolaj Velimirovic on a diplomatic mission to 
Western Europe and the United States to advocate the Serbian cause_ 
18) The term 'omnihurnan' was first introduced by Dostoyevski in his work Pushkin 's address. 
Dostoyevski envisaged it as a Orthodox Christian equivalent to Nietzsche's 'superman', that is as the 
highest ethical ideal of a devout Orthodox Christian. The concept is also central to Velimirovic's 
philosophy, much of which is based on the critique ofNietzsche (Bigovic, 1998) 
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19) An anecdote connected to calls for Velimirovic 's canonisation provides a clear illustration of the 
extent to which Velimirovic 's antisemitism is taboo within religious circles in Serbia. On one occasion 
Patriarch Pavle is said to have admitted that canonising Velimirovic would be 'controversial'. 
However, the alleged controversy is not in Velimirovic's questionable political orientation or his rabid 
antisemitisrn, but in the fact that he 'smoked cigarettes' and that some of his personal friends are still 
alive. 'It would sound strange' the Patriarch is said to have argued, 'if someone could say "I once knew 
a saint"' (reported in Heroes of our times: Prayers and requests, Nin, 1 January, 1999). 
Chapter 4: Social psychology and the study of extraordinary explanations: from attributional 
bias to ideology 
1) The F AE is thought to be less evident in the attribution of causes of one's own behaviour, when 
situational factors are preferred. However, this again depends on the type of event and the use of 
various self-serving biases in attribution (Storms, 1973). 
2) All three books were published in the same Studies in Prejudice series (see Billig, 1978) 
3) A New Scientist survey in the early 1970s, cited by Collins and Pinch (1979) revealed that 70% or 
readers believed in the possibility of psi phenomena. Also, discussions with scientists conducted by the 
two authors revealed little hostility towards parapsychology among physicists. At the same time, there 
is less evidence of institutional bonding between mainstream science and parapsychology, in that the 
same physicists reported that a public display of enthusiasm for the paranormal would probably 
adversely affect their careers. 
4) Also, while the existence of a myth of anti-Serbian conspiracy was undoubtedly politically 
advantageous to Milosevic and his regime, it is hard to see how any concrete political advantage could 
be derived from antisemitic conspiracy theory. 
5) The emphasis on method is not only the prerogative of traditional experimental and other 
quantitative approaches to scientific inquiry. Discourse analysis (DA, Potter & Wetherell, 1987) or 
conversation analysis (CA; Hutchby and Wooffitt, 1998; Antaki and Widdicombe, 1998; ten Have, 
1999) are also inherently linked to assumptions (no matter how vaguely defmed or even denied) about 
how analysis of social psychological phenomena should be done. Both CA and DA are defined by what 
is thought to be the correct or at least recommended practice of analysing discourse or conversation, as 
well as by their theoretical of meta-theoretical assumptions. 
6) A similar sentiment was expressed by Tajfel (1981) when he noted that understanding prejudice 
reqnires the examination of relevant '[cultural] myths, be they called representations collectives, social 
representations, or social (as opposed to individual) stereotypes'. Tajfel recognised the historical and 
cultural specificity of these 'myths' and their irreducibility to individual and universal psychology. In 
doing so he effectively sided with Moscovici in the desire to turn social psychology into 'an 
anthropological and historical science' (Moscovici, 1984b, p.948). 
Chapter 5: Data and Materials 
1) For instance, it is common practice in Yugoslavia to keep copies of old newspapers for recycling or 
for general use in the house. Consequently, in the summer of 1999, door-to-door inquiries were often a 
productive data-gathering exercise. 
2) In addition to the data listed above, in the initial stages of the data-gathering process recordings of 
over 20 hours of radio news bulletins broadcast during the bombing campaign were obtained from the 
Radio Belgrade audio archive. However, this material was not used. The bulletins consisted mainly of 
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factual information about targets ofNato attacks and the occasional commentaries were similar to those 
examined in Chapter 6, which were found in Politika. 
3) Several attempts were made to obtain the circulation figures for the publications used in the thesis, 
but with little success. According to Prvosav Plav!ic of the independent Media Centre based in 
Belgrade, who is one of the leading experts on the Serbian media, official statistics are impossible to 
come by. The reason is that most publishers inflate the sales figures when trying to attract advertisers, 
investors or donors, and deflate them when doing their tax returns. Plavsic pointed out that editors are 
sometimes willing to give out information to researchers 'off the record', but that without independent 
verification, the source cannot be treated as reliable. 
4) The name is pronounced Jurjevich. This is also the spelling which Durdevic adopted during his 
career in the US. The thesis will use the original, Serbian spelling. 
5) Incidentally, Krstic died in a virtually identical way as his political role-model Dimitrije Ljotic. He 
was killed in a car accident, after his vehicle careered of the road and crashed in a ditch. 
6) Extracts from the trascript of the encounters with Vlaj ic are provided in Appendix A. 
Chapter 6: Protoconspiracy theory and the proliferation of suspicion in the Serbian media and 
political discourse 
I) The tendency of conspiracy theories to emerge in time of war has been noted in literattrre on the 
subject (e.g. Pipes, 1998). As one author put it, 'all wars start with conspiracy theories, put out by the 
various governments, proving to the satisfaction of their citizens, at least for a while, that all the trouble 
was cased deliberately by the other side' (Wemick, 1994; p.l20) 
2) The transcript of the document was subsequently leaked to the weekly news magazine Vreme which 
published it in April 1991. 
3) A. Apostolovski is one of Politika's regular journalists whose contributions during the war ranged 
from straightforward reports from bombed sites or press conferences, to bitter anti-Western 
commentaries. 
4) Further discussion of the use of biological metaphors can be found in Chapter 9. As will become 
apparent, biological metaphors are in some contexts also used to represent the enemy. This is the case 
for instance in references to strikes 'at the heart' of the enemy, or breaking the enemy's 'backbone'. 
5) The reference to international organisations in this context is interesting as it implies that these 
organisations, just like the lay public, are the victim of media manipulation. However, on other 
occasions international organisations and charities were often portrayed not as victims of manipulation, 
but as participants in the conspiracy. For example in the issue of 14 April 1999, Nedeljni Telegraf 
revealed that OSCE verifiers in Kosovo were recruited from a 'private intelligence company from 
Virginia' and that during their brief stay in the province they placed many missile guidance devices in 
crucial locations. In an earlier issue the magazine revealed that Medecins sans Fontieres as well as 23 
other charity organisations were systematically gathering logistical information for Nato. The view of 
charities as spy nests was 'confirmed' when Steve Pratt, an Australian charity worker arrested during 
the bombing, 'confessed' that he spied for Nato. 
6) The website belongs to the so called Serbian Defence League, a California-based antisemitic 
organisation run by the Serbian emigre Boris Pribic. 
7) Such articles were also read out in Radio Belgrade's principal daily news bulletin at 3.00 pm. 
8) In addition, the development of the idiosyncratic style of protoconspiratorial explanation in the 
mainstream political discourse of the early 1990s can be said also to have been motivated by the desire 
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to maintain the distance between the official rhetoric of the Milosevic regime and the 1930s right-wing 
ideological tradition which was still largely considered to be beyond the boundaries of acceptable 
opinion. 
9) On 11 April 1999 Slavko Curuvija, founder and editor of the daily Dnevni Telegraf and the 
magazine Evropijanin was assassinated in front of his home in Belgrade, by the Serbian security forces. 
The killing was interpreted by most of Serbia's independent media as a warning and as a sign of the 
regime's determination to use violence in dealing with any kind of dissent. 
I 0) In Chapter I 0 there is a reference to a media campaign in the months after the war against members 
of the Serbian opposition who met with Madeline Albright. Korac was a member of the delegation that 
visited the former US Secretary of State, and was as such labelled 'traitor' and 'servant of the West'. 
Chapter 7: The emergence of antisemitic conspiracy themes in the mainstream Serbian press. 
I) In Ilurdevic 's books Masonry: a conspiracy against God and man, through the centuries and today 
and Five Bloody Revolutions of Judeo-bankers and their Judeo-masonry, the Bilderbergers and other 
world elite organisations are located on the third level of the conspiratorial pyramid. Above them are 
the Committee of300, which in turn is ruled by leaders of the 'Judeo-Masons' and 'Pharisees', namely 
Rockefeller and Rothschild. 
2) Although The Trilateral does not deal directly with the bombing of Yugoslavia (it was published in 
1998), the book warrants further attention. The Trilateral is the clearest and the best known elaboration 
of the world elite conspiracy theory available in the Serbian language to date. A vramov claims that the 
book sold over 10,000 copies. 
3) The name 'Aradunik Mihajlovic' is most probably a printing error as 'Aradunik' does not exist as a 
Serbian name. Unfortunately, in spite of all attempts to trace the article in Politika which O'Kane 
mentions in her report, it was not possible to find the original text. 
4) Umberto Eco (1989) reflects upon this temporal dimension of conspiracy theory in Foucault 's 
Pendulum when one of the characters in the novel describes 'the lunatic', one of the categories in a 
somewhat cynical classification of humanity. The 'lunatic' in many ways resembles the conspiracy 
theorist: 
'For him everything proves everything else. The lunatic has an "idee fixe• and whatever he comes across 
confirms his lunacy. You can tell him by the liberties he takes with common sense, by his flashes of 
inspiration, and by the fact that, sooner or later, he brings out the Templars' (p.67) 
Although conspiracies are often traced back to Templars, the Weishaupt's Illuminati or the early 
Freemasons, their origins frequently go even further back in history, mostly to early Christian times. 
Reference to early Christian themes, especially those relating to the death of Christ, can be regarded as 
a legacy of antisemitic elements in conspiracy theory, in that they accentuate the importance of the act 
of crucifixion which is traditionally blamed on the Jews (Cohn, 1957). 
5) Two years after the publication of the second edition of The Trilateral, Avramov wrote another 
book, Opus Dei, devoted entirely to the conspiratorial machinations of the Vatican and its anti-Serbian 
and anti-Orthodox machinations. 
6) There is no reason to believe that the author of the article is herself an exponent of political 
extremism or an enthusiast for the wilder reaches of the conspiracy tradition. Knezevic is a single 
mother in her early thirties, with a degree in Spanish. She is only a part time journalist. Otherwise she 
translates subtitles for Latin American soap-operas. Knezevic's biographical information was provided 
by a former editor of Politika's culture supplement, who described his young colleague as 'very 
intelligent'. When asked to explain the content ofKnezevic's articles, our source explained that 
Knezevic was probably 'too short of money to be to concerned with morals'. 
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Chapter 8: Conspiracy theory and paranormal explanations 
I) Research on wartime rumourmongering has led to a series of attempts at categorisation (Rosnow, 
1976). One of the better known attempts was the threefold classification of rumour proposed by Knapp 
(1944), which distinguished between 'pipe dreams' 'bogies' and 'wedge-drivers'. 'Wedge-driving' 
rumours are those which divide the community in which they circulate by suggesting, for example, that 
certain sections contribute less to the war effort, or even collaborate with the enemy. Interestingly, 
Knapp's research on rumours in the US during WWII indicated that the vast majority or rumours were 
of the 'wedge-driving' kind (66%) with ouly 2% of stories collected falling into the 'pipe dream' 
category. On the other hand, more recent research conducted during the Nigerian civil war (1967-1970) 
suggests that on this occasion 'pipe dream' rumours were by far the most common category (above 
60%; Nkpa, 1977). 
2) It appears that the articles were not initially envisaged as a series. At the end of the first article there 
is no 'to be continued' message, commonly found in Duga in the case of serialised articles. Radi~ic's 
articles are linked only by subtle references in the text itself as well as by the caption 
Parapsychological Patriotic War printed above the titles of the second and the third article. It is 
therefore possible to speculate that the magazine initially intended to publish only the first article, but 
subsequently decided to include two others, possibly because it became apparent that there was a 
public demand for material on this topic. 
3) These issues were discussed with Stojadinovic during an informal conversation which took place in 
Belgrade, in December 2000. 
4) Radi~ic was subsequently promoted to the rank of colonel, which he holds to the present day. 
5) The First World parapsychological war is the first part of a trilogy, which also includes First World 
anti-Christian War (1999) and most recently The History of the Future (2000). 
6) After the fall of the Milo~evic regime, and the 'liberation' of the state media, Stojadinovic moved to 
Politika where he writes on military affairs. 
7) Parapsychology is today often regarded as a legitimate academic discipline which, in the US at 
least, attracts government funding. Collins and Pinch (1979) cite the executive secretary of the 
(American) National Institute of Mental Health as stating that funding for parapsychological research 
is justified because those involved are 'perfectly well trained, respectable scientific investigators. They 
are sincere and serious and they deserve a chance' (p.l67). 
8) According to Gardner (1981) this trend reflects both the psychic's fascination with modem science 
and the need for rational explanation which would ultimately lead to recognition. In the past, 
Maxwell's electromagnetic waves, as well as various aspects of Einstein's relativity theory, were used 
by psychics to account for phenomena such as precognition, psychokinesis and clairvoyance (see 
Gardner, 1981). 
9) The concept of 'synchronicity', initially described by Jung, refers to 'a coincidence in time of two 
or more causally unrelated events which have the same or a similar meaning'. It includes instances 
such as thinking of someone shortly before receiving a phone-call from that person, etc. In other words, 
synchronicity refers to instances where a mental event corresponds to a physical event in a seemingly 
acausal manner. With Pauli's help this somewhat mystical idea attained a quantum mechanical 
elucidation. Jung and Pauli also argued that underpinning synchronicity is the fact that both physical 
and mental worlds are aspects of the same transcendental reality (unus mundus) which organises 
images in the sphere of the psyche and regulates the transformation of matter and energy on the 
physical level. The idea of a unus mundus as some hyper-reality where all information (physical and 
mental) is stored, links Jung' s and Pauli' s concept of synchronicity to the the Hindu notion of 'Akashic 
record', William James's 'cosmic reservoir' of memories, or the 'astral plane'. In his work Vlajic 
insists that the key to parapsychological warfare lies in the mastery of this 'universal' or 'information 
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field', which would make it possible not only to predict the future, but also act in a seemingly acausal 
way on a subquantum level. 
10) Jung and Pauli did not specify the precise 'location' of the unus mundus. However, the idea of a 
realm consisting of pure information led other theorists, such as the biologist Rupert Sheldrake to 
speculate about the existence of actual physical 'morphogenetic fields' which 'carry information only 
(no energy) and are available throughout time and space without any loss of intensity after they have 
been created' (Gilman, 1986). These fields supposedly contain information on the structural 
organisation of all living matter. In Vlajic's work, 'morphogentic fields' are treated as synonymous 
with the 'universal field' (see previous note). 
11) The EPR (Einstein, Podolski, and Rosen) paradox, or the 'non-locality problem', presents one of 
the principal unresolved issues ofQM. A comprehensive description of the paradox and a discussion of 
its implication for psi-research can be found in Gardner (1981) and Collins and Pinch (1982). For the 
present purposes, it suffices to say that, according to quantum theory, in some situations it appears as if 
'information can go instantly from one particle to another one that is ten light years away', travelling at 
superlurninal speeds (Gardner, 1981). Therefore, theoretically speaking, causes of some physical events 
need not be temporally or spatially local, suggesting the possibility of 'action at a distance' (Collins 
and Pinch, 1982). This phenomenon has led some well-known physicists, most notably David Bohm, to 
speculate that the particles in question may be connected on a subquantum level, which Jay outside the 
time-space dimension of relativity theory (Gardner, 1981). 
The implication of the EPR paradox, which is still a subject of controversy among experts in QM, but 
which makes it appealing to parapsychologists, is that it opens up the theoretical possibility that the 
space-time reality which we inhabit is just the surface of a hyperspace, in which some type of 
information can travel instantly. More importantly, as Vlajic indicates in his account of the EPR 
paradox, the force which supposedly links the two electrons featured in the famous experiment is 
constructed as somehow originating in the human mind. 
The attribution of causality in quantum phenomena to the human mind, common in parapsychological 
theorising since the 1970s, appears to be the result of an unfortunate semantic confusion, resulting from 
the ambiguity of the category of 'observer' referred to in specialist literature. According to Stenger 
(1992), when describing how the state of a system is affected by the act of measurement, pioneers of 
QM research like Bohr and Heisenberg, used the term 'observer', thus 'inadvertently [leaving] the 
impression that human consciousness enters the picture to cause that state to come into being'. As QM 
gradually became part oflay discourse, the reference to the 'observer' was interpreted as implying 
human involvement. Stenger (1992) concludes that 
'If Bohr and Heisenberg had spoken of measurements made by inanimate instruments rather than 
'observers', perhaps this strained relationship between quantum and mind would not have been drawn. For 
nothing in quantum mechanics requires human involvement.' 
Therefore, although QM is fairly specific when it comes to identifying the limits of hypothetical sub-
quantum processes and assumes that an 'observer' is an inanimate, hypothetical entity, Bohm's 
interpretation led many believers in the supernatural, including Vlajic, to use this type of explanation to 
account for telepathy, clairvoyance, psychokinesis, and practically all other parapsychological 
phenomena. The re-presentation of specialist concepts within external, non-specialist explanatory 
frameworks has been the topic ofMoscovici's (1976) early work on social representation which 
examined the commonsense understanding of psychoanalytic terms. The dynamic through which 
expert vocabulary is re-presented in a paranormal conspiratorial explanatory framework will be 
examined in more detail in the following chapter, through the example of the term 'neocortical war'. 
12) The first QM interpretation of 'psi' emerged in the 1950's (Jordan, 1950, Margenau, 1956), 
although this idea gained wider recognition among parapsychologists only in the 1970s, when the work 
ofEvan Harris Walker (1974) of the Jolm Hopkins University was frrst published (Collins and Pinch, 
1982). Interestingly, Walker's work is said to have been approved even by some established 
mainstream physicists, including the Nobel Prize winner Brian Josephson (Gardner, 1981) 
13) Global Proliferation of Weapons ofMass Destruction: A Case Study on the Aum Shinrikyo. 
Senate Government Affairs Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, October 31, 1995 Staff 
Statement (http://www.fas.org/im/congress/1995 mt!aum/part06.htm) 
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14) The crusade against 'sects' in recent years was not confmed to religious authorities, but included 
parts of the Serbian political and military establishment. In 1999, the Helsinki Committee for Human 
Rights considered the campaign against small religious communities in Yugoslavia to be sufficiently 
aggressive to constitute a potential infringement of the freedom of confession prescribed by the Serbian 
constitution (HCFHR Serbia Report 1999). 
15) http:/!www.spc.org. vu/Latin/sekte. html 
16) Vlajic cites the Military Review as a source of information on the voodoo units. An extensive 
search of the Military Review database failed to reveal any articles in support ofVIajic's claim. 
However, a text found on the website of the US Army Combined Arms Research Libarary suggests 
that US special forces did use charms against voodoo magic during the 1994 operation in Haiti (Major 
Ronald M. Johnson, Application Of Aspects Of Unconventional Waifare: Tools For Engaging The 
Current And Future Threat Trends O[The Post- Cold War Environment, Masters thesis, Faculty of the 
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College). The purpose of this exercise was to reduce anxiety 
among soldiers and prevent the spreading of rumours. It does not mean that military authorities 
seriously entertained the possibility of witchcraft, or that the American army employed 'witches'. 
17) In fact 'Don Amerigo' is not an anagram of' Armagedon'. The two words only have 
corresponding consonants, but not vowels. 'Don Amerigo' has an 'o' where 'Armagedon' should have 
an 'a'. 
18) The 11" century Tibetan saint, Jetsun Milarepa was a poet, musician, and meditation master. 
Milarepa was the first Tibetan 'commoner' to attain enlightenment in only one lifetime, exemplifying 
the great human potential for transformation. 
19) Because of the noticeable discrepancy between Vlajic's and Radisic's explanations, in terms of the 
emphasis on the religious element, Vlajic was asked, during the recent conversation, to comment on the 
apparent absence of Orthodox Christian spirituality in the work of his colleague, Svetozar Radisic. 
Interestingly, Vlajic denied the existence of any significant difference of opinion. Instead, he pointed 
out that Radisic 's reference to Eastern mysticism was not used to account for methods used by Group 
69, but rather, to describe the techniques of Serbia's enemies: 
'[Radisic] mentions everything that is being used by the great powers, Eastern or Western. However, 1 read 
very carefully: nowhere does he say what it is that Group 69 uses. As far as I know, the basis of the work 
of Group 69 is accessing nature through prayer ... and asking, in a way that is pleasing to God, for so-called 
mental chips to come about, in accordance with God's justice.' 
This explanation is more applicable to Radisic's recent work (see next chapter), where he does focus on 
the methods employed by Serbia's enemies, than to the views expressed in the articles in Duga. 
20) The alleged association between Obradovic and Freemasonry is a common theme in early 20" 
Century anti-Masonic conspiracy theory in Serbia, and reflects the tendency to link all progressive 
figures from Serbian political and cnlturallife to some evil and alien anti-Serbian plot. 
Chapter 9: 'Neocortical Warfare': conspiratorial representation of a biological metaphor 
I) RadiSic elaborates on Hagelin's ideas of universal consciousness in more detail in Chapter 7 of his 
book, entitled Information shell. In the introduction to the chapter he reveals that John Hagelin visited 
Belgrade in 1990, and gave a lecture at the conference centre 'Sava' in which he suggested that 
humanity is approaching the 'more fundamental levels of natural dynamics, that is the universal field of 
natural intelligence' (Radmc, 1999; p.57) 
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2) Radisic 's article in Duga was subsequently reprinted in Revija 92 (By winning, America is /oosing 
the war, Revija 92, 18 October, 1996; p.8) where it was also introduced as 'exclusive'. Large sections 
of this article can also be found in the book Neocortical Waifare, so specific ideas contained in the 
articles will not be examined separately. 
3) Although the Tofflers' book War and Anti-War received relatively little coverage in academic 
literature it has been widely influential within the US military establishment. For a number of years 
Alvin Toffler, the book's first author, has been teaching the 'wave theory' of warfare at the highly 
esteemed Air War College in the US. The popularity of War and Anti-War within the military is 
evident in the fact that it was through an example from this book that Professor George Stein of the Air 
University justified the inclusion of the concept of information warfare in US military doctrine: 
'if the world really is moving into a third-wave, information-based era, failure to develop a strategy for 
both defensive and offensive information warfare could put the United States and the US military into 
the situation of being on the receiving end of an "Electronic Pearl Harbor"' (Stein, 1995). 
4) Collateral Damage or Unlawful Killings?, Violations of the Laws of War by NATO during 
Operation Allied Force (AI Index: EUR 70/18/00), published in June 2000. 
http://www.web.arnnesty.org/ai.nsfi'lndex!EUR700302000?0penDocument&of=COUNTRIES\YUGO 
SLAVIA 
5) Whitehead ( 1997) criticises the concept of 'neocortical warfare' mt the grounds that it is not a 
particularly original idea, but a pretentious name for 'psychological operations, propaganda and 
military deception'. DiNardo and Hughes (1995) perceive Szafranski's ideas as 'speculative' and 
'radical', not because he proposes a revolutionary new method based on brain manipulation, but 
because 'information warfare' cannot provide an alternative for traditional methods of war. For similar 
reasons Whitehead (1997) evaluates 'neocortical war' as 'unconvincing' and 'irresponsible'. 
6) In spite of the disagreements between social representations and the study of discourse, some 
attempts have been made to reconcile the two perspectives (Billig, 1988a; Harn!, 1984, 1998). Billig, 
( 1988a, 1993) for example, drew attention to the argumentative and rhetorical aspects of anchoring and 
objectification, thus bringing together the theory of social representations and rhetorical psychology. 
Similarly, Moscovici (1998) recently reiterated the importance oflanguage in the process of 
representation, and suggested that the analysis of discourse can complement his theory by exploring in 
greater detail its linguistic and discursive aspects. 
7) However, this appears to be changing since the fall ofMilosevic, see next chapter. 
8) It is also noteworthy that such 'convergence of extremes', based on a shared endorsement of 
conspiratorial culture, is not a uniquely Serbian phenomenon. In Russia too, anti-Western forces from 
opposite ends of the political continuum endorse similar conspiratorial beliefs. Communist Zyoganov 
and nationalist Zhirinovsky justify their anti-W estem sentiments on the basis of a similar conspiratorial 
notion. Similarly, in the United States, former Attorney General Ramsey Clark, usually perceived as a 
representative ofleft-wing conspiracism (Pipes, 1998) maintained links with the LaRouchians, an 
extreme right-wing organisations known for its devotion to conspiracy theories (Berlet, 1994). In both 
cases, just like in Serbia, the common feature which brings diverse institutions and movements together 
is an antagonism towards the Western/ American political establishment. 
Chapter 10: Conspiracy culture in post-Milosevic Serbia: the return to the margins 
I) A similar analogy with Nazi Germany appeared on other occasions. On 25 May, Kostunica stated 
that Nazis were 'small children' in comparison with Nato generals (Politika, 25 May 1999; p.l2). A 
day later he suggested that compared to Nato and its generals, 'Goering and his Luftwaffe are the 
epitome ofhonourable warriors' (Politika, 26 May 1999, p.l2) 
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2) Some years ago VujaCic (1995) suggested that Jowitt's (1992) interpretation of political charisma 
was applicable to Milosevic, who in the late 1980s successfully combined the ideas of(Yugoslav) 
socialism and (Serbian) nationalism. Milosevic's success, Vujacic argues, lay in his ability to present 
himself as the epitome of the new nationalist revival, while at the same time maintaining the image of 
someone devoted to communist ideals. This rhetorical strategy enabled Milosevic to ride on the wave 
of popular nationalism while preserving the support of reactionary communist institutions such as the 
Army and the Party. 
3) This information is based on media monitoring analysis provided by the Belgrade-based Media 
Centre (http://www.mediacenter.org yu) 
4) However, Markovic countered this pessimistic view of Serbia's future with the assurance that 'The 
power-and-money hungry American empire will collapse like a house of cards, as every empire does in 
the end, because its foundations are rotten to the core'. 
5) The continuation of the belief in an international conspiracy was also reflected in the warning Vlajic 
gave his visitor from England about the dangers facing those who 'promote' his work in the Western 
world: 
'Be careful, because their blows are powerful, yet invisible. You are simply left at the bottom 
Marginalised. That is the worst kind of blow. Many competent Europeans, I know some of them, I co-
operated with some of them, they are staggering around Switzerland ... They are more knowledgeable than 
many of those who are well-known ... So you have to be skilfui...Let me tell you ... this Brotherhood of 
bankers, they don't care ... ' 
6) The list of enemies included 'Zionists (Jewish rasists )'- who are on other occasions also referred to 
as 'Judeo-Masonic murderers'; 'Ustashi' (a derogatory term denoting Croatian people in general); 
'Potutice' (a derogatory term for Slavic Muslims from Bosnia and the Serbian region of Sandzak); 
'Shiptari', i.e. the Albanians; 'Democrats' who are seen as 'impostors in the Serbian being', as well as 
pacifists ('false peacemakers'), members of religious sects, homosexuals ('perverts'), 'drug-addicts' 
and 'criminals'. This information was available on the Obraz webpage until late 2001, when the section 
Message to Serbia's enemies was taken off. It is highly likely that this was done following the negative 
publicity which antisemitic aspects of the ideology of Obraz attracted in the liberal media. 
7) Krstic in Racism defies Serbian democracy- violence grows despite change in leadership, San 
Francisco Chronicle, Aprill8, 2001). Interestingly, in this interview Krstic admitted that he voted for 
Kostunica, although he expressed some reservations concerning the more liberal wing of the Serbian 
opposition. 
8) This was partly because many Serbian conspiracy theorists harbour a deep-rooted suspicion towards 
the Internet. Many theorists, including Vlajic and Durdevic, see this Western invention (initially 
developed by the US military!) as a dangerous tool in the hands of conspirators. Unlike their younger 
counterparts, these 'old-fashioned' authors still rely mainly on the printed word. 
9) Also, before the fall ofMilosevic, members ofObraz and similar organisations were not engaged in 
the obstruction of meetings of organisations such as the Writer's Union, because their leaders were 
members of those same organisations. Nebojsa Krstic, for example, was himself a member of the 
Serbian Union of Writers, although his literary output hardly warrants membership in this elitist 
organisation. 
10) The enduring presence ofPavkovic is all the more remarkable bearing in mind his involvement in 
a number of fmancial scandals concerning the appropriation of Army-owned real estate in Belgrade, 
not to mention his at least indirect role in the war crimes committed in Kosovo at the time when the 
region was officially the responsibility of the Yugoslav Army. 
11) The world's media are accused of 'imposing values which appeal to the lowest human passions 
(surrogates of culture)' thus 'destroying the feelings of kindness and solidarity; contributing to the 
development of an egoistic, selfish and petit-bourgeois mentality; and raising the cult of material 
wealth to the level of the principal value; provoking national, religious and racial intolerance 
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accompanied by the loss of self-respect and self-confidence'. (p. 80-81 ). The power of the world's 
media is said to turn certain societies into a 'chaotic mass, which their government cannot control and 
direct towards the realisation of national interests' (p.81). 
12) This is the first occasion in Serbian military publications, or anywhere else in Serbian literature on 
the subject, that someone has mentioned 'neocortical war' and cited Richard Szafranski as the person 
who coined the term. Footnote in SaviC's article, which follows the reference to Szafranski, points to an 
1996 issue of the Translation Bulletin (lnformativni Bilten Prevoda), which presumably is a military 
publication containing a digest of foreign literature. It is however uncertain whether the Bulletin 
contained a full translation of Szafranski's article or just extracts. Either way, this does not undermine 
the argument put forward in the earlier chapters. The fact that most authors use Lukic 's article in Vojno 
De/o as the principal source on 'neocortical war' suggests that the translation printed in the Bulletin 
was not very well known and there is certainly no indication that Radisic used it in his work or even 
read it. 
13) A similar trend is visible in other texts. For instance in Alliance and the protection of the national 
interests of the FRY, which appeared in the same issue of Vojno Delo, Major General Milinko Stisovic 
recognises the need for Yugoslavia to enter 'international political organisations, economic and 
financial institutions, as well as collective defence systems'. However, at the same time he suggests 
that the security of FRY continues to be jeopardised by 'great centres of power, which in the battle for 
extra profit do not chose their means and methods for creating the so-called New World Order' (p.9). 
14) The book was initially available even from the more established booksellers (e.g. Stubovi Kulture, 
or Plato) which do not regularly stock antisernitic writing by the likes ofVIajic and Durdevic. 
Appendix A: Extracts from transcripts of recorded encounters with Spasoje Vlajic 
I) All the book titles (in italics) are by Vlajic himself. 
2) Serbian for George, pronounced 'Georgeh'. 
3) Mountain pass separating Kosovo from Macedonia. 
4) Serbian term for the flower 'iris'. 
5) Vlajic is comparing the 10 dinar note, which is illustrated with the pictures of the 19"' Century 
Montenegrin Bishop and ruler Petar Petrovic Njegos and the Cetinje Monastery, with the 10 (German) 
Mark note, which features pictures of the German mathematician Car! Fiedrich Gauss and a sextant. 
The comparison refers to the decision by the Montenegrin leadership to abandon the Dinar as legal 
tender in Montenegro, and adopt the German Mark. 
6) During the uprising of October 2000, I 0,000 protesters from the central Serbian city of Ca~ak were 
at the forefront to the anti-Milosevic demonstrations in Belgrade. Consequently, on this occasion, the 
reference to Ca~ak as a bastion of opposition activity is invoked as an illustration of the political views 
held by the 'cardiologist' who visited Vlajic. 
7) Radomir Nik~evic and Amfilohije Radovic are two Montenegrin religious figures. Radovic is the 
Bishop ofMonetengro, while Nikcevic is a priest in the Montenegrin city ofCetinje. 
8) The 'Prince' whom Vlajic is referring to is the 14"' Century Serbian ruler Lazar Hrebeljanovic who 
led the Serbian army into the Battle ofKosovo in 1389. Pavle Orlovic was one of the flag bearers 
during the battle ofKosovo, who features in Serbian folk stories and epic poetry. 
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